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Abstract 
The research evaluates the pattern of change in the field of employee representation in 
the UK as influenced by the transposition and implementation of the Directive 
2002/14/EC establishing a general framework for informing and consulting 
employees in the European Community and to relate this analysis to the impact of 
legislation in the field of labour law and industrial relations through the location of 
managerial and labour practice in implementing and handling the information and 
consultation arrangements. Theoretically, the thesis draws on the theory of reflexive 
law (Teubner, 1993; Barnard and Deakin, 2002) and on the capabilities approach 
(Sen, 1999), which has recently emerged in political economy. Empirically, it 
combines textual analysis, interviews with key actors, a questionnaire survey of 
companies and in-depth case studies in a few organizations in the business services 
and the financial sectors. The research aims to move beyond the traditional socio-legal 
concepts and methods to incorporate insights from the institutional and political 
economy frames of analysis commonly deployed in the field of industrial relations, 
and from its tradition of empirical enquiry rooted in field-based qualitative research 
methods. 
In diverging from existing UK social norms and conventions a new role for the two 
sides of industry, CBI and TUC, was created that assisted in the development of the 
national legislation transposing the directive and led to a re-conceptualization of the 
EU-level norms, as stipulated by the directive, concerning information and 
consultation of employees. Whilst the introduction of national legislation drove to 
some extent the spread of voluntary arrangements, albeit at the instigation of 
management, there was not much evidence that the `standard provisions' of the UK 
Regulations promoted institutional experimentation or to a new framework for a 
process of learning, participation and capabilities for voice. This was down to the 
nature of the legal obligations, the efficacy of the enforcement mechanisms and the 
degree to which extra-legal resources, mainly trade union organization, were utilized. 
11 
Chapter 1. Introduction: employee representation, reflexive law and the 
capabilities approach 
The thesis sets out to evaluate the pattern of change in the field of employee 
representation in the UK as influenced by the transposition and implementation of the 
Directive 2002/14/EC establishing a general framework for informing and consulting 
employees in the European Community' (ICED) and to relate this analysis to the 
impact of legislation in the field of labour law and industrial relations through the 
location of managerial and labour practice in implementing and handling the 
information and consultation arrangements. Informed by a reflexive law and 
capabilities approach theoretical framework and adopting a `double subsidiarity' 
analytical and methodological approach, the study is based on empirical evidence 
gathered through the conduct of qualitative and quantitative research regarding the 
transposition of the ICED in the UK, and its implementation by management and 
labour at organizational level. 
While in the great majority of the then EU countries at the time when the ICED was 
adopted, national legislation already met the requirements or needed only minor 
amendment (Broughton, 2005: 201), the transposition and implementation of the 
ICED in the UK and Ireland could have far reaching consequences for the way 
employers inform and consult employees over a wide range of issues. In more detail, 
the UK has been traditionally portrayed as having a distinctive voluntaristic ideology 
underpinning its unregulated collective bargaining (Dunlop, 1958, Kahn-Freund, 
1954). Within this context, worker representation was based on the so-called `single 
channel' model of representation though recognized unions2 and `joint consultative 
committees' (JCC)3 with the state supporting collective labour relations as its central 
regulatory method (Clark and Winchester, 1994: 714). As Barnard (2006: 65) notes, 
`the single channel model formed the centre-piece of the industrial pluralist model of 
worker representation which was informed by the idea of equality of arms and an 
acceptance of a conflictual relationship between employers and unions. ' The principle 
of `industrial autonomy' (Kahn-Freund, 1954: 44) explains hence the historical 
absence of legislatively mandated works councils in the enterprise. Instead, the 
continental works council system had `its British equivalent in the functions of the 
shop stewards', but `without - from the British point of view - the oppressively 
gigantic legal apparatus of the works council system. ' (Kahn-Freund, 1983: 8). 
1 Directive 2002/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2002 establishing a 
general framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community, OJ 23.3.2002 
L80/29. 
2 The single channel of representation had two characteristics: first, worker representation was not 
organized around a representation rule laid down in law but instead was based on a social practice of 
worker representation. Secondly, the recognized union had a monopoly on worker representation 
(Davies and Kilpatrick, 2004: 121). 
3 The notion of JCCs refers to `committees of managers and employees that are primarily concerned 
with consultation rather than negotiation' (Kersley et al., 2005: 126). 
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Starting in 1975 with the legislation on collective redundancies, a piecemeal 
development of statutory requirements for consultation with employee representatives 
on a range of issues, which reflected legislative developments at EU-level, was 
evidenced. Under the original statutory requirements concerning consultation in 
respect of impending redundancies4 and transfers of undertakings', introduced to 
transpose the relevant EU directives, the right to be consulted was confined to 
representatives of recognized trade unions. However, in Case C-383/92 Commission 
v. UK6 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the UK had failed to fulfil its 
obligations under articles 2 and 3 of Directive 75/129/EEC on collective redundancies 
by not providing a mechanism for the designation of workers' representatives in an 
undertaking where the employer refused to recognize a trade union. 7 The ECJ's 
decision led to the emergence of a `modified single channel' of employee 
representation (Davies, 1994: 279), in which worker representation is primarily 
conducted by recognized trade unions but, in the absence of union representation, 
workers can be represented by elected representatives who negotiate a `workforce 
agreement'. 8 Importantly, the transposition of the European Works Councils (EWCs) 
94/95/EC Directive9 in 1999 through the Transnational Information and Consultation 
of Employees Regulations (TICER)10 extended the range of issues on which 
employees have statutory information and consultation rights, including in key 
business, employment and restructuring issues. The Regulations provided, in effect, 
for the first time in Britain for the creation of a standing works council-type body, 
albeit of a transnational nature. 
In February 2002, the European Parliament and Council of Ministers formally 
adopted the ICED. Its stated purpose is `to establish a general framework setting out 
minimum requirements for the right to information and consultation of employees in 
undertakings or establishments within the European Community'. 11 The directive's 
4 75/129/EEC Directive providing information and consultation rights in the event of collective 
redundancies. The Directive was amended in 1992 by the 92/56/EC Directive, and both Directives were 
consolidated in the 98/59/EC Directive. 
5 Directive 77/187/EEC providing information and consultation rights in the event of transfer of 
undertakings. The Directive was amended by the 98/50/EC Directive, and both Directives were 
consolidated in the 2001/23/EC Directive. 
6 Case C-383/92 [1994] ECR 1-2435. 
A similar allegation was made by the Commission in Case C-383/92 Commission v UK [1994] ECR 
1-2479 in respect of Directive 77/187/EEC on transfers of undertakings. The ECJ reached a similar 
conclusion to that in the Case C-383/92. The ECJ rulings prompted also the introduction of the Health 
and Safety (Consultation with Employees) Regulations 1996, which require employers to consult 
employees who are not covered by safety representatives appointed by recognized unions under the 
Safety Representatives and Safety Committees Regulations 1977. 
S The `workforce agreement' solution was later used in the transposition of the EU Directives 
concerning statutory requirements in working time, maternity and parental leave, and fixed-term work. 
9 Directive 94/45/EC on the establishment of a European works council or a procedure in Community 
scale undertakings and Community-scale groups of undertakings for the purposes of informing and 
consulting employees. 
'o Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 1999. 
"Art1(1). 
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requirements apply, according to the choice made by member states, to: undertakings 
employing at least 50 employees in any one member state or establishments 
employing at least 20 employees in any one member state. 12 `Information' means 
transmission by the employer to the employees' representatives of data in order to 
enable them to acquaint themselves with the subject matter and to examine it and 
`consultation' means the exchange of views and establishment of dialogue between 
the employees' representatives and the employer. 13 The right to information and 
consultation covers: information on the recent and probable development of the 
undertaking's or the establishment's activities and economic situation; information and 
consultation on the situation, structure and probable development of employment 
within the undertaking and on any anticipatory measures envisaged, in particular 
where there is a threat to employment; and information and consultation with a view 
to reaching an agreement on decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work 
organization or in contractual relations. 14 Member states may entrust management and 
labour with defining the practical arrangements for information and consultation 
freely and at any time through negotiated agreements, including at undertaking or 
establishment level. 15 Such agreements, including those which predate the directive's 
transposition deadline, may establish provisions that differ from those in art 4 of the 
directive while respecting the principles set out in art 1.16 
The ICED represents an example of EU flexibility with regard to the form of the 
legislative instrument in two ways: first, in line with the notion of `framework 
directives', the ICED lays down certain core standards but the detail of their operation 
is left to be determined by the member states and/or the social partners, and, secondly, 
it sets minimum standards which member states are free to improve upon. 17 However, 
flexibility is not confined to the form of the legislative instrument. Increasing 
flexibility manifests itself within the ICED18 in the provision allowing member states 
more time to apply the national provisions implementing the ICED and in permitting 
the conclusion of ICE agreements with provisions that are different from those 
12 Art 3. 
13 Art 2 (f) and (g). 
14 Art 4. 
15 Art 5. 
16 According to Bercusson (2001: 209), the ICED requires a nine-stage process: `(1) transmission of 
information/data, (2) acquaintance with and examination of data, (3) conduct of an adequate study, (4) 
preparation for consultation, (5) formulation of an opinion, (6) meeting, (7) employer's reasoned 
response to opinion, (8) `exchange of views and establishment of dialogue', `discussion' with a view to 
reaching an agreement on decisions', and (9) `the employer and the employees' representatives shall 
work in a spirit of cooperation and with due regard for their reciprocal rights and obligations, taking 
into account the interests both of the undertaking or establishment and of the employees. ' 
" The Council Resolution on Certain Aspects for an EU Social Policy (1994) states: `minimum 
standards constitute an appropriate instrument for achieving economic and social convergence 
gradually while respecting the economic capabilities of the individual Member States. They also meet 
the expectations of workers in the EU and calm fears about social dismantling and social dumping in 
the Union. ' 
`8 Barnard (2000: 84) describes this type of flexibility as a form of `internal flexibility'. 
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referred to art. 4. The latter aspect of `internal flexibility' envisages simultaneously a 
greater role for the social partners. More specifically, the ICED provides that not only 
can the social partners transpose the directive, but according to art. 5 `member states 
may entrust management and labour at the appropriate level, including at undertaking 
or establishment level, with defining freely and at any time through negotiated 
agreement the practical arrangements for informing and consulting employees', 
providing thus a space in which the social partners can negotiate for improved 
standards and - contrary to the Continental legal tradition- for worse. 19 Hence, the 
ICED is based on a notion of subsidiarity at two levels, otherwise 'double' 
subsidiarity, i. e. at first level it requires transposition into national law and at second 
level precedence is given to arrangements negotiated by the parties (Blanke, 1999; 
Marginson and Sisson, 2004: 291). 
The consequence of the incorporation of the `double subsidiarity' mechanism in the 
exercise of the ICE rights, as stipulated in the ICED, is as Bercusson (1994) has noted 
`bargaining in the shadow of the law'. Aimed at regulating the area of employee 
representation, the ICED combines in effect, at the upper level, i. e. at European level, 
some general substantive ICE rules with rules of procedure which entrusts the detailed 
contents of the regulation to decentralized levels, agreed through negotiated and/or 
participative arrangements by management and labour (Chouraqui, 2003). The default 
procedure becomes applicable only when the negotiations at lower level fail or the 
employer fails to act in response to the employee request for the 
establishment/amendment of ICE arrangements. Within this context, the ICED moves 
also beyond the previous EU legislative approach of stipulating national-level ICE 
rights in ad hoc cases, e. g. collective redundancies, transfers of undertakings and 
health and safety. Hence its regulatory aim is not simply to impose mandatory 
restrictions on employers but to use this as a means to encourage management and 
labour to develop local-level solutions and to put into the centre of on-going social 
dialogue an expanded list of organizational issues including, among others, the 
representation and participation of employees in the management and anticipation of 
change (Commission, 2001: 20, Salais, 2000). In that way, it shifts the focus of the 
existing procedures from dealing with situations of crisis to offering an on-going and 
permanent means for integrating employee interests in organizational decision- 
making. 
The ICED was transposed into UK law by the UK Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations 200420 (ICER) and will apply to almost all organizations with 
at least 50 employees by April 2008.21 An outline scheme was agreed between the 
19 This is an example of `controlled' or `negotiated flexibility' (Barnard, 2006). This is also described as 
`centrally-coordinated' regulation by Ferner and Hyman (1998: xvi). 
20 Statutory instrument 2004 No. 3426. The Information and Consultation Regulations 2004. 
21 Reg 3, sch 1. 
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Government, the CBI and the TUC that provided the broad basis for delineating the 
statutory requirements for employee participation (DTI, 2003a). In avoiding a `copy- 
out' approach to the transposition of the ICED, the ICER provide a set of innovative 
provisions regarding the exercise of ICE rights. The key word associated with the 
ICER is `flexibility'. In rejecting a `one size fits all' approach, the Regulations allow 
employers, trade unions and employees considerable flexibility of response, both 
procedurally and substantively (Hall, 2006). The most important elements of the 
Regulations are: the stipulation that employers need not act unless 10% of their 
employees trigger statutory procedures intended to lead to negotiated agreements; 22 
the possibility for effectively pre-empting the use of the Regulations' procedures 
through the conclusion of voluntary, pre-existing agreements (PEAs), which can vary 
the nature of ICE arrangements that will apply; 23 and, finally, the possibility for 
providing direct forms of information and consultation in the cases of PEAs and 
negotiated agreements rather than informing and consulting indirectly through 
employee representatives. 24 In line with the ICED, the standard provisions become 
applicable only as a fallback in situations where the employer is obliged to initiate 
negotiations, but fails to do so, or where a negotiated agreement is not reached within 
the stipulated time period. 25 But even in the case of the standard provisions, the 
Regulations do not specify the establishment of a representative body as such, in other 
words a committee or council, nor the frequency of meetings or facilities for 
representatives (Hall, 2005). 
The legislative change introduced by the ICED in the UK took place against a 
background of the decline of multi-employer, sectoral bargaining, which accelerated 
rapidly in the mid-1980s (Brown et al., 2000: 614-616), declining trade union 
membership and influence, and decrease in the incidence of JCCs. The recent 
Workplace Employment Research Survey (WERS) 2004 findings indicated that only 
34 per cent of all employees in workplaces with 10 or more employees were union 
members and 64 per cent of workplaces had no union members. Union members 
made up a majority of the workforce in only 18 per cent of all workplaces in the 
survey (Kersley et al., 2006). 26 42 per cent of all employees were in a workplace with 
a workplace-level JCC, compared with 46 per cent in 1998. The decline in site- 
specific JCCs was concentrated among smaller workplaces and within workplaces 
22 Reg 7. 
23 Reg 8. 
24 Regs 8 (1) and 16 respectively. 
25 Reg 19 (1). 
26 The Labour Force Survey (LFS) 2006 further found that the rate of union membership (union 
density) for employees in the UK fell by 0.6 percentage points to 28.4 per cent in 2006, down from 
29.0 per cent in 2005 . This was the 
largest annual percentage point decline since 1998. Just one in six 
(16.6 per cent) private sector employees in the United Kingdom were union members in 2006 - down 
from 17.2 per cent in 2005. Collective agreements covered less than one in five (19.6 per cent) private 
sector employees. Almost three in every five (58.8 per cent) public sector employees in the United 
Kingdom were union members in 2006. Collective agreement coverage for the public sector was 69.0 
per cent, more than three times that of coverage in the private sector (Grainger and Crowther, 2007). 
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that did not recognize trade unions, where the incidence of workplace-level JCCs fell 
from 14% in 1998 to 8% in 2004. The proportion of employees covered by any form 
of consultative arrangement also declined, from 46% to 42%. Alongside a further 
decline in union representation a `growing heterogeneity of representational forms 
within British workplaces' came that include non-union structures and hybrid 
arrangements combining both union and non-union representation (Charlwood and 
Terry, 2007: 325). WERS 2004 found a shift in the mix of channels through which 
consultative voice is exercised, with a decline in the proportion of workplaces with a 
JCC or covered by a committee at a higher level in multi-site organizations, and an 
increase in the already high proportion of workplaces utilizing one or more forms of 
direct, two-way forms of employee involvement. 
In contrast to continental business-coordinated economies, organized business is weak 
and plays a limited role in coordinating the institutional framework in the UK 
(Soskice, 1999; Hall, 1999). Instead, a rather unmediated interplay of market forces 
on the one side and external governmental regulation on the other side takes place. 
Within the context of a deregulated labour market, the UK industrial relations systems 
lacks arguably a `social partnership' approach and effective employee representation 
at subnational levels is rather discouraged, especially in non-union organizations. 
Reflecting a liberal market economy, strong rights of employee consultation and 
representation in decision-making in the company are perceived as incompatible with 
the notion that a company's directors are solely accountable to their shareholders, not 
the employees, for the decisions they make (Deakin and Njoya, 2007: 20). Employers 
and trade unions have given distribution more importance than integration (Coats, 
2004) and collective bargaining is mainly confined to wages, hours and terms and 
conditions of employment. As Edwards (2007: 39) notes, reflecting the assumption in 
the UK industrial relations system that the parties engage each other at arms' length, 
the mechanisms to support workplace justice have been relatively weak and an 
approach in terms of basic compliance, rather than using the law as a basis for 
improvement has been favoured. As a result, the `institutional logic'27 revolves 
around adversarialism, voluntarism and autonomy of industrial relations and 
collective bargaining from state intervention and external regulation. In recent years, 
the concept of partnership, which is directed at committing the partners, i. e. 
employers, management, employees and, where recognized, trade unions, to working 
together has been adopted by part of the British trade union movement and then by 
government and some employers (Terry, 2003). Trade union enthusiasm for 
partnership has largely been based on the proviso that unions are involved. However, 
this view has not been fully shared by the government, and even less so by employers 
(Hall et al., 2002: 27). 
27 According to Scott, (2001: 139) institutional logics refer to the belief systems and related practices 
that predominate in an organizational field. 
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Against this background, the 2002/14/EC Directive with its emphasis on the 
development of consultation and on-going dialogue between management and labour, 
which stems from both the regulatory mode that adopts and the European vocabulary 
on collective relationships more generally (Terry, 2003)28 represents a marked change 
in employee representation policy for the British system of industrial relations. 
Simultaneously, it extends legal regulatory norms into areas of the employment 
relationship, which were until hitherto largely a matter for voluntary determination. It 
is within this context that the thesis attempts to make a contribution to scholarship by 
firstly providing an original empirical study of the pattern of change in the field of 
employee representation in the UK, as influenced by the transposition and 
implementation of the ICED. The thesis also aims to contribute to learning by relating 
the empirical findings of the research to a theoretical framework that draws on the 
reflexive law theory and the capability approach. It is suggested that the adoption of a 
`general framework' by the directive results in a number of provisions that have 
reflexive characteristics both in terms of its transposition and of its implementation. 
At the same time, the emphasis of the EU legislative instrument on the importance of 
deliberative and participative structures through the establishment of on-going 
employee representation structures has strong parallels with the capability approach, 
as developed by Amartya Sen (1999). Informed by these two theoretical approaches 
and based on the substantive results from the transposition and implementation of the 
directive in the UK, the thesis assesses the extent to which proceduralized or reflexive 
mechanisms established by law can play a role in implementing, at a micro level, the 
objectives of a rights-based agenda that is in line with the capability approach. 
Bearing in mind that it is not possible to presuppose a specific mode of evaluation, 
since in line with the reflexive law theory and the capability approach the systems 
generate their own modes of evaluation, the principal issues that are explored in the 
study are: 
" The fate of the voluntarist elements of the ICED in the multi-level system as 
utilized by the UK government, the social actors at national level and lastly, 
management and labour at organizational level 
" The extent, if any, to which the establishment and operation of employee 
consultation arrangements at organizational level, as influenced by the 
institutional design of the legislation, can promote the development of a 
learning process of participation and of developing capabilities for voice. 29 
28 With reference to the EC proposal on the ICED Wedderburn (1997: 11) also argued that `voluntary 
`information and deliberation' may become a substitute for legally mandated power-sharing, and 
governance by consultation now seems to be the preferred model' where the Community is unable to 
sustain co-determination rights. ' 
29 The capability for voice is concerned in the socio-economic context with the integration of employee 
interests in the organization. `Integration' implies the incorporation of employee voice directly into the 
decision-making structures of the firm (Deakin and Njoya, 2007). 
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The next section of the chapter provides an exposition of the theoretical framework of 
reflexive regulation and the capabilities approach. This provides an indication of how 
the transposition and implementation of the ICED relates to the suggested theoretical 
framework. The final section provides an outline of the structure of thesis. 
1.1 Theoretical framework of the thesis 
As a result of the ICED's multi-dimensional potential implications for different 
systems at various levels the study - located in a multi-disciplinary field, i. e. 
industrial relations - refines its conceptual tools by attempting to bridge disciplinary 
divisions. Hence, in order to provide an assessment of the institutional responses to 
changes concerning EU labour law norms on ICE rights the use of the reflexive law 
theory, which assists in sensitizing us to the need to cope with the dual autonomy - 
that of law and of the other social systems - is adopted. At the same time, the 
capability approach (CA), which is more attuned to empirical research at subnational 
level, helps in introducing a stronger substantive element in the study. Based on a 
perspective which links the social communication and interaction processes within 
ICE arrangements with an analysis of the structural framework conditions into which 
the internal interaction processes are embedded - those set by the legal and industrial 
relations systems - an integrated approach to the examination of the impact of the 
ICED is adopted. A pragmatic-eclectic combination of theories is utilized as the 
conceptual basis for such an approach, which aims to combine the analytical strengths 
of different disciplinary traditions, rather than viewing them mutually exclusive. 
1.1.1. Reflexive law 
Reflexive law (RL) theory represents an attempt to move beyond a straightforward 
dichotomy between `instrumentalist' theories of regulation and `deregulatory' theories 
that suggest the removal of all external regulatory controls (Teubner, 1993; Rogowski 
and Wilthagen, 1994). Its central tenet is that `traditional' regulatory interventions, 
consisting of top-down uniform rules backed by sanctions, which seek to directly 
prescribe or impose particular substantive standards, will fail to achieve their 
objectives because of the nature of the interaction between the legal system and other 
systems, such as the economic, the political and the industrial relations system. 
Within the modern welfare state, Teubner (1983: 268) claims that `social processes 
and economic arrangements are simply too dense, complex and potentially 
contradictory to be adequately accounted for in the kinds of interventionist control 
mechanisms that have been created'. As a consequence of the functional 
differentiation of systems within society, a regulatory trilemma might emerge: law 
may be irrelevant to the other systems and of no effect; through the legalization of the 
regulated field law may damage the other systems through inhibiting their capacity for 
self-reproduction; the self-reproductive capacity of the legal system may be damaged 
through the `politicization of law' (Rogowski, 1994: 16; Teubner, 1993: 19-27). 
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Commenting on EU developments, Supiot (2003) remarks on a shift in the form of 
legal governance: `the law is relinquishing the job of establishing substantive rules, 
but is instead concentrating on affirming principles and laying down procedures. 30 
Teubner identifies this as RL, which is the solution that he offered to the regulatory 
trilemna. In essence, Teubner suggests that the solution to the regulatory trilemna lies 
in adopting a reflexive regulatory strategy which will aim to induce actions in the 
social systems rather than command them. Hence, the concept of RL is both positive 
and normative. In its positive sense, RL analyzes the mechanisms through which the 
legal system relates to other systems, including the industrial relations system. In its 
normative sense, it can be seen as promoting a multi-level approach to governance 
which depends for its effectiveness on decentralized forms of deliberation (Barnard et 
al., 2005: 206-207). 
In more detail, RL theory puts the emphasis on an approach of law which is flexible, 
strategic and contextual (Black, 1996: 51). Its central proposition is that rather than 
imposing mandatory substantive legal standards law should devolve rule-making 
powers by adopting a procedural orientation that encourages and structures processes 
of self-regulation. In that way, `law searches for `regulated autonomy' : it seeks to 
design self-regulating social systems through norms of organisation and procedure' 
(Teubner, 1993: 254). RL shares with substantive law the notion that focused 
intervention in social processes is within the domain of the law but it retreats from 
taking full responsibility for substantive outcomes; in becoming reflexive the form of 
legal regulation changes from substantive to procedural law. Therefore, a strategy of 
reflexive legal intervention requires the proceduralization of regulation. In this vein, 
law operates as an `external constitution' which can promote discursive decision 
making processes and consensus-oriented procedures of negotiation and decision 
(Teubner, 1983: 275), the objective being to structure decision processes and create 
the conditions for responsiveness without trying to control the substantive outcome of 
any decision (Black, 1996: 46). However, the adoption of a reflexive legal strategy 
necessitates not only a retreat from substantive to procedural regulation, but also the 
adaptation of the form of the regulatory instrument to the specific self-steering, or 
self-regulatory, mechanisms of the field that it seeks to regulate. Teubner (1992: 
30 Marginson and Sisson (2004: 87) suggest: `[f]ive main types of EU regulation may be identified, 
whose relative importance has changed over time. The first, `hard' regulation, takes the form of `one- 
size-fits-all' legislation such as the `daughter' directives dealing with specific aspects of health and 
safety, and is reserved for the earlier period. The second type combines a `hard' and `soft' dimension. 
Examples include the European Works Council Directive (EWCD) and the Working Time Directive 
(WTD), both of which allow flexibility in implementation through collective agreements... With the 
third type, `framework agreements', the balance shifts further in the direction of `softness'. 
`Framework agreements' establish a broad principle whose purpose is to incite negotiations and/or 
legislation at national and/or lower level... the 2002 telework agreement is an example. The fourth 
category is softer still, and comprises the `joint declarations' and `joint opinions'... these are at best 
advisory and implementation is not addressed. The fifth type is also softer... but represents a different 
point of departure. It takes the form of the `open method of coordination' (OMC) of the EU's 
employment strategy... ' 
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1460) advocates that `the idea is to make law `responsive' toward society by 
transforming social self-production processes into sources of law production'. 
Consequently, reflexive law exhibits elements of both substantive and procedural 
responsiveness: `it is substantively responsive in that it allows for substantive 
standards to be determined through self-regulatory processes and it is procedurally 
responsive in that the procedural framework that it lays out should reflect the 
processes and operations of the regulated arena' (Hobbs, 2005). 
Within the EU context, the notion of `reflexive harmonization' is suggested as an 
alternative to the dilemma between regulation from the centre or regulatory 
competition between EU Member States. Barnard and Deakin (2002: 220) argue: 
`Reflexive harmonisation operates to induce individual states to enter into a `race 
to the top' when they would have otherwise had an incentive to do nothing (the 
`reverse free rider effect') or to compete on the basis of the withdrawal of 
protective standards (the `race to the bottom'). This is done by giving states a 
number of options for implementation as well as by allowing for the possibility 
that existing, self-regulatory mechanisms can be used to comply with EU-wide 
standards. In these ways, far from suppressing regulatory innovation, 
harmonization aims to stimulate it. '31 
Regulatory learning through providing space for engagement, experimentation and 
standard-setting at national and sub-national level through granting collective actors 
the power to negotiate their own local agreements to meet the aims of EU policy, 
rather than promoting regulatory competition as an end in itself, becomes the 
objective (Barnard et al, 2001: 478). 32 In establishing mechanisms that have the 
potential to help actors to internalize certain imperatives, previously externally 
imposed, law encourages them to reflect over selected considerations and to redefine 
at the same time their interests through a process of collective learning and discovery 
(De Schutter and Deakin, 2005). As a result of this process of learning and the 
installation of discursive decision-making procedures, aside from the legal norms that 
31 In accounting for the emergence of `soft' regulation at EU level, Sisson and Marginson (2001) also 
relate the concept of `regulated autonomy' - as developed in the area of industrial relations - with the 
theory of reflexive regulation. In the context of private law, Teubner (1998: 31) has also argued for `a 
new interpretation of the subsidiarity principle, understood no longer in terms of political 
decentralization, but rather of respect for the autonomy of social, economic, and cultural sectors, 
devolution of rulemaking powers to social groups, and a reinterpretation of conflicts of law no longer 
in terms of national laws but of different production regimes. ' 
32 In their `democratic experimentalist' regulatory proposals Dorf and Sabel (1998) stressed the 
importance of local experiments in the development of responses to social problems, which, when 
monitored and evaluated by a higher-level agency, yield a dynamic learning process that generates 
ongoing improvements in regulatory norms and mechanisms. However, as Deakin (2007) argues, `the 
deliberative polyarchy approach is silent on the role that minimum standards might play in shaping the 
process of transnational integration' (2007: 8) and `... sees the EU as simply one case amid a larger set 
of emerging governance forms to be found at national, regional and global levels' (2007: 10). 
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come into play, the development of a culture of on-going problem solution and of 
constant re-negotiation of norms and values between the social actors is promoted 
(Sisson and Marginson, 2001). 
The starting point for emphasizing the need for procedural regulation to adapt 
simultaneously to the self-regulatory mechanism of the field that it seeks to regulate is 
the so-called `autopoietic' nature of the social systems. 33 In essence, autopoiesis 
focuses on the analysis of the operation of horizontal social sub-systems, which are 
deemed as self-generating, self-reproductive and self-regulating, and their 
relationships with each other and with the general social environment. According to 
autopoiesis, sub-systems, such as the economic, political, religious and scientific, 
create their own internal norms and discourses and as such they are differentiated 
from one another by their specialized communicative characteristics. Each of the sub- 
systems is autonomous and is tied to its own specific binary code, e. g. payment/non 
payment (economic system), and governance/opposition (political system). In order to 
maintain their distinctive communicative elements, self-referential or autopoietic 
systems are characterized by organized processes of action and communication and 
are considered operationally closed. In this context, the legal system is also viewed as 
`a closed autopoietic system operating in a world of closed autopoietic systems'. Its 
self-referential closure is found in the circular relation between legal decisions and 
normative rules: decisions refer to rules and rules to decisions and it is distinguished 
by the binary code of legal/illegal. The validity of legal norms is thus based solely on 
legal norms and is not dependent on the external norms of politics, economy or 
industrial relations. The industrial relations system is also viewed as a `fully-fledged 
function system' whose role is to manage conflicts and provide channels for peaceful 
interactions between collective actors (Rogowski, 2000: 120) and its binary code is 
negotiable/non-negotiable. Structures and procedures for negotiation ensure the 
reflexivity of the system and its independence from other social systems. In this 
context, collective actors take up a particular institutional role inside the industrial 
relations and legal systems through the attribution to them of a specific identity by the 
respective systems. 
While the specialized communicative characteristics create the autonomy of each 
system with regard to other social systems, they do not isolate the latter from their 
environment and from other systems. Teubner (1993: 86) suggests that autopoietic 
systems are operatively closed but cognitively open in that they can observe their 
environment and other sub-systems. The combination of cognitive openness and 
33 Autopoiesis is a term developed initially in biological sciences and is derived from Greek words, 
meaning auto (self)-creation" (from the Greek: auto - auzö for self- and poiesis - iroI nS for creation or 
production). While Teubner's approach is premised on Luhmann's theory of autopoiesis, Luhmann's 
theory lies beyond the scope of this thesis. In the present context only those elements which are most 
immediately relevant, namely the fragmentation of society into differentiated functional systems and 
sub-systems and the nature of these systems, will be emphasized. 
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operative closure thus achieves a situation whereby systems communicate internally 
about their environment, or about communications deriving from other systems, but 
they do not communicate directly with their environment or with other systems 
(Hobbs, 2005). However, Teubner posits that there is still a possibility of real 
communicative contact between autopoietic social systems. The reason for this is that 
autopoietic systems use the same basic stuff, `meaning', they develop their systems on 
the basis of communications and the forms of their specialized communication are 
always forms of general societal communications. Yet, he further suggests that as a 
result of the operative closure of autopoietic systems `the system can only deal with 
its own internal construct of the environment' (Teubner, 1993: 74); hence the 
influence from one system on another can only be understood by the latter through a 
translation in the proper language of that system. 
The autonomy emanating from the self-referentiality of autopoietic systems has 
negative repercussions for attempts at direct legal intervention through command and 
control regulation. According to Teubner (1993: 75), `it is not legislation which 
creates order in the social subsystems. It is the subsystems themselves which deal 
selectively with legislation and arbitrarily use it, to construct their own order'. In the 
industrial relations system, for instance, only industrial relations norms, and not legal 
norms, are recognized as valid and law cannot thus simply instruct the industrial 
relations system to act in the way that law demands. Legal norms are merely external 
noise, which the industrial relations system will reconstruct in accordance with its 
own rationality of efficiency and fairness (Cooney et al., 2002). 34 The self-steering 
and self-referential communications of the system may also lead to the emergence of 
the regulatory trilemna, as described above. 
Despite the fact that `law is a closed autopoietic system operating in a world of closed 
autopoietic systems' (Teubner, 1993: 97), social regulation through law can be 
attained to a certain extent. Teubner suggests that this can be achieved when law 
becomes reflexive in the sense of recognizing that legal intervention is dependent on 
the self-production and self-steering mechanisms of the other systems and of 
encouraging other systems as well to consider their closure (Paterson, 2000: 65). In 
that way, RL initiates the so-called process of structural coupling, i. e. the process by 
which the legal system triggers the self-regulatory mechanisms of itself and another 
system so that the two run in parallel in a process of co-evolution (Black, 1996). The 
34 It is important to add here that although it is theoretically possible for each social system to 
reconstruct every other system according to its own procedures and to attribute its own meaning to that 
system, the relationship between social systems is not necessarily one of equality. Instead, insisting on 
the existence, albeit in a different form, of the concept of power in autopoiesis, King (1993: 231) 
suggests that those systems which are widely accepted as defining meanings for the whole of society, 
e. g. economics, politics, science and law in post-industrial Western societies, are in a much more 
powerful position that others. In this sense, it is hence possible to speak of `the enslavement' of the 
knowledge of one meaning system by another (Teubner, 1989: 749) that may arise in situations when 
certain systems have acquired a more powerful position that others. 
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possibility of structural coupling comes about from the mechanisms of interference 
operating between systems and the `overlapping of events, structures and processes 
within and outside the law' (Teubner, 1993: 65). The objective is to not only to 
`guarantee social autonomy in the area of substantive rule-making' (1993: 97) but also 
to `foster mechanisms that systematically further the development of reflexion 
structures within other social sub systems (Teubner, 1983: 275, emphasis in original). 
Hence, RL is `regulation through decentralized mechanisms of self-regulation... 
[where]... the law of the state regulates only the contextual conditions' (Teubner, 
1993: 67). 
In adopting a regulatory approach that is based on a combination of a hard and soft 
regulatory dimension (Sisson and Marginson, 2001), i. e. legally binding framework 
with a regime for its implementation via decentralized experimentation by 
management and labour at national and organizational level, the ICED represents an 
example of the current regulatory hybridity in the area of EU governance. Its form can 
be seen as an example of reflexive harmonization in that it is partly the outcome of 
recognition on the part of EU lawmakers that the self-production processes of the 
national industrial relations systems should be employed to achieve substantive 
standards of protection. Barnard et al. (2004) emphasize that the success of reflexive 
law and regulation strategy depends on its capacity to engender responses of a certain 
kind within the relevant sub-systems. From a socio-legal point of view, what is 
important is to confront the images of changes and developments in the legislation 
with regulatory practice and `law-in-action' and assess how institutional responses to 
changes in the environment of EU labour law are formulated in other social systems. 
It is important to stress here that a crucial aspect of reflexive regulation is that rather 
than simply attempting to delegate rule making authority to self-regulatory 
mechanisms, such as collective bargaining, it uses legal norms to `frame' or `steer' the 
process of self-regulation (Barnard et al., 2004). The `general framework' that the 
ICED follows together with the minimum standards set in the standard provisions can 
be seen as providing a `frame' to steer rather than command the EU Member States 
and industrial relations actors at national and sub-national level (Hobbs and Njoya, 
2005). But, in contrast to the more elaborate frame in the case, for example, of the 
WTD, 35 where a number of elements, such as the default rules and the procedural 
conditions attached to the derogations stipulated (Barnard et al., 2004: 5), meant that 
its implementation was not entirely left to spontaneous forces (De Schutter and 
Deakin, 2005), this is not evident to the same extent in the ICED. Whilst there is an 
element of control of the substantive outcome through the establishment of a default 
procedure for the exercise of ICE rights and the latter have been recognized in the EU 
35 93/104/EC Directive concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time. 
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Charter of Fundamental Rights (art 27)36 there is still considerable scope for 
flexibility both at national and enterprise-level in respect of the practical arrangements 
for the introduction and operation of ICE mechanisms. 
As Barnard and Deakin (2000: 344) note, the use of RL in EU social policy has its 
limitations if used in isolation. One of the major criticisms leveled against RL theory 
is the presumption that the collective actors involved are able and even willing to 
participate in a process of social dialogue. More specifically, Chouraqui (2003) notes 
that while the development of arrangements for employee representation is at the core 
of the EU regulatory techniques that are based on the recognition of the `regulated 
autonomy' of the systems, challenges exist `when some of the partners are too weak, 
when the balance of power in co-producing rules is too unbalanced or when the 
process of learning their new regulators' roles takes too long. ' Furthermore, De 
Schutter and Deakin (2005) suggest that the emphasis of RL in self-regulation within 
subsystems raises the question `of which safeguards need to be imposed-not 
excluding the imposition from above of substantive standards-to limit the risk of 
abuse in power relationships. ' In light of these criticisms, the relevance of the 
capability approach will be explored in the thesis. The use of the RL theory is a 
potential problem in this regard. But even as Teubner (1993: 67) has stated: 
`substantive legal norms remain indispensable. It is only that the process of their 
production and justification has to give way to a socially adequate proceduralization. ' 
In this context, a capability-based approach assists through emphasizing the 
importance of substantive social rights in providing a stronger framework for the 
institutional frame of EU social policy initiatives. For that reason, it is believed that 
the relationship between RL and the CA can be fruitfully explored, at least for the 
purposes of the thesis. 
1.1.2 The CA 
A substantive recalibration of the content of labour rights has accompanied the shift in 
the regulatory form of EU law. As Fudge (2007: 37) notes, `social rights have 
conventionally been understood as claims to resources in the form of income, services 
or employment. Their role was distributive, and they conflicted with the logic of the 
market, and, to a certain extent, with civil rights. ' Based on the idea of a more 
dynamic notion of equality that focuses on capabilities the work of the economist and 
philosopher Amartya Sen (1999) has come in recent years to prominence as an 
alternative substantive basis for labour rights for the EU. 37 In asserting that different 
36 Article 27 reads: `Workers or their representatives must, at the appropriate levels, be guaranteed 
information and consultation in good time in the cases and under the conditions provided for by 
Community law and national laws and practices. ' 
37 In endorsing the significant role of institutional frameworks in social and economic activity at EU 
level, the group of experts in the Supiot report (1999) advocated an update of the traditional social 
regulations to include new actors and the encouragement of greater collaboration in the workplace via 
the support of an appropriate legal framework. The underlying basis for the promotion of this renewed 
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people and societies usually differ in their capacity to convert resources and 
commodities into valuable achievements, the CA advocates that in evaluating the 
well-being of different people, it is not sufficient to look only at the commodities or 
resources each person can successfully command; the capability of individuals to 
achieve a range of functionings with the commodity or resource has to be considered 
as well (Sen, 1999). 
In Development as Freedom, Sen (1999: 75) offers this set of definitions: `the concept 
of `functionings', which had distinctly Aristotelian roots, reflects the various things a 
person may value doing or being. The valued functionings may vary from elementary 
ones, such as being adequately nourished and being free from avoidable disease, to 
very complex activities or personal states, such as being able to take part in the life of 
the community and having self-respect. A person's capability refers to the alternative 
combinations of functionings that are feasible for her to achieve. Capability is a kind 
of freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations'. 
In considering the conversion of resources or commodities into capabilities so as to 
achieve a given functioning (doing or being), the CA identifies a range of `conversion 
factors' that are necessary for capabilities to come into existence. These are described 
as the characteristics of an individual's person, their society and their environment 
which together determine their capability to achieve a given range of functionings. 
Vital, therefore, to Sen's CA is the idea of conversion factors that operate at multiple 
levels. 
In the context of the institutional dimension of capabilities, Browne et al. (2002) 
suggest that social norms, legal rules and public policies are crucial, since they may 
affect the achievement of a given range of functioning by individuals. Linking Sen's 
economic notion of capabilities with the juridical concept of social rights the attention 
is hence re-directed into `how social rights can be used to shape the institutional 
environment in such a way as to enable all individuals to convert endowments in the 
form of human and physical assets into positive outcomes and thereby achieve a 
higher level of economic functioning' (Browne et al., 2004: 2 10). Hence, social rights 
operate as conversion factors that seek to enhance the real choices of individuals. 
Browne et al. (2004: 211) also suggest that `the procedural orientation of social law, 
evident in the EU with the OMC and in the constitutional recognition of freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, forms a bridge to the idea of social choice 
procedure of the kind which Sen sees as providing the most appropriate basis for the 
achievement of equality of capability'. In this vein, a two-type conceptualization of 
social rights is advocated: firstly, social rights as claims to resources, such as social 
security payments, and, secondly, social rights as rights to take part in forms of 
conceptual framework for the role of social policy not only at EU but also at national level was 
significantly based on the CA. See also Handler, (2004); Salais and Villeneuve (2004); Brown, Deakin 
and Wilkinson, (2002) and Deakin and Wilkinson (2005). 
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procedural or institutionalized interactions, such as those arising out of collective 
bargaining. The first category of social rights can be seen as claims to commodities 
that can be converted by individuals into functionings, such as sick and maternity pay. 
The second category of social rights acts as `social conversion factors', that is, social 
or institutional settings which shape the set of possibilities open to individuals in 
terms of achieving their goals (Browne et al., 2004: 212-213). 
It is important to emphasize here that capabilities require that collective structures will 
be available. In the view of CA proponents, the development of capabilities should 
not regarded in general as an individual affair and that even though Sen's work is 
primarily focused on individual capability, individual capability - even in Sen's 
meaning - cannot be operative, nor effective without due and adequate support by 
collective resources, rights, institutions, systems of governance; thus, the `conversion 
factors' by which capabilities are enhanced should be primarily collective in nature 
(Deakin and Wilkinson, 2000). 38 In that way, the CA contrasts substantially with 
standard economic approaches to labour market regulation that rely on the idea of the 
self-equilibrating or self-regulatory market and the logic of social rights as capabilities 
rather than being contradictory to market processes constitutes the precondition of a 
functioning market order. Simultaneously, through providing a framework for 
locating social rights within a market setting it is advocated that a capabilities-inspired 
approach manages to transcend the conceptualization by T. H. Marshall of social rights 
as operating in tension with market relations (Browne et al, 2004). 
While the CA provides an essential step in a particular way of thinking about social 
rights with respect to market processes, Sen refuses to draw a definite list of specific 
valuable functionings and points to the necessity to contextualize the selection of 
valuable functionings (Sen, 1999). The efficiency of the systems is thus assessed, as 
Deakin and Wilkinson (2005: 352) suggest, through a context-dependent process of 
social learning, rather than being theoretically or dogmatically asserted: `[the 
capabilities approach] encourages and enables a debate over the precise meaning of 
`capabilities' in different circumstances, thus enabling a reflexive approach to the 
content of social rights in different circumstances, including in different economic and 
social situations' (emphasis added). Similar to the RL theory, the CA comes hence 
into sharp contrast with top-down approaches to regulation and identifies two main 
drawbacks of `command and control' regulatory approaches: firstly they locate the 
whole decision-making power exclusively in the central government and secondly 
they shape cognitively the whole policy process in imposing a particular substantive 
economic programme or policy model, thereby forbidding the very possibility of 
reflexive law (Bonvin and Thelen, 2003: 8). 1 
38 See also Supiot (1999: 268). 
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In rejecting a top-down approach to policy-making, the CA puts into the centre of 
regulation design the setting-up of the so-called `situated public action' at national 
and EU level, i. e. a public action located within established negotiation and decision- 
making of local actors, in territories, trades, networks or firms (Storper and Salais, 
1997). In requiring that both types of regulation - central and decentralized - should 
collaborate to enhance peoples' real freedoms, regulation should be a combination of 
a `controlling regulation', designed by a central body, and an `autonomous 
regulation', i. e. the situated interpretation of the rule set by the centre (Reynaud, 
1989). In stressing the value of experimentalist and learning-based approaches to the 
realization of substantive economic freedoms, the CA intersects with the RL theory. 
This is not to suggest that RL is inevitably associated with the CA, or vice versa; 
simply that a reflexive orientation to law and regulation is one means, and perhaps a 
principal means, by which the CA might be operationalized in legal institutional terms 
(Deakin and Koukiadaki, 2007). 
For Bonvin and Thelen (2003: 3), the emphasis that the CA puts on participation and 
deliberation in implementing effective freedom involves the development of a 
particular kind of capability, capability for voice, which they define as `the ability to 
express one's opinions and thoughts and to make them count in the course of public 
discussion'. In emphasising the combination of process, i. e. valuable functionings 
defined through collective deliberation including all members of the group, and 
opportunity, i. e. necessary capabilities to achieve these functionings are made 
available to each and every member of society, they offer a way to resolve the 
criticism that the emergence of reflexive law by itself does not guarantee that the 
individual's whole capability set will be improved (Bonvin and Thelen, 2003: 4). 
Inspired by the CA, De Munch and Ferreras (2004) further attempt to establish the 
link between collective deliberation and collective rights in the socio-economic sphere 
and suggest that second-generation collective rights, such as the right to strike, trade 
union representation and collective bargaining are the democratic means for opening 
up a public space of deliberation and citizenship at socio-economic level. This 
conceptualization of collective rights, they argue, may constitute simultaneously, an 
adequate response to the longstanding challenge of industrial democracy. In contrast 
to the theory of industrial democracy, which mandates the imposition by law of a 
detailed framework for worker participation, the application of the CA in the socio- 
economic context focuses on capacity as a central feature of the requirements of 
access to and influence in discursive decision-making processes and aims thus at 
opening up a space of contextualised deliberation, citizenship and voice, which is 
sensitive to the particularities of different social and economic contexts. 
It is suggested that in seeking to promote the establishment and operation of employee 
representative arrangements the ICED has the potential to encourage the development 
of capabilities in terms of collective rights and procedures of participation and voice. 
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Hence, the ICED with its emphasis on employee representation on an on-going basis 
represents a shift towards the view of rights as organizing the socio-economic 
relations and allowing thus the utilization of the legal institutional framework as the 
basis for the realization of substantive freedoms. Informed by the CA, as developed 
by Sen (1999), and based on the elaboration of the link between the economic notion 
of capabilities and the juridical concept of social rights (Browne et al., 2004), the 
ICED could hence be understood as a `social conversion factor' for the development 
of capabilities for voice through the establishment and effective operation of 
discursive decision-making processes at sub-national level. Without explicitly 
adopting a capabilities-based approach, Lecher et al., (1999,2001) suggest that in the 
case of EWCs the relations of the employee-side EWC with management, the internal 
communication networks between the employee representatives, the relations between 
the latter and the national representatives as well as the potential cooperation with 
trade unions endowed EWC with their specific shape and provide a starting point for 
assessing whether those arrangements can develop a `capacity to act'. In a similar 
vein, the relations between the main actors involved in ICE arrangements, i. e. the 
employee-side ICE arrangements, management, trade unions, employees, as 
influenced by the application of the legislation, may indicate the status and prospects 
of the arrangements promoted by the ICED within the overall framework of a 
capabilities-inspired approach. 
1.1.3 An integrated approach to examining the impact of the ICED 
A review of the two theoretical approaches that will be utilized in the examination of 
the impact of the ICED in the UK industrial relations system was presented in the 
previous section. The overlap, albeit based on distinct grounds, between the RL and 
CA concepts, evident in the common emphasis on rejecting aspects of the neo-liberal 
critique, on criticizing hierarchical command and control intervention on substantive 
issues in a context of a `social permanent dynamic complexity' (Chouraqui, 2003), on 
recognizing a certain autonomy of social systems and suggesting decentralized 
regulatory models through attempting at `steering' and promoting `reflection' and 
`deliberation' has been illustrated. As suggested, a dual emphasis at EU-level social 
policy in recent years can be observed. Firstly, increasing emphasis has been placed 
on more flexible and decentralized forms of regulation, which necessitate the 
involvement of social actors in elaborating and transforming the standards set 
centrally. Secondly, the need for institutional learning, as promoted in a capabilities- 
based approach, redirects existing EU approaches to development and stresses the 
important role that social rights play in the realization of substantive freedoms. In this 
context, the ICED, with its emphasis on encouraging decentralized deliberation 
among individuals and reflection among subsystems within a multi-level institutional 
set provides a useful framework for testing how theory understands such shifts in the 
regulatory and substantive orientations of EU social policy. 
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In more detail, RL theory with its emphasis on self-referential autonomous social 
systems provides an interesting theoretical basis for the assessment of the institutional 
design of the ICED. The ICED could be a reflexive regulatory instrument with a 
rationale of regulating self-regulation and as such lends itself to an analysis conducted 
on the basis of a RL framework. Building on an analysis of the closed, autopoietic 
forces underlying the different social systems it becomes feasible to illuminate the 
sophisticated processes involved in the open transformational relations between EU 
law and the social systems involved. In that way, RL offers first an alternative 
approach for tracing the relationship that evolves between law and the social systems. 
Secondly, in aiming at the assessment of the institutional responses to changes in the 
environment of labour law it goes beyond analytical models that have been based, for 
instance, on rational choice institutionalism or Marxism. Thirdly, RL theory may be 
fruitful for the thesis as it opens up the question of how actors, as located within the 
systems, at different levels interacted and responded to the EU legal 'prompt '. 39 The 
ICED could therefore be a reflexive regulatory instrument with a rationale of 
regulating self-regulation and as such it lends itself to an analysis conducted on the 
basis of a reflexive theoretical framework; it presents hence the opportunity for an 
examination of how reflexive legal instruments that emanate at EU-level are 
transposed and implemented at national and sub-national levels. 
Simultaneously, the significance that the institutionalization of ICE rights has 
acquired at EU level for the development of an on-going dialogue between 
management and labour requires that attention should be given to the development - 
in terms of collective rights and procedures - of a learning process of participation 
and voice. In advocating an update of the traditional social regulations so as to 
encourage greater collaboration in the socio-economic sphere the ICED has the 
potential to provide a basis for `real freedom of choice' in relation to labour market 
participation (Supiot, 1999). By relating the empirical study of the regulation of the 
representative-based employee consultation in the UK to a theoretical framework of 
RL and the CA, the thesis attempts to contribute to a greater understanding of the 
practicalities associated with the advocacy of a reflexive approach to labour market 
regulation and the prospects of such regulatory techniques to potentially support - 
apart from the imposition of restrictions on behaviour - the development of 
institutional experimentation and a new framework for participation and learning, in 
line with a capabilities-based approach. 
39 RL theory has been widely used as an analytical framework for the assessment of legislative 
initiatives in the area of labour market regulation (see, for example, Rogowski and Wilthagen, 1994). 
Rogowski explicitly makes the point when he states: `the concept of reflexive law, which I propose to 
develop along the lines with the autopoietic systems theory of law, assumes that the social systems of 
`industrial relations' and `law' are both operationally closed systems of communication. This 
theoretical design... directs attention to the important relationship between modes of regulation and 
processes of self-regulation' (1994: 53). The concept of reflexive law has also been used for the 
evaluation of the impact of the WTD in the UK system of industrial relations (see, for example, 
Barnard et al., 2004; Hobbs and Njoya, 2005). 
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1.2 The structure of the thesis 
Having explained the broad theoretical basis of the thesis, chapter two proceeds to a 
presentation of the specific analytical and methodological approach adopted for the 
purpose of analysis of the empirical findings. In opting for a RL and CA theoretical 
framework, the analytical framework is particularly concerned with the participation 
of the social actors in framing the national legislation and in turn implementing it at 
subnational level. To address the research objectives, a multi-method methodological 
approach is employed, which highlights in more detail the role that social actors - 
viewed as located within the systems they operate - can play in translating and 
transforming at the same time the objectives pursued at higher levels of policy- 
making. 
Chapter three proceeds to a critical evaluation of the process for the legal 
transposition of the ICED in the UK. In the context of the theory of reflexive 
regulation, the examination of the development of the legal norms designed to `frame' 
or steer' the process of self-regulation (Barnard et al., 2004) is crucial. The question 
under discussion is the extent to which the EU-level norms, as prescribed in the 
ICED, were re-contextualized in the transposing legislation. The analysis provides a 
narrative on the consultation process leading to the DTI/CBI/TUC outline scheme and 
the final UK legislation. The fate of the voluntarist elements of the ICED in the multi- 
level system as utilized by the UK government and the social partners is also 
examined and assessed. It is suggested that whilst a consensus was reached - albeit on 
distinct grounds - the underlying principles and objectives of the ICED underwent 
significant alteration which could have an impact on the extent to which opportunities 
for leaning and participation at the level of the application of the ICER could develop. 
Chapter four goes then to examine the impact of the legislation on the UK system of 
industrial relations through the location of employers' associations' and trade unions' 
responses to the EU `legal prompt'. Based on primary and secondary evidence, the 
chapter examines the extent to which the options provided by the ICER were taken 
up. The analysis proceeds from the basis that the statutory provisions were designed 
as reflexive legal instruments to promote regulation through self-regulation. The 
evidence suggests that it was predominantly employers' attitudes and strategies that 
have shaped the extent to which the rights stipulated by the new legislation were 
realized; only in limited cases did unions adopt a proactive approach to the application 
of the ICER. In this context, the enforcement regime of the ICER may act as a further 
means of coupling between the legal and the industrial relations system and as such it 
is examined as well; the focus is on the extent and type of enforcement action. 
In the context of the implementation of the ICED, the set of responses operates 
predominantly at organizational level. Bearing in mind the characteristics of the ICER 
institutional design, chapter five examines case study evidence regarding the 
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establishment/amendment of ICE arrangements and critically assesses the impact of 
legislation on the development of participation at organizational level. An analysis of 
the processes for the establishment/amendment of the ICE arrangements firstly takes 
place. In line with the evidence presented in chapter four, proactive managerial 
approach to the introduction of the ICER is observed. However, there is limited scope 
for collective organization between management and labour concerning the drafting 
of the ICE agreements. An analysis of the specific provisions of the ICE agreements 
secondly takes place, which facilitates the identification of the structural and 
operational aspects of the agreements and assists in the evaluation of the `nominal 
rights' stipulated in the agreements. 
Based on an analytical framework that views the overall process of the establishment 
and development of ICE mechanisms as a product of a dynamic interaction between 
`external' influences, i. e. ICED, and `internal conditions', i. e. interaction between the 
protagonists (Lecher et al., 2001) chapter seven then examines the actual operation of 
ICE arrangements. The focus is on four fields of communication and interaction; these 
are: ICE arrangements and management, those internal to ICE arrangements, ICE 
arrangements and the workforce, and ICE arrangements and trade unions. Such 
analysis constitutes the further step where the CA substantially grounds up and opens 
up more with a view to evaluating the development of ICE arrangements, as situated 
within the wider legal and institutional framework. The analysis is presented as 
thematically-based so as to assist the systematic cross-case comparison of the issues 
raised in line with the analytical framework. 
Based on the analysis of the four fields of interaction, chapter eight then proceeds to 
an assessment of the case study evidence with a view to evaluating the extent to which 
the operation of ICE arrangements induced the development of institutional 
experimentation and a new framework for a process of learning and the development 
of capabilities for voice. In this context, the chapter firstly probes whether the ICE 
arrangements reflect subgroups or categories of general cases and secondly accounts 
for the variation in the capability for voice observed between the ICE arrangements 
under study. It is posited that whilst the form and content of the legal prescription 
made a difference to the quality of the ICE arrangements so did the approaches 
adopted by the actors involved in the operation of the ICE arrangements. Not all ICE 
arrangements were able to translate the `nominal' rights stipulated in the ICE 
agreements into `real' rights in line with a capability-based approach. 
Having provided an evaluation of each of the stages of the `life' of the ICED i. e. 
transposition and implementation, the final chapter attempts to synthesize the above 
areas of analysis and placing them upon a broader analytical canvas seeks to offer a 
conclusion about the extent to which reflexive regulation can be a principal means for 
the operationalization of a capability for voice in a socio-economic context. The 
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argument of the thesis is that whilst the legal strategy for regulating employee 
representation arrangements in the UK should maintain its reflexive regulation 
approach UK law should revisit the conditions attached to the selection of different 
compliance options. The study concludes with an evaluation of the analytical 
framework utilized for the analysis of the empirical findings and some suggestions for 
further research. 
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Chapter 2. Analytical and methodological framework of the study 
In light of the theoretical framework explained in chapter one this chapter presents the 
analytical and methodological framework adopted in the study. In suggesting that a 
notion of `double subsidiarity' underpins the institutional design of the ICED the 
empirical enquiry is centred on the two levels of the `life' of the ICED: firstly, its 
transposition and application in the UK system of industrial relations, and, secondly, 
its implementation at organizational level. The study is in line with the traditional 
conceptualization of the employment relationship as `the study of the rules governing 
employment' (Clegg, 1979: 1), where however `rules' are understood to embrace a 
complex and shifting set of expectations and norms involving the use of power and 
influences from outside the employment relationship that shape the rule-making 
process (Edwards, 2005: 266). This conceptualization has two advantages. In viewing 
the employment relationship as situated within supra-national and national regimes 
the analysis goes beyond the existing focus of industrial relations research on concrete 
events at micro level and incorporates an examination of the wider structural 
conditions that shape behaviour (Purcell, 1983). Secondly, while the study is 
concentrated on the impact of a single directive in one EU member-state, by tackling 
implementation and operation in the analysis, it goes beyond the existing mainstream 
research on the impact of EU law that has been largely focused on issues of legal 
transposition, thereby fusing an understanding of the nature of EU law with the 
questions asked by industrial relations scholars. 
2.1 Analytical framework 
2.1.1 The operation of the `double subsidiarity' mechanism in the transposition 
of the ICED 
The impact of EU social policy directives at organizational level is significantly 
mediated through a number of institutional influences, including the legal system and 
industrial relations (IR) system of the relevant member state (Deakin, 2006). In order 
to proceed to an assessment of the impact of the ICED at organizational level, it is 
thus crucial to establish firstly how the EU-level norms, as stipulated in the ICED, 
were reformulated in the context of the ICED's transposition and application40 into 
the UK legal and IR systems. 
Deakin (2007: 6) suggests that `reflexive forms of governance, involving a division of 
labour between EU institutions and the member states and commitment to 
experimentalism based on diversity of practices, were part of the EU's regulatory 
architecture from the outset. ' Hence, the preference for the adoption of directives, 
instead of regulations, as a tool for harmonization of the national labour markets can 
be seen as constituting a prime example of the use of reflexive techniques in EU 
ao By 'application', the study refers here to the monitoring and enforcement of the ICED at subnational 
levels. 
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governance. In light of the RL theoretical framework, the quality of the transposition 
and application of EU directives is contingent on the links between law and the social 
processes being regulated (Teubner, 1998). In locating the ICED as a key tool in 
allowing EU law to become embedded in the national legal and industrial relations 
systems, the ICED acts as an irritant of a co-evolutionary process of separate 
trajectories: on the legal side, the EU-level norms can be re-contextualized in the new 
network of legal distinctions, and on the social side, the legal impulse, if it will be 
recognised, will create perturbations in the industrial relations system that has 
responsibility for the establishment and operation of ICE arrangements, altering 
finally the existing configuration of law and its coupling to the social processes 
associated with the UK industrial relations system (Teubner, 1998: 21). 
The process of the transposition of the ICED into UK law involved the participation 
of the `two sides of industry', i. e. CBI and TUC, in the drafting of the transposing 
legislation. Relying on the first level of the `double subsidiarity mechanism', the 
thesis will firstly elucidate how the relationship of interdependence between the legal 
and IR systems evolved in the case of the legal transposition of the ICED in the UK. 
Existing UK social norms and conventions are not in favour of the involvement and 
agreement between the `two sides of industry' at national level regarding labour 
market regulation. There have been recent limited instances of social partner 
involvement at national level under the Labour government, albeit in different forms. 
Firstly, for the establishment of the National Minimum Wage in 1998, a Low Pay 
Commission composed of members representing the interests of trade unions, 
employers, employees and the independent community was established (Metcalf, 
1999: 171). Secondly, in 2001 the CBI and TUC worked together to produce the 
productivity reports which made a number of suggestions to government regarding 
how to improve productivity levels through initiatives in diverse areas. Thirdly, for 
the statutory trade union recognition procedure, an attempt for involvement similar to 
the one in the case of minimum wage was made. However, the social partners were 
unable to resolve their differences and a formal statement was issued by the TUC and 
the CBI highlighting the areas of continued disagreement between them, which the 
government was left to resolve (Novitz and Skidmore, 2001: 72-73). 41 
As Hobbs and Njoya (2005: 308) suggest in the context of the European Employment 
Strategy, `the very fact that the UK lacks institutional arrangements for national-level 
social dialogue and established structures of `social partnership' arguably increases 
the potential of the reflexive governance mechanisms of EU social policy to be an 
important dynamic in UK industrial relations practice. ' In this context, the reflexive 
41 One month after the agreement on the `outline scheme' in the case of the ICED, the CBI, TUC and 
CEEP UK agreed (August 2003) on a Code of Practice for the implementation of the EU Framework 
Agreement on Telework. Whilst the DTI participated in the discussions, it was not signatory to the 
agreement. A further agreement on a code of practice for the implementation of the EU Framework 
Agreement on Work-related Stress was concluded later (see Prosser, 2007). 
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elements of the ICED have the potential to promote co-operation between the UK 
government, unions and employers in the development of statutory legislation in the 
case of the ICED. Against this background, the objective of the analysis is two-fold: 
firstly, to analyze how national IR actors, viewed as parts of the IR system, 
structurally and strategically addressed the challenges and opportunities posed by the 
ICED during its transposition into UK law; and, secondly, to examine what was the 
fate of the voluntarist elements of the ICED in the resulting legislation. With regard to 
the latter and whilst employing a different theoretical approach, the study by Falkner 
et al. (2004) found that the UK belonged to a `world of domestic politics' when it 
came to the transposition and implementation of EU social policy directives that 
combine a `hard' and `soft' regulatory dimension. In effect, the procedural pattern of 
the UK both under Conservatism and Labour governments was one based on domestic 
political considerations rather than on a culture of dutifulness vis-ä-vis EU law. 
Specifically, the fate of non-binding or soft law recommendations typically depended 
on the extent to which they fitted with the agendas of important political actors at the 
domestic level. From a RL perspective, the priorities of the political and industrial 
relations systems can bring about a fundamental reconstruction of the notion of 
employee representation and as such they have the potential to produce results at 
variance to the ICED. 
2.1.2. The operation of the `double subsidiarity' mechanism in the monitoring 
and enforcement of the ICED 
The involvement of the social actors, as situated within the UK IR system, is not 
confined to the transposition of the ICED. Instead, their role, as stipulated in both the 
ICED and the ICER, is significantly greater in the application and enforcement of the 
resulting new legislative framework. In providing for alternative methods of 
complying to the legislation, the latter give a major role to the social actors in 
modifying statutory provisions which, as a consequence, took on the character of a 
`default rule'. In principle, the scope provided to the social actors for application of 
the legislation opens up a new space for the exercise of collective voice, or `capability 
for voice'. Nevertheless, this is significantly dependent on the ways in which the new 
institutional framework is perceived by the `binding arrangements' of the UK IR 
system (Teubner, 1998). The design of the reflexive framework is thus of 
fundamental importance, as it does not only seek to stimulate autonomous policy 
responses but also to provide a structure or a constraint within which the process of 
self-regulatory process occurs. Within the RL context, as Godard (2002: 259) 
suggests, `state attempts to regulate employer practice and human resource 
management are likely to be more effective not only in the extent to which they are 
consistent with pre-existing cognitive/normative rules but also in the extent that they 
are designed and implemented in conjunction with processes conducive to these rules 
and accompanied by a deliberate strategy to reshape them. Under such conditions, the 
law may function as much through its implications for expectations and norms as for 
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the specific rights and regulations it embodies. ' The question then is not so much if 
the UK industrial relations system will reject or integrate ICE rights. Rather, it is what 
kind of transformations of meaning will the term undergo, how will its role differ, 
once it is reconstructed anew in the UK system. 
Specific reflexive strategies advocated by Teubner and RL proponents that can assist 
in securing structural coupling are suggested. One way is `coupling through optional 
regulation. ' Teubner (1993: 94-95) posits that unlike `command and control' 
regulation, law can increase its regulatory interference by developing an `option 
policy' based on the knowledge of the regulated system in its capacity as an outside 
observer. Rather than seeking to impose substantive standards, law should present the 
regulated arena with legal options, which can be used as those concerned see fit. The 
consequence of this flexible legal policy that can be adapted to a variety of situations 
is that the law is used only when it meets social needs, otherwise not. 42 A second 
potential reflexive legal strategy advocated by Teubner (1993: 95) and a significant 
number of RL proponents is `coupling through collective organization'. For instance, 
Rogowski and Wilthagen (1994) have pointed to a model of reflexive labour market 
regulation where `the establishment of standards of protection is left to mechanisms of 
interest coordination, such as collective bargaining... [and] labour law provides the 
procedural framework in which coordination can take place. ' The preference for 
collective organization as a reflexive legal strategy is particularly advocated in the 
context of EU regulation. For instance, Deakin (1999: 245) suggests that "the 
preferred mode of intervention is for the law to underpin and encourage autonomous 
processes of adjustment, in particular by supporting mechanisms of group 
representation and participation" (emphasis added). Finally, another reflexive 
strategy advocated is through `establishing a communication link' (Teubner, 1993: 
91) between law and other social systems. This takes place through the use of moral 
pressure, persuasion as to the rightness of law or even sanctions. As Hobbs (2005) 
notes, this strategy is different from structural coupling in that it does not lead in the 
transformation of social self-production processes into sources of law production. As 
a result, the implementation of the ICED may contribute to filling the representation 
gap (Towers, 1997) through a variety of means, including the 
introduction/amendment of existing consultative arrangements in non-unionized 
organizations and the expansion of collective agreements to incorporate ICE rights in 
unionized organizations and transcend in this way the narrowly defined scope of 
existing collective bargaining structures. In that way, the new statutory requirements 
may provide new opportunities for the development of social dialogue procedures that 
42 While suggesting the development of an `option policy' as a regulatory means, Teubner stresses that 
conditions should be applied in order to limit the possibilities that the law is merely preserving the 
status quo or enables those who are already powerful to become more so. Mechanisms of intervention 
in optional regulation could include the offer of various regulatory options with the attached stipulation 
that one of the alternatives must be chosen and the linkage of certain options with attractive 
entitlements, such as privileges or incentives (Teubner, 1993: 94-95). 
37 
will assist in integrating employee interests in socio-economic decisions, in line with 
a capability-based approach. 
However, the novelty of the legal framework needs to be set against certain 
limitations that may constrain such developments. The relative absence of a tradition 
of cooperation between employers and employees at workplace and company level 
may create unfavourable conditions for the conclusion of ICE agreements. For 
instance, there is little or no tradition of using collective bargaining to vary the terms 
of legislative labour standards in the UK, and very little evidence of employers and 
unions seeking to bargain their way around the default rules on parental leave and 
fixed-term employment. Nor is there much evidence of `workforce' agreements being 
entered into, in cases where no collective agreement is in force (Deakin, 2006). 
Relatedly, as a result of the collapse of sectoral-level bargaining, the continental 
European division of responsibilities on the basis of the structure of collective 
bargaining, with negotiation being primarily the responsibility of employers' 
organizations and trade unions outside the workplace, and consultation taking place 
by works councils or their equivalent inside, is not possible (Sisson, 2002: 15-16). 
Against this background, it is questionable the extent to which the so-called `second 
generation of bargained adjustments' (Davies and Kilpatrick, 2004: 125)43 that stems 
from the regulatory model that is followed by the ICED and usually take place at 
sectoral level in other member states, will be taken up in the case of the UK. 
Whilst under the ICED and the ICER it is employees who are endowed with ICE 
rights, the importance of managerial behaviour in assessing the likely impact of the 
legislation is crucial (Hall and Terry, 2004: 221). Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman 
(2006: 488) also note that `the high degree of uncoordinated decentralization in 
British industrial relations over the past three decades provides employers with far 
greater autonomy than in other European countries in tailoring these arrangements to 
their own preferences, and conversely poses a far greater challenge to trade unions if 
they are to utilize them to their own institutional advantage. '44 The academic 
u Davies and Kilpatrick (2004: 125) further specify that bargained agreements are called `adjustments' 
because the effect of the bargained agreement is to adjust, to a greater or lesser degree within 
constraints fixed by statute, a statutory standard which would otherwise apply. The `first', i. e. UK, 
bargained adjustments are subject to the interposition of a ministerial discretion: Government must 
agree that the agreement provides adequate substitute protection for the statutory regime it wishes to 
replace. The `second generation' of bargained adjustments derive from EC law and provide that a 
bargained agreement can set or derogate from a wide range of legislative standards in the directives 
which are otherwise applicable. In their UK transposition, no ministerial approval is required; 
moreover, they can set a standard which is worse than the statutory standard. 
44 The advantage of management in this case lies in the fact that for some time they have unilaterally 
made most decisions on work matters and that in some cases they have established more sophisticated 
human resources policies securing already employee involvement (Gospel and Wilman, 2005). On the 
other side, Sisson (2002) suggests that there are very good reasons for management to take the 
initiative and establish ICE arrangements. Not only does this mean that they will be in a better position 
to shape the arrangements to suit their needs, but also reap the benefits, in terms of employee morale 
and commitment, which are likely to come from demonstrating a positive approach. 
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literature, reviewed by Marchington (1994) and Hall and Terry (2004), has identified 
a range of potential managerial rationales for the introduction and operation of 
consultative arrangements - among them union avoidance (Ramsay, 1980), 45 the 
containment of workplace pressures on managerial control (Butler, 2005), and more 
positively, the enhancement of employee engagement and organizational performance 
(Dundon et al., 2004). 46 The considerable variation in the rationale and objectives of 
consultative arrangements is the result of the attitudes and policies of management 
(Hall and Terry, 2004) and the organization-specific context (Marchington, 1994; 
Beaumont and Hunter, 2003). 
Within the context of the new statutory framework organizational responses may be 
significantly influenced by the nature of the legal obligations and specifically by the 
employers' assessment of employee demand for the establishment/amendment of ICE 
arrangements, the risk of the legislation's negotiating procedure being successfully 
invoked (Hall, 2005), the efficacy of the mechanisms of enforcement and union 
presence (Hyman, 1996). However, the experience of similar legislation, i. e. the 
statutory trade union recognition procedure and TICER, suggests that there were 
relatively few cases where the `standard provisions' were imposed on organizations. 
Concerning the former, existing research suggests that the direct effect of the law 
regarding union recognition achieved through use of the legislation was less 
important than the `shadow of law' and symbolic effect (Dickens and Hall, 2005: 16- 
17). Concerning the latter, the bulk of the existing EWCs in UK-based companies 
were established on the basis of `Article 13' agreements ahead of the directive's 
implementation date. Relatively few were based on `Article 6' agreements under the 
legislation's `special negotiating body' procedure. In no known case was a fallback 
`statutory model' EWC imposed on a UK-based company. However, Hall and Terry 
(2004: 212) report that most agreements have been strongly influenced by the 
Directive's subsidiary requirements: virtually all provide for a EWC-type body rather 
than any alternative form of transnational ICE procedure, and, in many cases, 
particularly art 6 agreements, their provisions are modeled closely on the subsidiary 
requirements. 
On the trade union side, the level and distribution of existing membership and 
recognition arrangements must be expected to impact on the extent to which they can 
make effective use of the opportunities arising out of the implementation of the 
as The incidence of non-union employee representation in sectors with `structural' characteristics 
associated with unionization, as Terry (1999) notes, meant that it was presumed to be an arrangement 
initiated by management principally for the purpose of union avoidance. 
46 Hall and Terry (2004: 216) suggest that while union avoidance and business case rationales for the 
establishment of consultative arrangements may not be mutually exclusive, they do suggest differences 
of emphasis, approach and agenda. In effect, when a `business case' rationale is adopted, `the 
dominance of a managerial agenda and the emphasis on employee output suggests a highly constrained 
form of participation with little if any space for the expression of employees' collective interests' (Hall 
and Terry, 2004: 216). 
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ICED. As the latest WERS and LFS report, the central feature of the existing pattern 
is uneven incidence and wide variations exist between different sectors of the labour 
force. While in the case where trade unions have a high level of membership and 
bargaining coverage, they may use the legislation to expand the scope and level of 
consultation and bargaining, it is in situations where there is partial trade union 
presence, i. e. at some levels or in some parts of an undertaking, that unions may 
confront challenges (Gospel and Wilman, 2005: 142). In areas of total union absence, 
i. e. workplaces where there is no union presence such as in parts of the service sector, 
unions can do little to promote ICE arrangements. Further, the implementation of the 
ICED could create a difficult situation for trade unions, threatening the UK system of 
single channel representation by giving non-union employees access to representation 
structures, threatening the unions' representative monopoly. These arrangements 
would either exist alongside existing traditional negotiation structures, which might 
narrow the range of issues currently determined by unions via collective bargaining, 
or even worse for unions, they might be established as a substitute for union 
recognition (Kelly, 1996). At the same time, should unions grasp this new instrument 
it could serve to strengthen their foothold within companies (Hyman, 1996) and 
extend their representation to include white-collar employees. 
2.1.3 The operation of the `double subsidiarity' mechanism at organizational 
level: conceptualization of the dynamics of ICE arrangements 
Employee voice is a term that refers to the processes by which employees are able to 
contribute to or influence managerial decisions, either directly or through their 
representatives (Boxall and Purcell, 2003). 47 Milward et al. (2000: 135) saw voice as 
comprising three different channels: first, via trade union membership, recognition 
and representation; secondly, via indirect or representative participation mechanisms 
such as joint consultation; and, thirdly, via direct employee involvement. As 
Chariwood notes, (2006: 303), `over the course of the twentieth century, voice 
arrangements in British workplaces changed from a position where no voice was the 
norm, with union voice practiced by a minority of employers (Gospel, 1992: 35) to a 
situation where only a minority of workplaces had no voice. ' 
The implementation of the ICER at organizational level has invigorated the debate on 
the forms and substance of employee representation in the UK system of industrial 
relations. Until hitherto, there were only a few studies of consultative arrangements, 
notably in the area of non-union employee representation (e. g. Broad, 1994; Cressey 
et al., 1985; Gollan, 2001,2002,2003; Kirkbridge, 1986a, b; Lloyd, 2001; Watling 
47 The modern conception of `voice' originated with Hirschman (1970) who envisaged consumer 
collective action as a form of voice that, under certain circumstances, generates benefits for the firm in 
terms of a reversal of product quality decline. Applying Hirschman's concept to employment relations, 
Freeman and Medoff (1984) viewed voice as one of two faces of union activity in which the benefits of 
voice (for employers) are contingent on the returns to unionization exceeding the costs of the monopoly 
face of union activities. 
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and Snook, 2003). As Gollan (2005) notes, the debates resulting from these studies 
focused on the ability of such forms of representation to match or exceed the 
effectiveness of trade unions as conduits of employee voice and interest. In light of 
the transposition of the ICED in the UK and adopting a RL and CA theoretical 
framework, the present study departs from the established research approaches to the 
issue of employee representation. The study is concerned not only with the rationale, 
objectives and design of the ICE arrangements in light of the ICER but also with `the 
quality of employee representation, as manifested in a mosaic of substance and 
process' (Gollan and Wilkinson, 2007: 1157). Based on the similarities in the 
rationale, regulatory form and substance of the ICED and the EWCD, albeit the latter 
applies in large, multinational companies, the operationalization of the theoretical 
framework at organizational level is significantly based on the analytical framework 
adopted by Lecher et al. (2001) for their examination of EWCs, as amended in light of 
the UK context and the view of the ICED as a `social conversion factor' for the 
development of capabilities for employee voice. 
In effect, the focus is on the four dimensions of communication and interaction which 
have the potential to determine the development, character and capability for 
employee voice of ICE arrangements and in turn also may affect each other. 
Following Lecher et al. (2001), these are: ICE arrangements and management, those 
internal to ICE arrangements (formal and informal co-operation between ICE 
members), ICE arrangements and the workforce, and ICE arrangements and trade 
unions. 48 Whilst the analytical approach focuses on the role of agency, it 
acknowledges the interdependent relationship between structure and agency, which 
shapes the constitution of consultative arrangements. In this context, the overall 
process of the establishment and development of ICE arrangements is hence seen as a 
product of a dynamic interaction between `external' influences, i. e. the regulatory 
environment in the form of the ICER, and `internal conditions', i. e. interests and 
interactions between the protagonists (Lecher et al., 2001). 
Hence, besides the rationale, processes and strategies adopted in light of the ICER and 
the formal arrangements set out by the ICE agreements, the structures and processes 
of communication and patterns of internal interaction are examined. Within this 
context, the development of interaction across the four fields endow the ICE 
arrangements with their specific shape and provide a starting point for evaluating the 
extent to which the newly established/amended consultative arrangements can open 
up opportunities for the mobilization of information and consultation rights by the 
social actors so as to develop capabilities for voice in terms of collective rights and 
48 The strength of this approach is, as Müller and Hoffman (2001) note, is that it takes into account the 
investigation of the case-specific perceptions and motivations of the individual actors involved and 
links this with research into their structural context. This goes beyond the level of a mere snapshot 
analysis by capturing the processual character of the development and potential implications of EWCs. 
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procedures of participation. The starting point regarding the impact of the ICED is 
that the greater the degree of the institutionalization of capabilities under the UK 
legislation, the greater the latter will be taken in the manner anticipated by the 
directive, i. e. to promote the development of capabilities in terms of procedures of 
participation and collective employee voice rights. In more detail, the analysis will 
seek to determine the extent to which the UK legislation provides a basis for the 
development of a capability for voice across the four fields of interaction. In this 
context, emphasis will be placed firstly on the capability of employee representatives 
(ERs) to form a view on management decisions, mainly through the provision of 
regular and adequate information; secondly, on the capability to express these views 
and establish a process of dialogue with management, principally through the 
occurrence of meetings and exchange of views, and finally; on the capability to have 
an impact on management decision-making either in the form of process, substance or 
implementation. For that purpose it is assumed here that in any system of employee 
representation, capabilities of employees may vary according to the existing level of 
capabilities of ERs. 49 
2.1.3.1 Establishment of ICE arrangements 
The examination of ICE arrangements at organizational level shares the same 
analytical approach adopted for the examination of the application of the ICED, as 
described in section 2.2.2. Whilst the latter provides a `bird's eye view' on the extent 
of change and response of the main actors involved in the ICED to the stimulus of the 
ICER, the former aims to substantiate these findings with the results from 
organizational-level activity. More importantly, the analysis will establish clearer 
linkages between the rationale, objectives, and processes for the establishment and 
amendment of ICE arrangements and will address in more detail the involvement of 
trade unions and employees in the constitution of ICE mechanisms. In order to do 
that, some further points need to be brought into the discussion. Apart from the factors 
outlined above, others that are more amenable to research at organizational level 
include organizational size, HR capacity, management style and organization, union 
presence (Hall, 2005), company structure (Marginson et al. 2004) and the nature of 
the pre-existing employee relations culture in the organization (Boxall and Purcell, 
2003). 50 In light of the discourses that were developed at policy level by the DTI, the 
potential recognition of the interrelationship between ICE arrangements and high 
organizational performance will be also explored when examining the rationales for 
49 It is beyond the purposes of the thesis to examine and assess the extent to which the ICED can act as 
`social conversion factor' for the development of capabilities in terms of individual career trajectories 
and opportunities. However, it could be suggested that where capability for employee voice is present, 
the capabilities of individual workers may be enhanced. But it has to be recognised that this is not 
always straightforward. 
50 Company structure and management organization may have important implications for the level(s) at 
which consultation takes place. Beaumont and Hunter (2003) also emphasize the importance of 
aligning the consultative arrangements with the decision-making structures of the organization, and the 
need for a hierarchy of consultative arrangements in larger organizations. 
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the establishment of ICE arrangements. Are employers unwilling to visualize the 
establishment/amendment of arrangements under the new legislation as an instrument 
for improving efficiency, and instead see it an instance of external governmental 
interference that should be resisted on grounds of flexibility? 
In the context of the establishment/amendment of ICE arrangements, the text of the 
ICE agreements constitute a further research issue. In effect, ICE agreements 
delineate the `nominal' rights of the new consultative arrangements and as such may 
influence the latter's operation. In concluding ICE agreements, the literature based on 
EWCs agreements suggests that apart from any possible `statutory model effect', 
there are likely to be other sources of influence operating on management and perhaps 
less, due to the methods of approval of the agreements, on the employee-side 
negotiators (Gilman and Marginson, 2002). These include company-specific factors, 
such as company structure, nature of business, and industrial relations arrangements 
and traditions. In the ICER context, these include the type of institutional 
arrangements for collective bargaining and consultation in the case of unionized 
workplaces, i. e. whether organizations have separate or combined arrangements for 
collective bargaining and consultation (Hall, 2004)51. Another source of influence is 
the experience with previous ICE arrangements. While these sources may influence 
specific issues, it has to be acknowledged here that there maybe an overlap of 
different influences in the structural and operational features of the ICE agreements. 
2.1.3.2 Operation of ICE arrangements 
Whilst the examination of the issues outlined above is closely linked with the CA, the 
assessment of the operation of ICE arrangements constitutes, in effect, the further step 
where the CA substantially grounds and opens up more with the view to evaluating 
the development of ICE arrangements, as situated within the wider legal and 
institutional framework. In examining the actual operation of the arrangements, it will 
be possible to address the distinction between nominal/formal rights, as stipulated in 
the agreements, and effective rights. 
Concerning the first field of interaction (table 2.1), the significant issue to consider is 
the extent to which management grant ICE arrangements, voluntarily or as a 
concession, firstly scope to operate and secondly scope to participate (Lecher et al., 
200 1). 52 Existing research suggests that the actual operation of consultative 
sl In non-union situations, this functional distinction will not apply, but the question there is whether 
non-union representation structures deal with pay and conditions issues (Hall, 2004). 
52 Lecher et al., (2001) suggest the following typology: a. `deficient' information exchange 
(management provision of information is poor and the forum refrains from demanding information), b. 
`satisfactory' information exchange (sufficient level of information provision), c. 'information plus' 
(the forum has scope for participation vis-ä-vis management beyond the receipt of information- 
participation in management's information process, e. g. inclusion in the decision-making process in the 
form of a formalized consultation procedure (=where the stage of the decision-making where 
43 
arrangements and the handling of management decision-making remain within 
parameters that are largely defined by management (Hall and Terry, 2004). 53 In the 
case of non-union arrangements, the findings map out the difficulties inherent in the 
maintenance of in-house representatives structures. Non-union arrangements are seen 
as considerably incapable of modifying the managerial agenda, or proactively 
pursuing specifically employee interests (Butler, 2005: 274). Based on these findings, 
Butler (2005: 285) argues that in light of the implementation of the ICED `it would be 
naive to assume that non-union employers will necessarily be willing to cede their 
traditional prerogative to decide the future strategic dimension of their businesses, or 
their right to unilaterally determine key issues. ' Additionally, from the perspective of 
ERs and those whom they represent, the operation of non-union arrangements 
indicates that systems are usually seen to lack effectiveness compared to unionized 
workplaces, principally as a consequence of managerial control of process and 
content, of ERs' inexperience and inadequate training and, in particular, of the 
absence of any recourse to sanction or effective pressure (Hall and Terry, 2004; Terry, 
1999). 
Whilst the non-union arrangements examined were operating in a vacuum of legal 
intervention, evidence from the operation of EWCs in UK-based multinationals paints 
a similar picture. Research conducted prior to the application of the EWC Directive in 
the UK found that British companies tended to take a restrictive approach to the 
content of EWC agreements (Marginson et al., 1998). Wills' (1999) survey of British 
managerial opinion of EWCs also found that managers saw the benefits of EWCs 
primarily in terms of reinforcing corporate communications rather than their wider 
consultative or representative role. Only a minority of respondents associated EWCs 
with the more concrete outcomes of `aiding organizational change' and `enhancing 
productivity through employee involvement'. 54 More recent case study research 
suggests that a range of factors are likely to influence the effectiveness of consultative 
arrangements, including the `fit' between the consultative infrastructure and the key 
level(s) of management, the broader industrial relations context, including the 
presence/absence of trade unions, management policy towards the role of the 
arrangements, and the organization/cohesiveness of the employee side (Marginson et 
al., 2004). On the employee side, research into representatives' experience of EWCs 
suggested that the provision of `useful' information by management and the 
occurrence of consultation were less widespread amongst UK- and US-based 
consultation takes place is established and consultation can postpone a decision), up to negotiations and 
agreements with management) (emphasis in original). 
53 Similarly, the evidence on `partnership' arrangements suggests that these often, but not always, entail 
engagement with agendas defined by management (Edwards, 2007: 18; see also Upchurch et al., 2006). 
sa A DTI survey (Weber et al., 2000) of managers in 10 companies with EWCs, six of them UK-based 
companies, produced similar results. Eight saw EWCs primarily as having a `symbolic value' and half 
the companies said that their EWCs had been beneficial in enabling them to exchange information with 
employee representatives and to involve employees more closely in the business. 
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multinationals than those headquartered in continental Europe (Waddington, 2003). 
British EWC representatives tended not to `punch their weight' within EWCs, 
attributed to their lack of familiarity with works council-type structures and 
consultation with senior management, and their limited infrastructural support at the 
workplace (Hall et al., 2003: 91). 55 Informed by these findings, the study will seek to 
assess the extent to which the operation of ICE arrangements has the capacity to 
advance a learning process of participation and capability for voice, as originally 
envisaged by the ICED. The implementation of the ICED with its emphasis on 
consultation may result in the communication of norms of information and 
consultation to the workplace environment. The research focus is on the dynamics for 
social dialogue, as developed and formalized between management and the employee- 
side within ICE arrangements, and the extent to which such arrangements may induce 
management to consider employee interests on a par with other stakeholders. In this 
context, the extent to which the arrangements develop beyond a purely consultative 
role to actually negotiate on the behalf of the workforce will be explored as well. 
Structural conditions, such as the external market context, may further shape the 
interaction between management and labour. In order to illustrate this point, the study 
will also examine the role of ICE arrangements in restructuring instances. Existing 
evidence suggests that many organizations do not formally involve employees until 
the later stages of change, once management has clearly established how the new 
initiatives will be implemented (see for example, Terry, 1999; Gollan, 2000; Millward 
et al., 2000). More specifically, in the case of collective redundancies, research by 
Hall and Edwards (1999) indicates an approach in terms of basic compliance, rather 
than using the law to improve employment relations within the firms. Decisions to 
proceed to collective redundancies were made by management; consultation with the 
ERs and trade unions took place with regard to the process of handling job losses and 
not on the wider collective redundancies' principles. However, influence on the 
implementation of management decisions and the means to communicate them to 
employees was evident in some cases and a greatest level of clarity and transparency 
was attained than would be otherwise the case. 56 A similar picture was reported in 
relation to transfers of undertakings (Sargeant, 2002). 57 
ss Similar findings were reported by Wills (2000). In a study of an EWC in a company formed by an 
Anglo-French-American merger it was reported that although the UK and France had the same number 
of EWC members, the employee-side tended to be `dominated' by the French representatives due to 
their greater experience of consultation at national level in France. 
56 In a survey of 24 UK, US and Japanese multinationals (a third of which were UK-based companies) 
(ORC, 2003) it was found that while 20 of the companies said they had informed and consulted their 
EWC over instances of corporate restructuring, and most regarded this as beneficial, its impact on the 
`content of the decision' was generally described as `low to non-existent. ' 
57 A 1998 survey on the specific issue of compulsory competitive tendering in local authorities also 
reported that only in 20 per cent of the transfers surveyed were employee informed on the economic 
consequences of the transfers, such as new job and salary structures, and even fewer were told about 
the consequences for existing collective agreements (Painter and Hardy, 1998). 
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Against this background, ICE rights under the ICED can be seen as a means to 
integrate employee interests in restructuring. The transposition of the ICED in the UK 
constitutes a break from previous practice for handling such difficult workplace 
change in three ways. Firstly, through promoting the establishment of permanent 
employee representation structures, it goes beyond the hitherto practice of ad hoc 
arrangements for employee representation in collective redundancies and transfers of 
undertakings and provides instead a vehicle for dealing with such issues as and when 
they arise. Secondly, through extending the statutory requirements to inform and 
consult on matters such as changes in work organization and company structure, the 
ICED promotes the development of an overall organizational approach to staffing 
arrangements. Finally, through its `universal' application, it stipulates ICE rights 
irrespective of trade union recognition or membership. 
Regarding the second field of interaction (table 2.2), that is the internal ICE 
arrangements, the key dimensions are their internal capacity and cohesion (Lecher et 
al., 2001). As Lecher at al., 2001 note, internal capacity presupposes internal 
structures, procedures and individuals as well as a definition of fields of activity. 
Marginson et al., (2004: 214) further suggest, `organization and cohesiveness is 
likely, in turn, to be shaped by several considerations. ' Within the context of the 
ICER, these may include: the nature of the employee-side organization - whether it is, 
in Lamers's (1998) terms, an `agenda' committee, whose activity is confined to 
meeting preparation, or an `executive' committee, which has ongoing liaison between 
members and with the wider employee side and ongoing contact with management 
and acts as a first point of contact for the provision of information and dialogue 
(Marginson et al., 2004: 214); the pattern or relationships between ERs and lines of 
cleavage along issues such as business units/divisions/bands or else the extent to 
which `interest aggregation' can be achieved (Lecher et al., 2001: 49); the existence 
of effective means of communication (Marginson et al., 2004: 214); the propensity of 
the employee side to engage in networking activity (Marginson et al., 2004: 214). All 
these aspects may shape the extent to which ICE arrangements will develop a 
capability for employee voice. 
The third field of interaction (table 2.3), namely that between ERs and the workforce, 
embraces the capacity of the arrangements to engage with the workforce and their 
legitimacy. The capacity to engage with the workforce is concerned with the extent of 
employee coverage in practice, the time allocated to ERs to meet with their 
constituents and the provision and use of facilities to develop communication links 
and receive feedback from the workforce. Concerning legitimacy, Hege and Dufour 
(1995: 85) have suggested that `local representatives derived their legitimacy first and 
foremost from their day-to-day activity on the job, at the level of the employees' 
immediate needs in the workplace; legitimacy is founded on the ways in which 
representatives maintain their links with the workforce and are able to express the 
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identity of the workgroup in their dealings with management. ' Further, Terry (1999) 
has suggested that visible process of consultation with management can confer 
legitimacy on accredited ERs. Against this two-fold definition of legitimacy, the study 
will explore the capacity of ERs to develop and maintain a sense of legitimacy in the 
eyes of the employees. 
The relationship between ICE arrangements and trade unions constitutes the fourth 
field of interaction (table 2.4) and is especially relevant for the examination of the 
development of employee capabilities for collective action. However, this relationship 
cannot be judged solely by the degree to which trade unions are formally included in 
the structures or in the process of information exchange, or by the degree to which 
trade unions directly support these structures, either with expertise or through offering 
a strategic focus. Another equally important factor is whether and to what extent ICE 
arrangements and trade unions, irrespective of whether they act independently of each 
other, co-ordinate their actions and their interests and lend each other indirect support 
and in particular, whether and to what extent ICE structures pursue policies which 
relate to trade union priorities and the extent to which trade unions use ICE structures 
to foster the expansion of trade union work (Lecher et al., 2001: 52). In this context, 
the extent to which the nature of the trade union's role alters as a result of their 
participation in the ICE arrangements will be explored as well. However, the elements 
constituting the fourth field of interaction have to be placed within the parameters of 
the UK context, as outlined in section 2.1.2. 
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2.2 Methodological framework of the study 
The adoption of the `double subsidiarity' mechanism as the guide for the research acts 
as an analytical means to complement the theoretical power of the reflexive regulation 
approach and the view of ICE rights as part of the process of `institutionalizing 
capabilities'. In opting for such a framework, it is possible to offer a critical 
assessment of the role of social actors' participation and the development of a 
reflexive approach to the content of ICE rights in the development of capabilities for 
employee voice. Based on this suggestion, this section turns to examine the 
methodological approach adopted in the study. Given the nature of the statutory 
framework, the research methods are expected to be of a multi-method nature. 
2.2.1. Research methods for the examination of the transposition and 
implementation of the ICED at national level 
Within this context, the research objective is to critically assess the use that was made 
of the reflexive elements of the ICED when proceeding to the transposition and 
implementation of the ICED at meso-level in the UK. In order to do that, a multi- 
method research strategy is adopted that allows for the provision of different insights 
for the systems and actors operating at each stage of the `life' of the ICED. Firstly, the 
attention given to the specific legal and institutional framework for information and 
consultation rights calls for a documentary analysis, which focuses on those produced 
by the UK actors regarding the transposition of the ICED. This analysis provides 
contextual understanding of the emergence of the ICER as it tracks the discussions 
both prior to the transposition of the ICED and with respect to the ongoing legislative 
activities in its wake between the main parties involved in the process, that is the DTI, 
employers' associations, especially the CBI, and trade unions, mainly the TUC. 58 The 
material is in the form of public, unsolicited, i. e. not produced for the research, 
documents. The latter are conceptualized as having a use value, since they were 
created for a particular audience and purpose within the context of the transposition of 
the ICED. 
In conjunction with a documentary analysis of the debate and the proceedings that 
took place with regard to the transposition of the ICED in the UK, semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with a range of EU and UK officials who had 
responsibility for information and consultation of employees' arrangements and were 
involved in consultation with the UK administration regarding the legal transposition 
of the ICED. Interviews with these individuals provided a substantial amount of 
background information needed to understand the discussions which were developed 
in drafting the UK legislation. The combined documentary and interview data were 
used as a means to examine the same dimension of the research problem and cross- 
58 Within this context, research included also an examination of the relevant debates in the UK 
Parliament. 
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validate the findings. This reflects a form of `triangulation' (Webb et al., 1966)59 and 
allows for an assessment of both the outcomes (as depicted by the documents) but 
also the processes involved in the transposition of the ICED. 
A second group of interviews was carried out with a range of organizations 
representing employers, employees and consultancy organizations involved in ICE 
arrangements. Relevant policy and guidance material with regard to the subject-matter 
of information and consultation arrangements issued by these organizations was also 
collected. The objective was to assess the response of the main industrial relations 
actors to the institutional design adopted by the ICER and the use they intended and 
actually made of the ICER at meso-level. The questions were in semi-structured form 
and hence allowed considerable scope for the interviewees to focus on issues that 
were not dealt with in the interview guides. Overall, the officials interviewed were 
from the following organizations alphabetically: 
" Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) 
" Amicus Graphic, Media and Printing (GMP)60 
" Britain's General Union (GMB) 
" Broadcasting Entertainment Cinematograph and Theatre Union (BECTU)61 
" Central Arbitration Committee (CAC) 
" Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) 
" Chemical Industries Association (CIA) 
" Confederation of British Industry (CBI)62 
" Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) 
" Electrical Contractors' Association (ECA) 
" Engineering Employers' Federation (EEF) 
" European Commission63 
59 Triangulation is broadly defined by Denzin (1978: 291) as `the combination of methodologies in the 
study of same phenomenon. ' 
60 In 2007, Amicus merged with the Transport and General Workers Union (T&G) to form Unite the 
Union. As most part of the research was conducted before the merger the thesis continues to refer to the 
separate unions during the analysis of the findings. 
61 The Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW) and the T&G were contacted for 
their views but were not interviewed. In addition, secondary data from e. g. press releases, company 
information, conference/workshop presentations, and information from trade unions, consultancy and 
research organizations with regard to the establishment and/or amendment of existing ICE 
arrangements in organizations operating in the UK covering the period before and after the 
transposition of the ICED in the UK was assembled and analyzed. 
62 A CBI official was interviewed in October 2004. In January 2007 a further interview with a different 
CBI official was carried out. The second interview was part of the project `The Capability Approach 
and the Implementation of EU Social Policy Directives' that was carried out in the Centre for Business 
Research of the University of Cambridge under the supervision of Simon Deakin. Two interviews also 
took place in the case of the TUC, CIA, EOs and IPA. 
63 The first informant was responsible during the period of the adoption of the ICED; the second 
informant was responsible for the EU policy on information and consultation after the ICED was 
adopted. In all the other cases, where further interviews were conducted, these took place with the same 
individuals - the only exception 
being the IPA. 
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" European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) 
" Involvement and Participation Association (IPA) 
" Local Government Employers (LGE) 
" Trade Union Congress (TUC) 
" University and College Union (UCU) 
Third, a survey was commissioned by the CIA and conducted between April and May 
2006. The objective of the survey was two-fold. Firstly, as is generally accepted, the 
WERS series constitutes the most representative national account of the state of 
employment relations and working life inside British workplaces. However, since the 
introduction of the ICER took place in April 2005 - that was after the completion of 
the WERS 2004 fieldwork - it is possible that at the time of the survey the parties at 
most workplaces had not begun to contemplate the implications of the ICER. 64 Thus, 
a survey at a stage when the ICER had already began to apply and which additionally 
concentrated on a specific sector is possibly capable of providing a more accurate - 
albeit limited - picture of the approach that organizations were taking in response to 
the introduction of the ICER. 
The second reason for the conduct of the CIA survey was the active strategy pursued 
by the CIA with regard to industrial relations at sectoral level. In contrast with the 
situation in most UK economic sectors where the instances of sector-level regulation 
of employment relations has been in decline over the last two decades, the chemical 
sector constitutes arguably an exception. 65 More particularly, as part of the CIA's 
vision for a sustainable chemical industry, member-organizations have been 
encouraged to embrace the goal of employee participation `through having in place 
processes for informing and consulting employees on matters that affect their working 
lives' (CIA, 2004). Further, the pharmaceutical segment of the industry is one of the 
few sectors in the UK which has been successful in competing in high-value-added 
markets (see also Temple, 1994; Earl-Slater, 1998). As a result of greater resources 
and higher profit margins, Lloyd and Newell (2001: 358) note that pharmaceutical 
organizations may have the potential to think more long term about managing 
employees than in other major industries in the UK. Because of the CIA's active 
policy, it is interesting to assess the extent to which a kind of residual `associational 
governance' influenced organizational responses to the introduction of the ICER. In 
terms of design, the CIA survey took the form of a brief questionnaire aimed at 
collecting information on existing patterns of ICE arrangements in the chemical 
64 The sixth survey in the WERS series, due towards the end of this decade, will undoubtedly provide 
an authoritative and representative evaluation of the quantitative impact of the Regulations in terms of 
the establishment and operation of information and consultation arrangements in organisations 
operating in Great Britain. 
65 Other active employer' association at sectoral level include the EEF and ECA; interviews took place 
with representatives of these associations. 
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industry and examining simultaneously the approach that CIA member-organizations 
were taking in response to the introduction of the ICER (see appendix A). 66 
The survey questionnaire was distributed to approximately 120 CIA member 
organizations and 38 returns were received -a 32% response rate. Concerning the 
number of workers employed the majority of respondents - 60.5% or 23 organizations 
- fell into the 150+ size bracket, i. e. they were organizations that were already subject 
to the ICER. A further 34.2% (13 organizations) had between 50 and 149 employees, 
so they would be in the second or third wave of organizations covered by the 
Regulations in 2007 or 2008.5.3% (2 organizations) had fewer than 50 employees 
and therefore would not become subject to the legislation. The characteristics of the 
respondent organizations to the CIA survey concerning employment size are broadly 
in line with the relevant characteristics of the CIA membership provided by the CIA 
economic advisor. According to 2006 CIA statistics concerning employment size in 
UK individual sites, 67 88 sites employed less than 100 employees, 89 sites employed 
from 101 to 500 employees, 14 sites had from 501 to 1000 employees, and, finally, 6 
sites had more than 1000 employees. While the CIA data provides the employment 
size of individual sites in the UK it still indicates the diversity - found also in the CIA 
survey - concerning the employment size of the CIA member organizations. Hence, 
in line with the CIA statistics, most of the organizations that responded to the CIA 
survey employed more than 150 employees; however, there were a significant number 
of organizations responding to the CIA survey that employed less than 100 
employees. 
Regarding the activity distribution of the respondent organizations, the majority of 
respondents fell into the chemical activity (89.5% or 34 organizations), with the 
remaining 10.5% (4 organizations) coming from pharmaceutical and plastic 
manufacturing. 63.2% (24 organizations) were organized across multiple sites and 
36.8% (14 organizations) operated in a single site. The CIA survey respondents' 
characteristics concerning main activity are very similar to the data given by the CIA 
Economic Advisor. In terms of the sectors covered in the CIA membership, the 
majority of the companies operating in the UK are involved in the chemical activity 
(87%); 11% of the CIA members are involved in pharmaceutical activity and 2% are 
involved in plastic manufacturing. 
66 A very similar questionnaire had been used for a survey on information and consultation practices 
that was commissioned by the West Midlands Employment Relations Forum (Hall et al., 2004). On the 
basis of the analysis of the findings of this survey, the text of the CIA questionnaire was subsequently 
altered in order to incorporate the feedback received and the particularities of the chemical sector. In 
that way it was possible to enhance the construct validity of the organizing concepts of the CIA 
questionnaire and increase the extent to which it could elicit responses which could constitute 
meaningful indicators of phenomena which are of real significance (Yin, 1994: 34-5). 
67 The data on individual sites was the only readily available data provided by the CIA; it is compiled 
each year as part of the industry's `Responsible Care' programme. 
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Lastly, for the purpose of assessing the impact of the enforcement regime of the 
ICER, in conjunction with interviews conducted with specialists in the field, 
documentary material was collected and assessed. This involved the use of primary, 
e. g. Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) and CAC case law, and secondary, e. g. texts 
and articles, legal sources relevant to the particular legal issue. However the analysis 
aimed at going beyond legal formalism and the exegesis of legal doctrine and 
provides instead evaluative research (Hepple and Brown, 1981) in the sense of 
examining the impact of legal norms on the operation of the enforcement regime of 
the ICER. 
2.2.2 Research methods for the examination of the implementation of the ICED 
at organizational level 
Regarding the impact of the ICED at organizational level, the study is concerned with 
three core themes: the establishment/amendment of ICE arrangements, the structural 
and operational aspects of the ICE agreements, and the operation of the ICE 
arrangements based on four fields of interaction. As provided in the analytical 
framework, the focus on the factors influencing the introduction, text of the ICE 
agreements and operation of ICE arrangements highlights the importance of 
organizational context. In turn, this requires a rigorous qualitative case study 
methodological approach designed to facilitate an understanding of the importance of 
contextual factors influencing the approach to information and consultation adopted 
by each organization. 
Darke et al. (1998) suggest that the use of case study in research is useful in newer 
less well-developed research areas particularly when examination of the context and 
the dynamics of a situation are important. Whilst there is evidence of growing 
research interest in employee representation structures, the introduction of the ICER 
constitutes a new key influence in the structure and processes of employee 
representation at organizational level. Hence, questions of `how' and `why' become 
prominent when attempting to explore the processes triggered by the need to 
implement the ICER and the latter's impact at organizational level. By allowing the 
researcher to engage immediately with social processes, the case study technique 
promises a detailed exploration of the causal mechanisms underlying the associations 
between the various social phenomena observed as these influences operate within the 
boundaries of the unit of analysis (Edwards et al., 1994: 9). Moreover, the conduct of 
case studies offers a means for the detailed examination of management/labour 
relations at organizational level, which is more amenable to an assessment of the daily 
experience of employment relations. Hence, case work may play a role in this context 
by allowing the study of the `real dynamics of micro relations' (Ramsay, 1993). In 
more detail, case study allows the investigation of actual as opposed to espoused 
practice, the assessment of the more diffuse, indirect impacts of legislation and the 
identification and assessment of the role of mediating factors, such as market context, 
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social relations within the firm, the presence and role of trade unions, management 
style, that influence the extent to which the ICED can act as a `social conversion 
factor' for the development of capabilities for voice. 
Based on the above-mentioned issues, an in-depth case study approach was adopted in 
the study. According to Yin (1994: 13), `a case study is an empirical enquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context especially when 
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident. ' In order to 
identify and assess the role of the ICED case studies were conducted in five 
organizations in the UK that had assessed and/or established/amended ICE 
arrangements in light of the new statutory requirements. Reflecting the phased 
implementation of the ICER and conditioned by the time of the research and the 
organizations interested in participating in the study, the case studies were conducted 
in large, i. e. employing more than 150 employees, undertakings. Whilst it has been 
suggested that the impact of the ICER would be greater in smaller organizations (Hall 
and Terry, 2004) an analysis of the ICE arrangements in larger organizations is still of 
significant interest. Firstly, those organizations that agreed to participate in the study 
may be examples of good or better practice in this area and in people management in 
general. Based on this, it is important to examine the impact of the ICER in those 
contexts, as it is arguably there the new legislation has the greater potential to act as a 
means to enhance the capability for employee voice. Secondly, as has been reported in 
successive WERS, it is arguably the case that in larger organizations a plurality of 
employee involvement mechanisms, both in the form of employee representation, i. e. 
though trade unions, and in the form of direct forms of information and consultation, 
is in existence. This is significant from the point of view of examining the challenging 
interaction between such existing forms of representation and the newly 
established/amended arrangements in light of the ICER. 
The overarching concern regarding case study research relates to threats to `external 
validity, i. e. `the extent to which the research findings can be extrapolated beyond the 
immediate research sample' (Johnson and Duberley, 2000: 46). While the number of 
case studies conducted for the study is relatively small, the selection of the 
organizations is intended to reflect the different pressures and conditions operating on 
organizations and to provide a range of contexts in which ICE arrangements were 
developed. The study follows thus a `multiple case logic' (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
According to Eisenhardt (1991: 620), `multiple cases are a powerful means to create 
theory because they permit replication and extension among individual cases' and 
they are consequently viewed as analogous to multiple experiments. Furthermore, 
multiple case studies are seen in this context as able to produce `grand' theory since 
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they offer an accumulation of both theory-building and theory-testing empirical 
studies (Eisenhardt, 1989: 546). 68 
Hence, the research sets out to provide a qualitative picture of the impact of the new 
employment legislation on ICE arrangements at organizational level; it does not aim 
to provide survey estimates of the impact of the legislation. Instead, acknowledging 
that the objects of science are not primarily empirical regularities, but structures and 
mechanisms, the purpose of the study is to examine and assess the likely patterns of 
the implementation of the ICER, the processes through which ICE arrangements were 
established or amended and to explore the extent to which the institutionalization of 
ICE rights can act as a `social conversion factor' for the development of capabilities 
for participation and voice at organizational level. In that way, the study is concerned 
with `analytical' not `statistical' generalization, the objective being to generalize 
theories `rather than enumerate frequencies' (Yin, 1994: 10). As Mitchell (1983: 203) 
also notes, the extent to which generalization may be made from case studies depends 
upon the adequacy of the underlying theory and the whole corpus of related 
knowledge of which the case is analyzed rather than on the particular instance itself. 
Whilst the selection of organizations is largely pragmatic, the aim for a theoretical 
rather than random sampling conditioned significantly the choices made. According to 
Eisenhardt (1989: 537), `the goal of theoretical sampling is to choose cases which are 
likely to replicate or extend the emergent theory. ' The five case studies cover a variety 
of circumstances, which also constitute the selection criteria, including: sector of 
economic activity, history of presence/recognition of trade unions, history of other 
employee representative structures, and formal competence of the ICE arrangements 
(table 2.5). 
68 Regarding construct validity, the use of multiple case studies is argued to have the ability to generate 
theory with less researcher bias than theory built from one case study (Eisenhardt, 1989: 546). 
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The primary selection criteria are the presence/recognition of trade unions and the formal 
competence of the ICE arrangements in order to show five extreme `case study' situations 
that may vary on the aforementioned aspects (Maylor and Blackmon, 2005: 249). 
Regarding trade union presence the picture is varied. Finl has a long established union 
recognition agreement in all but one workplace sites. In BS3 there is evidence of site- 
level employment relations as two unions are recognized in some sites as a result of 
acquisitions or the application of TUPE. Similarly, in BS 1 TUPE acted as a catalyst to the 
introduction of two unions in one of BS 1's units. Whilst the unions were recognized 
during the process for the establishment of the ICE arrangements, the actual operation of 
the consultative arrangements has taken place in a non-union environment. Lastly, Fin2 is 
a non-union organization, although attempts had been made several times by a union to 
actively organize in one site (see Appendix B for the organizational context of the case 
studies). 
Concerning the formal competence of the forums, there is some variation in the range of 
issues the forums may deal with. Whilst in the cases of Fin 1, Fin2 and BS2 the forums 
are entitled to consultation regarding collective redundancies and transfers of 
undertakings, BS 1 excludes consultation on these issues and in BS3 consultation with the 
forum on such issues depends on the number of affected sites. In turn, the differences in 
the formal competence of the forums may have implications for the development of 
discursive decision-making processes between management and labour involvement 
especially in market contexts where restructuring instances are more likely. Against such 
instances, the introduction of a regulatory framework that institutionalizes employee 
representation rights can act as a platform for the expansion of capabilities for 
participation and voice in organizational decision-making. In order to examine this 
hypothesis, the study concentrates on organizations operating in the financial and 
business services sectors. 71 Both sectors have experienced significant restructuring 
recently, fuelled by a combination of legislative reform, the expansion of production 
range, the opening of global markets, technological innovation and economic recession. 
Regarding banking and insurance activities, the change in the legislative and regulatory 
framework through the Financial Services and Building Society Acts of 1986 collapsed 
the hitherto sharp distinctions between the discrete banking, insurance and mortgage 
markets (Taylor et al., 2007: 31). The impact of these market shifts have been and remain 
the emergence of intense competition and marked trends towards mergers and 
71 According to the `Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community' (NACE) system, 
the financial intermediation sector comprises both financial intermediation in the form of monetary and 
other intermediation but also insurance and pension 
funding. The business services sector comprises real 
estate, renting and business activities. 
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acquisitions (Morris et al., 2001). As a result of technical innovations, the financial 
services sector has been very active in respect of the migration, mainly to India, of both 
telecentre services and back office processes (Taylor and Bain, 2003; 2006). Concerning 
the business sector, it has become during the recent years one of the fastest developing in 
the UK. Total UK employment grew by 14% or 3.6 million jobs between 1984 and 2001. 
Business services accounted for over half of that growth (Abramovsky et al., 2004: 6). 
The rapid growth in the sector reflects the vast economies of scale that business service 
providers make available to companies in other sectors of the economy through the 
outsourcing of the latter's activities. IT is by far the most outsourced business function 
and the fastest growing. As a result of the outsourcing activity, the composition of the 
workforce and terms and conditions of employment may become more diverse. 
Whilst both sectors face significant challenges as a result of offshoring and outsourcing 
activity, a marked difference exists concerning trade union presence and recognition. The 
financial intermediation sector has had a long tradition of non-union staff representation 
or representation by dependent staff associations (Upchurch et al., 2006: 395). This is in 
addition to sections of trade union representation. Whilst in the past the independent 
unions representing the sector recorded low levels of militancy, in the 1990s, Gall, (1999) 
recorded a change in bank workers' attitudes towards a more collective and pro-union 
orientation driven by work intensification and regimentation. 72 In contrast to the situation 
in the finance sector, the business services sector has been traditionally characterized by a 
low union membership rate and incidence of recognition. 
The case studies, conducted from September 2005 to May 2006, involved personal 
interviews with the key-actors such as management, trade unions - where existing - and 
ERs, in conjunction with non-participant observation of meetings between management 
and labour - where possible73 - and collection of relevant documentary material, such as 
the constitution of the ICE arrangements, minutes of the meetings and company policies 
with regard to employee participation. The case studies were conducted on the basis of a 
common template covering the general IR background and other indirect and direct 
methods of employee representation, the origins, agreements, functioning and impact of 
the ICE arrangements. Their depth varied according to the level of access granted by the 
participant organizations and the complexity of the organizations. Within the context of 
the case studies, a checklist for ICE agreements was developed and utilized (see 
72 At the same time, the finance sector showed an above-average incidence of new partnership agreements 
from the late 1990s (Gall, 2000). However, the common theme has been employers' interest in gaining 
legitimacy for HRM regimes supportive of current business priorities (Terry, 2003: 469). 
73 In three organisations, i. e. Finl, BS1 and BS2, non-participant observation of the 
ICE meetings took 
place. 
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Appendix C) so as to examine the actual texts of the ICE agreements as set against the 
requirements stipulated in the ICER for the PEAs and the standard information and 
consultation procedure. The aim was to provide a micro-level analysis of the structural 
and operational aspects outlined by the agreements. The structural aspects concern, 
among others, the ICE arrangements' composition, geographical scope and the business 
structure covered, while the operational aspects include issues such as the role and 
competence of the ICE arrangements as stipulated in the agreements, the processes of 
agenda setting and reporting back, the issues the ICE arrangements are supposed to deal 
with, the availability of training, confidentiality provisions and the role of experts. 
The number of interviews varied between minimum six (6) interviews and maximum 
fifteen (15) interviews. In each case, the management representatives interviewed 
included the senior manager with co-ordination responsibility for the ICE arrangements 
and other senior, i. e. business and HR, managers regularly involved in ICE meetings. On 
the employee side, in each case representatives who were members of the ICE 
arrangements were interviewed and, where recognized, trade union officials and trade 
union representatives that acted or not as ICE representatives as well. The semi-structured 
interviews had predetermined questions but the order was modified based upon the 
interviewer's perception of what seemed most appropriate. In that way they enabled the 
study to focus not only on the meaning of particular phenomena, such as the interaction 
between the various protagonists in the establishment and operation of the ICE 
arrangements, but also on the historical accounts of how these phenomena developed 
across a specific period of time. The case study visits took place over an extended period 
of time, around six months, allowing for an assessment of the development of the ICE 
arrangements. Repeat interviews were also conducted in some cases when the company 
reports were submitted. 
Concerning the analysis of case study findings, a `within case analysis' (Eisenhardt, 
1989: 540) was followed. As Eisenhardt (1989: 533) suggests, such practice both helps 
the researcher to reduce an enormous volume of data and similarly `gives investigators a 
rich familiarity with each case which, in turn, accelerates cross-case comparison. ' In 
essence, the approach adopted is perhaps best described as pragmatic grounded theory of 
the form outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994). Their methods are inductive and their 
analytical techniques tend towards the orderly and formal. The general approach focuses 
on data reduction, display and interpretation to make sense of substantial bodies of 
unedited text. The process was as follows. Firstly, all the interviews were fully 
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transcribed. Subsequently, specific themes were identified within the interview data. 74 An 
attempt was then made to establish links between the themes and discover relationships 
and to interrogate the data from the perspective of the present analytical framework and 
research focus. Following this, an account for each case study, in which the main essence 
of the establishment and operation of the ICE arrangements was depicted, was 
constructed. Regarding the presentation of the case study findings, the part of the thesis 
that deals with the latter is presented as thematically-based chapters rather than individual 
case studies, i. e. it moves in a `cross case' logic/analysis. This assists in the attainment of 
both analytical and theoretical clarity and facilitates the systematic cross-case comparison 
of the various issues raised in line with the analytical framework. As a result of the 
analysis, a typology of ICE arrangements is developed, based on the previous typologies 
advanced in the case of EWCs by Marginson et al. (1998) and Lecher et al. (200 1). 75 
However, overall the research objective is not just to make comparisons between the case 
studies but also to provide an analysis of the interaction between the actors as developed 
within the context of the new arrangements across the sample as a whole. 
2.2.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the analytical and methodological framework of the study was presented. 
Without a better view on how the hybrid institutional design of the ICED is transposed 
and more importantly implemented, i. e. how organizations are actually responding to 
reflexive regulation, there can hardly be a satisfying evaluation of the linkages between 
the changing regulatory approach of EU labour law and policy scene and the 
development of a learning process of participation and of developing capabilities. Before 
proceeding to an assessment of the changes `on the ground' the thesis will turn to 
examine how the indirect and reflective forms of norms-making were developed, 
monitored and enforced during the respective processes, i. e. transposition, monitoring 
and enforcement. Whilst the following chapter deals with the process and participation of 
the CBI and the TUC in the transposition of the ICED, chapter four deals with the 
application of the legislation at meso-level and the operation of its enforcement 
mechanism. 
74 A theme is defined as a way to get out a meaning and describe it, as a means to give shape and form to 
meaning, and is always a reduction from it (Van Manen, 1990: 88). 
75 Similarly, Hyman (2000: 6) has called for the development of the so-called `classificatory instruments', 
which will explain variation in behaviour and implications of consultative arrangements in the case of the 
EWCD. 
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Chapter 3. The operation of the double subsidiarity mechanism at national level: the 
transposition of the ICED in the UK 
Viewing the ICED as a key tool in allowing EU law to become embedded in the national 
legal and IR systems, the present chapter examines the process for the re- 
contextualization of EU-level norms, as stipulated in the ICED, in the new network of 
legal distinctions, as developed during the process for its transposition in the UK. The 
analysis proceeds on the basis that the participation of the CBI and TUC in the drafting of 
the legislation led to the development of a relationship of interdependence between the 
EU legal system and the UK social systems. This is evident in the way a range of difficult 
issues whose resolution was, in effect, relegated by the ICED to the national level were 
transplanted in the national legal system through the involvement of the two sides of 
industry and the mediation of political priorities, as delineated by the DTI. It has to be 
stressed here that the chapter is not concerned with a legal analysis of the ICER's 
requirements; 76 instead, the focus is on the involvement of the `two sides of industry', as 
located within the UK IR system, as well as the UK government's policy and priorities 
that led to the re-contextualization of the EU-level norms concerning employee 
representation. 
3.1 The process of the transposition of the ICED in the UK and the position of the 
main parties 
The negative stance of the UK government to the adoption of the ICED is well 
documented. " In essence, the UK government argued against the European 
Commission's proposal on the basis that a directive on ICE procedures applicable at 
national level would `cut across existing practices in member states to no benefit' and 
that it `was difficult to reconcile it with subsidiarity'. 78 Following the collapse of an 
Anglo-German `deal' that involved UK support for German concerns regarding the 
European Company Statute and the re-election of the Labour government in 2001, the 
latter was forced to withdraw its opposition. When the ICED was finally adopted, the 
UK government attempted to promote the transposition of the ICED through emphasizing 
the possibilities for flexible compliance. In July 2002 the DTI published the discussion 
paper `High Performance Workplaces: The Role of Employee Involvement in a Modern 
Economy' that prefigured the transposition and outlined the arguments concerning 
establishing statutory ICE rights. As stated in the document, the objective was `to respect 
and build on' existing information and consultation practice in the UK, including direct 
76 For a legal analysis of the compatibility of the ICER with the existing legal framework and issues of 
compliance of the ICER to the ICED see, for example, Davies and Kilpatrick (2004), Hall (2005), Ewing 
and Truter (2005), and Welch (2006). 
77 See, for example, Hall et al., (2002) and Bercusson (2001). 
78 DTI, Memorandum to House of Commons Trade and Industry Committee (19 November 1998). 
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forms of employee involvement. The transposing legislation would `not be imposed on 
workforces, but will give those who want it the right to information and consultation' 
(DTI, 2002: 4). A `one size fits all' approach was rejected. Instead, the scope for 
flexibility, which was claimed to be partly a success of the UK government lobbying 
during the process for the adoption of the ICED, was reiterated through the emphasis, 
firstly, on the staged transposition of the ICED, and, secondly, the significant leeway that 
the ICED provided regarding the conclusion of ICE agreements between management 
and labour. However, where agreements could not be reached, there would be a `statutory 
minimum requirement for formal information and consultation procedures consistent with 
the arrangements laid out in the Directive' (DTI, 2002: 10). 
Building on an initial round of consultation with a range of individual businesses and 
their representatives, unions and employment experts, the government held discussions 
with the CBI, the TUC and a range of other organizations about the details of 
implementation. During the first half of 2003, the DTI invited CBI and TUC 
representatives to take part in discussions with ministers about how the UK should 
transpose the ICED within a structure set by the government. The structure revolved 
around the avoidance of a `single, static model for information and consultation, and that 
the legislation should `create room for wide diversity of practices that have built over the 
years, combining both representative and direct forms of participation' (DTI, 2003a: 5). 
A DTI official involved in the drafting of the legislation gave the following explanation 
for the involvement of the two sides of industry in the transposition of the ICED: 
`Primarily, to build a consensus so we could say we had listened to what a lot of 
people have said in terms of the general thinking behind the way we should introduce 
the legislation. We have now sat down with the CBI and TUC to produce an outline 
framework so it is clear that we have a broad consensus... Secondly, this should make 
it easier to go on and develop the legislation. When we went out to further 
consultation, because it was clear that we had talked to a lot of people by that time, 
we had support for it. And this was a good way to do it. It fits with the maximizing 
potential in the workplace objective as well; we can build a good story around it. ' 
(DTI official) 
It is important to outline here the position of the two sides of industry, i. e. TUC and CBI, 
regarding the introduction of the `rung two' form of representation (TUC, 1995). 
79 
Originally, statutory ICE requirements, irrespective of trade union membership, were not 
welcomed by trade unions as they were perceived as inconsistent with the spirit of 
79 `Rung two' refers to legally based forms of information exchange and consultation between management 
and employee representatives (McCarthy, 2000: 530). 
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voluntarism. Any proposal for the introduction of `works councils' for the purpose of 
information and consultation was further considered as a risk either to `duplicate existing 
structures' which would have been `superfluous', or `to supersede existing trade union 
arrangements' (TUC 1973: para 94). In opting for an effective base for trade union growth 
- both in terms of membership and influence - the TUC's position was in line with the 
Donovan Commission's view that voluntary collective bargaining backed by a wide 
ranging immunity from the civil law was all that the union movement needed. Trade 
union attitudes changed in the 1990s, in a period when union membership fell below a 
third of the workforce and collective bargaining coverage below a half. Recognizing that 
the previous regime did not help substantially the union movement in organizing in 
sectors where the threat of industrial action was not potent, the 1995 `Your Voice at 
Work' included consideration of other forms of employee representation. During the 
process of the adoption of the ICED, the alignment of the UK Government's position and 
discourse with that of the CBI was particularly criticized. 80 Overall, the final text of the 
ICED was described by a TUC official as a `rather radical but weak piece of legislation'. 
Whilst it filled the legislative vacuum concerns were expressed regarding certain issues: 
the absence of a formal role for `external' trade union organizations in the ICE procedure; 
the weak sanctions available; the possibility that the translation of the notion of 
`management and labour' would allow the CBI to interpret this so as to argue for the 
inclusion in the definition of non-union bodies and finally the lack of clarity in the 
provisions dealing with the substance, timing and issues for consultation and use of 
experts. 
In contrast, from the employers' side, mainly the CBI, the introduction of statutory 
requirements for ICE rights have been traditionally resisted on the basis that such 
legislation would increase `red tape' and delay organizational decision-making (CBI 
interviewee). Concerning specifically the EC proposal, the CBI strongly opposed it and 
argued that it breached the principle of subsidiarity. It further suggested that the proposal 
would damage small and medium enterprises and that although effective employee 
involvement is critical to business success, it cannot not be legislated; instead the 
development of consultative arrangements should be a matter for the parties involved, i. e. 
management and employees, to decide. When the ICED was adopted, the CBI (2002a) 
issued a statement saying that it was `deeply disappointed by the agreement of this 
dossier. Nonetheless, the current text contains some useful flexibilities that will help limit 
its damaging impact. We will want to make full use of these in the implementation 
process. ' 
80 The CBI interviewee also noted that there was no time when there were differing opinions between the 
government and the CBI during the opposition to the adoption of the 
directive. 
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Both industrial relations actors accepted the invitation for discussion from the DTI. 8I The 
TUC official involved in the process stressed that the TUC saw particular political 
benefits in achieving a national social partner style framework agreement as the basis for 
the UK's transposition of the legislation. Whilst seeing the ICED as `the bedrock for the 
extension of effective partnership working in the UK' (Monks, 2002), a major concern 
identified was ensuring that the legislation would not only provide new rights of 
information and consultation but would do so in a way which `would mesh effectively 
with existing union recognition and bargaining arrangements and provide a platform for, 
not an obstacle to, the further spread of union recognition. ' (TUC interviewee) 
Subsequently, the TUC's priorities were to secure trade union representatives' role and 
rights on issues subject to bargaining, and to establish permanent, negotiated information 
and consultation procedures. 82 In 2002, the TUC made the following recommendations: 
legislation should be based on the principle that information and consultation should be 
via union representatives where unions are recognized, and otherwise via independent 
representatives elected by employees; flexibility should be allowed in the nature of 
information and consultation arrangements by agreement with trade unions; in the 
absence of agreed arrangements, recognized unions or employees should be able to 
trigger negotiations with management about the establishment of the necessary 
information and consultation arrangements and a statutory scheme should be prescribed 
as a fallback; a 10% threshold applied across a nationwide undertaking could be 
impossible to meet; legislation should be clear and sufficiently detailed to ensure that 
employers, unions and employees know what is expected of them, despite pressure for a 
`light-touch' approach to regulation; the ICED's requirements in terms of the timing and 
subject matter and of information and consultation should be clarified; speedy and 
accessible mechanisms should be provided for resolving disputes about the application of 
the legislation, with effective sanctions to ensure proper compliance; provisions should 
be put into place to ensure that the new legislation does not cut across recognized unions' 
existing consultation rights in respect of redundancies and transfers, nor inhibits unions' 
use of the statutory recognition procedure (Monks, 2002). 
On the employers' side, the CBI adopted a more pragmatic stance and attempted to 
ensure that the transposing legislation would `not have that much of an impact on UK 
businesses or that much of the adverse impact' (CBI interviewee). The general suggestion 
of CBI was that the government should take a `light touch' approach to transposing the 
81 The TUC interviewee emphasized that the CBI was initially reluctant to enter into discussions. 
82 Other key issues that were identified by the TUC interviewee included the following: the range of 
subjects to be included in the list for information and consultation; the situation in companies with mixed 
constituencies; the legal enforceability of the information and consultation agreements; the overlap with 
TUPE and the Collective Redundancies Regulations; the supervision of ballots; and, finally, the position of 
part-timers. 
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ICED, preserving as much scope for flexibility and diversity of arrangements as possible 
(CBI, 2002a). The main concerns for the CBI were to retain the spirit of voluntarism in 
the ICE arrangements through protecting pre-existing arrangements, to promote the 
establishment of a trigger mechanism in order to avoid a minority of employees 
challenging arrangements that were already in place, to render possible to have pre- 
existing and negotiated agreements covering more than one undertaking, and to provide 
for direct forms of information and consultation as a means of complying with the 
legislation (CBI interviewee). 
In July 2003 an agreed framework for implementing the legislation, the so-called `outline 
scheme', was published together with draft legislation in the DTI's `High Performance 
Workplaces-Informing and Consulting Employees' discussion document. 83 The outline 
scheme, which was agreed between the DTI, the CBI and TUC, constituted, in effect, the 
foundation for the transposition of the `soft' elements of the directive. The government 
invited again comments about how the proposed legislation would work in practice and 
information about the nature and scope of guidance and support. In 7 July 2004, the DTI 
published a revised draft of the ICER84 and consultative guidance on their 
implementation together with a document detailing the response to the various comments 
received for the 2003 discussion document from employers, unions and other interested 
parties. ACAS produced in collaboration with the DTI, CBI and TUC a good practice 
advice guide in order to help employers, employees and ERs to reach agreements in the 
light of the ICER. On the 2nd of November 2004, the DTI published the government's 
response to the public consultation on the draft DTI guidance that was issued in July of 
the same year and a summary guidance to the new legislation. The final form of the ICER 
was published in December 2004.85 It has to be added here that primary powers based on 
Employment Relations Acts were given to transpose the ICED. More specifically, clause 
83 Outstanding issues, for which the DTI invited comments and suggestions, were the following: the level 
of consultation, the interface of ICE arrangements with existing information and consultation requirements 
and the relationship of ICE arrangements to collective agreements with trade unions. 
84 The main changes to the draft ICER included: allowing ICE agreements that cover more than one 
undertaking; clarifying that collective agreements with trade unions may constitute valid PEAs, but that 
EWC agreements are excluded; requiring that, where employees request new negotiations despite there 
being a PEA, the request must be endorsed in a ballot not only by 40% of the employees in the undertaking 
but also by the majority of those voting; extending the time limit for starting negotiations following an 
employee request from one to three months; providing that, where the `standard information and 
consultation provisions' apply, there will be a minimum of two information and consultation 
representatives; amending the standard ICE provisions to provide that, where employers are obliged to 
inform and consult under the legislation on redundancies and transfers, they need not additionally consult 
information and consultation representatives under the ICER; and bringing the ICER 
into force on April 6 
2005, not the deadline of 23 March 2005 specified by the ICED. 
85 Under Schedule 1, the ICE Regulations apply initially (from 6 April 2005) to undertakings with 150 or 
more employees, but will be extended in two further stages to cover undertakings with at 
least 100 
employees (from April 2007) and then those with at 
least 50 (from April 2008). 
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42 of the ERA 2004 conferred a power on the Secretary of State to make regulations 
about employees' rights to be informed or consulted by the employer in Britain. The 
decision was made on the basis that the powers under section 2(2) of the European 
Communities Act 1972, which are usually used to implement EU Directives, were not 
sufficiently wide to cover aspects of the proposed Regulations (DTI, 2004b). 
3.2 Examination of key issues 
This section analyzes the position adopted by the DTI and the `two sides of industry' 
during the process for the transposition of the ICED with regard to the key features of the 
ICER, as identified by the parties involved in the process for the agreement on the outline 
scheme and the final ICER. It has to be stressed here that the aspects of the ICED that 
were left to be determined by member states were the following: whether to apply the 
ICED at undertaking- or establishment-level; whether to enable negotiated information 
and consultation arrangements which may differ from the provisions of the directive; the 
designation of the `employees' representatives' who are to be informed and consulted; 
the conditions under which management may withhold confidential information from 
ERs and; the enforcement mechanisms and sanctions that will be available in case of non- 
compliance with the ICED. In turn, the outline scheme included proposals for 
negotiations on ICE procedures to be triggered by employee request and for endorsement 
ballots where PEAs were in place. It outlined statutory provisions, applicable where no 
negotiated agreement was reached, involving an 'I&C committee' (though the ICER do 
not specify a representative body as such) with representatives elected by employee ballot 
as well and compliance and enforcement provisions. As Hall (2005: 110) also suggests, 
while the agreement made no explicit reference to enabling direct ICE forms it did state 
that `the parties to a negotiated agreement will be able to agree the information and 
consultation arrangements that best suit their needs and circumstances. The government 
will provide guidance and greater clarity on this'. 86 It has to be noted here that once the 
outline scheme was agreed with the CBI and the TUC, there would be no changes to that 
(DTI interviewee). 
3.2.1 Nature of the agreements and the trigger mechanism 
A key DTI objective was that the establishment of ICE arrangements should conform to 
the encouragement of `partnership and flexibility' and the promotion of high 
organizational performance, as promoted in the national agenda (DTI interviewee). In 
line with this and reflecting the results from the 2002 public consultation the following 
issues were identified as crucial by the DTI: a rigid `one size fits all' approach should not 
86 Whilst the examination of the specific issues stresses mostly the outcomes 
from the discussions held 
between the DTI, CBI and TUC concerning the outline scheme, the analysis also addresses issues that were 
dealt after the conclusion of the outline scheme. 
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be followed; agreements should be voluntary; pre-existing arrangements should not be 
eroded; ICE arrangements should be allowed for establishments and groups of companies 
and; finally, the arrangements should be driven by employee demand (DTI interviewee). 
In terms of its institutional design, the DTI wished to reject a `copy-out' approach to the 
transposition of the ICED and to take full advantage of the flexibilities provided in the 
final text of the ICED so as to allow compliance via PEAs or negotiated agreements. The 
DTI interviewee noted that the general model favoured for the legislative framework was 
that of the TICER. 
Concerning the nature of the agreements, both the CBI and the TUC stressed that the 
establishment of ICE arrangements should mesh effectively with the spirit of voluntarism 
that had until hitherto been the guiding principle regarding employee representation. The 
CBI urged the government to provide businesses with the maximum amount of freedom 
to find the ICE mechanisms that work for them, rather than having them imposed by the 
legislation (CBI interviewee). In this context, the DTI should make maximum use of the 
flexibility allowed in art. 5 of the ICED so that employers could opt out of art. 4 of the 
ICED and instead, with employee support, implement requirements more suited to the 
companies' needs. This included allowing flexibility for companies to turn existing 
arrangements into agreements and flexibility to negotiate different agreements after the 
ICED had come into force. On the TUC side, in its response to the DTI consultation it 
was stated `the TUC is not recommending a highly prescriptive approach to UK 
implementation, i. e. establishing a single statutory information and consultation 
framework which would apply in every undertaking. This would be widely seen as 
incompatible with the UK's `voluntarist' industrial relations traditions' (TUC, 2002, para 
7.6). A combination of flexibility with minimum standards was suggested by: 
establishing a general duty on employers to carry out the necessary ICE procedures as 
required by the ICED, where required by employees; allowing employers and employees 
to determine the practical ICE arrangements via negotiated agreements; in the absence of 
agreed ICE arrangements, enabling employees to seek the establishment of the necessary 
arrangements via some form of trigger mechanism; and making provision for a statutory 
fallback framework to be enforced on employers who are unwilling to introduce the 
necessary ICE arrangements by agreement. Whilst the potential for compliance through 
PEAs and negotiated agreements was welcomed, particular importance was given to the 
need that the agreements should not be foisted upon' employees. Instead, there should be 
parameters on what could qualify as PEAs and that the process for negotiating and 
agreeing agreements where the trigger had been pulled would provide a genuine 
agreement (TUC interviewee). The DTI welcomed the fact that both sides agreed with the 
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scope for transposition delineated by the government (DTI interviewee). 87 There was 
further no disagreement concerning the possibility for concluding PEAs even after the 
coming into force of the Regulations, as long as the agreements would satisfy specific 
criteria for the issue of employee approval. 88 
In contrast to the approach adopted for the transposition of the other `soft' provisions of 
the ICED, the transposition of the `standard provisions' for information and consultation, 
as stipulated in art. 5 of the ICED, were largely `copied out' in the outline scheme and the 
final ICER. 89 According to the DTI official, the intention was the `standard provisions' 
model to act both as a `last resort' mechanism, but also to influence the way negotiations 
would take place in the development of PEAs and negotiated agreements and limit the 
extent to which employees would agree substandard provisions on information and 
consultation. Whilst the copy-out approach was favoured by the CBI, weaknesses 
concerning the provisions on substantial issues, such as information and consultation 
matters, timing of consultation and access to experts were identified by the TUC not only 
in the `standard provisions' but also in the PEAs and negotiated agreements options. The 
TUC interviewee expressed concerns that the provisions run short of ensuring that the 
required procedures are effective and would not be treated as a `cosmetic device' by 
employers. In the TUC's view, the weaknesses in the final ICER reflected not only 
similar weaknesses of the ICED but also the successful attempts by the CBI during and 
after the conclusion of the outline scheme to persuade the DTI to avoid the `gold-plating' 
of the ICER. 
In the context of agreeing different types of ICE arrangements, the establishment of a 
trigger mechanism constituted an essential factor in ensuring political consensus and 
87 According to the DTI official, divergence of views was reported concerning the extent to which it would 
be possible to allow for PEAs and negotiated agreements to operate at a level other than that of 
undertaking. The CBI was keen for companies to be allowed to set up different arrangements at different 
levels (CBI, 2003, para 12). Whilst this was not included in the outline scheme, this is the way the final 
ICER have been framed concerning PEAs and negotiated agreements. Moreover, regarding the calculation 
of employee numbers for determining the application of the ICER, the TUC was strongly against the 
proposals to count a part-time worker as half a person for this purpose. The final ICER stipulate that it is up 
to the employer to decide whether to regard part-time employees as half rather than a whole person (reg 4 
(3)). 
88 With reference to this option - that a PEA can be agreed at any time provided 
it has been implemented by 
the date the trigger occurs, as stipulated in reg 2- it could be suggested that the ICER may not comply with 
the ICED requirements regarding timing since the ICER require only that a PEA is in place at the time of a 
trigger, and not on the date when the ICED came into force (Ewing and Truter, 2005: 631). 
89 Under the `other provisions' section of the outline scheme, confidential information, protection of I&C 
representatives, appointment of I&C representatives in the absence of a negotiated agreement, and election 
ballot arrangements, would be modelled on those in the TICER. It 
is important to stress here that as a result 
of the modelling of the ICER on the TICER, there is no provision 
in the ICER for the right of employee 
representatives to time off for training. 
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support by the main policy actors to the ICER. 90 Whilst the ICED does not provide for a 
trigger mechanism as such (Davies and Kilpatrick, 2004: 149-150; Sisson, 2002) recital 
15 states: `This Directive is without prejudice to national systems regarding the exercise 
of this right in practice where those entitled to exercise it are required to indicate their 
wish collectively. ' The implication of referring to the `right' to information and 
consultation in the ICED is that employees may not necessarily exercise it and that 
employers need not be obliged to inform and consult where this is the case (Hall et al., 
2002: 9). In the 2002 DTI paper information and consultation were described as a right 
for those who want it and it was further suggested that arrangements should not be 
imposed, but triggered by the relevant parties. The DTI interviewee justified the 
preference for a trigger mechanism by the necessity to show there is a degree of support 
for ICE arrangements and by the message coming out of the 2002 consultation that 
legislation should not do away with effective pre-existing arrangements. 
On the industrial relations actors' side, both the TUC and the CBI interviewees noted that 
the imposition of a trigger mechanism was one of the first areas to be resolved in the 
discussions with the DTI. For the TUC, the establishment of a trigger mechanism would 
ensure that if there is a challenge to an existing system that is union supported or a union 
agreement, it would have to be endorsed by a minimum of 10% of employees. This 
should prevent firstly challenges by individual employees who are disgruntled with a 
union for some reason. Secondly, in a non-recognized workplace, it would ensure that the 
union had sufficient support to allow it to negotiate a lasting and workable system (Veale, 
2005). In that respect, the trigger mechanism was described by a TUC official as the 
flexible friend of unions'. The CBI wished equally to protect existing arrangements so 
that its members would not have to face disruption in the ways the arrangements operated 
and supported the introduction of a trigger mechanism in the ICER. 91 
An `opt-in-approach' was adopted in the outline scheme and the final ICER so that 
employers are required to act only when a request for ICE mechanisms is made by a 
certain proportion of the workforce. There was reportedly disagreement regarding the 
90 The outline scheme stipulated that subject to the existence of valid pre-existing agreements, the employer 
must establish ICE procedures where a valid request has been made by employees. The request must be 
made in writing by 10% of the employees in the undertaking, subject to a minimum of 15 employees and a 
maximum of 2,500 employees. Where an employee request is made but there is already a pre-existing 
agreement with employees in place the employer would have the option to organize a ballot of all the 
employees in the undertaking so employees have the opportunity to endorse or reject the initial request 
made by the 10%. 
91 However, as suggested by Davies and Kilpatrick (2004: 149) UK law positively excludes representation 
in the case of the trigger mechanism. In other words, whilst 
in the TICER the trigger allows either 100 
employees or employee representatives representing that number of employees to request a 
EWC the ICER 
require that only the employees themselves (10% of employees, and a minimum of 
15) can make a valid 
request. 
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level of workplace support that should be required for the initiation of the process for 
establishing ICE arrangements under the ICER. Initially, the TUC had argued for 2-3 per 
cent while the CBI had opted for 20 per cent. A compromise was finally reached between 
the parties and both the outline scheme and the ICER require 10% of employees, and a 
minimum of 15 employees, to make a valid request to the employer for the establishment 
of ICE arrangements. Further, as stipulated by the final ICER, where 10% of the 
workforce wants to hold negotiations on new arrangements, qualifying existing 
arrangements can be maintained unless a majority of those who vote in it, as well as at 
least 40% of the workforce endorses the request for new negotiations in a ballot. 92 There 
was reportedly divergence over this form of `double trigger' as well with the TUC 
arguing initially for a lower level while the CBI supported 40 per cent threshold. 
However, it was later accepted that anything less onerous would have exposed existing 
93 agreements (including trade union agreements) to `easy challenge' (TUC official). 
3.2.2 Employee representation 
With its company-based collective bargaining system, a potential difficulty in the UK is 
that where ICE arrangements are established alongside bargaining arrangements, 
competition can arise between the two bodies. There is already a problem of, as Ewing 
(2001) puts it, `institutional incoherence' in the system of collective representation, a 
problem which, as Bercusson (2001) points out, is compounded by the `multitude of 
representational possibilities' in the 1999 TICER. Notwithstanding the fact that the ICED 
does not require ICE arrangements to take place with union representatives and in spite of 
the concerns in certain unions that the ICER could dilute existing collective bargaining 
arrangements or lead to the creation of rival non-union structures within the workplace, 
the TUC largely welcomed the opportunities offered by the ICER. In the discussions held 
between the parties, the TUC argued that the ICER should provide that in workplaces 
where there is a recognized trade union, the representatives should be representatives of 
the trade unions and in workplaces without a recognized trade union, the representatives 
should be elected by all employees in accordance with a clear statutory procedure. 
According to the TUC interviewee, such a system would not only avert the development 
of competition between the ICE arrangements and the unions and secure the 
92 The first draft ICER stated that 140% of employees in the undertaking endorse the employee request (reg 
8 (5) (b)). According to the policy actors' interviews, the insertion of the `majority of those who vote' was 
a result of the insistence of the CBI (see also, CBI, 2003, para 14). 
93 Agreement on the criteria for the protection of PEAs was also reached. According to this, PEAs `must 
cover all the employees in the undertaking, must be in writing so that everyone is clear what is involved, 
and not consist of arrangements unilaterally imposed by management without any discussion with 
employees and where employees have had no opportunity to signify their approval. ' The final ICER 
provide in reg 8(1) that the PEA must be in writing, cover all employees in the undertaking, has been 
approved by the employees and must set out how employees or their representatives are to be informed and 
consulted. 
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independence of ERs, but would also act as a means for access to strategic, financial and 
organizational information that would be useful when engaging in collective bargaining 
with the employer. 
On the CBI's side, concerns were expressed that the 2002 DTI consultation document 
overemphasized `partnership' with reference to trade union involvement and as such it 
did not support a commitment to `real flexibility'. In suggesting that the government 
should not conflate information and consultation with trade union involvement, 
`partnership' should be seen in a wider context and the government should ensure that the 
legislation would be flexible enough for firms to introduce innovative partnership 
mechanisms that did not necessarily involve trade unions. According to the CBI, all- 
employee bodies would also be in accordance with recent developments in terms of 
employee representation in the UK that entailed different mechanisms for different 
purposes, including non-union arrangements for permanent or ad hoc consultation and 
direct forms of information and consultation. 
In the DTI's view, all-employee bodies were preferred. Specific reasons advanced for this 
preference included the absence of a special position afforded to trade unions in the 
ICED, the latter's `universal' application, the limited extent - due to the steady decline of 
union membership - of unions representing effectively the whole UK workforce, the 
absence of strong TUC pressure on the issue, and finally that all-employee bodies would 
be consistent with the model set out by the TICER, which informed the ICER's 
institutional design (DTI interviewee). In line with the DTI considerations on the issue, 
the ICER reject the priority for recognized trade union model, as in the case of collective 
redundancies and transfers of undertakings, and instead adopt the model of employee 
representation that was followed in the TICER. No priority is thus given to recognized 
unions; instead, representatives are to be elected in the case of the standard provisions by 
the entire workforce in a statutory ballot procedure scrutinized by an `independent ballot 
supervisor'. 94 
3.2.3 Direct forms of information and consultation 
Already in the 2002 DTI document it was stressed that in considering how to best 
implement the ICED, `we should build on UK experience and create room for the wide 
94 A related issue concerned the interface with existing UK legislation on redundancies and transfers, where 
it is specified that the necessary information and consultation on these issues, with a view to reaching an 
agreement, should be with representatives of recognized unions where they represent the employees 
affected. As this issue was not addressed in the outline scheme or the first draft ICER it was resolved at the 
second round of consultations. The TUC was in favour of ring-fencing the existing role of recognised 
unions in relation to redundancies and transfers. The DTI decided to keep the various regulations and 
legislation separate. 
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diversity of practices that have built up over the years, combining both representative and 
direct forms of participation' (emphasis added); the rationale being that increased 
flexibility was a key ingredient of high performance workplaces. Further, according to 
the DTI interviewee, the feedback received from the 2002 consultation stressed 
particularly the importance of direct forms of information and consultation especially in 
undertakings employing between 50 and 100 employees. However, such a compliance 
option should be possible only where the employees agree to it and should not remove 
their right to be informed and consulted via representatives when they decide so. The 
agreed `outline scheme' made no explicit provision for direct forms of information and 
consultation. However, as already noted, there was one phrase in the `outline scheme', 
where the parties seemed to have left open the possibility for the DTI to include in the 
ICER the possibility for direct forms of information and consultation as a means of 
complying with the statutory requirements (Hall, 2005). 
This was strongly advanced by the CBI. 95 The underlying logic for the inclusion of direct 
ICE forms rested on two grounds: first, the need to allow employers to tailor the 
arrangements in line with the needs of the organizations, and secondly, empirical 
evidence suggesting that direct involvement plays a key role in bringing about a high 
performance and committed workforce, with indirect involvement at most playing a 
supportive role (CBI, 2002b: para 11). In contrast, the TUC official stressed that the 
organization raised major concerns during the discussions regarding the possibility for 
compliance through direct ICE forms. From a legal perspective, the TUC believed that a 
potential use by employers of direct ICE forms would not be compliant with the ICED as 
the latter laid emphasis on consultation with workforce representatives. From a practical 
perspective, the possibility for compliance through direct ICE forms would not be 
efficient, as the inability of individual employees, either as a result of lack of knowledge 
or fear of victimization, would weaken the process and substance of consultation. 
However, it was acknowledged that `this was one of the points we [the TUC] lost in 
negotiating' (Veale, 2005). Although not present at the discussions that took place 
between the Minister, the TUC and the CBI, the DTI interviewee suggested that the DTI 
did not act on its own when it included this controversial provision in the draft ICER. The 
CBI interviewee also noted: 
`The TUC completely opposed any sort of mention of direct only and still believe that 
it is a misinterpretation of the directive... They accepted it in the end as we accepted 
95 In contrast, the EEF interviewee noted that direct ICE methods was not the 
biggest issue for them, the 
reason being that it was not expected that many companies in the engineering sector would want to use 
it 
exclusively. 
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the Central Arbitration Committee, if you like. It was a concession they had to make 
because they had other elements of the framework agreement they wanted in place. 
So, technically, it was accepted. '96 
The fact that the inclusion of direct ICE forms was implicitly stipulated in the `outline 
scheme' did not allow the TUC to challenge this once the draft ICER were published: 
`It was df cult for us to go on pushing it because the minute we tried the CBI would 
come back and say `Oh, well, we did not want the CAC' and the whole agreement 
would fall to bits, and we felt it was important that didn't happen. ' (TUC 
interviewee) 97 
As a result, the final ICER provide for compliance through direct ICE methods in the 
case of PEAs and negotiated agreements. Apart from this and the fact that, as stipulated 
in the final ICER, there has to be agreement with the employees that they wanted 
individual consultation, it is plausible that the TUC hopes that the provision for direct 
ICE forms, even though it was based on the outline scheme concluded by the two main 
industrial relations actors, can still face challenges before the ECJ. As suggested by a 
number of commentators, whilst direct consultation can constitute a legal means of 
complying with the ICER when employees so choose under the PEA option, the fact that, 
under the ICER, their existence prompts the application of substantially higher thresholds 
of support for negotiations over new ICE arrangements to take place (40% of the 
employees and a majority of those voting in a ballot) could potentially be seen by the EC 
as undermining the unconditional right to information and consultation, via 
representatives, as envisaged by the ICED (Deakin and Morris, 2005; Hall, 2005). 
3.2.4 Enforcement and remedies 
From the outset, the TUC favoured enforcement procedures similar to those set out in the 
TICER, involving: complaints to a specialist industrial relations court; provisions for 
orders requiring defaulting employers to take specified steps to comply with the terms of 
96 The possibility that there was a trade-off between the CBI and TUC regarding the provisions concerning 
the enforcement regime and the possibility for direct ICE forms was also raised by the IPA interviewee: 
`You could say that the issue to do with how disputes should be handled and the other issue about direct 
and indirect was the main trade-off So the CBI had to give way on the CA C and the TUC probably had to 
give way on the direct. ' 
97 On the CBI side, it was also explicitly stated that the framework agreed by the DTI, CBI and TUC allows 
employers and employees to decide for themselves what is appropriate 
for the individual business including 
direct methods (CBI, 2003, para 7). 
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an agreement/the standard provisions; and financial sanctions. 98 Within this context, the 
TUC argued strongly for the appointment of the CAC as the primary enforcement 
mechanism. The committee was described as `a body with a good understanding of 
collective procedures in the workplace and a fair executor of its role' (TUC interviewee). 
In a similar vein, the CAC was reportedly anxious to ensure that the EAT would remain 
an appellate body, and that it would not have to take first instance decisions (Burton, 
2004). According to the CAC Chairman (2004), `the CAC is the proper court of first 
instance. It has both practical experience of the world of work and legal experience of 
applying legislation in the area of collective relations. It also has many years of expertise 
in the area of disclosing information for collective bargaining purposes. ' In contrast, 
employers' associations resisted the appointment of the CAC on the basis of concerns 
over the general approach of the CAC, the absence of rules of procedure and the lack of 
appeal mechanisms associated with the CAC procedures (CBI interviewee). 99 
While the DTI was in favour of the CAC dealing with complaints about the trigger or the 
nature of agreements, they initially proposed that the EAT should be responsible for 
dealing with complaints about failure to consult, rather than the CAC, the rationale being 
that the TICER stipulate a similar procedure. However, concerns were expressed by the 
EAT. It was suggested that firstly the EAT's responsibility concerning the TICER 
constituted an exception to the usual responsibilities of the court and secondly that it 
would increase the already overwhelming workload of the EAT. Finally, a compromise 
between CBI, TUC, DTI and Sir Michael Burton, President of the EAT and Chair of the 
CAC, was reached. It was decided that complaints relating to failure to inform or consult 
under the terms of an agreement reached under the Directive, or the default procedure, 
would be made to the CAC, which would also be the body responsible for complaints 
about the trigger or about the nature of agreements on procedures. 10° Further, in line with 
the TICER, the DTI also decided that the enforcement mechanisms should be applicable 
98 The TUC was also in favour of providing for injunctive relief, so that employers who fail to inform and 
consult properly, whether under agreed arrangements or statutory fallback arrangements, can be made to 
revert to the status quo ante. 
99 Overell (2005) noted that the CAC's record in union recognition cases led some UK business 
organizations to fear its expansion into information and consultation. Neil Bentley from the CBI was 
reported as saying: `Our experience of the CAC is that it has been too union-friendly. Modern employment 
relations use both direct and indirect communication with the workforce. But the skills pool of the CAC 
seems to draw on out-of date industrial relations experience, where only representative structures are 
deemed to constitute valid consultation. ' The EEF and CIA echoed similar criticisms (EEF and CIA 
interviewees). 
100 In the view of the TUC General Council (TUC, 2003) `there was an important advantage to having one 
body, the CAC, dealing with both types of complaint, as there may in some cases be complaints on both 
procedural and substantive matters running concurrently. ' 
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only where a negotiated agreement is reached under the `negotiated agreement' route, or 
the standard provisions apply, and not in respect of PEAs. lol 
The appointment of the CAC as the primary mechanism for resolving the disputes in the 
operation of the ICER was clearly stipulated in the outline scheme. In the latter, under the 
heading `compliance and enforcement', it was stated that `where an agreement has been 
negotiated following an employee request or employer notification, or the statutory 
provisions apply, disputes about the operation of the procedures may be brought before 
the CAC. ' Despite the reference of the CAC in the outline scheme, the CBI continued 
objecting to the CAC's appointment even after the publication of the outline scheme. In 
the CBI submission in November 2003 (CBI, 2003, para 3) it was stated: `This response 
to the draft regulations does not seek to reopen matters of principle which were agreed 
under the framework... This response also comments on two key issues that were not 
subject to the framework agreement. Firstly, the CBI believes that primary responsibility 
for enforcement of the new regulations should be given to employment tribunals rather 
than the CAC as the Government has suggested. ' Further, it was stressed: `The CBI is 
supportive of the framework for implementing the Directive, however, as the 
Government and the TUC will accept, the CBI did not agree to the enforcement of the 
Information and Consultation regulations being given to the CAC' (para 5)102 The CBI 
interviewee explained that even though the outline scheme mentioned the CAC `the 
option to lobby was still there. ' In light of the comments received from the employers' 
organizations, the DTI agreed to hold a recruitment exercise to appoint a limited number 
of additional CAC members with wider experience than just collective bargaining. 103 As 
a result of the suggested changes, the CBI and other employers' associations were finally 
forced to accept the appointment of the CAC in the final ICER. 
Finally, regarding the remedies provided in cases of employers' failure to establish ICE 
arrangements, under the `standard provisions', where required to do so, and failure to 
inform and/or consult under the `negotiated agreements' or the `standard provisions' 
options, the ICER followed the precedent set out in the TICER and stipulate that the EAT 
has the responsibility for the provision of remedies. 104 This was in line with the CAC 
preference for not having the responsibility for imposing sanctions for breach of its 
101 The TUC had preferred applying the ICER's enforcement procedures to PEAs or requiring legal 
enforceability (TUC interviewee). 
'02 The DTI official noted in the interview that the DTI had made clear that once an agreement was reached 
with the social partners on the framework there would be no subsequent changes. 
103 Advertisements for new appointments to the CAC released in 2005 stated: `In order to achieve a balance 
of experience on the committee, it is desirable for some members to 
have experience in a non-union 
environment' (Overell, 2005). 
104 The original proposals for the structure envisaged that the CAC would also 
impose sanctions for breach 
of its orders. 
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orders. Stressing the alignment of the CAC with the spirit of fostering `partnership at 
work', the CAC Chairman (Burton, 2004: 2) explained that `we do not have and do not 
wish the sanction of contempt of court... We have and wish for no such sanctions. ' 
Further, as in the case of the TICER, only sanctions in the form of financial penalties are 
stipulated. '°5 Unlike redundancy consultation, there is no provision for compensating 
employees in respect of whom a failure to consult has occurred and the financial penalty 
is payable to the Treasury. 106 The maximum penalty was set at £75,000 in the outline 
scheme and has been retained in the final ICER. During the negotiations with the CBI 
and the DTI, the TUC argued that the upper limit should increase according to the size of 
the undertaking; otherwise larger undertakings would not regard the penalty as a serious 
deterrent (TUC interviewee). However, neither the Government nor the CBI were 
prepared to support increased penalties beyond the £75,000 upper limit, and the outline 
scheme and the final Regulations incorporate this limit. '07 
3.3 Evaluation of the process for the transposition of the ICED 
The steps finally taken for the transposition of the ICED through the involvement of the 
CBI and TUC are nothing like what can be found at EU level, where employers' 
associations and trade unions are formally incorporated into the legislative process, or in 
some member states where EU policy initiatives may be implemented by the social 
partners performing a legislative function in collective agreements. However, the 
transposition of the ICED via an agreement between the DTI, TUC and CBI 
demonstrated how reflexive regulation mechanisms, as promoted by the ICED, provide a 
framework to support dialogue and negotiation between industrial relations actors in the 
development of legislation at national level. In diverging from a `consultation countries' 
type (Falkner et al., 2005), where social partners are only consulted and there is no 
negotiation and no common decision-making process between the state and the two sides 
of industry in the transposition of EU social policy directives, the discussions between the 
TUC, the CBI and the DTI could be effectively described as `tripartite meetings' for the 
development of national legislation. Whilst the DTI was ultimately responsible for the 
105 The CAC Chairman, Sir Michael Burton (2004) stated: `I am happy that, after discussions, the 
Regulations made no provision for the CAC to apply sanctions, and assigned the responsibility for the 
imposition of sanctions to the ETA. ' Also, against the preference of the TUC, reg 22(9) now expressly 
provides that no order of the CAC may have the effect of `suspending or altering the effect of any act done 
or of any agreement made by the employer or of preventing or delaying any act or agreement which the 
employer proposes to do or make. ' 
'06 Reg 22 (7). 
107 Concerning the cap to the financial penalty, the then DTI secretary, Gerry Sutcliffe (2004) commented: 
`the £75,000 is meaningless, but if we start with penalties then we lose the battle. ' The enforcement regime 
has come under criticism by a number of commentators (see for instance, Ewing and Truter, 2005; Hall, 
2005). In essence, it is suggested that it is open to question whether the enforcement regime is enough, and 
whether these provisions are sufficiently `effective, proportionate and dissuasive' in line with art. 8 (2) of 
the ICED. 
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introduction of the legislation, the involvement of the CBI and TUC had a significant 
impact on the form and content of the final text of the ICER. As such, the transposition of 
the ICED was in accordance with the underlying spirit of the ICED, which stresses the 
participation of social actors in the designing of national social policy. 108 This point was 
also recognized by the EC official involved in the adoption of the ICED: 
`The directive can be described as forward-looking as it can play an important role in 
developing social dialogue, not only at company level, but also at other levels since it 
requires that employers and trade unions organize themselves, like in the case of the 
UK where it led to the outline scheme at national level. ' 
On the part of the DTI, whilst the transposition of the ICED was justified on the grounds 
of fair treatment of workers, partnership, employee involvement promotion, and high 
performance workplaces (DTI, 2002: 4) the potential contribution of the ICED to the 
latter, i. e. high performance workplaces, and, in turn, to an improvement of UK's 
productivity was particularly emphasized. 109 The ICED's transposition was explicitly 
presented as part of achieving `a high skill, high productivity economy... through high 
performance workplaces, where employers and employees work together in partnership 
(DTI, 2002). Applying an autopoietic analysis, it is suggested that maintaining a 
`voluntary' approach to employee representation was the objective of the UK political 
system and that this was reformulated at national level into the objective of high 
performance workplaces. Although recent EU discourse increasingly stresses the 
importance of information and consultation of employees in the context of economic 
efficiency, EU communications expressly related to the ICED did not straightforwardly 
assert that establishing ICE arrangements would increase productivity. Instead, in the 
108 As Ewing (2003) suggests, on this occasion though the discussions took place in the shadow of 
obligations imposed by European law, with the threat of litigation before the ECJ lurking in the background 
to exercise the mind of government. 
109 The study does not intend here to offer a critical evaluation of the impact of employee participation 
schemes on company performance. It is suffice to note here that the basic argument of HPW proponents is 
that the use of high performance work practices, including comprehensive employee recruitment and 
selection procedures, incentive compensation and performance management systems, and extensive 
employee involvement and training, can improve the knowledge, skills and abilities of a company's current 
and potential employees, increase their motivation, reduce shirking, and enhance retention of quality 
employees while encouraging non-performers to leave the company (Jones and Wright, 1992; Huselid, 
1998). However, there is increasing evidence that the linkages between voice and performance are 
problematic not only for performance outcomes but also for workers and unions (see for example, Godard 
and Delaney, 2000; Godard, 2004; Edwards and Wajcman, J., 2005). Several reasons have been advanced: 
`firstly, there is the problem of benchmarking, of assessing the date at which to start making `before and 
after' comparisons... a second reason to be cautious.. . 
is that it is virtually impossible to isolate the impact 
of just one aspect of management practice (e. g. giving employees a voice) 
from other contextual factors 
that can influence behaviour at work... finally, there is the 
issue of evaluation and on whose terms' 
(Dundon et al., 2004: 1167). 
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explanatory memorandum accompanying the Commission's proposal (1998) four key 
rationales for the adoption of the ICED were identified and discussed: the political 
context, intra-Union socio-economic considerations on managing and anticipating 
change, the lessons of earlier EC employee representative participation initiatives, and the 
lack of established structure for the exercise of ICE rights in certain Member States. ' 10 In 
contrast, the discourse emanating from the DTI linked in a straightforward way the 
potential contribution of ICE arrangements to improving UK's productivity. 
It is suggested here that in adopting an explicit high performance workplaces (HPW) 
discourse, a two-way solution to the conundrum created as a result of the UK's 
opposition to the ICED and the subsequent need to transpose the ICED into national law 
was found. Firstly, the HPW discourse constituted a means of justifying the government's 
change of approach to the ICED and engage support from the business community which 
had been particularly dissatisfied with the government's earlier failure to block the 
adoption of the ICED. The linkage of the ICER to the HPW discourse was identified by 
consultancy organizations, such as the IPA, as a means to make the transposition of the 
ICED `more palatable ' to the employers. Other interviewees also described it as `a cover 
for the retreat' of the UK government when its opposition to the ICED was overcome. 
Interestingly, the association of the HPW discourse was not reportedly done initially by 
the DTI but by the No 10 Strategy Unit and the DTI then utilized it so as to maintain a 
strong positive role and promote within the government their role in the regulation of the 
workplace and the debate on skills. In this context, Sisson (2004) also saw no practical 
value in the link of the ICER to the HPW debate: `this was a political construct -a way 
of getting the workplace on the political agenda. ' 
Secondly, the adoption of the HPW discourse allowed the DTI to successfully promote a 
significant margin of flexibility in the regulatory framework of the ICER. A clear linkage 
between the HPW concept and the flexibility stipulated in the ICER was provided in the 
Regulatory Impact Assessment (2003b: 151) conducted prior to the introduction of the 
ICER when it was stated: 
`[T]here will be substantial economic and social benefits from the legislation over 
time... Employers should see gains from a better informed, more motivated and 
110 The most prominent features of the political, economic, social and legal context described were: the 
increased importance attached by citizens to the social dimension in Europe, globalization of the economy, 
completion and further development of the internal market, the new conditions imposed or prompted by the 
single currency and the European Employment Strategy and the weaknesses of Community and national 
law. 
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committed workforce... These benefits are more likely to be felt under option 4111 as 
they allow for a more flexible approach, taking the individual characteristics of the 
undertakings into account and allowing existing practices that are working well to 
continue uninterrupted. ' 112 
The influence of the HPW discourse was exemplified in the treatment of three significant 
for the regulatory framework issues: firstly, substantial flexibility in terms of the form 
and content of ICE arrangements was introduced; secondly, relying on the implicit 
reference to direct ICE forms in the outline scheme, such methods were considered as 
satisfying an employer's obligation to consult (DTI, 2004a: 17); finally, no formal role 
was provided to trade union representation in achieving the policy goals of the 
legislation. Falkner et al. (2005) have suggested that the fate of EU non-binding or soft 
law recommendations in the UK typically depended on the extent to which they fitted the 
domestic political agendas. In a similar vein, the study found that the design of the key 
features of the ICED that were left to be determined by member states was partially a 
result of the domestic political system, as reformulated through the adoption by the DTI 
of a HPW discourse. Overall, the UK political system's discourse can be thus interpreted 
as being concerned with the aims of avoiding a `one size fits all' approach and of 
maintaining organizational flexibility with the DTI espousing the argument that employee 
representation through voluntary flexible agreements would increase productivity. 
In conjunction with the impact of the DTI discourse on the institutional design of the 
legislation the role of the two sides of industry to the development of the legislation via 
the conclusion of the outline scheme was vital. The process for the transposition of the 
ICED illustrated the changing nature of the relationship between the TUC and CBI and 
the DTI (Barnard, 2006). Not only did the CBI and the TUC accept the invitation by the 
DTI to participate in the drafting of the legislation but they also reached agreement, 
which became the basis for the development of the legislation. The process for the 
transposition of the ICED approximated the process of `situated public action' (Salais and 
Villeneuve, 2004: 8), as advocated in the context of a capability-based approach. The 
main interest parties, CBI and TUC, participated in the transposition of the ICED that 
was publicly agreed upon and their role as interlocutors of government potentially 
11 Under Option 4, the legislation would only impact on undertakings where there is some employee 
demand for information and consultation, but it also allows for the use of pre-existing agreements adapted 
to the individual circumstances of the undertaking concerned, or gives employers and employees the 
opportunity to draw up new agreements. 
112 Whilst the government, based on specific criteria, calculated tens of millions of pounds worth of start-up 
and annual costs, it was unable to put a figure on the benefits. Positive though it was, the government 
simply stated that it estimated the benefits to be `in the order of magnitude of 
hundreds of millions over a 
ten- year period' (DTI, 2003b: 151). 
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enhanced their organizations' legitimacy and status. In that way, the organizations were 
able to express their opinions about the way to comply with the EU statutory 
requirements and to make them count in the course of public discussion (Bonvin and 
Thelen, 2003). Whilst a compromise deal was struck in some cases, e. g. trigger 
mechanism, in others a trade-off took place, e. g. in the case of the enforcement regime 
and the provision for direct ICE methods. 
In exploring potential factors for variations in the impact of labour legislation Dickens 
and Hall (2006: 348) suggest that whilst the involvement of social partners can impact on 
the degree of acceptance and compliance a danger exists that `public policy legislative 
intentions may be translated inadequately into law to secure acceptance, and issues such 
as whom `the partners' actually represent can arise. ' The present study found that the 
involvement of the CBI and the TUC enabled the DTI to depoliticize the issue of 
employee representation, reduced the possibilities that employers would continue to 
criticize the ICER, built a consensus between the CBI and the TUC on the way the 
legislation should be introduced and eased the process for the development of the 
statutory requirements (DTI interviewee). However, while the consultation process 
involved participation by diverse organizations, concerns were expressed that the scope 
for drawing up the agreed document was narrow and that the DTI should consult 
widely. ' 13 More particularly, some interviewees suggested that the emphasis in the 
discussions on large organizations that had already existing consultative arrangements 
reflected the interests of employers represented by the CBI and failed to take into account 
the situation in medium-sized enterprises where there is limited evidence of pre-existing 
arrangements with or without the participation of unions. Nonetheless, the involvement of 
other parties was seen as likely to reduce the possibilities for reaching an agreement. In 
limiting participation to key actors the DTI managed to find a means for taking difficult 
issues `off the table' and for reaching a compromise. 
The CBI interviewee held that whilst they were against the adoption of the ICED they 
were largely supportive of the final text of the ICER. 114 Two reasons identified with the 
change of approach were the CBI's involvement in the drafting of the ICER and, the 
flexibilities stipulated in the final ICER, including the compliance options that were 
secured, the inclusion of direct forms of information and consultation of employees and 
the imposition of an upper limit of £75,000 in the penalties for breaching the ICER. On 
113 Whilst welcoming the participation of the CBI and the TUC to the drafting of the legislation 
organizations that expressed simultaneously a preference for a wider consultation were the British Chamber 
of Commerce, ACAS, EEF and CIA. 
114 In November 2004 the FT (Jaggi, 2004: 4) reported that the DTI had bowed to pressure from employers 
and granted more flexibility in what was expected to be the final version of the ICER. 
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TEXT BOUND INTO 
THE SPINE 
TUC part, while it was acknowledged that `the agreement did not contain all the 
nents which the TUC had wanted' the General Council stated that `the agreement 
ceeded in providing protection for pre-existing collective agreements on information 
consultation as well as generating new opportunities for unions to extend union 
uence in unorganised workplaces and to extend collective bargaining scope, as long as 
have sufficient support within the undertaking' (TUC, 2004). Concerning the final 
the TUC (2006) remained concerned about certain aspects of the ICER: the 
vision that part-time employees only count as `half people' for the purposes of 
-ulating whether an undertaking fell within the scope of the ICER; the £75,000 upper 
t for awards against employers who fail to comply with the ICER; the lack of the 
R application to undertakings employing fewer than 50 employees; the lack of 
. rage of `workers'; the possibility of employers to establish systems for direct ICE 
not via trade unions or elected representatives; the lack of training and workforce 
-lopment in the list of issues which were to be the subject for information and 
l >ultation. ls 
Ist important the extent to which the agreement between the CBI and the TUC 
lituted a change of direction concerning national employment policy is still 
. rtain. From the TUC perspective, the outline scheme has been described as a `social 
er agreement' (TUC, 2006: 11), illustrating possibly TUC aspirations for developing 
1l dialogue at national level. In commenting on the agreement, the TUC general 
tart' Brendan Barber (TUC, 2003) stated: `in bringing us together with the CBI the 
rnment has done the right thing. We have always said that social partnership of this 
is the best way to draw up the details of implementation, particularly when there's a 
logic requirement or government policy that both of us understand is non- 
tiable. ' This view can be contrasted with that of the CBI. In an interview to The 
dian (Elliott, 2006) Digby Jones, the then Director-General, commented that trade 
is had become irrelevant to the CBI: `we have no formal meetings with the TUC. I 
meetings with NGOs, but I don't meet the unions. They are an irrelevance. They are 
ward looking and not on today's agenda. ' 
idly but equally importantly, the involvement of the two sides of industry in the 
)osition of the ICED led to a re-contextualization of the EU norms stipulated in the 
I. The quality of transposition was hence dependent on the social processes, as 
'elation to changes made to the draft ICER, the TUC 2006 General Report mentioned two issues 
the DTI made improvements: first, the final ICER do not undermine established rights for 
ized trade unions to be consulted over proposed collective redundancies and transfers of 
tkings; secondly, the final ICER made clear that part-time employees were to be treated as `whole 
'for the purposes of assessing support for a trigger requesting for ICE arrangements. 
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developed by the two sides of industry, which shaped and refracted, in turn, the EU 
norms on information and consultation rights so as to minimize the destabilization of the 
existing industrial relations networks (Teubner, 1998: 19). 116 As explained in section 
3.2.1, a main focus of the outline scheme concerned the procedure for triggering 
negotiations over ICE arrangements. There was general consensus that voluntary 
agreements in the form of PEAs were preferable to negotiated agreements and more 
importantly than the application of the `standard provisions'. In emphasizing the primacy 
of voluntary agreements and in rejecting an increased role for the legal system in 
providing for effective ICE arrangements the involvement of the CBI and the TUC in the 
framing of the legislation led to the maintenance of the voluntarist tradition albeit within 
a statutory framework. 
Applying a reflexive regulation approach, the mediation of the ICED's external noise 
within the paradigm of meaning in the UK industrial relations allowed for the 
transformation of the EU-level norms that were envisaged in the directive. Although such 
transformation is formally envisaged under the regulatory means of directives (Maher, 
1998, Deakin, 2007) the scope for transformation was significantly shaped by the existing 
linkages between the national legal system and the industrial relations system in the area 
of employee representation. In relying on a strict separation of legal regulation from 
forms of employee representation and especially collective bargaining a form of `tight 
coupling' (Teubner, 1998: 18) between the UK legal system and the industrial relations 
system has been sustained. As Teubner (1998: 19) stresses `while in the loosely coupled 
areas of law a transfer if comparably easy to accomplish, the resistance to change is high 
when law is tightly coupled in binding arrangements to other social processes. ' The tight 
coupling between the UK legal system and the industrial relations system in conjunction 
with the formal involvement of the two sides of industry in the framing of the national 
legislation had the effect that the transfer of norms from another source of law, in this 
case EU law, was refracted and shaped so as to secure a response that would 
accommodate the new legal links within the existing social processes. 
However, such an outcome may create a tension between the desire to encourage the 
preservation of existing approaches and a concern that only voluntary arrangements of a 
certain quality should be given statutory endorsement. This is reflected in the fact that 
that the conclusion of a PEA renders the possibility for a `negotiated' agreement much 
more challenging. Hence, in aiming to protect existing agreements and reduce the 
1'6 In essence, there were two iterations of consultation and subsequently two instances of impact of the two 
sides of industry to the institutional design of the ICER: firstly, impact was reported via the agreement on 
the outline scheme; secondly, impact was also reported on the issues that were left to be resolved once the 
draft ICER were published in July 2003. 
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possibilities that new arrangements would displace such agreements, the participation of 
the CBI and the TUC in the framing of the legislation went halfway in attaining the 
objective of the ICED. The underlying principle behind the ICED was to add a new 
component to collective labour law as it allows employees to have a new voice at work 
through the establishment or amendment of existing representative arrangements for 
information and consultation of employees. In that way, the ICED aimed to fill the 
representation gap, create opportunities for meaningful participation and improve the 
quality of working life in line with a capability-based perspective. These principles were 
somewhat neglected in the ICER as a result of the importance attached not only by the 
DTI but also the CBI and the TUC to the protection of the existing framework. 
3.4 Conclusion 
The development of capabilities and the effectiveness of consultative arrangements 
require a favourable legal framework. Since the Labour government was willing to 
involve employers and unions in the process for the transposition of the ICED differences 
between the two sides of industry became critical. Whilst concerns of domestic policies, 
as exemplified by the emphasis on HPW, were still dominant interest group politics were 
developed on the part of the CBI and the TUC (see also Falkner's et al. (2005: 334). 
From a reflexive regulation point of view, despite the fact that it was expected that the 
transposition of the ICED would bring about a reconstruction of the notion of employee 
representation, the fact that this was achieved through the coupling of the transposition of 
the ICED with a discourse on flexibility may arguably not provide the foundations for a 
paradigm that, in line with a capability-based perspective, could support more substantive 
reforms that would nonetheless be compatible with broader UK institutional 
arrangements. In effect, the preference for organizational flexibility as a result of the 
emphasis on HPW runs in contrast to the establishment of legally mandated works 
councils, underpinned by strong information and consultation rights. This is evident in 
the hierarchy of regulatory techniques set out in the legislation. Surprisingly, this 
corresponds to a progressive dilution of the consultative duty, with the least onerous 
formulation taking priority in the regulatory scheme (Bogg, 2006: 12). The shift has 
hence repercussions in terms of the nature of capabilities that could be developed so as to 
attain the objectives of public intervention, as defined in the ICED, since the 
implementation of the ICED becomes dependent on management considerations and only 
a limited role is provided to trade unions, representatives and individual employees. 
The attempt of the UK government to combine social protection and economic efficiency 
objectives lays the ICER open to contrasting and competing interpretations. From one 
standpoint, the ICER can be seen as one of the main achievements in creating a flexible, 
decentralized regulatory model stressing the importance of participation. However, the 
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risk when adopting a flexible institutional approach is that too many and too extensive 
possibilities for compliance, whether or not under the pretext of `participation', will 
undermine the very notion of a standard per se. In that sense, it is plausible to identify 
the ICER with what Streeck (1995: 45) has characterized as an emerging social policy 
regime of `neo-voluntarism' that is notable for its limited capacity `to impose binding 
obligations on market participants' (see Moffat, 1998 for the same issue in the case of the 
WTD). On the other hand, the ICER attempt to build on a history of voluntary employee 
representation with only weak ICE rights while encouraging employers, employees, and 
unions to negotiate their own arrangements. In that way, the new legal framework can be 
seen as consistent with pre-existing cognitive/normative rules whilst at the same time its 
implementation is in conjunction with processes conducive to these rules and is 
accompanied by a strategy to reshape them. This approach may be of value because it 
allows for the dynamic interplay between legal rules and cognitive and normative ones 
and attempts to shape both (Godard, 2002: 259). The question then becomes: will it be 
possible for the legal system to induce the IR system to modify the existing paradigms 
through the implementation of the ICER in a way that builds on yet allows for a change 
in established norms? In order to provide an answer to this, the next chapter turns to 
examine empirical evidence regarding the response of employers, trade unions and 
employees to the application of the ICER. In context of examining the extent to which the 
ICER tilted the regulatory outcome away from that which could be arrived at by private 
social actors in self-regulating markets, the chapter provides also an evaluation of an 
interrelated issue, that of the enforcement regime of the ICER. 
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Chapter 4. The response of the UK system of industrial relations to the reflexive 
design of the ICER 
As a consequence of the dependence of the ICED on the principle of double subsidiarity 
and the attempt to allow for flexibility that can accommodate but also assist in the 
evolution of national IR systems and practices, the ICED not only stipulates a crucial role 
to national legislation in transposing its provisions but also gives solutions negotiated at 
organizational level priority over statutorily prescribed ways of establishing ICE 
arrangements. As already seen, the ICER allow employers, trade unions and employees 
considerable flexibility of response, both procedurally and substantively (Hall, 2006). 
From the perspective of reflexive regulation the most important elements of the ICER 
are: 117 firstly, the stipulation that employers need not act unless 10% of their employees 
trigger statutory procedures intended to lead to negotiated agreements; "8 and secondly, 
the possibility for effectively pre-empting the use of the ICER procedures through the 
conclusion of PEAs which can vary the nature of ICE arrangements that will apply. 
Further, the ICER importantly include the possibility for providing for direct ICE forms 
in the cases of PEAs and negotiated agreements rather than informing and consulting 
indirectly through representatives. 119 In line with the ICED, the standard provisions 
become applicable only as a fallback in situations where the employer is obliged to 
initiate negotiations, but fails to do so, or where a negotiated agreement is not reached 
within the stipulated time period. '20 
Drawing on the institutional design of the ICER, the chapter presents an evaluation of the 
impact of the provisions in the establishment/amendment of ICE arrangements. The 
analysis proceeds from the basis that the ICER provisions were designed as reflexive 
legal instruments to promote regulation through self-regulation. The wider attitude of 
trade unions and employers' associations on the issue of the implementation of the ICER 
and the underlying rationales for the specific strategies followed by the actors are 
analyzed in the first section. An examination of how the implementation of the ICER 
stimulated actors' choices and collective organization on the establishment and/or 
amendment of existing ICE arrangements follows that is based on primary and secondary 
evidence on the incidence of ICE arrangements, employers', trade unions' and employees 
responses to the legislation, and the results of a questionnaire survey of companies 
11 It has to be stressed here that these options, as seen in the previous chapter, do not apply in the case 
where there is no undertaking, i. e. `a public or private undertaking carrying out an economic activity, 
whether or not operating for gain' (reg 2). Further, they do not apply in the case of undertaking that employ 
less than 50 employees. 
"8 Reg 7. 
119 Reg 8 (1) and reg 16 respectively. 
120 Reg 19 (1). 
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operating in the chemical sector. The chapter concludes with an analysis and assessment 
of the enforcement regime of the ICER. 
4.1 The compliance strategies recommended by employers' associations and the 
approach of the trade unions 
On the employer side, the 2004 CBI Guidance to the Regulations stressed that `important 
flexibilities have been delivered and it is vital for companies to utilize them' (CBI, 
2004a). The Guidance encouraged organizations to consider their options in view of the 
statutory requirements and it was geared towards encouraging employers `to go about and 
review the consultation arrangements that have in place now to ensure the Regulations 
have a minimum impact on the companies. ' The CIA guidance also emphasized the 
importance of such a pro-active strategy of reviewing and making changes when 
necessary in order to comply with the ICER requirements. In this context, making use of 
the flexibilities that the legislation offered and opting for the significant leeway that PEAs 
or negotiated agreements permit instead of the prescriptive approach of the `standard 
provisions' constituted significant underlying themes. Law firms and management 
consultancies also drew attention to the flexible options provided by the legislation and 
specifically the benefits of concluding PEAs before and after the legislation came into 
force in April 2005.121 While employers' associations emphasized the benefit for 
reviewing and concluding, where necessary, PEAs, attention was also drawn to the 
importance of maintaining the distinction between consultation and collective bargaining. 
The Head of Employment Policy at EEF, for example, stressed that it was important for a 
clear distinction to be drawn between ICE arrangements and any negotiations that take 
place between the company and trade union, the reason being the decentralized nature of 
the UK's pay bargaining system (Yeandle, 2005). In a similar vein, the CIA advised 
member-organizations to restrict negotiations with the unions to terms and conditions, 
pay, hours and holiday, and let ICE arrangements deal with the wider agenda (CIA 
interviewee). Further, the CIA guidance stressed the unique opportunity provided under 
the ICER to employers to set the agenda for information and consultation so as not to get 
`caught' by workforce demands. 
As already seen, trade unions have been denied a preferential role since the ICER 
stipulate that the representatives must be directly elected by workforce ballot. However, 
the legislation does offer elsewhere unions or union members a range of potential roles or 
opportunities to intervene (Hall, 2005). These include negotiating and approving PEAs - 
121 For instance, the Chairman of the Employment Lawyers Association (ELA) and head of employment at 
law firm Linklaters pointed out: `it is a good idea to get something in place before April and those who 
want but not yet have a PEA are rapidly running out of time. The Government's solution combines all 
models and is a bit of straight jacket for employers who might want 
different arrangements for different 
groups' (Hall, 2005). 
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though a collective agreement confined to a particular bargaining unit would need to be 
supplemented by other agreed provisions covering the remaining employees in the 
undertaking - collecting names for an employee request for a negotiated agreement, 
acting as negotiating representatives - albeit at the employer's discretion - and providing 
expert advice to representatives on ICE arrangements. 122 In the case of both PEAs and 
negotiated agreements, it is open to the parties to agree that union representatives, and 
potentially even external full-time officials, can represent unionized sections of the 
workforce in the ICE process. Possible methods include information and consultation via 
recognized unions with separate, supplementary arrangements for non-union groups, and 
`hybrid' consultation bodies involving both union nominees and representatives elected 
by non-union groups (Hall, 2005). In terms of trade union recognition, it is possible that 
under the legislation if a trade union is to make a judgment that it is unlikely to gain 
formal recognition through a ballot, it may decide to use the Regulations to secure a 
representation role in the workplace via the election of individual representatives loyal to 
the union. Depending on the issues and arrangements for consultation, such a role could 
arguably secure an influential role for the union, albeit falling short of formal recognition 
(Veale, 2005). 
A number of issues concerning the impact of the legislation on the trade unions were 
emphasized in the guidance published by the TUC and individual trade unions. 
According to a TUC interviewee: 
`The twin objectives when the Regulations came into force were to protect firstly the 
existing arrangements with trade unions and secondly, to use, if possible, the 
legislation as an organizing opportunity. ' 
Issues that were identified were the `meshing' of new consultation provisions with 
collective redundancies and transfers regulations, the preservation of single- and dual- 
channel systems, and the debate on the difference between negotiating and consulting 
(TUC interviewee). Drawing the boundaries between consultation and negotiation was 
considered as a key challenge for the TUC. Trade union officials were concerned that 
employers could set up alternative mechanisms to inform and consult with employees, 
even where there are already existing arrangements with the unions. Accordingly, the 
TUC advised unions to ensure that `the distinction between collective bargaining and 
consultation remains, so that where employers set up new ICE arrangements, they do not 
result in the dissolution or reduction in collective bargaining' (Veale, 2005). The 
insistence on the distinction between consultation and negotiation was further 
122 The DTI advised employers that union representatives `are likely to be well placed' to fulfill the 
negotiator's role for the conclusion of an ICE agreement. 
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complicated by two other factors. Firstly, in contrast to other national systems of 
industrial relations, multi-employer bargaining in Britain, as already seen, has been in 
decline with the division of responsibilities between bargaining and consultation being 
more challenging at company level (Sisson, 2002). Secondly, the Regulations' 
requirement that consultation should be `with a view to reaching an agreement' in the 
case of `decisions likely to lead to substantial changes in work organization or in 
contractual relations' can further blur the boundaries between the two concepts (Barnard, 
2006: 76). 
While individual trade unions expressed a generally supportive attitude towards the new 
legislation, the guidance issued to their members suggests that they had simultaneously 
significant concerns about the actual operation of the legislation. UNIFI (later merged 
with Amicus) adopted a generally supportive attitude toward the new regulations and 
while it started developing organizing strategies on a sector-specific basis it also 
expressed concerns about the effect that the legislation might have on undertakings where 
union-based ICE procedures were already in place. Amicus focused mainly on union 
recognition in workplaces but reportedly `took information and consultation seriously as 
well and suggested to its members that where an agreement existed it was best to slot in a 
clause on information and consultation' (TUC, 2004). Concerns were expressed on issues 
such as the balloting arrangements, the provision for direct ICE forms and the potential 
for the legislation to cut across existing rights. The T&G expressed a generally cautious 
approach and suggested that the Regulations' impact and importance would only be 
established through case law. 123 The GMB was also concerned about some of the 
legislation's shortcomings, particularly in relation to the balloting arrangements. 
USDAW did not see the Regulations as a threat to existing agreements while PCS was 
concerned that many of its members in the Civil Service would not be covered. GPMU 
stated there were a number of agreements in the pipeline and UCU was wary of the 
potential for the legislation to cut across existing rights but believed that since in many 
universities the union had negotiating as well as consultation rights, the legislation would 
not make any big difference (TUC, 2004). 
4.2 The extent and nature of responses to the ICER 
The section proceeds to a two-fold analysis of the actors' response of employers, trade 
unions and employees to the implementation of the ICER. Firstly, based on survey 
evidence the general impact of the ICER is analyzed. Secondly, an attempt is made to 
'23 The policy of T&G included the following issues: improve the quality and timing of consultation; 
protecting union representation; extending trade union presence; expanding the bargaining agenda; 
establishing high standards for the scope and procedure of information and consultation and; maximizing 
the enforcement potential of CAC and EAT. 
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identify specific sectors, organizations, and trade unions where the ICER had more 
impact and to identify the actors' preferred modes of response. 
4.2.1 The extent and nature of employers' responses to the implementation of the 
ICED 
During the process for the transposition of the ICED, lack of a pro-active management 
response was reported in a number of surveys. For instance, an IRS survey of 106 
medium-sized organizations carried out in June 2004 reported that more than two-thirds 
were unaware of the ICED. It also uncovered `a lot of antipathy' and concerns were 
expressed that the establishment of ICE arrangements would allow unions to rebuild their 
presence. 124 A DLA mini-survey of over 100 employers found that in only 25% of cases 
had employers reported instituting such a forum (Bradley and Leach, 2004) and a 2004 
IPA survey of 84 companies reported that 79% had not yet made any changes. Evidence 
of an increase in the level of awareness of the ICER and in the assessment of existing 
arrangements was later observed. A survey of client companies by management 
consultants ORC Worldwide and law firm Baker & McKenzie published in May 2005125 
found that the majority of organizations (84.6%) had assessed the legislation for the 
impact on their business and employees. But, only 15.6% had put in place arrangements 
to meet the statutory requirements, 4.7% had overhauled their arrangements in light of the 
legislation and 3.1% considered that their existing arrangements fulfilled the statutory 
requirements for PEAs. Most organizations were reportedly relying either on preserving 
the status quo of existing consultative arrangements or on a lack of interest on the part of 
employees in triggering negotiations under the ICER. 
However, a survey carried out in September/October 2005 for the West Midlands 
Employment Relations Forum (WMERF), provided evidence of active employers' 
responses (Hall et al. 2005). 37% of respondents said they had already made 
modifications to existing arrangements, 7% intended to introduce new ICE arrangements 
and another 20% planned to review their current arrangements soon. Successive 
employers' surveys conducted by the CBI also revealed a substantial increase in the 
number of organizations having permanent mechanisms for employee consultation. 
Interestingly, unionized organizations were proportionately more likely than non-union 
organizations to have modified their ICE arrangements (38% compared with 33%), and 
124 Another survey that was carried out in 2004 on behalf of the European Study Group reported that the 
level of awareness of the ICER amongst managers was considered very low. A survey of 99 organizations 
that was carried out in 2005 also reported that 14% of the respondents were not aware of the ICER despite 
the fact that two thirds of the respondents would be affected by the ICER in the first wave of the ICER 
application (Trident Communication, 2005). 
125 Out of the 66 respondents, 63 were in the private sector and 3 in the public sector; the majority of the 
respondents (69.2%) did not recognize unions. Interestingly, only two organizations indicated in their 
replies that their then consultation arrangements met all the requirements for PEAs. 
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were more likely to intend to introduce new arrangements (10% compared to 0%). Non- 
union organizations were more likely to say that they were not planning any action in 
response to the Regulations (44% compared with 33%). Respondents without any current 
arrangements but who were not planning to take any action were also more likely to be 
non-union organizations. These figures suggested an association between union 
recognition and active compliance strategies on the part of employers. Finally, all but one 
of the respondents said that they did not expect their employees to request negotiations 
under the legislation. 
The most recent CBI Employment Trends Survey, conducted in 2006, found that 57% of 
respondents reported that they had permanent mechanisms for informing and consulting 
employees, compared with 35% in 2002,47% in 2003,49% in 2004 and 47% in 2005. A 
further 12% of employers stated that they intended to introduce such a structure. 
Employers with 5,000 or more employees were most likely to have introduced such 
mechanisms (85%), compared with 51% of those with 50-199 staff. The latest Industrial 
Relations Services (IRS) survey of 134 HR practitioners reported that 55% of 
respondents operated one or more permanent consultative bodies, such as employee 
forums or works councils (Welfare, 2006). This was down from the 2005 IRS survey - 
when 74% of employers stated that they had a permanent consultation body - and closer 
to the 49% level reported in the 2004 IRS survey. The report stated that employers 
continued to establish such structures, however, with 18% having set up since 2003, and 
5% stating that they plan to do so within the next two years. 
Interviewees from employers' associations stressed that the most common response by 
employers was to undertake reviews of their existing arrangements in the light of the 
legislation and to assess the prospects of their employees seeking to trigger the procedure 
for the conclusion of `negotiated agreements'. As a result of reviews, instances of 
formalization of existing arrangements were reported. In more detail, the CBI interviewee 
stressed that the ICED was `a catalyst, a stimulant to review, renewal and formalization' 
of already existing arrangements. The Head of the EEF Employment Policy also noted 
that it was common to come across a `tightening up' of existing arrangements, especially 
in larger organizations, as a response to the legislation. In the chemical sector, the CIA 
Head of Employment Affairs noted that reflecting the already substantial degree of 
employee representation in the sector employers had largely sought agreement from their 
workforce on their existing ICE arrangements. However, as suggested by the 
interviewees, there was a significant number of employers who saw no need to establish 
PEAs as they perceived their existing arrangements as compliant to the ICER 
requirements and/or that employees would not trigger the process for `negotiated 
agreements' (see also Hall, 2006). For instance, in sectors such as local government and 
92 
further and higher education, interviewees stressed that due to the already substantial 
degree of consultation taking place in the sectors and employers' perceptions about the 
low risk of employees triggering the process for negotiated ICE agreements there was no 
evidence of employers establishing/amending existing ICE arrangements or employees 
triggering the process for the negotiation of ICE agreements. Similarly, in the engineering 
sector, the EEF interviewee noted the lack of pro-active employer response; this was 
reportedly due to a moderate level of organizational interest in complying with the ICER, 
the low awareness of the legislation by employees and the apprehension of certain trade 
unions in initiating such procedures and in sitting with non-union employees in 
consultative forums. 
Interviewees from employers' associations and the CBI stressed that proactive employer 
responses were more frequent in organizations with existing consultative arrangements or 
unionized workforces. With respect to the pre-existing structures of employee 
representation, the IPA interviewee mentioned that union recognition arrangements 
existed in 25 per cent of organizations where ICE agreements were established/amended 
in light of the legislation. The rest of the organizations either had communication forums 
or a different form of employee voice, which could not possibly qualify as an effective 
means for information and consultation. In unionized organizations, PEAs were 
established, amongst others, in Prudential (Luckhurst, 2005), Northern Food (EWCB, 
2006), SCA Hygiene Products, Rhodia, Robinson Brothers, Goodrich Engine Control 
Systems, Westinghouse Rail Systems (DTI, 2007), Electronic Data Systems (DTI, 2007), 
Accenture (DTI, 2007), Coors Brewers (DTI, 2007), ITV (DTI, 2007), Pindar Set (DTI, 
2007), Xansa, Fujitsu Services, Bombardier Transportation, Corus, Keogh Solicitors 
(Hall, 2006), BAA, Crown House and Twyford Bathrooms (Welfare, 2005). According to 
the IPA interviewee, a considerable number of ICE arrangements were also established in 
financial services and utilities organizations; in such cases, union recognition agreements 
existed and union membership was between 20% and 30%. 
While, according to CBI and EEF officials, there was limited evidence that employers 
were using deliberately the legislation so as to marginalize existing trade unions there 
was evidence that consultative arrangements were established in non-union organizations 
so as to prevent union organizing activities. Examples of non-unionized organizations 
were PEAs where reportedly established include Marks and Spencer, Schrader 
Electronics, Hewlett Packard, ARM (IDS, 2005), Grass Roots Group (DTI, 2007) and 
Land Securities. 126 The IPA interviewee also noted that in the voluntary sector, where 
126 However, there is no evidence to suggest that the arrangements in these cases were introduced in order 
to prevent union organizing activities. 
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collective bargaining arrangements have been traditionally absent, the introduction of the 
ICER led frequently to the establishment of consultative arrangements. 
However, lack of clarity in terms of whether ICE agreements were approved by or on 
behalf of employees was reported in a number of cases. Whilst the CBI interviewee noted 
that most employers had sought approval of the arrangements by workforce ballot, survey 
evidence suggested that in some cases the arrangements were not designed in 
consultation with employees; instead, the overriding majority was designed and signed 
off by management (ESG, 2004). The IRS survey in 2004 also reported that only 24% of 
employers had sought the agreement of employees (Welfare, 2004); this figure rose to 
32% of the sample in 2005 (Welfare, 2005) and in 2006 it stood at 25% (Welfare, 
2006). 127 Similar concerns were also expressed by the CIA interviewee, who suggested 
that, if tested, a considerable number of these would not satisfy the ICER criteria. Such 
testing could arise when organizations faced instances of major restructuring and re- 
organization, including potentially collective redundancies. In a number of arrangements 
that were reported it was uncertain whether the agreements were approved by or on 
behalf of employees; such arrangements include, amongst others, the ones in Telewest 
Global (Pickard, 2005), UBS, Citigroup, Ernst and Young, BSkyB, Amlin, Coca Cola 
Enterprises (IDS, 2005), United Co-op Travel Group (IDS, 2005), AMEC, Aviva, OCS, 
Gallaher, DHL Express, Safeway, and Babcock International Group. Further, surveys 
drew attention to the fact that a significant number of arrangements did not cover the 
entire workforce (Welfare, 2004) and that the arrangements were not in writing (Welfare, 
2006). 128 
There was evidence that the requirements for an agreement and the increased scope for 
flexibility was a source of uncertainty among employers. According to the ACAS 
interviewee, despite the CBI's emphasis on maintaining a flexible approach to the 
application of the legislation, the flexible institutional design of the ICER did not appeal 
to many employers: 
`What we have forgotten is that the great tradition of voluntarism in the UK, meaning 
reaching agreements, is 20 or 30 years out of date. So what was seen politically -for 
the government, for the CBI and the TUC - as a bonus, that is flexibility `you can do 
your own thing'. the response by lots of employers was: `can you just tell us what we 
have to do? ' You tell them all about the flexibility and they say `well, it is all very 
unclear'. So I say `look if the only thing you are interested in is complying, just put 
127 The 2006 CBI survey also reported that 25% of organizations had sought the agreement of their 
workforce to the effect that these arrangements were satisfactory. 
128 The 2006 CBI survey also reported that 49% of employers had ICE arrangements set out in writing. 
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the standard provisions in. ' But I've been told the standard provisions are 
terrible ... Again, we forget that in many companies as union membership and 
bargaining are down there is no management experience of negotiating. So, actually 
being told the way to implement the regulations, is via an agreement, causes all sorts 
of problems in some places. '(ACAS interviewee) 
This view was shared by the IPA interviewee, who noted that another source of employer 
confusion concerned the extent to which PEAs could be established after the coming into 
force of the legislation. 
In terms of the nature of the newly established arrangements, the IPA interviewee 
suggested that arrangements in the financial sector were introduced alongside existing 
union negotiation rights. According to the IPA and CIA interviewees, in both the finance 
and the chemical sectors a rigid distinction between consultation and negotiation was 
maintained. This view was shared by the CBI official, who stressed that whilst different 
mechanisms were set up for different purposes employers did not want to upset existing 
arrangements and excluded hence issues, such as pensions, that were already the subject 
of discussion with unions. According to the IPA, in almost all the cases where ICE 
arrangements were introduced in organizations with existing recognition agreements in 
the financial sector unions, even senior officials, were provided with designated seats in 
the consultative forums. Similar findings were reported in the chemical sector, where 
traditionally a significant number of organizations recognize trade unions. 129 
In line with the evidence reported in employers' surveys, while there was a flurry of 
activity and interest in organizations that wanted to put in place PEAs from April 2003 up 
to March 2005, the interest seemed to fall away almost immediately after the 
implementation of the legislation. The picture was similar when the ICER were extended 
in 2007 to cover companies employing 100-150 employees. According to the IPA 
interviewee, there was very limited interest and little take up of the legislation in such 
organizations. The paucity of cases of establishment or amendment of ICE arrangements 
was mainly attributed to lack of awareness of the legislation, especially in smaller 
129 The 2005 IRS survey reported that in 37% of employers who had employee representatives the latter 
were a mixture of union and non-union members. A further 27% said that all their consultation 
representatives were union members; slightly more - 32% - thought that none of their employee 
representatives were members of a trade union (Welfare, 2005). However, caution needs to be exercised as 
the sample had a high level of trade union recognition, with 61% of respondents saying that they 
recognized a trade union. The 2006 IRS survey also reported that 38% of organizations that had employee 
representatives said employee representatives were a mixture of trade union members and non-members. 
29% thought that none of their representatives were union members; and a further 30% said that all their 
employee representatives were members of a trade union (Welfare, 
2006). Again, trade unions were 
recognized at 57% of organizations. 
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organizations, where the absence of dedicated HR departments limited the extent of 
awareness, and the ambiguity regarding the possibility for concluding PEAs after the 
introduction of the legislation. While interviewees reported the incidence of the 
establishment of ICE arrangements through negotiated agreements the number was much 
lower than the reported number of concluded PEAs. Moreover, there was very little 
evidence of ICE arrangements introduced as a result of the application of the standard 
provisions; only the CIA interviewee noted that the standard ICE provisions had been 
applied in some organizations in the chemical industry. 
Lastly, in terms of direct forms of ICE, there was very limited evidence of employers 
using this option in order to comply with the requirements of the legislation. Hall (2006: 
466) reported that some organizations had introduced or formalized direct ICE methods 
for certain groups of employees, e. g. head office or managerial staff, not previously 
covered by existing consultative arrangements. According to the TUC interviewee, there 
were not many examples of direct systems that were formally set up and covered all 
employees. Only Yellow Pages (Amicus interviewee) and mobile operator 3 (Personnel 
Today, 2005) were reported to have used direct ICE methods so as to comply with the 
legislation. The IPA interviewee also noted that two smaller organizations had used direct 
ICE forms to comply with the ICER. The limited use of direct ICE methods to meet the 
statutory requirements comes in sharp contrast with the steady increase of the use of 
direct employee engagement methods, as evidenced in successive WERS. A possible 
reason for the limited use of direct ICE forms maybe the fact that until the time of the 
research the ICER were applicable to undertakings employing more than 150 employees, 
where direct ICE methods are frequently complemented by indirect employee 
representation mechanisms, through union recognition agreements or other consultative 
arrangements. Moreover, consulting with representatives was perceived by employers' 
associations, such as the EEF, and reportedly some large organizations, such as KPMG 
and Astrazeneca, as not only beneficial for the organizations in terms of the skills and 
experience of the representatives and trust built up between management and ERs, but 
also as a way to ensure that adequate consultation through representatives took place 
when required by the law, such as in cases of collective redundancies and transfers of 
undertakings (Clegg, 2005). Further, the possibility that direct ICE forms may be 
challenged by trade unions before the ECJ has arguably influenced the advice provided 
by employers' associations. Even in the case of the CIPD, which was strongly supportive 
of direct information and consultation the CIPD interviewee noted that the use of such 
ICE forms may be questionable when perceived as sufficient on their own in meeting the 
objectives of the legislation. Similar concerns were raised by the EEF; in its guide to the 
legislation (EEF, 2005: 66), it is stated that direct ICE methods may be `difficult to 
organise and operate effectively, except in the smallest undertaking. ' 
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4.2.2 The CIA survey 
The chemical industry provides an interesting example, as it is one of the few sectors in 
the UK where there is evidence that the sector goes against the trend in liberal market 
economies. The CIA, as suggested in chapter two, constitutes an active employers' 
association. It brings together businesses of all sizes, across all chemical activities. At the 
time of the research, it comprised over 140 members, based at 200 manufacturing sites 
nationwide. The combined breadth and strength of its membership enables the CIA to be 
not only the largest but also the most influential, supportive and progressive association 
to represent chemistry-using companies in the UK today. As part of the CIA's vision for 
a sustainable chemical industry, member-organizations have been encouraged to embrace 
the goal of employee participation through having in place processes for informing and 
consulting employees on matters that affect their working lives. 
The survey, conducted for the purpose of the thesis, took the form of a brief questionnaire 
designed to collect information on employers' arrangements for informing and consulting 
their employees and their responses to the ICER. 78.4% (29 organizations) recognized 
trade unions for at least some employees while 21.6% (8 organizations) did not. The 
survey asked what types of information and consultation arrangements existed (figure 1). 
A total of 43.5% (10 organizations) out of those operating at multi-site level (24 
organizations) "0 reported they had a multi-site information and consultation body or 
employee forum and 39% (14 organizations) had one or more site-level bodies. 65% (24 
organizations) of the total sample informed and consulted via recognized trade unions. 
The slightly more popular practice of information and consultation directly with 
employees took place in 67.6% (25 organizations). In 5.2% (2 organizations) there were 
no ICE arrangements. The majority of the organizations (24 or 66.6%) reported using 
more than one method, including two organizations where all four methods employees 
were in operation. 
130 There is one missing value. 
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Figure 1 
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Information and consultation via recognized unions was the most common practice 
among unionized organizations, reported by over three-quarters of the unionized 
respondents (figure 2). Direct information and consultation took place in 18 out of 29 of 
unionized organizations (62.1%). Ten unionized organizations (35.7%) had multi-site 
arrangements while 12 (41.4%) had one or more site-level ICE bodies. Only one 
unionized organization (3.4%) replied that they had no current ICE arrangements. Among 
the non-union organizations, direct information and consultation was the most popular 
practice, reported by 87.5% of respondents (7 of 8). There was a multi-site ICE body in 
one organization (16.7%) and two organizations (28.6%) reported having one or site-level 
ICE arrangements while one organization (12%) said they had no current ICE 
arrangements. Hence, non-union organizations were much more likely than unionized 
organizations to inform and consult directly and less likely to have ICE bodies. 
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Figure 2 
Existing arrangements by trade union recognition 
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In the majority of the organizations (70.6% or 24 organizations) where ICE arrangements 
were in place, they covered the whole workforce, while 26.5% (9 organizations) replied 
that the arrangements covered most of the workforce and 2.9% (1 organization) reported 
that the arrangements covered some of the workforce (figure 3) 
Figure 3 
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In light of the significance that the ICER put on ICE arrangements agreed between 
management and ERs or approved by employees, organizations were further asked to 
provide details on the status of their information and consultation practices, i. e. whether 
they were based on a written agreement with trade union representatives, whether a 
written agreement with other ERs was concluded or approved by employees (e. g. in a 
ballot); whether they were formal arrangements introduced by management acting alone; 
or finally whether they were ad hoc arrangements, such as in the cases of collective 
redundancies and transfers of undertakings (figure 4). Of the 36 respondents who had 
information and consultation arrangements, 21 respondents (58%) had written 
agreements with trade union representatives and 11 (30%) had arrangements based on 
written agreement with other ERs. In nine cases (25%) the arrangements were approved 
by employees. In seven organizations (19%) there were formal arrangements introduced 
by management and in 12 cases (33%) respondents reported that `ad hoc arrangements' 
were in operation. 
Figure 4 
Status of existing arrangements 
70% 
60% 58% 
50% 
40% 
30% 
33% 
30% 25% 
19% 
20% 
10% 
0% - 
  Written agreement with trade union representatives 
  Written agreement with other employee representatives 
Q Approved by employees 
Q Formal management arrangements 
  Ad hoc arrangements 
Regarding information and consultation topics (figure 5), the great majority of 
organizations (87% or 33 organizations of 36 respondents) reported that they informed 
employees and/or ERs on business development issues, e. g. strategic objectives. 89% (34 
organizations) informed employees and/or ERs on financial issues, e. g. performance and 
financial outlook, while 84% (31 organizations) provided information regarding 
production issues, such as level of production of sales. In contrast, consultation with 
regard to these issues, i. e. business, financial and production, appeared a minority 
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phenomenon. 2 organizations (5.5%) consulted on business issues, one (2.7%) consulted 
in financial and four (11.1 %) consulted in production issues. 
Figure 5 
Information topics 
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However, a significant number of respondents reported that they consulted ERs and/or 
employees with regard to employment, pay, health and safety and work organization 
issues (figure 6). More specifically, regarding employment issues, 88.8% (32 
organizations) replied that they consulted on employment issues, 63.8% (23 
organizations) consulted on pay issues, 86.1% (31 organizations) consulted on health and 
safety issues, and finally 88.8% (32 organizations) consulted on work organization, such 
as changes to working methods and working time arrangements. It was further found that 
16.6% (6 organizations) consulted on pension schemes issues. 
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Figure 6 
Consultation topics 
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When analyzing these findings by trade union recognition (figure 7), it is shown that 
information on business and financial issues was provided to a fairly similar extent within 
unionized and non-unionized organizations. 
Figure 7 
Information topics by trade union recognition 
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However, regarding consultation (figure 8), organizations where trade unions were 
recognized tend to consult more than non-unionized organizations on pay (82.1% 
compared to 28.5%), health and safety (82.1% compared to 
71.4%) and work 
organization issues (85.7% compared to 71.4%). In the case of pensions' changes non- 
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unionized organizations seemed to consult more than unionized organizations (28.5% 
compared to 21.4%). 
Figure 8 
Consultation topics by trade union recognition 
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Concerning the frequency of meetings (figure 9), the greatest number of respondents 
(71% or 22 organizations out of 31) reported that they held meetings with ERs at least 
quarterly. 19.5% (6 organizations) held monthly meetings and only 9.7% (3 
organizations) met annually with ERs. Out of the 22 organizations that met at least 
quarterly with ERs, 77% (17 organizations) recognized trade unions. 
Figure 9 
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The most significant findings from the survey constitute arguably the ones measuring the 
impact, if any, of the ICER on organizations' ICE arrangements (figure 10). 71% (27 
organizations) responded that they had made an assessment of the possible impact that 
the ICER had on the way the business managed employee information and consultation. 
These organizations were then asked which of a number of different statements most 
accurately describe their response to the ICER. The results presented in figure 10 give the 
details of the 27 organizations that had assessed the potential impact of the ICER. 11% (3 
organizations) responded that they were not then covered by the ICER (those 
organizations employed fewer than 150 employees but would be covered at a later stage, 
either in 2007 or 2008). The majority of the respondents (59% or 16 organizations) 
replied that their arrangements were already in compliance with the ICER. However, 
22% (6 organizations) said that they had already modified their arrangements in response 
to the ICER. Furthermore, there was only one organization where the arrangements did 
not comply with the ICER and the organization was planning to introduce new 
arrangements or amend the existing ones. Finally, there was only one organization where 
the then existing arrangements did not comply but the organization was not 
contemplating any action. 
Figure 10 
Organizational response to the ICER 
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When the responses of unionized organizations are compared with non-union 
organizations (figure 11), it is evident that unionized organizations were proportionately 
more likely to have already modified their arrangements in response to the Regulations 
than non-union organizations (25% compared to 14%). While these figures may suggest 
an association between union recognition and active compliance strategies on the part of 
employers, it is important to add here that the only case where the arrangements were 
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considered as not complying with the ICER but the organization was not planning any 
action was a unionized organization. 
Figure 11 
Organizational response by trade union recognition 
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Out of 11 respondents that did not made an assessment of the possible impact of the 
ICER, the majority, 7 organizations, intended to make an assessment of the ICE 
arrangements within the next two years. A further interesting result is with regard to the 
possibility of employees requesting negotiations under the ICER on the establishment of 
new ICE arrangements (figure 12). In this case, the majority of organizations (32 
organizations or 86% of the total sample) reported that they did not expect such a request. 
However, there were five organizations (24%) that did expect one. These had not yet 
assessed the possible impact of the ICER. Interestingly, in three out of the five 
organizations that did expect such a request, ICE arrangements based on agreements with 
trade unions and/or ad-hoc arrangements were already in operation. This finding may 
suggest that in such cases employees/trade unions perceived the status of these 
arrangements as not adequate for the purpose of complying with the ICER. In the only 
non-unionized organization where it was expected that employees might request the 
negotiation of an information and consultation agreement, there were then no ICE 
arrangements. 
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Figure 12 
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Concerning the extent to which employers took account of the CIA guidance on 
information and consultation of employees when assessing the possible impact of the 
ICER in their organizations (figure 13), 30% (8 out of 27 organizations) reported that 
they drew on the CIA guidance while 30% (8 organizations) were not aware. A slightly 
greater number (40% or 11 organizations) reported that while they were aware of the 
guidance they did not draw on it. 
Figure 13 
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Finally, an interesting result comes from the question regarding information and 
consultation of employees constitutes an organizational goal (figure 14). The great 
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majority of the respondents (27 organizations or 71% out of the total sample) replied that 
in line with the CIA policy of encouraging organizations to adopt sustainable 
development goals, it did. Seven organizations (18%) replied that it was not considered as 
an organizational goal while four (10%) said that they were not aware of the CIA policy. 
Interestingly, 64% of the organizations where information and consultation constituted an 
organizational goal employed more then 150 employees, while where it did not constitute 
part of the organization's objectives the majority of the respondents (66.7%) employed 
50-149 employees. 
Figure 14 
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Overall, the survey provides information on organizational practice in CIA member- 
organizations. In line with the CIA policy, the survey indicated that prompted by the 
introduction of the ICER most CIA member-organizations (71 %) had reviewed their 
existing ICE arrangements. This picture is consistent with a `risk assessment' 
approach, as described by Hall (2006), since many organizations arguably took the 
view that their existing arrangements were broadly consistent with the aims of the 
legislation, and/or that employee `challenges' under the ICER were unlikely, making 
PEAs unnecessary. However, in terms of organizational response to the ICER, the 
survey recorded a considerable minority of organizations (22%) actively responding 
to the legislation by establishing new ICE arrangements or modifying their existing 
ones. Organizations recognizing trade unions were more likely than non-union 
organizations: to have established ICE arrangements involving ERs, to consult more 
on pay, health and safety and work organization issues and, finally to have been 
actively responding to the new legislation by establishing new arrangements or 
modifying their existing ones. 
4.2.3 The extent and nature of trade unions' responses to the implementation of 
the ICED 
Survey findings ahead of and after the implementation of the ICER presented a 
positive attitude towards the new legislation and active involvement on the part of 
trade unions. A DLA Industrial Relations Survey carried out between July 2002 and 
July 2003 found that 70% of union officials regarded legislation providing for this 
right as essential (Bradley and Leach, 2003). When asked about trade union 
exclusivity for the purposes of implementing the legislation, where a recognition 
agreement already existed, a slight majority of respondents said that it was important 
but not a priority (53%) in contrast to 32% who believed that it was essential. In terms 
of the establishment of ICE arrangements, 68% of respondents said they would sit 
alongside non-trade union representatives in relation to all issues for discussion. This 
view was confirmed in the 2004 DLA survey in which trade union officials perceived 
the legislation as the single greatest opportunity to increase membership and influence 
in the work place (Bradley and Leach, 2004). In the same survey, trade unions saw 
themselves as the natural negotiators to establish works councils within the 
workplace, which in turn would facilitate consultation on strategy and policy. 
Evidence of a `concerted effort' to raise their profile regarding ICE arrangements was 
also found in the CBI 2004 survey where it was reported that less than half of existing 
bodies included trade union representatives (CBI, 2004b). '3' 
The results of a 2004 Labour Research Department (LRD) survey of trade union 
representatives further suggested that the extent to which unions were informed and 
13' The CBI survey also found that fewer companies reported no trade union involvement in their 
formal ICE structures than did in 2003; 57% of companies did not have trade union involvement, 
compared to 67% in 2003 (CBI, 2004b). 
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consulted on a range of issues had increased since the 2002 LRD survey (LRD, 2004). 
The survey indicated a `sharp increase' in the reported incidence of ICE bodies 
involving employees who were not union members as well, from 11% of responses in 
2002 to 25% in 2004, and found that over a quarter of these had been set up recently 
(in 2002 or later). In more than half of these bodies, unions had an organized 
presence: in 57% of the cases unions appointed at least some of the members, 20% 
said that an entirely non-union body was used and a further 23% reported that 
individual union members were elected in the body rather than being selected by the 
union. The survey further found that in 30% of cases the union side had discussed the 
Regulations internally, and in 32% that the issue had been discussed with the 
employer. When discussed with the employers, the unions appeared to have taken the 
initiative on raising the Regulations' issue and only in 6% of those cases did the 
respondents say that it had been raised by the employer, although many more (29%) 
said that the employer had come forward with proposals on information and 
consultation generally in the last two years. The existence of written ICE agreements 
was reported by 43% of respondents and a further 4% responded that the employers 
claimed that there was an agreement but this was disputed. In more than a quarter of 
cases (27%) where the respondent specified a date, the written agreement was reached 
or amended since 1999. 
A 2006 LRD survey reported that a significant number of unions had effectively used 
the legislation in order to improve or consolidate their influence in the workplace. 
Well over two-thirds of respondents said that formal ICE arrangements were in place 
at their workplace, with almost half of these reporting that their arrangements were 
drawn up, amended or reviewed in the light of the legislation. 22 respondents reported 
new formal ICE arrangements taking account of the Regulations had been set up since 
2004, and in 15 of these the initiative came from the employers. But 11 of those 15 
employers had then negotiated a formal agreement with the union(s) (and sometimes 
other representatives) with the result that no respondents said they thought their 
union's position was weakened as a result of the new arrangements. However, 4 
respondents stated that their employer had not only suggested setting up formal ICE 
arrangements but also had imposed them without negotiation: in all cases, this 
involved information and consultation via staff councils with few or no places set 
aside for unions. In the other 7 workplaces where new, formal ICE arrangements were 
set up taking the Regulations into account, the initiative came from the union. The 
arrangements in four of these workplaces were negotiated with the union alone and 
provided for ICE through the union alone; two of the other workplaces with union- 
inspired ICE arrangements set up staff councils with at least 50% union 
membership. 132 Among the 27 respondents who reported that their existing formal 
ICE arrangements at workplace level were reviewed and/or revised in the light of the 
132 In the last case the medium for consultation was still under negotiation when the survey was carried 
out. 
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legislation, satisfaction was generally high. Of those who had not used the 
Regulations to review their existing arrangements, nearly 100% were happy with 
those arrangements, suggesting that where union representatives were not satisfied 
with their existing ICE mechanisms, they had used the legislation to do something 
about it. However, the significantly positive perception and activity by trade union 
officials/representatives regarding the legislation recorded in these surveys should not 
be taken as synonymous with the state of arrangements on the ground. Firstly, the 
LRD surveys, as acknowledged also by their authors, concerned the situation in 
unionized organizations rather than organizations in general. Secondly, it is likely that 
many arrangements reviewed under the Regulations would not have qualified as 
PEAs, given the tightly defined legal meaning ascribed to these agreements by the 
Regulations. Still, it is interesting that a significant percentage of workplace 
representatives reported that the legislation has been useful to them. 
The possibility that the existing surveys of trade union officials provided a more 
positive union stance rather than the one actually adopted was confirmed to some 
extent in the interviews carried out and in the accounts provided by national and local 
union officers. The latter suggested that in practice unions would appear to have 
adopted differing and ad hoc approaches to the legislation, with differences apparent 
within individual unions and by regions. The majority of union interviewees reported 
that the Regulations were perceived as `of no effect' for the unions and that pro-active 
trade union activity with regard to the Regulations' application was limited. While 
recognizing the possibilities for using the legislation in organizations where trade 
union density was around 30-40% the TUC official commented: 
`Most of the arrangements were employer-led and trade unions did not use the 
legislation in order to promote their role within the workplace... at the early stage 
of the Regulations' application, employers saw the legislation as an opportunity 
to diminish the role of the unions and the latter were predominantly interested in 
collective bargaining. ' 
Drawing on the limited evidence of ICE arrangements being established and/or 
amended at organizational level, a TUC official suggested elsewhere that the 
legislation had hence proven to be `a dog that has not barked' (Veale, 2007). The lack 
of union activity was much more evident in non-union workplaces where there were 
reportedly no examples of unions using the legislation. Trade unions preferred to 
focus on reaching the requisite threshold for trade union recognition, suggesting thus 
that achieving union recognition remained the priority for them. Even in cases where 
union recognition agreements were already in place, as in further and higher 
education, there was no attempt by the unions to use the legislation to promote further 
employee interests. However, in some cases existing union agreements were 
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revamped in order to meet the requirements for PEAs. 133 Apart from maintaining their 
long-standing priorities, the high thresholds required by the legislation for the 
establishment of ICE agreements acted as further constraints on the development of a 
pro-active approach. According to the TUC official: 
`Part of the problem is with the way the agreement [outline scheme] is framed, 
you do have to put pressure on, certainly the upper and lower limit. This will 
particularly be the case when the smaller companies come in... The thresholds 
have done what they were supposed to do to an extent [assist in preserving 
existing agreements with unions] but the one big problem with them, which I think 
none of us foresaw, was that if you are out there in the workplace organizing you 
have got a threshold to meet. In a sense if you think you have got adequate 
support for ICE, why not hang a bit longer and go for recognition? ' 
Where ICE agreements were concluded with the participation of the unions, `hybrid' 
consultation bodies involving both unionists and non-union representatives were often 
set up. However, the issue of trade union representatives sitting at the table with the 
so-called `noners', i. e. non-union ERs, was mentioned by both unions and employers 
as constituting a complicated dimension in the application of the legislation in 
organizations with partial union recognition. This was reportedly the case in some 
companies in the engineering and chemical sectors. The CIPD interviewee also noted: 
`We know that the T&G has sworn in blood not to sit down with non-union people. ' 
The negative union stance was attributed by the IPA to confusion around the 
distinction between consultation and negotiation and concern that bargaining 
arrangements could be undermined. The IPA interviewee also drew attention to the 
reluctance of unions to use the legislation as a means to extend consultation to 
strategic issues: 
`All the ones I have been involved even upfront or in the back of their minds they 
[unions] see it as either a threat or an unnecessary inconvenience ... Do they see 
this [the Regulations] as a route into more strategic relationship with the 
organization? All the evidence is no, they have not seen this as a possibility. ' 
While the adoption of a pro-active approach to the establishment/amendment of ICE 
arrangements was not evident, some unions reported that they adopted a less 
indifferent approach to the legislation. For example, BECTU believed that the 
legislation gave the union opportunities for consultation in areas where they had 
members but no recognition agreements. While initially the union perceived the 
legislation as a potential threat in cases where union recognition existed, as in the 
133 Such action was taken in the following organizations: Sheffield Hallam University, University of 
Salford. Sussex University, University of Hertfordshire, University of Wales Swansea, University of 
Oxford, University of Exeter. 
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BBC and ITV and major theatre suppliers, there was agreement with management that 
where there was a requirement to consult under the Regulations the union would 
undertake the consultation and would invite non-members to participate as well. The 
conclusion of the outline scheme between the DTI, TUC and CBI had assisted, 
according to the CIA, in the adoption of a more positive approach of the unions 
towards the introduction of ICE arrangements in the chemical sector as well. The 
TUC interviewee also noted that GMB, Unison, and the National Union of Rail, 
Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) 134 had either extended and refreshed their 
existing union agreements or negotiated an ICE agreement that maintained the 
collective agreement for the required bargaining unit. 
Among the trade unions that had adopted a clear pro-active approach in promoting the 
promulgation of the legislation at organizational level was Amicus. In delineating its 
priorities at the time of the passage of the Regulations, the union acknowledged that 
`there could be a point where we would devote energies to securing ICE agreements 
as a first step toward securing recognition agreements where they do not already exist' 
(TUC, 2004). In its 2004 guide to the legislation, Amicus warned that, if negotiations 
do take place in organizations, union representatives should negotiate for the inclusion 
of ICE requirements that at least comply with the standard provisions. The union also 
suggested to its representatives not to negotiate any agreement without `talking it 
through with the national or regional officer first', and that all agreements must be 
forwarded to the union's legal department for approval before being signed (Amicus, 
2004: 16). 
Evidence of the pro-active strategy pursued by Amicus was particularly clear in the 
paper, print and publishing sector where the union tested the legislation through 
applications to the CAC and through negotiations with management for the 
conclusion of negotiated ICE agreements. 135 According to the Amicus GMP assistant 
general secretary: 
`High levels of collective bargaining in the sector mean that the legislation 
presented both threats and opportunities: employers may seek to use the 
Regulations to weaken trade unions' position by claiming that they cannot 
represent non union employees in consultation, but unions prepared to put in the 
effort may be able to increase activity and membership through new ICE 
agreements'. 
134 In the case of RMT, a PEA was concluded in Carillion Rail. 
135 Apart from the case of Amicus activity in the finance and paper, print and publishing sectors, 
evidence of a pro-active strategy in other sectors was arguably non-existent. 
For example, according to 
the Electrical Contractors' Association interviewee, Amicus never raised the issue of application of the 
ICER in the sector. 
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Amicus developed model ICE agreements with the British Printing Industries 
Federation (BPIF), the Scottish Printing Employers Federation and the Confederation 
of Paper Industries. The Sector Partnership Agreement and Code of Practice as 
developed by the BPIF/Amicus GPM Sector Partnership at Work Joint Review Body, 
which took effect from November 2005, included a Model Information and 
Consultation Agreement for use in the industry. According to the Amicus assistant 
general secretary: `the model agreement manages to resolve some of the important 
concerns unions had raised about the Regulations, including: the definition of 
information and consultation, the subject-matter available for discussion, the 
nomination and election of union and non-union representatives, meeting 
arrangements, confidentiality, facilities and the use of external union officers and 
other experts' (Stevens, 2006). 
Amicus was also in discussions with a number of organizations in the media, printing 
and paper industries. Importantly, the union was in favour of the `negotiated 
agreement' compliance option as this would secure that the enforcement provisions 
would be applicable. This stands in contrast to the stance adopted by other unions; the 
LRD reported that the unions were advising representatives that it was best to take the 
informal approach and reach an agreement, i. e. a PEA, under conditions that suit them 
rather than having to follow the procedure for the negotiated agreements set out in the 
ICER (LRD, 2004: 15). Amicus successfully negotiated agreements at company 
level, 136 organized training sessions for the representatives and intended to appoint 
full-time officials that would be responsible for approaching companies with more 
than 100 employees in order to trigger the process for the conclusion of negotiated 
agreements. The assistant general secretary described the union's approach as: 
`... both re-active, i. e. in terms of blocking employers from introducing agreements 
from the back door, and pro-active, i. e. in the sense of actually approaching 
employers for the conclusion/amendment of existing arrangements in order to 
comply with the Regulations'. 
In line with its approach to challenge legally the conclusion of agreements that 
provide for `substandard ICE arrangements, which undermine the whole spirit of the 
new Regulations' requests were made by Amicus GMP to the CAC (see section 4.4). 
However, the union official stressed that `all the way through the legislation the 
employees are massively disadvantaged compared to the employer. ' Significant 
challenges that were attributed to the institutional design of the ICER and hindered 
trade unions, and perhaps even more individual employees, from using the 
legislation 
included: the ambiguity of the notion of `undertaking'; the need to identify the exact 
number of employees in the organization for the purpose of triggering the process 
for 
136 Individual ICE agreements were concluded in a number of companies operating, such as 
in Trinity 
Mirror, DS Smith Packaging and de la Rue. 
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the negotiation of ICE agreements; management discretion over the nature of 
constituencies in the case of negotiating and ICE representatives; and the limitations 
inherent in PEAs, such as the lack of sanctions, the methods of employee approval 
used by employers in some cases such as email in the case of Yellow Pages, and the 
possibility for concluding PEAs after the introduction of the legislation. Another 
union concern was the significant amount of time and resources that was needed on 
the part of the union in order to pursue such a pro-active strategy. 
Another trade union that adopted a proactive stance towards the new legislation was 
Prospect. The general secretary of the union, which represents professionals, viewed 
information and consultation as a key instrument in the union's approach to 
membership and recognition: `it is an opportunity for trade unions to strengthen their 
role in the workplace, by developing an influential role in the workplace and an 
influential role in the formative stages of the decision-making process' (Stevens, 
2006: 6). At the time of the research, Prospect had already addressed or was in the 
process of addressing employee consultation by establishing ICE mechanisms in the 
private sector. Examples included the agreement at Diamond Light Source, where the 
union - whilst it enjoys 10% membership - secured 50% of the seats on a new 
committee, Ofcom where the union was working alongside non-union representatives, 
and Drax where a collective agreement covering consultation on transfers of 
undertakings was concluded. 
In this context, it is important to briefly assess existing evidence concerning the 
response of individual employees to the application of the ICER. A survey of 790 
employees employed in companies with 150 employees or more that was conducted 
by Croner just before the coming into force of the legislation found that almost three- 
quarters (74%) of employees were not aware of their new rights. 137 This percentage 
was lower (33%) where the respondents were employed in a nationalized industry or 
public corporation. Employers were reportedly not doing enough to make employees 
aware of their legal rights under the Regulations (Croner, 2005). A further study of 
1,000 workers - mostly employed in larger companies - that was conducted by 
consultancy CHA in August 2005 showed that more than 80% had not heard of the 
Directive. Around the same number (88%) had not been told about the Directive by 
their employer, and almost all (94%) had not been told by their trade union. Just 13% 
of the employees surveyed by CHA were aware that the Directive gave them the right 
to ask management about future business direction. The findings suggested that both 
137 An employee survey that was published just after the implementation of the ICED reported that one 
in three UK employees (29%) said that they were never consulted when major change occurred in their 
organizations. This contrasted with the employees' opinion on consultation, with as many as nine out 
of ten (87%) saying that they wanted to be informed and consulted, particularly on 
issues that could 
affect them and their peers directly (Talking People, 2005). The survey was undertaken 
by YouGov for 
Talking People among a representative sample of 2,000 UK employees about their specific views on 
information and consultation in the workplace. 
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employers and unions had done little to keep workers informed about the changes. 
Further, representatives from employers' associations suggested that the level of 
employee awareness of the legislation was predominantly limited and there was thus 
little employee demand for the establishment/amendment of arrangements. 
Significantly, there was very limited evidence suggesting that employees were 
proactive in terms of triggering the process for the conclusion of negotiated 
agreements. For instance, the 2006 IRS survey revealed a lack of pressure from 
employees. Just two employers in the survey had received a request to negotiate new 
arrangements under the ICE Regulations. 
4.2.4 Assessment of the impact of the application of the ICED 
As noted in the beginning of the chapter, the flexibility in the ICER provisions 
presented employers, trade unions and employees with specific options in light of the 
establishment and/or amendment of ICE arrangements. The existence of different 
compliance options is in line with one of the main reflexive legal strategies that 
Teubner had advocated as a means of structural coupling, namely coupling through 
optional regulation. As analyzed in chapter two, Teubner (1993: 94) suggests that 
instead of law intervening by imposing particular distributive outcomes it could 
merely produce `optional regulation, which those concerned could use or not, as they 
saw fit'. In the context of the ICER, options included were doing nothing, pre- 
empting the use of the ICER procedures through the conclusion of PEAs, proceeding 
to the conclusion of `negotiated agreements' or to the application of the `standard 
provisions'. In turn, should employers, trade unions and employees decide to proceed 
to the establishment/amendment of ICE arrangements in order to comply with the 
legislation, opportunities for autonomous processes of adjustment through collective 
organization arise, which constitute another form of structural coupling suggested by 
Teubner and a significant number of RL proponents (see for instance Deakin, 1999). 
Hence, the responses of the social actors to the implementation of the ICER provided 
an opportunity to study the operation, in practice, of legislation which incorporates 
these `reflexive' techniques. 
First of all, the research found that despite the focus of the ICER on employee rights, 
it was predominantly employers' attitudes and strategies that have shaped the extent 
to which the rights stipulated by the new legislation were realized. As evident from 
the ORC/Baker & McKenzie, IRS, WMERF, CBI and CIA surveys, the 
implementation of the ICER acted as a stimulus to the management review of existing 
ICE arrangements in a significant number of organizations; such activity was also in 
line with the advice of the majority of employers' associations, such as the CBI, CIA, 
EEF and CIPD. More importantly, the legislation induced in some cases the 
formalization of existing consultative arrangements through the review of existing 
mechanisms as well, suggesting that employee representation structures, albeit not in 
the form of union recognition and not formalized as the ICED envisaged, were 
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already a significant feature of organizational practice in Britain. As reported in 
interviews, the introduction of the Regulations acted further as a catalyst for the 
institutionalization of ICE arrangements in organizations where previously collective 
representation through the unions was absent, e. g. voluntary sector. While a 
considerable number of PEAs was concluded before and just after the introduction of 
the legislation in 2005, there was, as seen, the standard provisions were rarely applied. 
Hence, the `shadow' effect of the standard provisions - prompting voluntary ICE 
agreements before and slightly after the introduction of the legislation - proved more 
important than its direct impact, that is, the application of the standard provisions. An 
additional reading would be that the possibility for concluding PEAs even after the 
coming into force of the Regulations limited the rate of negotiated agreements 
concluded in light of the legislation and the application of the standard provisions. 
It was further evident from the study that the opportunities for the 
establishment/amendment of consultative arrangements in light of the ICER were 
conditioned firstly by the assessment of their existing arrangements as compliant to 
the ICER requirements and/or the perception that employees would not trigger the 
process for `negotiated agreements'. Concerning the former, there was widespread 
perception that existing arrangements were compliant with the ICER requirements on 
PEAs. According to reg 8 (1) PEAs need to have been approved by the employees. 
Whereas the outline scheme, as agreed by the TUC, CBI and DTI, stipulated that 
PEAs should `not consist of arrangements unilaterally imposed by management 
without any discussion with employees and where employees have had no opportunity 
to signify their approval, the DTI Guidance only suggests that employee approval can 
be demonstrated by a simple majority of those voting in a ballot of the workforce; by 
the support of the majority of the workforce expressed through signatures; or through 
the agreement of employee representatives, representing a majority of the workforce 
(DTI, 2006: 20). 138 It was found that in a considerable number of cases employee 
approval was sought for the establishment or amendment of existing arrangements in 
order to qualify as PEAs. However, the means by which such approval was secured, 
e. g. through email, were brought into attention by trade unions who claimed that such 
methods did not necessarily mean that genuine employee approval existed in such 
ICE arrangements. Based on these findings, it could be suggested that the procedural 
conditions attached to these options were rather weak. In contrast to Teubner's 
suggestion (1993: 94) that reflexive optional regulation should not `enabl[e] those 
who are already powerful to become more so', it was not certain in a number of cases 
whether the agreements in question were genuinely approved by employees or were 
unilaterally imposed by management. 
138 As Davies and Kilpatrick (2004: 149) suggest, although the requirement for employee approval does 
not exclude representation of employees, it certainly does not require it. However, it is questionable the 
extent to which approval for instance by email can be considered as adequate for the purpose of the 
ICER. 
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Concerning the trigger mechanism, the generally low expectation on the part of 
employers (3% in the WMERF survey and 14% in the CIA survey) that their 
employees would request negotiations under the new legislation on the establishment 
of negotiated ICE arrangements and the limited take-up rate of negotiated agreements 
(only two reported in the IRS 2006 survey) clearly indicate the constraining impact of 
the threshold in the take-up of the ICER. This was perhaps more clearly illustrated in 
the finding that very few ICE arrangements `started from scratch', i. e. in organizations 
without existing consultative arrangements or unionized workforces. As a result of the 
institutional design of the ICER the new requirements for statutory employee 
representation were simply avoided in many workplaces, limiting in turn the extent to 
which opportunities for the integration of employee interests in the organizations 
could arise. The requirement for employee support of this kind may be particularly 
onerous in organizations with no existing union recognition, membership or other 
consultative arrangements. It may be even more challenging in cases where employers 
have rushed to introduce arrangements, which may not though constitute valid PEAs 
for the purpose of the legislation, constraining thus the possibilities for employees to 
overturn such agreements. This is all the more important if evaluated against one of 
the aims of the Directive, that is, to provide statutory information and consultation 
rights that apply irrespective of union recognition or activity. The operation of these 
factors limited the extent to which the implementation of the directive could take 
place through collective organization between management and the unions. 
Regarding the compliance option through direct ICE methods, the research indicates 
that this was not considered as being responsive to the characteristics of the British 
system of industrial relations. Employers did not see this as an inexpensive and simple 
to manage mechanism to avoid the establishment of indirect ICE arrangements. 
However, as suggested earlier, such assessment may be restricted to organizations 
employing a large number of employees; it is plausible to suggest that in the case of 
firms employing fewer than 150 employees, direct ICE methods maybe perceived as 
an adequate compliance option. 
On the trade union side, the evidence presented in this chapter suggests that despite 
the rather positive union stance at policy level and the encouraging results from union 
officials/representatives surveys, unions did not (with few exceptions) challenge 
existing practices or act proactively to negotiate ICE arrangements under either 
compliance route, i. e. PEAs, `negotiated agreements', application of the `standard 
provisions'. The lack of a pro-active union approach reflected clearly the doubts and 
concerns regarding the impact of the legislation on union organization and 
recognition. As a result of the absence of any formal role to unions in the ICER and of 
decentralized forms of collective bargaining, there is no natural regulatory space 
within the firm which consultative structures may occupy (Davies and 
Kilpatrick, 
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2004: 127); competing forms of employee representation, if created, exist thus side- 
by-side in UK workplaces and companies. In line with TUC advice on protecting 
firstly existing union arrangements and using only secondly the ICER to extend union 
organizing activities TUC affiliated members adopted a predominantly reactive 
strategy to the introduction of the ICER and sought almost invariably to safeguard 
existing agreements. In situations where unions had a high level of membership and 
bargaining coverage, trade unions regarded their existing structures as sufficient for 
the purposes of the legislation; in some cases, clauses on information and consultation 
were inserted in collective agreements. In situations where there was partial trade 
union presence, which is also where challenges for unions may exist, there was no 
significant evidence that unions made effective use of the organizing opportunities 
arising out of the implementation of the ICER. The same held true even more in the 
case of workplaces with no union presence, where there was almost no evidence of 
unions using the ICER to get a foothold in the organization. 
Nonetheless, there was some evidence of collective organization providing the basis 
for the establishment/amendment of ICE arrangements in light of the ICER. More 
particularly, the evidence from existing surveys, for example those of WMERF and 
the CIA, and of the interviews, for example with Amicus, and the CIA, suggests an 
association between active compliance strategies on the part of employers, union 
recognition and sectoral/regional associations. In the case of the CIA, it could be 
suggested that the existence of shared norms of behaviour among actors within the 
chemical industry acted as a stimulus for a more proactive approach to the 
implementation of the ICER. In the case of Amicus GMP, the union importantly 
followed a different strategy and pressed for the conclusion of negotiated agreements 
instead of PEAs, as advocated by the majority of unions, the rationale being that 
`negotiated agreements' enjoy more substantive provisions such as stronger ICE 
rights and the application of the enforcement mechanism. Further, there were 
instances where unions, such as BECTU, used the ICER to address a greater number 
of employees and increase their level of influence in the organizations. In exploring 
potential factors for variations in the impact of labour law legislation Dickens and 
Hall (2006: 348) have suggested that `the involvement of social partners and other 
actors in the formulation of legislation can affect the degree of acceptance and thus 
likely compliance - in part through bestowing legitimacy on the legislation, de- 
politicizing it and securing `buy-in', and in part through ensuring a better fit with 
existing practice. ' In this case, there was some evidence that the conclusion of the 
outline scheme between the CBI and the TUC influenced the review and sometimes 
establishment/amendment of existing arrangements to comply with the ICE. 
Lastly but equally importantly, there was some move in companies away from a 
traditional single channel to a dual channel system with recognized trade unions and 
collective bargaining on the one hand, and ICE procedures, on the other hand. Apart 
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from establishing supplementary arrangements for non-union groups of employees in 
cases were unions were recognized or establishing ICE arrangements for which 
elections were held for all cases, it was reportedly more common to proceed to the 
establishment of `hybrid' (Hall and Terry, 2004) arrangements made up of 
representatives from unionized groups appointed by recognized unions and elected 
representatives from other, non-union groups; there was hence an increase in ICE 
arrangements in unionized organizations where non-union employees also 
participated. However, there was no evidence of the division between issues for 
negotiation and consultation being blurred. Distributional issues continued to be 
channeled into collective bargaining with the unions; it was discussions between 
employers and employees over production, employee welfare and personnel that were 
channeled into information and consultation with the newly established/amended 
arrangements. 
4.3 The enforcement regime of the ICER 
As clarified in chapter two, Teubner suggests that power-based sanctions constitute a 
form of coupling and interference between different social sub-systems. In that way a 
communication link is established (1993: 91). In light of this Teubnerian thesis, this 
section examines the enforcement regime of the ICER. After providing an analysis of 
the characteristics of the enforcement regime with particular emphasis on the role of 
the CAC the study then proceeds to examine and finally assess the empirical evidence 
concerning the extent and type of enforcement action that had been taken at the time 
of the research. 
4.3.1 Characteristics of the enforcement regime 
The Regulations' enforcement regime is applicable only where a negotiated 
agreement is reached under the Regulations' procedures, or the standard information 
and consultation procedures apply, and not in respect of PEAs. In the latter case, any 
dispute about the operation of the arrangements would need to be dealt with in 
accordance with any dispute resolution procedures the agreement itself provides for, 
or by voluntary reference to ACAS's conciliation services. 139The institutional design 
of the legislation distinguishes between disputes related to the rights of ICE 
representatives, which are determined by Employment Tribunals (ETs), and other 
disputes concerning the establishment and operation of negotiated and standard ICE 
arrangements, which are determined by the CAC, the EAT and the Civil Courts. 
140 
Where a negotiated agreement has been reached under the statutory procedure, or the 
139 The dispute may be thus brought before the courts if the agreement provided for legal enforceability. 
140 In brief, the ETs deal with complaints from individuals over an employer's failure to grant time off 
to ICE representatives and complaints of unfair dismissal and/or detriment. The Civil Courts are able to 
award compensation where representatives disclose information given to them in confidence and 
finally the EAT is charged with determining a penalty notice when complaints under regs 19 (4) and 22 
(1) are successful before the CAC. There is also a right of appeal to the 
EAT on any question of law 
arising from any declaration or order of, or arising in any proceedings 
before, the CAC under the ICER. 
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`standard' ICE requirements apply, employees/representatives may complain to the 
CAC if the terms of the agreement or the standard provisions have not been complied 
with. Bases of complaint could include a failure on the employer's side to establish 
the agreed or required procedure, or, having established it, a failure to inform and 
consult in line with the agreement or the standard provisions. The CAC's role is to 
facilitate to try to direct that the parties take steps to implement the legislative 
requirements. Within this context, the CAC takes a problem-solving approach and 
helps the parties, where possible, to reach voluntary agreements outside the statutory 
process. 141 While this process bears similarities with the statutory trade union 
recognition process, as stipulated in the 1999 Employment Relations Act, two 
important differences are worth highlighting here. Firstly, in contrast to the statutory 
trade union recognition procedure, where recognition claims can only be submitted by 
trade unions, in the case of information and consultation claims can be submitted by 
trade unions acting as ERs, ERs, groups of employees or individual employees. 
Secondly, the ICER do not provide for a continuous process; instead, the CAC can 
intervene at different stages, and then return the matter back to the parties. 
In more detail, the CAC's role under the ICER is both administrative and 
determinative. In terms of administration, the CAC has a role as an independent third 
party to whom employees of an undertaking can submit a request for negotiating an 
ICE arrangement if they prefer not to issue such request direct to the undertaking 
itself. In this way, the anonymity of the employees is preserved. In its role as a 
determinative body, the CAC is empowered to adjudicate on a broad range of 
different grounds of application or complaint under the ICER. There are four areas for 
CAC intervention in the case of the establishment and operation of negotiated 
agreements and statutory provisions: disputes about whether a valid request has been 
made to initiate negotiations about establishing ICE arrangements, complaints about 
ballots, disputes over a failure to establish an ICE procedure or the operation of a 
negotiated agreement/statutory provisions (including the election of representatives) 
and finally disputes about withholding information or whether it was reasonable for 
the employer to impose a confidentiality restriction. More specifically, there are 14 
different applications or complaints that can be made. These concern the employer's 
obligation to provide information on numbers, 142 the PEAs, 143 the validity of 
request, '44 the validity of employer notification, las the appointment or election of 
negotiating representatives, 146 the ballot to approve a negotiated agreement, 147 the 
'a' The CAC is also under a duty to establish if it is reasonably likely that the application or complaint 
could be settled by conciliation through ACAS. 
142 Reg 6(1) 
143 Reg 8 (7) and (8), reg 10(1) and (2). 
14' Reg 13 (1). 
145 Reg 13 (2). 
'46 Reg 15 (1). 
lay Reg 17 (1). 
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ballot to elect ICE representatives, 148 the employer's failure to comply with the 
agreement/provisions, 149 the requirement to hold information in confidence150 and 
finally, whether information should be disclosed. '51 
In the case of successful complaints under Regulations 19 (4) and 22 (1) the CAC is 
obliged only to issue a declaration and thereafter the relevant applicant may proceed 
in a separate application to the EAT, which is empowered to impose a financial 
penalty of up to £75,000 on the employer, depending on the seriousness of the breach. 
Hence, only sanctions in the form of financial penalties are provided. 152 Even if a 
financial penalty is imposed as a result of an application by individual employees, 
trade unions or employees' representatives, the penalty is payable to the Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry. 153 Unlike redundancy consultation, there is hence no 
provision for compensating employees in respect of whom a failure to consult has 
occurred. 154 
4.3.2 Evidence on the extent of enforcement 
The early publicity to the ICER by the DTI and ACAS concentrated on the benefits of 
establishing ICE arrangements and did not give any prominence to enforcement and 
the CAC in particular. At the time of the research, the CAC interviewee noted that the 
CAC secretariat had received a low number of enquiries about different aspects of the 
Regulations. The inquiries, which predominantly came from employers and individual 
employees, were concentrated on the form the request should be in and the 
requirements for PEAs, including methods of approval. 
Concerning the number of requests from employees regarding the establishment of 
ICE arrangements, the CAC Annual Report (2006) stated that the CAC had received 
such requests in respect of six employers. The CAC interpreted this responsibility as 
an `administrative' role for the secretariat, since it involved no decision by a CAC 
Panel. According to the CAC Report the employer provided in every case the names 
of those employed in the undertaking to enable the secretariat to report accurately to 
them on the number of employees making a request. 155 Interestingly, in three out of 
these six applications requests were organized by trade unions acting as ERs; four 
requests came from the private sector and two from the public while the majority of 
148 Reg 19 (4) and para 3 of Sch 2. 
149 Reg 22 (1). 
150 Reg 25 (6). 
's' Reg 26 (2). 
152 Reg 22 (9) expressly provides that no order of the CAC may have the effect of `suspending or 
altering the effect of any act done or of any agreement made by the employer or of preventing or 
delaying any act or agreement which the employer proposes to do or make'. 
153 Reg 22 (7). 
154 Based on this aspect of the ICER, the CAC enforcement regime was 
described as `a form of 
privatization of law enforcement of a most cynical nature' (Ewing and 
Truter, 2005: 636). 
Iss According to the CAC interviewee's opinion all of the requests probably led to the conclusion of 
ICE arrangements. 
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those requests were concerned with fairly large undertakings. The significance of the 
size of the organization was highlighted by the CAC interviewee: 
Y suppose the bigger the employer the more likely a trade union is likely to be 
interested. Because the trade union will get more out of it, they can get more 
people signed in I would have thought.. . Also as an employee you are going to be 
less exposed than you would in a small undertaking. ' 
Additionally, the CAC received sixteen applications for decisions on issues arising 
under the Regulations. A significant number of the applications, i. e. five, were made 
with regard to reg. 19(4), i. e. in the case where arrangements for a ballot to elect ICE 
representatives have not been arranged. Interestingly, seven applications were made 
by Amicus acting as employee representatives. 156 The potential difficulties for 
individual employees to bring complaints before the CAC were brought to attention 
by the CAC interviewee: 
`In a big company that is spread out around the country, for example, that is 
going to be a huge problem. In a smaller company where you are all on one site 
then the chances are that you are going to be even more exposed... It is not easy 
for individual employees to go round and to find the time and the inclination to 
get people to sign up. They are not used to it; union officials are more suited to 
that sort of thing. ' 
Out of the total sixteen applications, seven were withdrawn, one remained unresolved 
and five decisions were issued. The analysis here concentrates on the two most 
significant cases for the purpose of clarifying specific statutory provisions. 157 The first 
decision related to an application made against the Moray Council and was the subject 
of an appeal and cross-appeal to the EAT. The Stewart v. Moray Counci1158 case 
raised the issue regarding to what extent a prior collective agreement with a trade 
union meets the requirements for a PEA under the Regulations. In factual terms, Mr. 
Stewart, an employee of Moray Council, lodged a petition with the council in which 
over 500 employees requested the council to initiate negotiations to reach a negotiated 
agreement under the legislation. '59 The council's view was that there were PEAs in 
156 The rest of the applications, i. e. nine, were made by individuals. However, four were made by the 
same person (Moray Council case) whilst one application was made against Watt Gilchrist, a printing 
company, which was probably organised by Amicus GMP. 
157 The CAC issued decisions on three further cases: Partnerships in Care Limited (IC/3/(2005)), 
Newsquest (Worcester Ltd) (IC/12/(2007)), and Bournemouth University (IC/14/(2007)). 
158 IC/3/(2005). The appeal and cross-appeal to the EAT meant that no action could be taken on two 
further applications against Moray Council, under regs 6 (1) and 19 (4) until the EAT judgment had 
been issued. 
159 The request was opposed by the local branch of public services union UNISON, since the council 
already had union-negotiated arrangements in place. In particular, according to the union, the two 
council employees (and former UNISON officers) who organized the request `exploited the unrest 
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place covering all the council's employees and therefore, as provided by the 
Regulations, the Council was entitled to hold a ballot to ascertain whether the wider 
workforce endorsed the employees' request. More specifically, the council contended 
that three documents, i. e. the framework local recognition and procedure agreement 
covering teachers and related staff, the council officer trade union group constitution 
and the protocol for consultation with trade unions, constituted valid PEAs for the 
purposes of the Regulations, and covered all employees regardless of whether they 
were trade union members. However, in Mr. Stewart's view, these three documents 
represented agreements with trade unions and provided only for consultation with 
unions with no provision for informing and consulting non-members. 
In its decision the CAC ruled that the agreements related to negotiation and 
consultation for council employees without differentiating between union members 
and non-members and that they did in fact cover all employees. The CAC panel also 
decided that the agreements' approval by trade union representatives and the fact that 
a majority of the workforce belonged to the unions constituted approval by the 
employees under the ICER. However, the CAC held that the agreements within the 
Moray Council did not, when considered together, satisfy the criteria laid down in the 
Regulations. More particularly, the CAC held that one of the three agreements, i. e. the 
framework local recognition and procedure agreement covering teachers and related 
staff, was insufficiently detailed about how the council was to give information to the 
employees or their representatives and seek their views on it, and therefore did not 
fulfill the requirements of reg 8 (1) (d). 
Regarding this case that there was then some comment that the CAC had attempted to 
set a standard which was higher than that expected by the legislation (CAC, 2006). 
However, at EAT level both the appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, confirming 
the CAC decision. In detail, the EAT's view was that the agreement, i. e. the 
framework local recognition and procedure agreement covering teachers and related 
staff, `... does not engage with those detailed requirements [information and 
consultation] in any way. ' Furthermore, and significantly from the point of view of 
organizations with previously negotiated trade union agreements, the EAT, noting that 
the Regulations do not prescribe any particular way in which employee approval 
needs to be demonstrated and making though no reference to the DTI's guidance on 
this point, also supported the CAC decision that approval for PEAs could be inferred 
where a majority of employees in an undertaking were union members. It did however 
state that, when considering the question of the approval of a PEA consisting of two 
or more agreements, the CAC should consider separately whether each agreement had 
caused by single status and gave the impression that a new consultative group would 
be able to offer 
improved negotiating arrangements for employees', despite the 
fact that any such group would `give 
less power to staff in determining their own 
future than the set-up that already exists' (LRD, 2006: 16). 
Later, UNISON supported Moray Council's appeal against the CAC ruling. 
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been approved by the group of employees it covered. Where there are a number of 
agreements, the necessary approval exists only if each of the agreements has been 
approved by the employees covered by this agreement. 
The main conclusions that can be drawn from the decision are the following. Firstly, 
the case indicated that against widely held thoughts that only unions would ever had 
the ability to organize formal employee requests for a new ICE agreement this was 
not true; instead, a single employee was able to bring successfully a request before the 
CAC. Secondly and importantly, the decision could be seen as a notice for trade 
unions and employers that believe that their existing arrangements for consultation 
provide them with protection against being the Regulations. As seen from the first 
section, a significant reason for the lack of a proactive approach in the case of 
unionized organizations has been the belief on the part of both employers and trade 
unions that there is no need to amend existing union arrangements in light of the 
ICER. However, many existing arrangements with unions are somewhat vague as to 
what exactly the employer undertakes to do, and how the ICE process will be 
conducted and could hence be vulnerable to potential complaints brought before the 
CAC. The decision was also important as it emphasized that the CAC and EAT were 
prepared to accepted as valid PEAs agreements approved by trade union 
representatives where a majority of unions belonged to a union. Finally, the decision 
of the EAT that the question of employee approval is one of fact for the CAC is 
important as it demonstrates that the CAC should be willing to consider all available 
evidence as to whether or not a PEA has been approved, limiting potentially the extent 
to which management could unilaterally impose ICE arrangements. 
The second CAC decision, i. e. Amicus (as employees' representatives) v. Macmillan 
Publishers, 160 was with respect to an employer providing information to allow 
employees to calculate the threshold they had to achieve to make a valid request. In 
August 2005 employees of Macmillan Publishers submitted an `employee request' 
with a view to initiating negotiations to reach a negotiated ICE agreement. The 
employee request was submitted with a letter from Amicus requesting data on the 
number of employees employed within the undertaking. Following the failure of the 
employer to identify the establishment, sites and/or plants that they consider make up 
the undertaking and the number of employees within each of these, Amicus, in the 
capacity of an employees' representative, submitted a complaint to the CAC in 
November 2005 and complained that data that had been provided by Macmillan 
Publishers for the purpose of reg 5 was incomplete in a material particular. 161 In its 
160 IC/4/(2005) Macmillan Publishers. 
161 The union based its complaint on three arguments: a. that, against the background of the fragmented 
nature of the Macmillan group, the employer's failure to disclose the whereabouts of the relevant 
establishments and employee numbers made it impossible for employees to exercise their 
legal rights 
under the Regulations; b. that neither employees nor their representatives could verify the 
figures 
disclosed by the employer in respect of the total number of employees in the undertaking or the number 
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decision the CAC Panel upheld the application and ordered the employer to disclose 
data consisting of the establishments, sites and/or plants that the employer considers 
make up the undertaking, and the number of employees within each of those 
establishments, sites and/or plants. While it is possible to suggest that the disclosure 
of information on the establishments and number of employees employed would not 
be difficult for employers, the case highlighted that the CAC was able to resolve such 
a difficulty when necessary. The decision was also important for trade unions, as the 
disclosure of such information may be useful to unions attempting to extend their 
influence in organizations. 
A further development regarding this time the application of the standard provisions 
took place in February 2007. In an application brought again by Amicus against 
MacMillan, that is Amicus (as employees' representatives) v. Macmillan Publishers, 
162 the union complained that the employer had not arranged for the holding of a ballot 
for the election of ICE representatives, as required by reg 19 (1). MacMillan sought to 
rely on pre-existing agreements; however, the CAC found that only one agreement 
pre-dated the employee's request. Others post-dated it and another had not even been 
concluded. Nor was there any evidence that Macmillan had planned to hold a ballot to 
seek endorsement of the purported pre-existing agreements. For these reasons, the 
CAC upheld Amicus' complaint and ordered the company to arrange for the holding 
of a ballot of its employees to elect the relevant number of ICE representatives for the 
application of the standard provisions. The union went to apply to the EAT for a 
penalty notice and, on 24 July 2007, the EAT made an award of £55,000,163 declining 
to award the maximum penalty of £75,000 on the grounds that this was `not the most 
serious' breach that might be envisaged by the legislation. 
4.3.3 Assessment of the enforcement regime 
According to the CAC Report `the level of activity to date has given few clues about 
the long term impact on the CAC of these Regulations; there is a great deal of 
uncharted water'. Issues recognized by the CAC as providing potentially fertile 
ground for future litigation and challenges for the CAC itself involve the definition of 
the various terms, such as `undertaking', for the purpose of the application of the 
Regulations, the relationship between collective agreements and ICE arrangements 
and the disclosure of confidential information. It could be suggested that the low 
number of applications to the CAC reflects the recent adoption of the ICER and the 
relative absence of concerns on the part of employers, unions and employees alike 
regarding the existing situation with regard to ICE arrangements at organizational 
required to reach the 10% threshold to make a valid employee request; c. that regs 5 and 6 had to be 
read in the context of the legislation as a whole. Against Amicus claims, the employer argued 
in main 
that it was not required by the legislation to provide such information. 
'62 Case Number: IC/8 (2006). 
163 Amicus (as employees' representatives) v. Macmillan Publishers, UKEAT 0185/07. 
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level. However, in light of the nature of the enforcement regime of the Regulations 
one should be cautious of such a conclusion. 
As suggested by various interviewees representing employers' associations, trade 
unions, and the CAC the enforcement regime posed significant challenges for those 
contemplating bringing an application. While information and consultation rights 
have been conceived at EU level as collective rights, the enforcement mechanism, as 
stipulated in the Regulations, provides that the exercise of such rights is dependent on 
claims made by individual employees. To that direction, the Moray Council case 
highlighted the possibility that applications can be brought before the CAC by 
individual employees. However, this case may be the exception to the rule. It is 
plausible to believe that individual employees, irrespective of the size of their 
organization, may not feel they have sufficient time, resources and confidence to 
bring individual claims. Related to this, the involvement of a variety of different 
institutions and mechanisms, e. g. CAC, EAT, ETs, in the enforcement of the 
Regulations in conjunction with the complexity of the legislation and the operation of 
the trigger mechanism could further impact on the extent to which applications can be 
brought by individual employees, representatives or even trade unions. 
Moreover, the Regulations do put a considerable onus on individual employees to 
advance the procedures. Hence, unlike the case of statutory trade union recognition 
procedure where the CAC supervises the process there is no provision for a 
continuous role for the CAC in the case of applications concerning the ICER. While 
the argument for the adoption of a non-interventionist stance in the case of the 
Regulations is that the parties are more suited to find a solution tailored to their needs 
the need for the CAC to get more closely involved with the process under the ICER is 
all the more apparent in view of the individual character of the claims in this case. In 
addition, the lack of the power of the CAC to question the legality of any decision 
taken in breach of the duty to inform and consult in conjunction with the fact that the 
financial penalty of £75,000,164 if imposed, is payable to the Treasury, may further 
discourage individual employees and representatives from lodging a complaint to the 
CAC. This will be particularly the case in collective redundancies, where employees 
may alternatively seek recourse to the ET in order to be able to request compensation 
where a failure to consult has occurred. Lastly, the fact that the possibility exists for 
the conclusion of PEAs after the introduction of the ICER can raise further potential 
issues with regard to the Regulations' compliance with the ICED and specifically art 
8, which applies irrespective of the nature of the ICE agreements, i. e. whether they 
were pre-existing or not, especially if these agreements have been made as result of 
the ICED. While such PEAs can be overturned by employee requests the hurdle of the 
10% trigger mechanism provided by the legislation may dishearten employees from 
'64 The level of the financial penalty is also a potentially challenging issue, as 
it may be suggested that 
for larger organizations the £75,000 cap would not be considered as a major 
hurdle. 
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challenging arrangements that have been concluded via the PEA option, especially in 
non-union settings where provision of time, resources and experience regarding 
collective representation issues is arguably absent. 
Based on the above mentioned elements of the enforcement regime, the present study 
found that, as Ewing and Truter (2005: 641) have suggested, the ICER enforcement 
regime provides `very little incentive to employers to comply with the statutory 
requirements since any penalty is conditional on private parties, employees or their 
representatives, taking enforcement proceedings initially at their own expense, with 
no compensation being recoverable for the losses they have suffered as a result of the 
employers' breach'. In light of these considerations and within the context of RL 
theory, while the enforcement mechanism of the ICER places significant 
responsibilities to the parties involved, the nature of the power-based sanctions 
applicable in case of breach of the Regulations do not seem sufficient to constitute an 
adequate form of communication link through which the legal and industrial relations 
systems can be coupled. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In the preceding sections, the impact of the ICED in the UK system of industrial 
relations has been evaluated through a critical examination of the industrial relations 
actors' response to the new statutory framework and of the operation of the 
enforcement regime. While there was considerable activity in terms of organizations 
reviewing their existing arrangements in light of the ICER, the evidence suggests that 
the implementation of the ICER in the UK did not lead to significant developments in 
the institutionalization of ICE arrangements more generally, as envisaged by the 
ICED. More specifically, due to the institutional design of the ICER, in particular the 
existence of a trigger mechanism, the possibility for concluding PEAs even after the 
transposition of the ICED, and limited sanctions in terms of enforcement, there was 
limited organizational activity in terms of establishing/amending ICE arrangements in 
light of the legislation. Apart from the review of existing arrangements and the 
conclusion of a limited number of PEAs, especially before the coming into force of 
the ICER, there was no significant evidence of negotiated agreements or agreements 
based on the standard provisions. Importantly, the extent of the take-up of the 
legislation was particularly limited in cases where consultative arrangements of the 
type promoted by the ICED have been traditionally absent, that is, non-union 
workplaces. 
Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that trade unions and individual 
employees did not develop a significantly proactive approach to the introduction of 
the ICER. For their part, trade unions appeared wary of the potential impact of the 
legislation on union-based arrangements. On the other hand, individual employees 
lacked awareness of the details and even in some cases the existence of the 
legislation. 
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However, in light of the limited span of the Regulations' life, these conclusions must 
be necessarily provisional. Positive signs in terms of union strategies, in the cases of 
Amicus and Prospect, have been evident and potential further case law developments 
that will deal with the actual operation of ICE arrangements may induce a different 
response by the industrial relations system. 
The examination of the operation of the flexible institutional design of the ICER 
assisted in illuminating how the reflexive elements of the ICER impacted on the 
British system of industrial relations. It provided a `bird's eye' view on the extent of 
change and response of the main actors involved, i. e. employers and trade unions, to 
the stimulus of the ICER. Bearing in mind the particular characteristics of the 
legislative design, the next chapters turn to examine case study evidence regarding the 
establishment/amendment and operation of ICE arrangements at organizational level. 
In that way, the thesis aims firstly to substantiate these findings with the results from 
activity at organizational level and to address in more detail management strategies 
and trade union and employee involvement in the establishment and operation of the 
ICE arrangements. Secondly, such analysis opens up further space for examining the 
extent to which the regulatory approach adopted by the ICER impacted on the 
development of a capability for employee voice in organizational decision-making. 
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Chapter 5. The operation of the double subsidiarity mechanism at organizational 
level: the review and/or establishment/amendment of ICE arrangements 
The flexibility in the UK Regulations but also its standard provisions can have a 
marked influence both on the dynamic with which consultative arrangements are 
concluded and the structural and operational aspects of the agreements. In light of the 
analytical framework adopted in the study, the objective of the chapter is two-fold. 
Firstly, the chapter aims to highlight how the significant scope for management and 
labour to agree tailor-made, organization-specific arrangements was utilized in the 
organizations under study. As a result of the renewed institutional emphasis on 
consultation, a central question is how managerial approaches to employee 
representation change and what the response of trade unions and employees is. The 
examination of management rationales and strategies for the 
establishment/amendment of consultative arrangements illustrates the extent of the 
impact of the UK Regulations on organizational considerations and the objectives 
behind the introduction/amendment of consultative arrangements. On the employee 
side, the examination of the approach of trade unions - where existing - and 
employees to the introduction/amendment of consultative arrangements is equally 
important as it indicates the level of union support for such arrangements, and 
demonstrates the extent to which there was collective organization between 
management and labour concerning the framing of the consultative structures. 
Secondly, the chapter aims to assess to what extent the content of the resulting ICE 
agreements concluded between management and labour provided `nominal rights' for 
the development of a learning process of participation and of developing capabilities. 
While the number of case studies does not allow a wider comparison to be made 
between the text of pre-existing agreements, negotiated agreements and statutory 
arrangements in the context of the overall impact of the legislation, a descriptive 
analysis of the PEAs concluded in the organizations under study is still significant for 
the following reasons: firstly, as evident from chapter four, the option of concluding 
PEAs has been preferred at organizational level to a greater extent than the other 
legislative options; and secondly, taking into account the greater scope for flexibility 
provided in the case of PEAs it is worth exploring how the kind of flexibility inherent 
in the PEA option was used at organizational level. 
The chapter opens with an examination of the organizational responses to the 
introduction of the ICER (see table 5.1 for the organizational background). Within 
this context, key considerations influencing organizational approaches to the 
application of the legislation are considered, including the potential impact of the 
Regulations but also other issues such as business and employee strategies. Particular 
emphasis is then placed on the guiding principles that informed the parties involved in 
the delineation of the structure and remit of the consultative arrangements. In the 
second part, the relevant legal provisions with regard to the content of consultative 
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agreements are outlined and a comparison is made between the ones relating to PEAs, 
negotiated agreements and the `standard provisions'. The intention is to provide a 
basis for assessing the features of the arrangements under study. A breakdown of the 
elements of the consultative agreements, in the form of detailed tables, follows. In 
light of the theoretical approach adopted in the study, a critical assessment of the main 
features of the agreements is offered in the final section of the chapter. 
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5.1 The establishment/amendment of ICE arrangements 
5.1.1 Finl 
During 2004 Fin 1 reviewed its employee consultative arrangements with a view to 
improving their effectiveness. This decision was attributed to several factors. Firstly, 
major organizational change over the past years, combined with the acquisition of 
two organizations, moved Fin I from a number of autonomous divisions to a single 
integrated business. As such, there was a need to bring together the disparate 
approaches to employee participation. Secondly, the review was given substantial 
impetus by the impending directive on information and consultation. The operation of 
the European Works Council at Finl had increased management awareness of EU law 
and it was deemed important to take a pro-active approach so as to tailor the 
legislation to the organizational specifics. The recognition that the establishment of 
representative structures would ensure that Fin! maintains its commitment to be a 
leader in respect to human resource policies and a positive reputation relating to the 
treatment of employees acted as further stimuli. The recognition of an intermediary 
relationship between employee voice mechanisms and organizational impact rather 
than a direct causal link with improved performance per se (Dundon et al, 2004: 
1163) was also emphasized by the manager responsible for employee relations. 
While the general flexibility provided by the legislation in the form of PEAs and 
negotiated agreements was perceived as positive the employee relations manager still 
described the trigger mechanism as `high potential impact but low risk' and suggested 
that significant benefits would be secured if management acted in advance of an 
employee request such as the ability to tailor the arrangements to the organizational 
needs. Whilst stressing that the establishment of a PEA would `stop a small number of 
people upsetting something that a very significant number of employees are 
comfortable with' there was reportedly no management expectation that employees or 
the trade union would trigger negotiations for the establishment of consultative 
arrangements. Management drew also attention to the market and industrial relations 
context as a further factor facilitating the establishment of the forum suggesting that 
the good employee relations climate in financial services organizations facilitated the 
establishment and effective operation of consultative arrangements. Based on these 
considerations the ER manager got executive approval from the board to set up the 
forum. 
The project was initiated and managed by the HR team. Management's intention was 
to introduce a consultative forum, with a clear remit for information and consultation, 
not negotiation. The nature of the workforce in the finance sector, i. e. highly educated 
people with no interest in collectivism, was emphasized as a factor influencing the 
decision to proceed with the establishment of an all-employee forum instead of 
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extending existing union arrangements to cover all employees. However, HR 
management was keen to emphasize that there was no intention for the forum to 
impact on the collective agreement concluded with the union. Management consulted 
with the union and the then existing staff site-forum on the proposed arrangements as 
they would cover all employees. Whilst there was initial union concern regarding the 
potential impact of the arrangements on union activity the good relationship between 
management and the union and the fact that the former was keen to clarify that the 
existing agreements with the union would continue to operate and to distinguish 
simultaneously between negotiation, through collective bargaining, and consultation, 
limited the union's worry that the forum would crossover or affect its work. Union 
resistance was also overcome by the fact that management insisted that the bigger 
issues such as re-organizations would still be dealt with the union. During the 
discussions, the issue of specified union seats came up but there was no union 
interest. Union's unwillingness to secure seats in the forum was attributed to the high 
union membership density, the `universal' character of the forum, its inability to deal 
with major issues where unions are normally involved, and the desire to avoid 
undermining the commitments made with management regarding the preservation of 
existing agreements. 
Management's guiding principles when promoting the ICE agreement included the 
coverage by business areas and grades. Despite the fact that management was aware 
of the option for direct ICE so as to comply with the ICER, this was considered 
inadequate for the organization. The ER manager explained that they saw no need in 
replicating the existing provision of direct ICE forms and that in light of the 
organizational context it would not secure a credible form of employee 
communication. Once the basic structure of the forum was agreed, communication 
means were used to increase employee awareness and encourage those interested to 
nominate themselves for election. Non-union ERs highlighted the fact that during the 
election period the union encouraged their members to vote for union representatives. 
However, they also encountered a significant number of employees commenting that 
they would vote for the non-union candidates on the basis that it would ensure the full 
representation of all employees. 
The first group of ERs was elected in late 2004. ERs included seven union 
representatives and two representatives coming from the forum in the non-union site. 
The percentage of employees that voted for their election was around 52-53%. 166 
Having received training by the IPA on the differences between consultation and 
negotiation and the ways ERs could meet the demands of their roles ERs were called 
to discuss with management the conclusion of the ICE agreement. Within this context, 
the possibility for an employee ballot for the approval of the ICE agreement was 
'"There were some constituencies where elections were not held due to the fact that there was only 
one person nominated and one vacancy. 
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considered as inadequate by management as it would run against the organizational 
commitments to social dialogue with the representatives. In the initial meeting, five 
work streams were identified and representatives' teams were created that would be 
responsible for developing certain issues including: the forum's constitution; how it 
would communicate; how it would measure success; its operating principles and, 
personal development. Whilst the constitution went through at least ten version 
changes before it was ratified, the input by ERs to the drafting of the actual text of the 
agreement was to a large extent limited with ERs being able to make changes only in 
terms of details concerning, for example, the wording of specific provisions. Having 
signed the ICE agreement, the forum was formally launched in April 2005. 
5.2.2 Fin2 
An employee forum, with the purpose of `listening to the views of employees and 
helping to communicate the vision and direction of Fin2' was established in 2000. 
The decision was based on management desire to create an environment where 
organizational change could be facilitated, alignment about what can be achieved 
could be developed and contact with employees during the organic expansion of Fin2 
would be maintained. Within this context, the CEO stressed that it was also important 
to have an environment where people can prosper: `it is a human rights issue. ' 
Management's concerns to avoid independent union influence were also evident as 
that time, the union that was recognized by the then majority owner of Fin2 attempted 
to gain influence in Fin2. 
During the early period of the forum's operation, problems associated with the 
effectiveness of the forum were identified by employee representatives. The latter 
were concerned about the lack of significant impact of the forum on organizational 
decision-making. In their view, the forum was rather preoccupied with `tea and toilet' 
issues and tended to take a re-active approach to management decisions. On more 
significant issues, such as reorganization, the forum tended to be consulted in the 
decision making process at a late stage and as such its operation was constrained to 
the implementation of decisions that had already been taken and with providing 
support to the affected employees. Due to the limited involvement of the forum on a 
wider range of issues and its re-active approach the ERs were concerned that the 
forum might be seen as `the management's lap dog. 'Notwithstanding the drawbacks 
from the operation of the forum between 2000 and 2002 it still enjoyed the support of 
senior management, and especially the CEO. The latter, having joined the 
organization in 2000, was questioning the value that the forum was bringing to the 
organization but was also keen to see the forum developing a more strategic role 
within Fin2. 
Driven by the perceived inefficiency of the forum a transformation took place in 
2003, which was initiated by the employee representatives with the support of the 
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CEO. In the period between July and September 2002, a team comprised of two ERs 
met with the CEO and discussed their concerns about the forum and its future 
direction. In a presentation by the ERs an agreement was reached on the need to 
change the profile and remit of the forum. In order to attain a level of independence 
the CEO suggested the affiliation of the forum to a third party. The October meeting 
was followed by a series of discussions during early 2003 where the parties agreed to 
IPA affiliation. They also discussed how the forum could move forward with the 
union, which during the earlier months had increased its attempts to recruit members. 
In January 2003 a second presentation by employee representatives was made to the 
CEO and senior management, where they emphasized the crucial role in developing a 
new mandate for the forum and the resources needed to start playing it big, meaning 
greater involvement and influence in management decision-making. ' 
In July 2003 the CEO and the board of executives agreed a package of changes 
including new elections to appoint three full-time representatives, an annual budget of 
£20,000 to be managed by the forum, membership of the IPA, guaranteed paid time 
off for part-time representatives and the adoption of an `options-based' consultation 
approach, as advocated by the IPA. An important point to emphasize here is that the 
forum was not institutionalized in the form of a written agreement. Instead a series of 
`commitments' to employees and the organization were in place. These commitments 
identified the forum as the only mechanism through which employees were informed 
and consulted on strategic and operational issues. Significantly, the lack of a formal 
agreement arguably indicated the deliberate avoidance of a strategy to put in place a 
binding procedural constitution, as it is usually the case in unionized organizations. 
The employee chair explained: 
`The absence of a formal constitution reflects the flexible and informal way in 
which Fin2 and the forum operates. However, we appreciate the concerns some 
might have about not having our terms of reference laid down in one document 
and we keep the matter under continuous review'. 
Despite the fact that the amendment of the consultative arrangements was not directly 
linked to the ICER both management and ERs held conversations with the IPA, 
employment law solicitors and their legal department and undertook an assessment of 
the application of the Regulations at the organization. While the absence of a written 
agreement outlining a specific framework for informing and consulting employees 
prohibited the agreement from being considered as a valid PEA, management and 
ERs saw no perceived need to amend the forum structure in light of the legislation 
and no potential threat in terms of employee pulling the trigger' for the conclusion of 
a negotiated agreement. In their views, the arrangements went, in essence, beyond the 
statutory requirements. The HR director noted: 
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`Everyone stamped the fact that we fully complied with the pre-existing agreement 
requirements, and why would we want to alter anything because it's really 
working well, the forum at that time had got absolute visibility in the business, 
lots of awareness and even indeed when we went out to survey our people we got, 
well why would we want anyone else, you are our forum, you are our consultation 
body, we do not want anybody else, why should we? ' 
5.2.3 BS1 
When the ICER became applicable, HR management recognized that there was an 
opportunity to work proactively within the legislative framework, embrace it and put 
in place a forum that would form part of the existing employee communication plan. 
In view of the anticipated business growth, it was also considered important to ensure 
a two-way communication between employees and management. Further, identifying 
itself as a market leader and `employer of choice' management at BS1 wished to 
establish a consistent group-wide approach to employee consultation. Moreover, the 
nature of the business activities of the organization was recognized as an important 
incentive for the establishment of consultative arrangements. As BS 1 competed at a 
public sector level for outsourcing contracts, management was keen to be able to point 
out various initiatives that exhibited the forward thinking, innovatory and inclusive 
aspects of its approach as an employer. 
In March 2004, the HR Group Director submitted a proposal for the establishment of 
an ICE forum based on a PEA. Management believed that the adoption of a proactive 
strategy enabled the organization to agree on the format and manage the process 
according to business needs, rather than being possibly later legally enforced to 
comply with the more onerous requirements stipulated in the `standard provisions'. 
Within this context, the improbability of employees overturning the agreement was 
mentioned as another reason for opting for a PEA. However, owing to employee 
satisfaction with existing employee engagement structures the chances of employees 
triggering the process for the establishment of an employee forum were considered 
minimal. Discussions were held internally for the introduction of an overarching 
forum at BS 1 group level but management finally opted for three district forums: one 
at group level and one in each of two BS 1 business units, the main reason being that 
different forums would allow the organization to focus on each business unit's issues 
specifically. The implications for the interaction of the arrangements with the existing 
trade unions in one of the BS 1 business units, particularly in respect of collective 
agreements and also in respect of potentially group-wide challenges for unions to 
extend their influence and launch recruitment activity, acted as further factors 
influencing this decision. 
Management informed the union leaders of their plan, including the way they were 
planning to establish the forum and its scope; there was no request for specified seats 
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to be provided to the trade union representatives. Whilst the DTI guidance was 
considered unhelpful, advice was provided by the in-house lawyer and an 
employment relations consultant. The underlying management logic was to avoid a 
type of collective bargaining body but keep it simultaneously meaningful. To that 
direction, the use of the flexibility, as stipulated by the ICER, in designing the 
framework, was deemed vital. However, there was no consideration of compliance 
with the ICER through opting for direct ICE forms. In the view of the HR director, 
direct ICE forms would be impersonal and impractical since they would require a 
significant amount of time spent in communicating with each individual employee. 
Having the draft framework ready the Chief Operating Officer (COO) was involved 
so as to approve the structure of the forum. An additional consideration leading to the 
involvement of senior management was the desire to present the establishment of the 
forum as a business-led rather than an HR initiative. According to the HR 
management, the involvement of the COO and his proactive strategy assisted in 
getting buy-in from line management. Having acquired the approval of the COO and 
management for the draft framework and for the purpose of getting the approval from 
the employees, management turned it into a Q&A document and put it for approval 
via email by the workforce. The decision to proceed through this way was made 
intentionally as management did not wish to enter into negotiations with the ERs over 
the content of the ICE agreement as this would `set an inappropriate tone for a forum 
that is supposed to be about consultation not negotiation' (ER manager). 
Over 50% of the workforce approved the framework document and the nominations 
for the election of the ERs then followed. Around 50 employees stood as candidates 
for the 26 positions. ERs held a meeting with management where having discussed 
the implementation of the agreement they acted as signatories of the agreement. 
However, the lack of discussion between management and ERs on the substance of 
the agreement was strongly criticized: 
`A lot of ERs felt that in a way it was something that was imposed, the remit 
wasn 't actually agreed by us. It was agreed by us because we had to agree to it 
but actually it was something that had been discussed with senior management 
but not with the individuals who were going to be on the forum. ' (ER) 
5.2.4 BS2 
Following a major restructuring process in 2002 and several acquisitions, an internal 
review took place in early 2003 concerning the management of employee relations. 
This review was attributed to a set of reasons. Management was concerned about the 
disparate approach to employee relations as large numbers of employees had joined 
the organization as a result of TUPE bringing along a number of unions that operated 
in pockets of BS2. Further, it was recognized that the organizational culture should 
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evolve from a `command and control' approach towards a more participative ethos. 
In light of the expansion of organizational activities and the nature of the market 
context, the introduction of a forum was seen as a way to assist with the attainment of 
such an ethos and would further secure successful change management. However, the 
MD did not expect that the operation of the forum would assist in increasing 
organizational performance per se. The need to satisfy the ICER regulatory 
requirements and act proactively in light of the legislation acted as a further stimulus. 
Within this context, management was concerned that trade unions would have the 
right to initiate the process for the conclusion of a `negotiated agreement'. For that 
reason, it was deemed best if the forum could be established in advance of the ICER 
so as to have time to develop a level of effectiveness that would then act as a buffer 
against union attempts to negotiate an ICE agreement. While the ER manager noted 
that the forum was not set up specifically for the purpose of trade union containment 
the possibility that the operation of the forum could substitute the unions, which were 
at that time increasing their influence, was recognized. 
In response to the management decision to proceed to the establishment of the forum 
union officials criticized the lack of consultation on the management's plans. Having 
expressed their concerns to management, the latter assured the unions that the forum 
would not supplant the unions' role and that they valued the existing relationship with 
the unions. However, requests by unions to have specified seats on the forum were 
reportedly refused by management on the basis that the unions represented specific 
parts of the organization and as such lacked the ability to represent all employees and 
that the lack of cooperation between management and the unions contrasted to the 
integrative nature and purpose of the forum. Prompted by these issues and the 
potential ineffectiveness of the forum due to its limited rights, trade union officials 
kept their distance from the forum during its establishment. 
In preparation for the launch of the forum, BS2 consulted with the IPA on the 
development, scope and purpose of the representative body. Elections were held in 
late 2003. While ERs that did not belong to a trade union emphasized the 
apprehension of trade unions when the forum was first established they hinted that the 
unions supported strategically certain candidates for elections in the forum. Three 
union representatives were elected in the forum. Management held discussions with 
the ERs on the framing of the agreement. However, the ICE agreement was largely 
drafted by management and ERs' input was minimal: 
`We were very naive then. Nothing was negotiated, bear in mind we had half a say 
training to start up, part of which told us what the difference was between 
negotiation and consultation... To be fair, the agreement was 
dictated to us' (ER) 
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Despite the lack of discussion on the substance of the agreement, ERs reported that 
they influenced some of the details of the ICE agreement, such as the wording of 
some provisions. Nonetheless, with regard to the substance of the final ICE agreement 
there was a concern among the ERs that it was ambiguous. An ER explained: 
`I don 't think the agreement is defined enough. Now, in a way that's been to our 
advantage because it doesn't preclude our involvement in anything, we've been 
able to argue that it doesn't preclude anything, but I think it would be better for a 
forum, when it's set up, to have a clear, well defined agreement. I would always 
argue to include things like pay and reward, every aspect of terms and conditions, 
but it should be clear regardless of what's included. ' 
When the ICER came into force, having discussed within the forum as to whether the 
agreement complied with the statutory requirements, management and ERs agreed 
that there was no need for an amendment of the agreement in light of the ICER. 
5.2.5 BS3 
An employee forum was first established in 2000. Perceiving employee involvement 
and consultation as a means to bring business benefits through better buy-in from 
employees and positive attitude to change were cited as reasons for the introduction 
of the forum. Other considerations included the need to link the existing EWC 
structures at group-wide level with the UK and the desire for BS3 to be recognized as 
an `employer of choice'. More particularly, in view of the business activity of the 
organization, e. g. bidding for government services' contracts, management perceived 
the establishment of the forum as a supplementary means to retain the `Investors in 
People' (IIP) accreditation. 167 Taking into account BS3's business strategy, 
management also held that in contrast to a union an all-elected forum could be a more 
suitable means for employee representation as it would represent the whole 
workforce. 
During the period leading to the introduction of the ICER management started 
contemplating on the need to amend the agreement. Complying with the legislation 
but also going beyond the legislative requirements was emphasized by the Group HR 
Director: `we certainly wanted to comply and I think we would like to lead by it and 
we are a good example for our practice. ' Management also emphasized their 
concerns over the influence of trade unions. The HR manager commented: 
`We were keen to ensure that we were in line with the legislation because our 
relationship with a union at the time was not as good as it could be and we felt 
there was potentially a threat if we did not have the documentation all signed up 
167 One of the key standards in the IIP is the company's ability to consult with employees. 
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by all representatives that one of the unions could bring a claim under the 
legislation to set up a forum which they would feel they had more control over it 
than we wanted them to have. ' 
While management believed that the biggest union could trigger the process for the 
conclusion of a `negotiated agreement' they did not consider that individual 
employees without the support of a union would have the ability to do that. This was 
attributed to the nature of the industry, where pay, pension and promotion are 
significantly based on personal performance and contribution, the indifference of 
employees to the value of a union style consultation, and the feeling of apathy among 
individual employees. 
In 2004 management proposed amending the agreement at one of the forum meetings 
and suggested the establishment of an employee sub-group that would work with 
management on the details of the agreement. An external advisor was invited to 
contribute to the discussion and management and ERs worked in separate groups in 
order to come up with specific proposals. While management described the DTI 
guidance as `too cumbersome', the CBI workshops were considered useful in terms of 
exchanging information about practical issues regarding the establishment and 
operation of such structures. The operation of the EWC acted also as a source of 
influence in terms of the principles applied. In terms of priorities, management was 
keen to comply with the PEA requirements, as stipulated in the ICER, and to ensure 
the amount of time-off for ERs was not excessive. Management did consider the 
possibility of consulting directly but decided not to proceed with such action, the 
rationales being: 
`Direct ICE forms would have been seen by employees as a backward step as we 
had already set up a consultation forum with ERs and we would have had 
questions about why we were taking it away. It may also have been perceived as a 
threat to our unions as the idea of direct consultation is something that they 
would strongly oppose. If a matter was of significant importance we would apply 
both type of consultation - probably starting with talking to the reps and 
communicating directly with people and collecting feedback through ERs. ' (HR 
manager) 
Whilst there was discussion on allocating specified seats to the unions there was 
reportedly no union interest. The unions felt that they had sufficient support to be able 
to be elected in their own right and believed that having specified seats could limit 
them in areas where they had already recognition. ERs developed a proactive role 
during the discussions. Their guiding principles included the following: the need to 
ensure that the constitution was unambiguous as possible in terms of the scope of the 
forum and the subjects to be discussed; that it enabled ERs to communicate with each 
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other and with employees; that management would commit to bring important topics 
to the forum; and, finally, that ERs would be able to publish any documents regarding 
the development of the forum without being hindered by management. As a result of 
their pre-active approach a number of provisions were inserted or amended in line 
with the ERs' recommendations. Specifically, more comprehensive provisions on the 
timing and conduct of information and consultation were stipulated. A more detailed 
definition of consultation was inserted and provisions on the formation of a select 
committee among ERs so that they can act collectively or take decisions were 
introduced. The provisions on the method of selection of representatives were further 
elaborated in an attempt to reflect the organizational structure and the provisions on 
the locally-elected representatives for the purpose of statutory consultation were 
amended so that the forum had a say in the issue. Work was also done on refining the 
division of geographical constituencies so as to facilitate greater communication 
between the representatives and the employees. The conditions for electing ERs, such 
as vacancies and arrangement of elections were clarified and the inclusion of the CAC 
in case of disagreement on confidentiality was inserted as a result of the ICER 
requirements. ERs also pressed for the inclusion of a `freedom of speech' clause that 
management successfully resisted. Lastly but importantly, management succeeded to 
exclude from the remit of the forum any issues that would affect one constituency, 
including collective redundancies and transfers of undertakings. While the unions 
acknowledged that the amended ICE agreement was `inevitably imperfect' they 
expressed their content that it was a substantial improvement of the previous 
agreement and stressed that the agreement was, in effect, negotiated with 
management. This reflected three different sources of influence: the ICER, practices 
imported from the company-wide EWC, and the experience of five years of the UK 
forum. 
At the time of the elections, due to the perceived apathy of the workforce and the 
concern on the potential predominance of the unions in the forum, management was 
keen to promote the forum across the workforce so as to increase interest for 
nominations and participation in the elections from employees in non-union 
workplaces. As evident from the independent unions' communications to the 
workforce, both unions actively encouraged their employees to vote in the forum 
elections for union representatives on the basis of the unions' experience in employee 
representation, access to advice, support and training for the representatives. Around 
34% voted in the elections. Out of the 18 forum seats, 8 were won by the biggest 
union, three by the second recognized union and one by another union member. 
Having elected the ERs, the ICE agreement was signed by management and ERs. 
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5.2 Assessment of the approaches adopted by the industrial relations actors in 
the establishment/amendment of ICE arrangements 
Based on a synthesis of the empirical findings in the previous section, the present 
section provides a critical evaluation of the establishment/amendment of the ICE 
arrangements within the analytical framework adopted for the purposes of the study. 
Table 5.2 gives a synopsis of the main characteristics of the ICE arrangements in each 
case study. 
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5.2.1 Organizational responses to the ICER 
All organizations established/amended existing arrangements that represented and 
were elected by all employees. In three cases (Finl, BS1 and BS2) consultative 
arrangements that covered all employees were established for the first time. In Fin2 
and BS3 pre-existing procedures for employee representation were in operation, either 
in the form of informal mechanisms, such as in the case of Fin2, or formalized, such 
as in the case of BS3. The date of the agreements varied. In the case of consultative 
arrangements established for the first time, two of the organizations proceeded to the 
agreements on April 2005 (Finl and BS1) while BS2 acted at an earlier stage, i. e. 
November 2003. In the cases of amended arrangements (Fin2 and BS3) the 
amendment took place in mid-2003 in the former and in May 2005 in the latter. Pre- 
existing employee representative participation structures at European-level, i. e. 
EWCs, were provided in the cases of the two organizations operating at European 
level, i. e. in Finl and BS3. 
As suggested in chapter four, despite the fact that the Regulations offer to all actors 
involved in the arrangements, that is management, trade unions - where existent - and 
employees, a leeway regarding how to respond to the legislation, the institutional 
design of the legislation may favour a management-led approach to the 
introduction/amendment of existing arrangements. In line with the findings 
concerning the impact of the legislation on the system of industrial relations, the 
arrangements established or amended in the organizations under study constituted 
predominantly the result of a pro-active approach by management alone in light of the 
ICER. In Finl, BS1, BS2 and BS3 the initiative to review and introduce or amend the 
existing consultative structures came solely from management. Management was keen 
to make use of the flexible institutional design of the legislation and present 
themselves as adopting a pro-active approach when dealing with employee relations 
issues. Only in Fin2, did both the amendment of the arrangements and their review 
later in light of the ICER take place at the instigation of both management and 
employee representatives. 168 
The introduction/amendment of consultative arrangements reflected a matrix of a 
number of organizational considerations. Firstly, operational and strategic issues were 
identified in all cases. These included the need to bed down significant organizational 
changes or restructuring, and acquisitions such as in BS2, or to move to integrated 
organizational activities such as in Finl. Within this context, considerations of 
potential expansion of the organizations acted as further stimuli in Fin2, BS 1 and 
BS2. Importantly, the nature of the business activities of the organizations - 
competing for attracting outsourcing contracts from the public sector - such as in 
168 However, even in this case, management were keen to appear proactive in the provision of 
employee representative structures. 
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BS 1, BS2 and BS3, was emphasized as a further key management consideration. 
Whilst this organizational consideration was closely interlinked with the more general 
priority of adhering to the compliance with law and being an `employer of choice', 
evidence of the latter was also provided in the other cases, i. e. Fin! and Fin2. As 
suggested in chapter three, as the process for the transposition of the ICED developed 
different discourses were utilized. In essence, the discourse on employee participation 
oriented towards the integration of employees in the socio-economic context of 
management decision-making was transformed at the UK level into a discourse 
associating the ICER with a high performance rationale rationale. Notwithstanding the 
emphasis of the DTI on economic efficiency arguments as a means to induce 
organizations to comply with the legislation there was no evidence, apart from Finl, 
of such a rationale. Management pointed out that no such expectations were 
considered as driving forces for complying with the new statutory requirements. 
However, there was no evidence either of management considering the legislation as 
an instance of external governmental interference, which should be resisted on 
grounds of flexibility. 
In conjunction with the operation of the above-mentioned organizational and strategic 
considerations, evidence of the impact of the Regulations was also reported. The 
impact of the legislation was not confined to an assessment of any existing 
consultative arrangements but also led to decisions aimed at introducing or amending 
existing arrangements in order to comply with the legislation in Fin 1, BS1, BS2, and 
BS3. Even in Fin2 where the arrangements were introduced and amended before the 
application of the legislation, management were keen to proceed to an assessment of 
the arrangements in the period leading to the introduction of the legislation. Based on 
these findings, evidence of two channels through which the new statutory 
requirements could affect arrangements at organizational level was evidenced. In line 
with Edwards et al. (2003) typology of legislative impact, indirect influence, i. e. 
through the establishment/amendment of arrangements in light of the ICER, was 
apparent in Finl, BSI, BS2, and BS3. In Fin2, a broader affinity between the 
organization's approach and the direction of public policy, i. e. legislative framework 
on information and consultation rights, was demonstrated. 169 
In practical terms, the projects were initiated by the human resource departments of 
the organizations. Significantly, all HR managers and directors showed considerable 
awareness of the statutory requirements. This finding is possibly linked to the large 
size of the organizations under study and the already established sophisticated human 
resources policies. Despite the fact that the projects were initiated by the HR 
169 According to the authors (Edwards et al., 2003), in this case there need be no specific direct or 
indirect effect of the latter on the former; an example is when an organization may 
be doing something, 
which is consistent with legal developments with there being virtually no specific causal processes or 
where organizations decide to do something, which they might 
have done but to which the law acts as 
an encouragement. 
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departments, evidence of substantial support provided by senior management such as 
the CEO in Finl and Fin2, and the COO in BS1 was reported. The involvement of 
senior management aimed both at securing lower management's support for the 
operation of ICE arrangements and at ensuring that the arrangements would be seen as 
effective means for consultation by the workforce and not merely `window-dressing' 
activities that would fade out. All organizations employed a wide variety of direct 
forms of employee involvement for a number of years. Despite having the possibility 
to establish direct ICE forms, as stipulated in the ICER, none proceeded to the 
establishment of such forms. The main considerations suggested by management were 
that such forms would not be beneficial to the organizational context, either because 
of the large number of employees and the time needed for such forms to be 
implemented or because of the already existing direct forms of employee 
involvement. 
In the majority of the cases management sought the formal protection provided by 
having PEAs in place. This finding is in line with the evidence provided in chapter 
four. Facilitated by the adoption of an `option policy' by the ICER, employers were 
able to choose among a variety of legal options, which could be used as they saw fit 
(Teubner, 1993: 93-94). At present, the main incentives for choosing the PEA option 
rather than opt for a negotiated agreement or the application of the `standard 
provisions' stemmed from the opportunity given by the PEA option to take account 
both of the management structure of the organizations and of existing approaches and 
structures of industrial relations within the organizations. Evidence of avoiding the 
statutory requirements in the form of the standard provisions or even the provisions 
applicable in the case of negotiated agreements was also reported. Acting as a `frame' 
to steer rather than `command' management, these provisions actually had the effect 
of steering management away from the application of the negotiated agreements or 
the `standard provisions' due to concerns about the stringency of the statutory 
requirements in these cases. 
Despite the fact that the trigger mechanism provided in the ICER was generally seen 
by management as `a sting in the tail' for employees and trade unions, there was 
absence of clear evidence that the latter would actually use the ICER to request the 
establishment of ICE arrangements. Such considerations were only clearly expressed 
in BS1 and BS3, where management viewed as plausible the chance that unions 
would use the ICER so as to extend their activity. However, evidence from BS2 
suggests that management considered this as a possible threat, precipitating arguably a 
proactive response to the introduction of the ICER; whilst management did not expect 
that unions could trigger the process for negotiated agreements concerns were 
expressed that they would be able to use the ICER as a way to extend their presence. 
Even in Fin2 the amendment of the consultative arrangements and review of the latter 
against the legislation took place against union organising activities. 
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As Hall and Terry (2004: 223) note, in unionized workplaces the challenge for 
employers lies in the requirement to extend consultation beyond those categories of 
employees that enjoy representation through trade union recognition into a system of 
universal representation. Regardless of the existence and recognition of trade unions 
in parts of three organizations, i. e. Finl, BS1, BS2 and BS3, there was no 
management support for union-based arrangements; neither did unions seem to 
expressly request these. Instead of incorporating ICE provisions in the existing 
collective agreements with the unions or introduce supplementary arrangements for 
non-union groups of employees, the unionized organizations opted for an all- 
employee forum, where trade union representatives could be elected by workforce 
ballot. An explanation that emerged from the interviews with management for opting 
for all-employee forums was the perception that employee involvement encompassing 
the whole workforce was needed. For example, in Finl management treated employee 
involvement as a holistic project - drawing together elements of employee 
representation, collective consultation, individual grievance procedures and trade 
union recognition - to form a `grand plan' for how the organization could approach 
management-employee relations. In Fin2 and BSI the emphasis was on the need to 
maintain co-operative relations with employees and was seen as a `human rights' 
issue by the CEO in Fin2. The reference to the nature of the workforce, i. e. 
knowledge-based employees whose interests may not necessarily align with those of 
unions, was used as a further justification for introducing all-employee bodies. As a 
result, across the unionized organizations the ICE arrangements were established in 
parallel with established collective bargaining arrangements. 
5.2.2 Was there any scope for collective organization? 
Whilst the ICER give great leeway to management regarding how to respond to the 
legislation they also present trade unions and employees and their ERs with choices as 
to the existence and form and structure of ICE arrangements. Reflecting the ad hoc 
and differing approaches by the unions to the implementation of the ICER, as 
evidenced in the previous chapter, significant variety of responses to the management 
initiatives to introduce/amend ICE arrangements was evident. The unions adopted a 
re-active approach to the management initiatives and there was no case where the 
review and establishment/amendment of the arrangements was at the instigation of the 
unions. In some cases, union officials were even unaware of the details of the ICER 
and in a significant number of cases individual employees were largely unaware of the 
provisions stipulated in the ICER. Out of the four unionized organizations, unions 
responded with clear apprehension to the introduction of the ICER only in BS2. Their 
negative stance possibly reflected the fragile nature of their existence in the 
organization and the adversarial relationship developed between them and 
management. In contrast, in Finl, where the union enjoyed significant support by the 
workforce and there was no perceived challenge of its legitimacy by management, the 
union's approach was positive. The same held in the case of the amendment of the 
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arrangements in BS3: whilst there the relationship between management and the 
biggest union was adversarial, the fact that the unions enjoyed already a close 
alignment of interests with the existing forum allowed them to adopt a clearly positive 
approach to its amendment so as to comply with the ICER. Lastly, in the case of BS 1, 
where two unions were recognized, their reaction to the management-led introduction 
of the arrangements was neutral, showing no signs of apprehension or support to the 
introduction of the arrangements. 
As already seen, a significant finding regarding the process for the 
establishment/amendment of ICE agreements was that in almost all the cases the 
process - drafting of the agreements, selection of methods of approval and details of 
the final agreements - was predominantly management-led. This was the case even 
when employees were already represented by elected ERs in the forum such as in 
Finl, BS1 and BS2. The most striking example of absence of discussion between 
management and ERs over the form and substance of the agreement was provided in 
BSI, where management intentionally secured employee approval of the ICE 
agreement before the conduct of the ERs' elections so as to avoid potential 
negotiations over its text. Even in cases where management expressed their interest in 
co-producing the text of the agreement such as in Finl, there was no evidence of joint 
drafting of the agreement. Hence, while workshops were held with the participation of 
management and the elected ERs with the aim of delineating the structural and 
operational features of the agreement, the final arrangements were predominantly 
determined by management. Similarly, the agreement at BS2 was solely drafted by 
management and there was very limited input by ERs to the framing of the agreement, 
leading to criticisms by a number of ERs. 
Influence over the substance of the agreement was reported only in cases where 
established structures had already been in operation, i. e. Fin2 and BS3. In both cases, 
there was evidence of collective organization, as advocated by reflexive regulation 
theorists (Barnard and Deakin, 2002). In Fin2, ERs were successful in expanding the 
resources of the forum, i. e. budget and provision of full-time ERs, and the scope of 
the forum, including `option-based' consultation. In BS3, based on the experience 
from the operation of the forum, the EWC and the ICER requirements, ERs were able 
to participate and actually negotiate the substance of the agreement. Such a finding 
confirms the potential for the evolution and learning that such arrangements allow for. 
However, evidence of a kind of `reverse learning effect' was also provided in BS3, 
where management successfully excluded from the scope of the forum issues that 
affect one constituency. Hence, while a process of learning based on implementation 
and experience took place this was conditioned not only on the experience acquired 
during the operation of the arrangements but also on the parties' principles and 
priorities in specific contexts when discussing the amendment of the agreements. 
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Overall, the absence of participation of employees in the framing of the agreements is 
in line with the research findings presented in chapter four. Hence, the extent to which 
the establishment/amendment of existing arrangement Was snhier. t to r. nl1Pr-tivP 
organization between management and employees or trade unions was limited. In 
turn, the absence of genuine employee participation in the framing of the agreements 
may have repercussions in terms of advancing a capability for voice, as envisaged by 
the legislation. Presuming that the arrangements were mainly designed in order to 
advance organizational aims and priorities, the extent to which employees' interests 
can be promoted through the operation of such arrangements may be constrained. In 
contrast to the intention of the ICED to transcend the unilateral character of employee 
involvement initiatives and provide scope for participation to the employee side the 
ICER served surprisingly as guidelines for the legitimization of the management as 
the party responsible for the drafting of the agreements and for the composition of the 
ICE arrangements. As such, while the ICER and the `standard provisions' shaped 
management priorities and set some limits to the diversity of the ICE structures and 
modus operandi they induced only in limited cases the development of social dialogue 
between management and labour for the conclusion of the agreements. 
5.3 Evaluation of the content of the ICE agreements 
While the actual practice of ICE arrangements may be rather different from what is 
laid down in an agreement (Gilman and Marginson, 2002: 37; Ramsay, 1997: 316) 
there is still a relationship between the provisions negotiated/concluded in an 
agreement and the practice which subsequently develops. As Gilman and Marginson 
(2002: 37) note in the case of EWCs, `agreements can be more or less supportive of 
EWCs developing activity and influence: in certain respects, they can seek to 
prohibit.. . or 
in others to promote. ' Within this context, the ICE agreements can 
operate in similar ways. Whilst they do not predetermine the actual operation of the 
arrangements, they stipulate `nominal rights' and hence provide a framework within 
which the ICE arrangements will function. 
5.3.1 The relevant legal provisions 
As already seen, the ICER envisage a three-staged process for the conclusion of ICE 
agreements between management and ERs, i. e. PEAs, negotiated agreements or the 
application of the `standard provisions'; with at each successive stage, negotiations 
become increasingly regulated by the ICER in terms of both the procedure and the 
substance of the agreements. 170 The structure and content of PEAs and negotiated 
agreements are largely determined by the primacy of the voluntary agreement. 
Regarding the selection of ERs, in the case of PEAs, the selection method, where 
170 Regarding the coverage of ICE agreements, the ICER (reg 2) use the notion of 
`employee', which is 
narrowly defined as `an individual who has entered 
into or works under a contract of employment', 
thereby excluding many of those engaged in `atypical work', e. g. agency and casual workers. 
The 
ICED also refers to employees. 
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applicable, is determined by the agreement. 171 Methods by which employee approval 
of PEAs can be demonstrated includes support indicated by: a simple majority among 
those voting in a ballot of the workforce; a majority of the workforce expressing 
support through signatures; the agreement of representatives of employees who 
represent a majority of the workforce. This includes officials of independent trade 
unions in workplaces with a recognized union and other appropriate representatives of 
employees (DTI, 2006: 20). 172 
Concerning the content of ICE agreements, a PEA must simply `set out how the 
employer is to give information to employees or their representatives and seek their 
views on such information. ' 173 The ICER do not specify what information is to be 
provided under such agreements, nor does the seeking of views equate to the 
definition of consultation, as provided in reg 2, i. e. `establishment of dialogue'. 
Negotiated agreements must set out the circumstances in which the employer must 
inform and consult its employees and cover all employees in the undertaking. 174 
However, the parties are free to negotiate regarding the content of information and 
consultation, which although higher than PEAs is lower than the standard provisions, 
i. e. there is no provision of consultation `with a view to reaching an agreement'. 
Under both PEAs and negotiated agreements there is the option for direct ICE 
methods. 175 When negotiating or implementing a negotiated agreement, the parties are 
under a duty to work in a spirit of cooperation, taking into account the interests of 
both the undertaking and the employees. 176 In terms of enforcement, there is, as 
already seen, no enforcement mechanism stipulated in the case of PEAs. 177 Any 
dispute about the operation of a PEA would need to be dealt with in accordance with 
any dispute resolution procedures the agreement itself stipulated, or by voluntary 
reference to ACAS's conciliation services (Hall, 2005: 117). Based on the 
presumption that ICE agreements should not be treated as collective agreements, 
Ewing and Truter (2005: 637-638) have suggested that the former have legal status 
171 In the case of negotiated agreements, the ICER provide that `any information and consultation 
representatives' would need to be appointed or elected, but the parties are be free to decide how (reg 14 
(1)-(2)). In the case of negotiating representatives, these may be elected in a ballot of employees, or 
simply appointed by the employees directly without an election, and it for the employer to decide 
which (DTI, 2006: 35-36). 
172 Employee approval of negotiated agreement should be provided by either (a) signature by all the 
negotiating representatives or (b) signature by a majority of the negotiating representatives and 
approval either in writing by at least 50% of the employees in the undertaking(s) or by 50% of 
employees who vote in a ballot of all employees in the undertaking (reg 16). 
173 Reg 8 (1)(d) 
174 Reg 16 (1)(a)-(c)(e). 
175 Reg 16 (1)(f). 
176 Reg 21. 
177 Reg 22 (1), (3). However, the ICED does not distinguish in terms of enforcement between PEAs and 
other agreements deriving from its application 
(art 8). 
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and as such they can be enforceable in contractual proceedings where they were 
negotiated by employees or non-union representatives but not trade unions. 178 
In contrast to the PEAs and negotiated agreements, the standard provisions apply at 
the undertaking level. Where the standard provisions apply, in terms of infrastructure, 
the ICER only specify that the ballot arrangements are arranged by the employer, who 
also determines the ballot constituencies, and appoints an `independent ballot 
supervisor', whose costs are to be met by the employer, as are the costs relating to the 
holding of the ballot. 179 Representatives are to be elected by workforce ballot of all 
employees, irrespective of union structures. There must be one representative for 
every 50 employees or part thereof, although this is subject to a minimum of 2 and 
maximum of 25.180 However, the ICER do not specify the establishment of a 
representative body as such, i. e. a committee or council, nor facilities for 
representatives (Hall, 2005: 115). 181 The ICER do not contain either specific 
requirements as to the frequency and timing of information and consultation and the 
level of management involved. Regarding the former, the ICER provide that the 
relevant information must be provided at an `appropriate time', in particular to enable 
the ICE representatives to conduct a study and, where necessary, prepare for 
consultation. Consultation must take place in such a way as to ensure that the timing, 
method and content of the consultation are appropriate; 182 on the basis of information 
provided by the employer and any opinion expressed by the representatives; 183 and in 
such a way as to allow the representatives to meet with the employer at the relevant 
level and obtain a reasoned response from the employer to any such opinion. 184 In 
terms of the latter, i. e. level of management, the DTI Guidance (2006: 54) notes that 
the level of management relevant to the subject under discussion implies a level of 
management with the authority to change the decision being consulted about. 
Concerning the subject-matter of information and consultation, the employer is 
required to provide the ICE representatives with information on the following matters: 
the recent and probable development of the undertaking's activities and economic 
situation; the situation, structure and probable development of employment within the 
undertaking and on any anticipatory measures envisaged, in particular, where there is 
178 On the other hand, Hall suggests that the terms of a PEA would only be enforceable through the 
courts if the agreement explicitly provides for legal enforceability and refers to the TUC advice to 
unions to ensure that appropriate and effective means of ensuring of compliance are included in the 
PEAs they negotiate (2005: 117). 
179 Sch 2, para 15. 
180 Reg 19(3). The obligation to work in a spirit of co-operation also applies in the context of the 
`standard provisions' (reg 21). 
181 The Guidance only suggests that `at least one meeting per year would seem to be a minimum 
requirement', although `one or more additional meetings' might be necessary in relation to the probable 
development of employment within the undertaking (DTI, 2006: 46 (box)). 
182 Reg 20 (4)(a). 
183 Reg 20 (4)(b). 
184 Reg 20 (4)(c). 
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a threat to employment within the undertaking; and, decisions likely to lead to 
substantial changes in work organization or in contractual relations, including in cases 
of collective redundancies and transfers of undertakings. 185 The employer must 
consult on the second and third of the matters in respect of which information is to be 
provided. 186 In case of a statutory duty to inform and consult in terms of the 
provisions referred to above on collective redundancies and transfers of undertakings, 
the employer is released from the obligation to inform and consult on decisions likely 
to lead to substantial changes in work organization or in contractual relations under 
the ICER. 187 Further, consultation concerning decisions likely to lead to substantial 
changes in work organization or in contractual relations must take place with a view 
to reaching agreement. '88 While the range of topics covered by the ICER are 
potentially wide-ranging (DTI, 2006: 38-44), the DTI Guidance (2006: 43) also notes 
that ICE rights on pay or benefits that have a monetary value are excluded and 
information and consultation `on the recruitment, terms and conditions, redundancy, 
dismissal etc of an individual employee or of a small number of employees' is not 
required. 189 There is no specific obligation in the standard provisions for ICE 
representatives to report back to the employees they represent, or to obtain their 
views. 190 
Regarding confidentiality, employers who have a negotiated agreement, or who are 
subject to the standard provisions may, on confidentiality grounds: restrict any 
information or document they provide to ICE representatives] 91 or others and may 
withhold information or documents, where their disclosure would seriously harm the 
functioning of the undertaking or would be prejudicial to it. 192 In the case of PEAs, 
185 Reg 20(1). For restrictions relating to the disclosure of confidential information, see regs 25 and 26. 
186 Reg (20)3. 
187 Reg 20 (5). The DTI Guidance (2006: 57) notes that where there are affected employees who are not 
represented by a recognized union, the employer must inform and consult other appropriate 
representatives of those employees. These may be either new representatives elected for the purpose, or 
existing representatives provided that their remit and method of election or appointment gives them 
suitable authority from the employees concerned. ICE representatives elected or appointed under the 
ICER would be appropriate representatives for this purpose, although the employer would still be free 
to consult to consult other appropriate representatives or arrange for new ones to be specially elected 
for the purpose. In contrast, in the cases of PEAs and negotiated agreements if the parties to such 
agreements want to adopt a similar approach they must include such a provision in their agreement. 
188 Reg 4 (4)(d). The DTI Guidance (2006: 53) states if those decisions are within the scope of the 
employer's powers, then the employer must aim to reach agreement with the I&C representatives on 
such decisions, though sometimes agreement may not be possible. 
189 ACAS (2003) has suggested that `depending on the arrangements for collective bargaining, it may 
be sensible to exclude pay and conditions of employment from the subject matter of consultation. ' 
190 McCarthy (2000: 553) described the absence of similar provisions in the TICER as a `conscious or 
unconscious self-defeating gap'. 
191 Reg 25. 
192 Reg 26. There is ambiguity as to what information might be `prejudicial' or `seriously harmful' to 
the functioning of the undertaking and it is also unclear on what grounds information would be deemed 
to have such an effect on the functioning of the undertaking or establishment. Despite the frequently 
cited by management reason for not informing employee representatives ahead of public 
announcements it is significant that the DTI 
Guidance (2006) stresses that neither the UK listing rules, 
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where the provisions do not apply, employers and employees or their representatives 
are free to agree whatever confidentiality provisions they wish (DTI, 2006). 193 Lastly, 
in terms of protection, facilities and resources for ERs, the ICER provide that a 
negotiating representative or an ICE representative is entitled to `reasonable time off 
in order to 'perform his function as such a representative', 194 and to be paid for this 
time; PEAs representatives are excluded from such facilities. Certain categories of 
employees are also protected against unfair dismissal or detriment by their employer 
when acting as representatives of employees under a negotiated agreement or under 
the standard provisions. Despite the stipulation of a right to time off to undergo 
training in legislation requiring consultation over collective redundancies and 
transfers of undertakings the ICER do not include such a provision. 
While the scope for the structural and operational aspects of the PEAs is significantly 
flexible, the ICER may have, as in the case of EWCs, a `statutory model effect', i. e. 
the impact of the terms of the ICER themselves, including the standard provisions, on 
the content of ICE agreements (Gilman and Marginson, 2002: 37). Issues potentially 
susceptible to the `statutory model effect' comprise provisions on the following 
matters: coverage of all employees in the undertaking; methods by which employee 
approval of PEAs is demonstrated; selection and number of ERs; information and 
consultation topics, including in cases of collective redundancies and transfers of 
undertakings; provision for direct ICE methods; protection of ERs and provision of 
time-off to perform their duties; and lastly, enforcement and confidentiality 
obligations. In contrast, the ICER make no reference to the following potential aspects 
of ICE agreements, which, hence, depend on the discussions between the parties to an 
ICE agreement: nature of the ICE arrangements, i. e. joint management employee 
structure or only employee-side bodies; methods for distribution of seats; period of 
office, eligibility criteria and termination of office for representatives; attendance of 
non-forum members by right or invitation; chairing of meetings; notice of meetings 
and agenda items and setting; timing and method of information and consultation; 
preparation of minutes/report of the meetings; provisions for feedback of information 
from the meetings; number of ordinary meetings per year; facilities for extraordinary 
meetings; facilities for pre- and post forum meetings for ERs; access to external 
experts, including trade union officials; provision of full-time representatives; 
provision of other management funding and communication with employees. 
5.3.2 The structural and operational aspects of the agreements 
The descriptive analysis focuses on both structural and operational aspects as outlined 
by the agreements. Structural factors include the ICE arrangements' composition, 
nor the city code on takeovers and mergers, nor similar US rules prevent companies 
from sharing price 
sensitive information with employee/union representatives, in confidence, 
before it is publicly 
announced. 
193 However, in this case disputes would not be resolved by the CAC. 
194 Reg 27 (1). 
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scope and business structure and employees covered. Operational aspects cover issues 
related to the role and competence of the ICE arrangements, the organization of the 
ICE arrangements and meetings, provisions on facilities and experts and clauses that 
ensure protection for the ERs, confidentiality provisions and, finally, resolution of 
disputes and amendment and termination of the ICE agreements. The presentation of 
the details of the agreements is in the form of tables, i. e. 5.3-5.11, which are broken 
down into their different aspects. 
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5.3.3 Assessment of the form and substance of the ICE agreements 
The descriptive analysis of the text of the PEAs concluded in the five case studies 
presented here demonstrated that the high degree of flexibility provided by the ICER 
for the conclusion of organization-specific ICE agreements was reflected in the 
considerable variation in their provisions. However, these PEAs exhibited interesting 
commonalities with one another as well with the provisions of the ICER and other 
influences emanating from the UK IR system. The following common structural 
features of PEAs were identified. Regarding the composition of ICE arrangements, in 
line with evidence on EWC agreements in Anglo-Irish multinationals (MNCs) 
(Marginson et al., 1998), all the agreements opted for a joint management/employee 
structure. The nature of the agreements, as revealed by the findings, was consistent 
with the suggestion that ICE arrangements would resemble the structures that 
constituted established consultation practice in the UK IR system (Gilman and 
Marginson, 2002: 43). However, there was evidence of impact of the statutory model 
in the case of employee coverage as all employees, including those in senior 
management positions, were explicitly covered by three ICE agreements, i. e. Finl, 
BS 1 and BS2. While the coverage of all employees under the agreements contrasted 
with previous non-union consultative structures' practice of excluding certain 
employee bands from their coverage (Terry, 1999) there was no extension of the 
agreement to cover agency or casual workers; as such, categories of precarious 
workers were excluded from benefiting from the formal rights stipulated under the 
ICE agreements. This finding is particularly significant from a capability-based 
perspective as it demonstrates that in line with the ICER `standard provisions' the 
provision of formal information and consultation rights was denied in the case of 
workers in precarious positions. 
Further, it is argued that the strategies for appointing ERs to ICE agreements should 
be fair and transparent (Dix and Oxenbridge, 2003). Possible mechanisms for 
ensuring fairness and transparency include the provision of elections, or other 
procedures that allow individuals to be selected or nominated by employees, rather 
than being appointed by management. The selection of ERs in all cases was through 
direct elections from the workforce. This finding is in line with the WERS 2004 
findings (Kersley et al., 2005) and the `standard provisions', which opt for direct 
election. However, the finding also constituted a break from the previous practice of 
appointing ERs for the purpose of complying with ICE requirements in the case of 
transfers of undertakings and collective redundancies in non-unionized organizations 
(Hall and Edwards, 1999; Terry, 1999; Sargeant, 2002). However, regarding the 
organization of elections there was no significant evidence of the use of an 
independent body as in two of the case studies the arrangements were made at the 
discretion of the organization and in the other two cases there was no provision at all. 
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With few exceptions (see chapter four), the ICER make no mention of trade unions. 
However, the right of trade unions to have `specified seats' in the ICE arrangements is 
an indicator of the extent to which ICE agreements provide an ongoing role for trade 
unions. The incidence of this provision can vary according to the IR situation in the 
organization, and more particularly the management rationale for setting up the ICE 
body and the trade union approach to the ICER. In none of the unionized 
organizations did the ICE agreements provide for nomination by trade unions for at 
least some of the ERs. As a result, a dual model of representation with the trade 
unions and the forums running in parallel was preferred instead of extending the 
union arrangements to all employees or establishing `hybrid systems' where unions 
could have specified seats. The analysis further demonstrated that in contrast to the 
ICER, but in line with evidence from non-union representation practice (Terry, 1999), 
all the agreements specified a method for the allocation of seats and provided for a 
distribution of seats that varied according to business areas and/or geographical 
locations. Finally, the majority of the ICE agreements operated at company-wide 
level, reflecting possibly the large workforce size of the organizations under study. 
Only in BS 1 were there two different ICE agreements covering the distinct two 
business units of the organization. 
Concerning the operational aspects of the ICE agreements, the stated role of the 
arrangements in all but Fin2, where the role of the forum was the individual and 
collective representation of employees, was information and consultation. However, 
the analysis demonstrated that in the majority of the agreements there was no 
definition of the notion of `information' or any details on the timing/method of 
information provision. Only in BS3, the timing/method of information provision 
reflected accurately the ICER wording; in the majority of the other cases such 
definitions were absent. In contrast, considerable variation existed with regard to the 
definition of consultation, which ranged from an `exchange of views and ideas' to the 
`establishment of dialogue with a view to reaching a consensual understanding or 
decision. ' However, in none of the agreements was there reference to `consultation 
with a view to reaching an agreement' that is stipulated in the ICER standard 
provisions, probably limiting the extent to which the ICE arrangements can develop 
the capability to influence management decision-making. Additionally, more 
encompassing provisions, such as on timing and scope of consultation, including in 
case of transfers of undertaking and collective redundancies, were - apart from the 
case of BS3 - absent. While in most of the agreements there was no distinction 
between information and consultation topics, 246 leading to potential confusion 
regarding the specific remit of the ICE bodies, evidence of similarities in the issues 
the ICE bodies were entitled to deal with was provided. In most of the cases, 
information and consultation topics included the following: economic and financial 
246 The exception is BS3 where information topics are explicitly 
distinguished from consultation topics. 
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situation of the company; organizational changes; changes to working arrangements 
or HR policies, learning and development, collective redundancies and transfers of 
undertakings. 
All the ICE agreements contained to a greater or lesser extent provisions that 
excluded specific matters from information and consultation. For example, in a 
number of cases pay and remuneration as well as individual matters were excluded 
from the remit of the agreements. Fin2 was an exception here as individual matters 
and pay and bonuses were included; the inclusion of such topics can be though 
attributed to the explicit non-union character of the forum (Butler, 2004: 81-82; Hall 
and Terry, 2004: 215). Workforce size criteria for raising ICE issues were also 
stipulated in the cases of Fin1, BS 1 and BS3. The greatest constraints in the remit of 
the ICE arrangements were evident in the case of BSI, where issues excluded 
included: remuneration and benefits, terms and conditions, health and safety, 
individual/collective grievances, TUPE and collective redundancies and information 
which is described as `super-confidential'. Management's insistence on the exclusion 
of issues in all the cases arguably reflects, as in the case of EWCs in UK-based 
multinationals (MNCs) (Hall et al., 2003: 83), unfamiliarity with works council 
practice in the UK and the absence of clear-cut distinction at institutional level 
between information and consultation on the one hand and consultation on the other 
(Sisson, 2002; Terry, 2003). Similarly, all the agreements contained `damage 
limitation provisions' as detailed and restrictive confidentiality requirements, in the 
form of separate agreements or specific clauses in the agreements, were inserted 
reflecting arguably not only Anglo-Saxon traditions of corporate governance (Hall et 
al., 2003) but also potentially sensitivities about protecting information in 
organizations operating in the business services and financial sectors. 
In contrast to the absence of specific provisions in the ICER, formal provisions 
covering the chairing of the meetings, the employee-side coordinator or chair, the 
setting up of the agenda, the drawing up of minutes and the dissemination of the 
outcome of meetings were stipulated in all the agreements. The fact that the 
agreements tended to spell out these operational issues may be attributed to the need 
of the parties to ensure clarification of the agreements, which cover unfamiliar aspects 
of the ICE arrangements. Secondly, while an employee-side chair or coordinator was 
provided in most cases and the setting up of the ICE agenda was done jointly, the 
organization of the ICE arrangements was significantly management-led. 
Considerable variation regarding the number of ordinary meetings held existed, with 
meetings ranging from twice a year (Finl) to bi-monthly (Fin2). However, facilities 
for extra-ordinary meetings or ad hoc interaction between the representatives and 
management were included in all cases except from BS2. Rights to arrange 
extraordinary meetings and/or to receive information on an ongoing basis from 
management are important to underpinning an ICE 
body characterized by ongoing 
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activity, in contrast to less frequent meetings (Marginson et al., 1998: 76-77; Gilman 
and Marginson, 2002: 40). As Gilman and Marginson (2002: 40) also note in the 
context of EWCs `the facility to convene a follow-up meeting between the ERs is 
likely to strengthen the effectiveness of ERs to pursue issues with management, and to 
report back to employees. ' Within this context, the facility to convene pre-meetings is 
also important as it allows representatives to prepare adequately and develop a 
coherent strategy. However, in all but one of the agreements (BS3) there were no 
explicit provisions regarding the facilities for the representatives to hold pre- and 
post-forum meetings without management. 
From an operational point of view, another important dimension for the development 
of capabilities for voice is the ICE bodies' access to facilities and protection for the 
ERs. While training and time-off to perform their duties were stipulated in the 
agreements, access to external experts was only provided in limited cases. 
Interestingly, the ICE agreements in unionized organizations did not mention trade 
unions as a potential source of experts nor did they stipulate rights for union 
representatives to attend ICE meetings. Provision of additional resources and 
participation in discussions with recognized third parties, e. g. IPA, were also 
stipulated. In two of the cases, i. e. Fini and Fin2, full-time posts were also provided. 
The facility to communicate with employees freely through adequate means is also 
vital in raising the profile of the forum, gaining and retaining legitimacy among the 
workforce and consulting employees on significant issues. Communication with 
employees relies significantly on the provision of intranet, email and phone; only the 
BS3 agreement stipulated the use of meeting rooms for communicating with 
employees. The possibility for consultation between the ICE bodies and the workforce 
was also explicitly stipulated in some agreements. Lastly, in line with the ICER, 
provisions on the protection of the ERs are included, covering cases of discrimination 
and advantage/disadvantage through membership. Based on these elements, signs of 
significant dependence of the ICE arrangements on management for the provision of 
basic operating resources, such as expertise, time off for training, proper contact with 
external union officers, effective contact with members, issues which were 
highlighted by Terry (2003: 502) in the case of `consultative' unionism, were evident 
here. Equally importantly, apart from Finl, there were no provisions stipulating 
procedures for the resolution of disputes arising within the ICE arrangements. This 
finding is significant as it confirms the concerns expressed elsewhere in the thesis 
regarding the lack of compliance of the ICER with the ICED due to the absence of 
enforcement procedures in the case of PEAs. 
Apart from the influence of the ICER, company-specific factors and the more general 
UK IR climate, a `learning effect' (Gilman and Marginson, 2002) was evident in Finl, 
Fin2, BS2 and BS3. In effect, provisions allowing for practical experience from 
implementation to be reflected in the agreements were included in all these 
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agreements. Specifically, the agreements allowed for an amendment of the structural 
and operational aspects of the ICE agreements with requests by either party and 
agreement by both parties. While the ICE agreements were fairly recent at the time of 
the research, some changes had already been made regarding provisions concerning 
follow-up meetings, communication between the ERs and the remit of the ICE 
agreements. For instance, drawing on experience from the early operation of the 
initial arrangements in BS2, management and ERs issued supporting documents that 
specified in more detail the consultative remit of the forum suggesting that a `learning 
effect' was in operation there, in which innovations regarding the operational aspects 
of the forum's operation were later incorporated in the ICE agreement. 
Importantly, evidence of integrative purposes in the establishment of all the ICE 
agreements was also provided (Heery et al., 2004). This was illustrated in the pattern 
of issue-specific rights conferred to the ICE bodies, which sought to balance the 
respective interests of employers and employees and in the balancing of rights with 
organizations via stipulating co-operative and participative principles. Within this 
context, the influence of considerations of enterprise performance and managerial 
control to the establishment/amendment of ICE agreement was also evident. Broad 
(1994: 27) has suggested that representative participation may be established `to 
provide a mechanism to rationalize the information and communication systems 
directed towards the achievement of a `consensus culture'. The use of terms such as 
`consensual management' in the description of the nature of the relationship between 
the ICE arrangements and management provided evidence of such an approach. In 
conjunction with the dominance of a managerial agenda in some of the cases, e. g. 
BSI, and the emphasis on employee output in almost all the agreements, evidence of 
constrained forms of participation with limited space for the expression of employee 
voice and collective interests (Hall and Terry, 2004: 216) was provided. The inclusion 
of explicit provisions that clarified that the ICE arrangements did not supersede 
existing collective agreements in organizations where trade unions were recognized 
and that the forums' role was consultation, not negotiation, could also be seen within 
the context of limiting the role of the arrangements to a role that is importantly 
underpinned by a spirit of co-operation and partnership. 
On the basis of the comparison here, a `basic model' of ICE bodies can be identified 
in particular with regard to its composition as a joint management-employee body that 
is chaired by management, and its competences that are limited to information and 
consultation and do not extend to any co-decision rights, as it is the case in some 
continental European legal systems. The finding of a `statutory model effect' 
(concerning mainly scope of application, employee coverage, selection of ERs and 
nature of the arrangements) demonstrates, how when `bargaining under the shadow of 
the law' (Bercusson, 1992), the choices made by management and ERs over the 
provisions of ICE agreements are likely to be constrained, as in the case of EWCs 
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(Gilman and Marginson, 2002: 49). Bearing in mind the minimalist approach of the 
ICER evidence of weak institutionalization of the ICE bodies and in certain 
procedural aspects, such as the dominant position of management, the exclusion of 
certain issues from the ICE bodies' competences, the absence of the right of the ERs 
to consult external experts and, the lack of enforcement procedures was found. 
However, the analysis also demonstrated evidence of other sources of influences on 
the provisions of the ICE agreements. These sources of influence had their origin in 
the business structure, IR situation and broader practice of employee representative 
structures in the UK. However, the evidence of a `learning effect' suggests that as in 
the case of EWCs, `the parties are developing a momentum of their own, in which 
good practice progressively evolves. Periodic review and renegotiation of agreements 
means that the scope of learning is ongoing' (Gilman and Marginson, 2002: 50). 
Despite the existence of a significant number of similarities between the ICE 
agreements analyzed here, it is still possible to suggest that the degree to which the 
ICE agreements provided opportunities for the development of capabilities for 
employee voice differed to a significant extent. In their study of voluntary agreements 
under the art 13 procedure of the EWCD, Marginson et al. (1998) defined `active' 
EWCs as those that have the potential to generate activity in a company by allowing 
ERs to share ideas and information outside meetings. In opposition, `formal/symbolic' 
EWCs are those with no provision for employee-side meetings, no access to employee 
expert assistance, no independent administrative procedures and no rights to alter the 
agenda of the EWCs. In line with the typology suggested by Marginson et al. (1998) 
and based solely on the text of the ICE agreements, `active' forums could include the 
ones in Finl, BS2 and BS3. The forum in Fin2 could also be included in this category 
provided that the agreement was in writing. Instead, based on the significant 
restrictions regarding information and consultation topics the forum in BS 1 could be 
described as `symbolic'. 
As seen from this chapter, the implementation of the ICER acted as a `catalyst' for the 
review of existing approaches to information and consultation of employees in all the 
organizations studied. Significantly, in the majority of cases it also led to the 
establishment or amendment of existing arrangements in order to qualify as PEAs. In 
taking advantage of the institutional design of the legislation and the lack of active 
involvement of trade unions - where recognized - in the process, ICE arrangements 
that operated in parallel with established collective arrangements were promoted. 
Importantly, from a capability-based perspective there was very limited scope for 
collective organization between management and ERs concerning the structural and 
operational details and the method for the approval of the ICE agreements. Hence, 
while the ICER and the `standard provisions' shaped to some extent management 
priorities they proved unable to promote genuine participation of employees 
in the 
framing of the agreements. 
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However, for the purpose of assessing the potential of the ICE arrangements to 
provide effective rights for the development of capabilities for employee voice an 
analysis of only the aspects of the agreements is not sufficient. As Marginson (1999: 
260) suggests in the case of EWCs, `at best, the formal provisions of agreements are 
likely to constitute only an approximate guide to the actual practice evolved by the 
parties in functioning EWCs. ' For this reason, the following chapter focuses on the 
actual operation of such arrangements and assesses the extent to which the `nominal 
rights', as stipulated under the ICE agreements, become `effective rights' for the 
purpose of developing capabilities for employee voice. 
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Chapter 6. Analysis of the operation of the ICE arrangements 
As Lecher et al. (2002: 131) emphasize in the case of EWCs, consultative 
arrangements must develop a number of autonomous qualities independently of the 
quality of the agreement. This chapter examines the operation of the ICE 
arrangements in terms both of their `inner life' and their relevant external relations 
(Lecher et al., 1999). The analysis proceeds on the basis that the capability for voice 
that the new consultative arrangements can develop is the product of external 
influences, i. e. effect of the ICER, and internal developmental preconditions of the 
ICE arrangements that operate in the organizations under study. As analyzed in 
chapter two, the internal preconditions refer to four fields of interaction. The first is 
between the employee-side ICE arrangements and management, where the two 
dimensions that are critical are: to what extent does management grant the ICE 
arrangements, voluntary or as a concession, firstly scope to operate and secondly 
scope to participate? The second is the internal employee-side ICE arrangements, 
where the key dimensions are the employee-side's internal capacity and cohesion. The 
third is between the employee-side ICE arrangements and employees, where the 
dimensions are the capacity and legitimacy of the arrangements. The fourth is 
between the employee-side ICE arrangements and trade unions, where issues of 
formal integration, specialist and policy support and resource supplementation and 
concentration constitute the key dimensions. In line with Lecher et al., (1999: 77) 
interaction is defined here as `a process of mutually-related action, in which actors 
respond to and anticipate the actions of others. ' Having provided an analysis of each 
field of interaction, a brief summary is included at the end of each case study where 
the ICE arrangements are positioned on the four internal fields of interaction. 
6.1 Finl 
6.1.1 ICE arrangements and management 
Scope to operate 
The forum had a management-appointed, full-time administrator. Training - including 
sessions that were available only for senior managers - was provided to all ERs at the 
establishment of the forum and later by external organizations and in-house 
specialists. The objective was not only to send a message to the management 
community that the forum should be seen as important but also to give the ERs the 
opportunity to network with senior management, understand management thinking 
and ultimately be able to contribute to organizational objectives. Whilst there was 
good management `buy-in' in terms of time-off facilities, both the ER manager and 
the forum chair attempted to minimize face-to-face communication with the ERs so as 
to play down' line management concerns. However, ERs noted that work related to 
the forum was usually performed outside normal working hours. 
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Due to greater familiarity with the rationale and objectives of the forum, the first chair 
was a management appointed representative. 247 In practice, there was significant 
evidence that the management chair controlled substantial aspects of the forum 
meetings, such as choosing which ERs to be consulted on specific issues and 
arranging meetings with management, hence significantly restricting the scope 
available to the ERs. The majority of agenda issues came from the HR side. This was 
attributed to a number of factors: firstly, ICE issues were initiated by the HR 
department; secondly, the forum was still `ending its feet'; and thirdly, the structure 
for communication with employees was not yet in place. 248 The dissemination of 
documents prior to consultation was reported in some cases but there were no minutes 
taken in any of the forum meetings. 
Scope to participate 
The forum held bi-annual formal meetings attended by the CEO, other executive 
members and the HR director. In one of the meetings, management provided 
information on the UK business, including a review of the past year and the prospects 
for the following twelve months concerning financial, business and operational 
aspects. Information exchange between management and the ERs took also place 
outside of the formal meetings. Monthly and ad-hoc communications between the 
forum and the Business Area (BA) chairs took place through teleconferences and site- 
level meetings. Whilst the timing, level and nature of such information were 
considered satisfactory by ERs, the provision of such information was predominantly 
for the purpose of the conduct of consultation and did not extend to wider 
organizational issues. 
Consultation took place on an ad hoc basis and included the following stages: when 
management decided there was an issue for consultation with the forum they informed 
the chair of the forum who then organized the appropriate ERs for consultation. The 
ERs were then provided with information for and consultation took place with the 
management responsible for the affected area. According to the ER manager: 
`We will listen, we will discuss, we will thrash out, but we won't seek agreement, 
and that to me is the essential difference between the union and the forum. ' 
ERs reported generally their satisfaction with their level of involvement and the 
supportive management approach. Subject for consultation included changes 
in 
pensions, the refurbishment of a site canteen, changes in the IT architecture, changes 
in the retirement age, an update of the so-called `People Capability 
Project', flexible 
247 The management representative was seconded 
into that role for a year and after the expiration of the 
year, a full-time employee-side chair would 
be elected among the ERs' team. 
248 In order to develop a pro-active approach and reinvigorate 
the forum's agenda, ERs intended to 
introduce a diary including all the issues raised regularly within 
the organization. The minutes from the 
meetings were solely management's responsibility. 
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working policies, accounting trainee schemes, restructuring and redeployment. In 
some cases, consultation took place at an early stage of decision-making. For 
example, in the case of changes to the `People Capability Project', which involved a 
new way of profiling staff, ERs participated at an early stage in a workshop, where 
they were able to reflect and comment on what was proposed and gave substantial 
feedback on the scheme. 
Despite the significant support by the CEO and the HR department, instances where 
the forum was only consulted at a late stage were reported, especially in restructuring 
exercises. For example, due to cost savings Finl decided in April 2006 to close 
offices at three sites. The decision involved around 700 job losses over 2006-08. The 
most affected areas were customer services (365 posts) and telesales, (115 posts) and 
involved the transfers of the majority of the jobs (around 700) - some to other 
locations within the UK and others to India. Following a 90-day period of 
consultation between management, the union and the forum over the future of a 
specific site, Finl agreed to outsource life and pensions' sales and administration 
services to another organization operating in the UK. Approximately 450 employees 
working in Finl's customer services, direct-to-consumer and support operations in 
Ireland were transferred to the acquiring organization under TUPE in early autumn 
2006. The outsourcing agreement that was agreed in consultation with the union and 
the forum helped provide employees with continued employment. However, union's 
view was that this was predominantly a result of union organization and activity and 
that the forum's involvement was insignificant. 
The term `consultation' was also used in situations where the forum served more as a 
means for employee feedback with no possibility for actual consultation. For 
example, regarding changes in the retirement age the forum hosted employee focus 
groups in order to gauge employee perceptions and concerns regarding the three 
options on retirement, as suggested by the HR team, and then fed back to 
management. While management considered this as a major consultation exercise, 
ERs commented that while the exercise was well structured in terms of the options 
provided and their substantive value, it could not be described as consultation; 
instead, it was seen as providing a service for the company. It is important to add here 
that there was strict adherence to the confidentiality provision in the ICE agreement. 
All the issues that were dealt with were considered as confidential, the rationale being 
that ERs had exclusive access to issues that were not even available to management. 
Lack of ERs' interest in challenging management proposals and decisions was also 
evident. Non-union ERs were keen to examine the extent to which the operation of 
the forum impacted positively on organizational efficiency. 
Impact on management decision-making 
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Impact of the forum on organizational decision-making was reported in some cases. 
For instance, in the cases of training and communication in the largest business area, 
the `People Capability Project' and the rationalization of flexible working policies, the 
suggestions made by the forum were taken into account and influenced the substance 
and implementation of management decisions. The fact that in all these cases the 
involvement of the forum had taken place at an early stage was identified by ERs as a 
key factor for the effectiveness of the forum. Regarding the capacity of the forum to 
influence decision-making, the view 
fundamentally change business strategy 
influence some thinking. ' 
of ERs was that whilst it would not 
overnight, it was in a fairly sharp end to 
On the management side, the influence of the forum was considered to range from 
impact on communication and implementation of decision-making to the substance of 
decision-making. While recognizing the involvement of the forum as a means to 
legitimize management's decisions and to provide a support mechanism for 
restructuring instances, as precipitated by developments in the finance sector, the ER 
manager stressed the potential input of the forum in better decision-making: 
`Certainly by talking to people change is going to happen more easily as a result 
of it. But change is a necessary evil and I suppose by being creative you can 
minimize the negative impacts of that having by having representatives who do a 
good job. They may not always agree with you, but the likelihood is you will make 
slightly smarter decisions. If nothing else, you have to think things through. ' 
While management was keen to measure the impact of the forum on organizational 
performance they recognized the intangible character of the criteria used and chose 
instead to focus on measuring the quality of the consultation exercises. For this 
purpose, a number of categories for ranking consultation were developed by 
management and the forum, including: the timing of consultation, provision of 
adequate information, value added in terms of ideas taken on board, and provision of 
feedback by management. Effective consultation took place in 56% of all exercises. In 
20 consultations the level of the forum's involvement was measured at around 4 
points out of 11. According to management, the nature of these consultations - mainly 
organizational policies - did not allow the development of `real consultation': while 
the forum was involved at an early stage the process was described as mostly 
information provision. Consultation in the other 20 cases, with the exclusion of two 
issues where the forum was not consulted, was measured at around 8 out of 11 as the 
forum was involved at a relatively early stage and had an influence on management 
decisions. 
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6.1.2 Internal ICE arrangements 
The communication structures were radial. The central figure was the management- 
appointed full-time coordinator, who was given instructions by the management chair. 
This was reflected by the absence of infrastructural support to the ERs so as to 
organize meetings independent of management and the fact the management chair 
was the main contact between the forum and HR and senior management. The co- 
ordination and distribution of responses from consultation exercises to ERs were dealt 
with either by the forum coordinator in cases of UK-wide exercises or by the BA 
(Business Area) chairs in the case of local consultations. General communication 
between the BA chairs and ERs was reported, such as in the case of the election of the 
next chair of the forum. The BA chairs had monthly meetings and feedback was then 
provided to the rest of ERs. Similarly, they took issues from ERs in case there were 
specific issues for discussion and they provided feedback to the ERs. The co- 
ordination of the forum activities was considered by the chair of the forum 
particularly significant in light of the pressure across all the business areas and the 
limited time-off facilities for ERs to perform their roles. A number of work streams, 
managed by the forum chair, operated on issues such as the election of the forum 
chair, the retirement age consultation and the training offered to new ERs. While 
communication and feedback between ERs was very common at the initial set up of 
the forum, representatives stressed that this settled down in the following months and 
there was limited evidence that ERs developed their own procedures for information 
exchange, for agreeing and for coordinating interests among themselves. 
The existence of a diverse group of employees with varying experience in 
consultation and exposure to senior management was considered as beneficial by both 
management and ERs. The representation of senior management by four ERs was 
particularly viewed by management as contributing to the leverage of employee 
interests in the forum. In terms of cohesion, concerns were expressed by non-union 
ERs regarding potential differences of opinion between themselves and union ERs, 
especially when representing a common constituency. While instances of 
disagreement between ERs were mentioned, these were described as a 'healthy two- 
way communication' by both management and ERs. 
6.1.3 ICE arrangements and employees 
Particular emphasis was put by management on the need for the forum not to be seen 
as a `corporate mouthpiece'. Accordingly, management felt that the provisions for a 
full-time coordinator and forum chair contributed to an increased level of physical 
manifestation and visibility of the forum. The need for ERs to forge relationships with 
their constituents, e. g. through feedback mechanisms in consultation exercises, was 
also considered important. However, the interaction of the forum with employees was 
limited. For example, the absence of minutes meant the inability of the forum to 
communicate the outcomes to employees. While the 
intranet was used to promoting 
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its launch, ERs emphasized the constraining impact of the confidential nature of the 
issues dealt with later, such as restructuring, on the dissemination of results to the 
workforce. Further, email communication by the ERs to their constituents was 
prohibited on the basis of data protection issues and concerns were expressed 
particularly by ERs representing larger constituencies that covered disparate areas. 
Each representative had a clearly defined constituency of between 40 and 300 
employees. ERs reported in many cases limited time-off facilities with the workforce, 
especially in larger constituencies. Importantly, evidence of lack of intention on the 
part of some ERs to interact independent of management with their constituents due 
to concerns over potential division and confidentiality was reported by ERs. 
The absence of workforce interaction had, in turn, significant repercussions for the 
ability of the ERs to consult adequately their constituents and receive feedback, 
limiting the extent to which the forum could accurately represent workforce's 
interests. Concerns were expressed by both management and ERs regarding the 
limited potential for the development of a two-way dialogue between the forum and 
the employees. Employee apathy in certain constituencies was attributed to the lack of 
the forum's visibility and the absence of interest in employee representation. In the 
view of ERs, there were only two instances where they managed to raise the level of 
employee awareness. The first concerned the process for the launch of the forum in 
2005 and the second involved a consultation held with employees about the 
refurbishment of one of the canteens. In the view of ERs, the latter constituted a 
`symbolic activity' that acted not only as a means to raise awareness of the forum but 
also as a means to highlight its ability to represent employee interests and, more 
importantly, the ability to deliver. 
6.1.4 ICE arrangements and trade unions 
In the views of management and union representatives alike the introduction of the 
forum did not impact on the nature and scope of the collective agreement. Concerning 
the process for dealing with issues that affected both unionized and non-unionized 
employees, the ER manager explained: 
`What I do is I consult with the forum first, bearing in mind that I am often talking 
to the same people in both, because there are union representatives in the forum 
so they know precisely what I am up to because they are at both meetings and it's 
all open. So I consult with the forum first, and it might be an hour or two or the 
day before, it's on the basis of I am purely consulting with you, I make it clear 
that I need to negotiate with the union about this, but in order for the company to 
reach a negotiating position to take then to the union I want to understand what 
the forum thinks about it and that will help inform my thinking which I then take 
and negotiate with the union. ' (ER manager) 
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Management was positive that the involvement of the same union representatives in 
both structures brought an alignment of interests and as a result both discussions went 
in a positive direction. For instance, two ERs engaged in the consultation about 
changes to flexible working patterns were also union representatives and the manager 
responsible held that the outcome was acceptable to all parties. In re-organization 
exercises that involved collective redundancies, statutory consultation took place with 
both the union, where recognized, and the forum, albeit under separate channels. 
According to a union official, the nature of the issues influenced significantly the 
approach developed for the discussions held with the forum and the union: 
`Some things like the refurbishment of the [site] canteen were dealt with by the 
forum and the company did not speak to the union on this. And then I think on 
some of the bigger issues they've spoken to us first and then spoken to the UK 
forum. But on some of the even still bigger issues what they seem to do, which is 
the way we want it in many ways, is they speak to us, they will inform the UK 
forum rather than negotiate and consult, and then they will come back to us and 
we will go through any proper consultation and negotiation. ' (Full-time union 
representative) 
There was evidence that the union promoted the nomination of union representatives 
to participate in the forum. For instance, in their communication to their constituents 
during the 2004 forum election the experience of union representatives in dealing with 
management and their skills in consultation and negotiation were highlighted. 
However, the distinction between the capacity of the forum and the union was also 
clearly emphasized. This rested on issues such as the level of support on all 
employment issues, e. g. difference of the level of resources available to the union and 
the forum; the secured independence of the union in contrast to the inability of the 
forum to campaign, take legal action or industrial action as a last resort; the right of 
negotiation that the union enjoyed while the forum was only limited to consultation; 
the statutory rights coming with union recognition, e. g. TUPE and health and safety 
rights; the provision of independent training to the union representatives and; the 
response to the challenges of the finance industry, e. g. offshoring, where reportedly 
such forums `cannot really fight - they can only consult' (union communication). 
Evidence of positive impact of the operation of the forum on the union was reported. 
For example, the full-time union representative highlighted the potential for the union 
to be informed through the forum of issues about areas not covered by the collective 
agreement. In terms of other advantages for the union from the operation of the 
forum, it was suggested that owing to the approach adopted by the union the latter 
picked up some members in areas where it did not have recognition. 
Attempts to transfer knowledge and information between the union and the forum 
were also reported by both sides. For instance, non-union ERs stressed that in certain 
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cases, e. g. in constituencies where vocal senior union representatives existed, they 
tended to invite them along in the ad-hoc forum meetings. They also emphasized that 
the fact that the same people were sitting on both groups could create synergies in 
terms of cooperating in certain issues and achieving alignment where differences 
between the two existed. This view was shared by union ERs, who also stressed their 
ability to contribute substantially to the operation of the forum due to their greater 
training and experience in employee representation. However, tensions reportedly 
existed between collective bargaining and the union's sphere of influence and the 
recently established forum, where the latter could attempt to encroach on the former. 
For instance, tension between non-union ERs and the union was reported regarding 
the impact of the lack of transparency regarding developments in the discussions 
between management and the union on employee interests on an organizational-wide 
scale. ERs questioned the priority of the union in consultation exercises and were 
wary of the potential impact of the pay negotiations with the union on the remit of 
consultation within the forum, e. g. limiting potentially the ability of the forum to 
expand the consultation scope to the issue of bonuses. Interestingly, non-union ERs in 
the non-union site also stressed that they were careful not to be seen in `too close 
company with the union' as this would possibly endanger the relationship of the 
forum with management. 
6.1.5 Case study summary 
As evidenced from the analysis, whilst a level of interaction existed between 
management and the employee-side arrangements, provision of information and 
conduct of consultation could be described as rather poor. For the most part, ERs were 
passive and allowed management to determine the course of joint meetings. Nor was 
the forum in a position or willing to obtain and work with information and feedback 
from the workforce. Finally, although the forum was formally recognized by the 
recognized union, the level of informal support between the two was not significant. 
6.2 Fing 
6.2.1 ICE arrangements and management 
Scope to operate 
A budget was allocated to the forum. Subject to the prior approval of the CEO as the 
forum's chair, the budget covered the full-time representatives' salaries, costs of 
training and development, equipment, membership of professional organizations, 
travel, stationery and printing expenses. Further, ERs benefited from training 
provided by in-house lawyers, solicitors and external consultants in health and safety, 
employment law, managing change, disciplinary procedures and performance 
reviews, and balloting services. Since July 2003, responsibility for training 
representatives has belonged to the forum's employee chair. This enabled ERs to be 
trained by a variety of trainers from different sources, through which they reportedly 
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acquired a sense of independence. ERs also stressed the importance of developing 
networks with organizations where similar arrangements operated and the IPA for the 
purpose of advice and guidance. Their `professional' stance was positively 
commented upon by the HR management, who claimed that they were in a better 
position to understand the organizational culture than trade unions. 
Concerning time-off, part-time ERs had around four hours per week to perform their 
forum duties and there were reportedly no challenges regarding the allocation of time- 
off. At formal meetings the agenda was shaped by both management and the 
employee chair after consulting with the ERs. The forum meetings were jointly 
chaired by the CEO and the employee chairperson. Secretarial support was provided 
by the other full-time representatives. The management chair, the employee chair and 
the secretary were responsible for arranging formal meetings and providing an agreed 
agenda. The employee chair also had responsibility for agreeing with the CEO an 
annual work programme for the forum as well as any structural or procedural changes 
to the way in which it operated. There were no reported problems on the distribution 
of material before meetings. Minutes were agreed between the management and the 
employee-side jointly and were then distributed in the form of communique to the 
workforce. 
Scope to participate 
The forum was informed on a regular basis on business, operational and employment 
issues. ERs reported that the CEO shared with them information on all aspects of the 
organization's operations, including information that could be deemed as confidential. 
For instance, in 2004, the then majority owner of Fin2 was considering selling the 
business. The forum was brought in as soon as the CEO became aware of the issue 
and in two days a communique was distributed to the workforce. Information 
exchange also took place through informal and flexible ways, such as through ERs 
participating in team meetings and maintaining regular contact with the HR and 
communication teams. 
Since the amendment of the agreement in July 2003, the forum, with the crucial 
support of the CEO and the development of a partnership relationship with the advice 
of the IPA, attempted to acquire strategic influence over individual and collective 
workplace issues. Issues where the forum was involved in collective consultation 
included: changes in shift patterns, flexible working, home computing, a new 
employee assistance programme, career development and departmental restructuring. 
The forum also functioned as Health and Safety Committee. ERs were also consulted 
on pay, reward and pension issues, relating to both salary and additional benefits. 
Involvement in discussions regarding organizational policy was also reported; issues 
included: mobile telephone use, the application of the working time directive, 
holidays, anti-bribery and flexible working. 
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Despite having a formal consultation process in place, ERs preferred operating in a 
more informal and flexible manner. The forum acted as a task-group on a range of 
issues at any one time and dealt directly with the departments concerned. For 
example, in the case of the introduction of flexible shift patterns, conversations 
directly with the department highlighted specific issues that would be significant 
when implementing the new policy. The interaction of the forum with middle 
management led reportedly to a greater willingness on the part of managers to work 
together with ERs as `business partners' and respect their opinions. The ERs also 
worked closely with the HR department as `a matter of good practice' and cooperated 
on a day-to-day basis on issues such as policy development and strategic issues. The 
balance between formality and informality in the consultation was attributable by 
both parties to the lack of established history or culture of management-employee 
relations. 
A so-called `option-based consultation process' was adopted and included the 
following stages: business objectives are identified at the level of strategy and policy 
development. Management identifies different options, which are shared with ERs 
well in advance of any meeting. Consultation starts before a decision is made: options 
are examined; ERs share views and offer alternatives; managers take views and 
options on board, responding directly or promising to provide a fuller response at a 
later date; ERs have a genuine opportunity to influence the outcome. Management 
then consults informally and identifies further options, based on the action points 
derived above. Then the final decision is made by management and ERs are given a 
reasoned justification for the final decision, including why other alternatives were 
rejected. Following this, consultation over communication ensures that confidentiality 
remains intact and that all staff receive the same information. ERs and management 
noted that the consultation process provided an adequate framework for employee 
representation. Whilst it was recognized that responsibility for decision-making lay 
with management, the forum's role was to challenge and question decision-making. 
The ERs saw themselves as `business partners' in consultation and stressed that in 
order to be able to influence decision-making it was important to use an approach 
similar to that of management. Management also recognized that the forum was 
aligned with the objectives of the organization and it had assisted in strengthening the 
need for workplace changes, such as in the changes on shift patterns. 
Regarding the timing of consultation, earlier consultation took place overall since the 
amendment of the forum in 2003, especially in restructuring. For example, two major 
cases of restructuring took place in the IT department; one in February 2003 and one 
in March 2005. In the first instance, which involved 100 collective redundancies, the 
forum was only given 24-hours notice in advance of the public announcement of the 
redundancies. The consultation process was characterized as `an absolute disaster. 
Management just gathered the people in the room where they were told of the 
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developments' and ERs felt that their role was essentially confined to supporting the 
people affected. Negative repercussions in terms of employee morale levels and the 
organizational culture were later observed. Prompted by this experience the forum 
was informed three months in advance about the possibility of 55 redundancies in the 
IT department in March 2005. ERs were involved in the definition and application of 
the selection criteria and drew plans for the redeployment of employees. Only 9 
employees finally left Fin2 through the application of a voluntary redundancy scheme 
agreed between management and the forum. ERs felt that their early involvement 
increased the opportunities to ensure the transparency of the process, to challenge the 
business rationale through different options, e. g. redeployment, and finally to 
influence the outcome of management decisions. 
Importantly, the forum represented individuals on a range of issues including: 
performance management, general support and guidance, organizational processes, 
disciplinary issues, sickness reviews, child-care, medical issues, and redundancy 
hearings. At the request of management, ERs also represented individual employees 
over pay determination; their role was to support direct communication and 
consultation between individuals and their line management rather than `act as a go 
between'. ERs were usually present at disciplinary hearings and sickness review 
meetings and offered impartial and informal advice to employees and managers on 
individual and collective issues. In the view of management, the involvement of the 
forum in the proceedings on individual issues contributed to `rounded, more objective 
and informed decisions. ' 
Impact on management decision-making 
Management suggested that the forum was in a strong place to influence the 
organization. The importance of the CEO's support was seen as critical to the capacity 
of the forum to integrate employee interests in management decision-making: 
`He [CEO] went for them [the ERs], he recognizes the value they add, he listens 
to them, he values their contribution, and so the support is there from the top. And 
basically, he will bring them into any very initial changes in business 
management, he will bring them in very early on and he will listen to them. ' (HR 
manager) 
An impact of the forum on the substance of management decision-making was 
reported in a number of cases. For example, regarding proposed changes to the 
employee bonus scheme an agreement was reached whereby employees could choose 
whether to have their bonus paid in cash, child-care vouchers or into a pension fund. 
Further, concerning the retention bonuses (£1,000) that CEO decided to give to 
employees when the majority owner contemplated selling it, the forum worked with 
the HR and reward teams and arranged for vouchers or contributions to pensions to be 
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given so as to avoid tax charges. In 2004, the forum assisted in the redefinition of 
policies regarding the conduct of interviews and disciplinary sessions and all the 
forum's suggestions were implemented by management. Finally, in a matter which 
involved management closing down the on-line warehouse, consultation resulted in 
the redeployment of the employees affected. The input of the forum was 
acknowledged by the communications' manager: 
`The benefits for having the forum are that they are involved in the projects; 
decision-making has become faster. The forum is independent and apolitical and 
represents Fin2 employees efficiently. Through the forum employees are also 
happier and the shareholders benefits due to lower attrition costs. Customers 
have happier experience, which considering the competitiveness of the financial 
sector is very important for Fing. ' 
6.2.2 Internal ICE arrangements 
Each site was required to maintain a minimum of two representatives. In the view of 
ERs, the internal communication links operated very well. Despite operating in 
geographically dispersed locations the interaction between the part-time and full-time 
ERs was frequent and regular. The employee chair also kept regular communication 
with the other ERs through weekly emails, phone and visits to the other sites. While 
being a full-time ER was recognized as not being very good for individual career 
prospects, the benefits of having full-time posts were reportedly significant for the 
operation of the forum. These included the full commitment of the ERs, increased 
flexibility, the possibility for additional research, training, relationship building and 
earlier consultation in management decision-making. Both full time and part time 
representatives had defined job profiles and had key accountabilities that were 
performance managed. Part-time representatives had a primary role in allocating time 
to meet with the employees in their constituencies, while the full-time representatives 
were responsible for raising general awareness about the forum at the different sites. 
However, a challenge that was identified was the limited involvement of the part-time 
ERs. Full-time ERs were involved naturally more in consultation exercises, 
particularly regarding strategic issues, and part-timers were concerned that in some 
cases they were by-passed. Increased emphasis was also given by the ERs to the 
importance of developing and maintaining links with other organizations where 
consultative forums existed. ERs believed that such activity assisted in acquiring a 
level of independence and autonomy from management that could be appreciated by 
the workforce. Substantial cohesion among ERs was also reported by both ERs and 
management. Whilst ERs represented different bands and locations, the regular 
interaction and the development of internal procedures between ERs had positive 
impact on the cohesiveness of the employee-side to agree on common action, define 
and implement projects as a body and deliver agreed opinions to management. 
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6.2.3 ICE arrangements and employees 
Constituencies were divided according to site, and ERs retained a wide remit of 
activities and responsibilities in the sites. All were involved in presentations to new- 
starters about the forum as part of employee induction and took part in monthly `open 
house' sessions. The forum's identity was also promoted by ERs' wearing brightly 
coloured uniforms, the use of the forum's letter-headings, communicating via the 
forum's intranet and adopting an immediately accessible location in Fin2's sites. The 
forum's desks were strategically located in the entrance of the building. ERs did not 
only rely on the use of modern technology, such as email, telephone, intranet, use of 
display boards and plasma screens at the workplace, to communicate with the 
workforce. More informal ways, such as monthly open-house sessions, `desk drops', 
`walk-about', and team meetings were utilized so as to maintain the liaison with their 
constituents and to canvass their opinion regularly. ERs also worked with the 
corporate communication team in a number of instances such as in assessing the 
results from the employee surveys and in advising senior management about how and 
when communications regarding restructuring should be addressed to employees. ERs 
were then available to employees, particularly where jobs were affected, to provide 
support and advice. 
Evidence of the visibility of the forum to employees was provided in the employee 
surveys. In October 2004, the percentage of employees who understood the forum's 
values and role stood at 60%, and 50% knew how the forum could support them. In 
September 2005, the percentages had increased to 83% and 77% respectively. A high 
employee turnout was also reported in the forum elections. The importance of dealing 
with individual issues was stressed by ERs, who believed that otherwise the forum 
would run the risk of being seen as `management' by employees. However, the 
operation of the confidentiality provisions prohibited the forum from demonstrating 
its involvement in individual issues to the workforce, damaged its legitimacy. 
Evidence that the ERs were seen in some cases as an adjunct of management when 
they advocated unpopular decisions was provided. For instance, in the case of changes 
on call arrangements in the call centre, while the issue was initially a subject for direct 
ICE methods the ERs got involved in the process and supported the management 
proposals as they were perceived as beneficial for employees. Due to the impact of 
the new policies on shifts and pay the forum's stance angered a number of employees. 
ERs recognized that in hindsight their involvement was a mistake and that it 
compromised the independence of the forum. Interestingly, the lesson learnt from this 
case for ERs was that whilst the forum should be free to represent individual concerns 
it should also allow management to make the final decisions. 
6.2.4 ICE arrangements and trade unions 
While Fin2 did not recognize any trade unions, it is useful to examine briefly the role 
of the forum in rebuffing union recruitment activity. Formal and 
informal discussions 
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on the issue were held with the participation of the forum in 2001 and 2002. At the 
end of the discussions ERs stated that `we have no objection in principle in allowing 
the union to make representation to Fin2 employees'. In the view of ERs, the question 
was not whether the union should be allowed to talk to employees. It was rather 
whether they could add any value to supporting the workforce by working with the 
forum. Fin2 and the union were then to continue the dialogue as Fin2 would make the 
final decision. The forum started at that time to transform into a more influential 
voice. The union did not then contact Fin2 or the forum for a number of months. 
A presentation took place by the union towards the end of 2004. However, by this 
time the forum had undergone re-elections and the HR personnel had changed 
significantly. Changes in personnel had taken place in the union as well. The forum 
felt that the new ERs needed to review the previous statement of the forum as the 
original ERs were no longer there. Fin2 requested the forum's opinion on this before 
making any final decision. The ERs talked to their business areas and consulted the 
workforce. The feedback from the employees was that unions were not required in 
Fin2. When this conclusion was communicated, Fin2 made the final decision and 
informed the union that the forum would continue to be Fin2's recognized 
consultation body and the union's services would not be required. The change in the 
forum's approach to endorsing the union's calls for union representation was arguably 
attributed to the substantial changes that had taken place with regard to the role of the 
forum in Fin2, the significant support to the forum's work by the CEO and the sense 
of independence that the ERs had acquired as a result of their affiliation to the IPA. 
6.2.5 Case study summary 
There was satisfactory provision of information with active forum participation that 
extended to consultation on a wide range of issues. Employee-side organization was 
strong and sufficiently cohesive to define and implement projects as a body. It sought 
to consolidate the autonomy of the forum and build a sustained capacity to engage 
successfully in consultation with management. Regular interaction between the forum 
and the workforce took place but the forum rejected union attempts to gain 
recognition in the organization. 
6.3 BS1 
6.3.1 ICE arrangements and management 
Scope to operate 
All ERs were provided with training on the remit of the forum and the distinction 
between consultation and negotiation when the forum was established. Whilst useful, 
ERs stressed that the provision of additional training and access to experts, 
concerning especially the development of their role and their adequacy 
in dealing with 
complex information, could enhance further their capabilities. 
ERs were given time to 
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attend the forum meetings and were entitled to reasonable time to obtain feedback 
from employees within their constituency. However, they saw their role as `tagged on 
to their normal duties' and raised concerns over the possible adverse effects of limited 
time-off on their performance. The fact that the amount of time spent on forum work 
was not quantified either in the agreement or in practice caused further uncertainty 
among ERs, especially those representing a large number of constituents, regarding 
the division of time between the forum and their work. 
Management was responsible for preparing the agenda and sending it to ERs. At the 
first meeting it was agreed to structure future meetings around a standard agenda: 
business performance, organizational and people issues. These were subsequently 
divided into further sub-sections, whose substance varied depending on the time of 
the year and developments in the organization. ERs could add issues and specific 
questions for discussion with management during the meetings. The agenda was then 
published on the intranet so that employees could become aware of and give 
feedback. The process of drafting the agenda allowed ERs to familiarize themselves 
with the issues and to prepare for the discussions. However, as recognized by both 
management and ERs, the agenda was predominantly management-led. As a result of 
the recent establishment of the forum, ERs felt that they were still finding their feet' 
regarding the issues that they could bring to the forum. The lack of interaction 
between the ERs themselves and between them and their constituents were also 
identified as reasons for the absence of significant input into the agenda. Despite the 
top-down approach to agenda setting, ERs still saw an improvement on the number of 
issues brought and the discussions held between them and management over the 
course of the meetings. 
However, cases of excluding items proposed by ERs were mentioned. For instance, 
despite requesting the inclusion of annual leave and flexible working issues on the 
agenda, these were excluded and no reasoned management response was provided. 
There was also limited evidence of management providing documents to ERs before 
the meetings. In terms of the minutes from the meetings, it was the management 
coordinator's duty to takes note during the meetings. These were then written up and 
after review by the COO and any other senior managers present at the meeting they 
were sent to ERs. The latter ensured that the document reflected accurately the 
substance of the meeting and the minutes were finally published on the intranet by the 
management coordinator. 
Scope to participate 
The forum met three times per year. The meetings normally lasted about half a day, 
depending on the number of topics on the agenda. A considerable amount of 
information was provided about the business and financial performance. The COO's 
starting premise was that management would share all the information with the ERs 
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with the exception of information that was not shared with the City and the Stock 
Exchange. In practice, management identified beforehand the information that should 
not be divulged to anybody outside the forum. In cases where management and ERs 
agreed on the confidential nature of an issue, the COO prepared a short note, which 
provided guidelines as to how ERs should respond to their constituents in case 
relevant issues were raised. There was general satisfaction with the practice developed 
and management attitude regarding the dissemination of information was regarded as 
considerably open. 
Examples where management shared information included the organization's future, 
customer satisfaction reviews, new business updates and future plans, and 
developments in information systems projects. Information was also provided 
regarding organizational issues, such as commercial strategy and service delivery. In 
terms of employment issues, information on the employee surveys, training 
initiatives, legislative developments, and staff conferences was provided. In light of 
the significant number of new contracts ERs stressed the need for provision of greater 
and earlier information on the future business and employment plans. Further, in their 
views, information concerning restructuring, the potential for job losses and the 
application of the legislation regarding transfers of undertakings was provided in 
some but not all instances. 
While the forum was supported by the HR department it was considered important 
that its operation should be seen as driven by senior management. Management and 
ERs stressed that the participation of senior management, such as the COO, the HR 
Director and other board-level managers in the meetings illustrated the serious 
management commitment to the forum, added credibility to the forum and allowed 
the discussion to extend to more important issues. While rejecting the notion of 
`consultation with a view to reaching an agreement' and entering into consultation on 
issues that affected fewer than 20 employees, the COO stressed that management was 
interested in examining the ER proposals and in giving a reasoned response in cases 
where management decided to act otherwise: 
`Because it is not a negotiating forum, I do not discuss things with them with a 
view to reaching an agreement. It is a consultation forum, saying what is 
happening. Now, equally they express views and thought, and actually, in a large 
part we can agree with these. '(COO) 
Consultation took place over some issues. For instance, in the case of the employee 
surveys, ERs were asked to suggest ways of retaining the positive results and 
improving areas where employee morale was low. The forum's feedback was then fed 
into the lower-level departmental forums. Evidence of consultation with employees at 
the instigation of middle-level management was also provided. For example, in the 
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case of the annual employee road shows the manager responsible involved the forum 
in the organization of the events: ERs invited employees to join focus groups and 
contacted their constituents so as to find out their preferences regarding the 
organization of the event. The feedback received was then submitted to management, 
which was taken into account in the final decision. However, consultation on such 
issues was generally confined to management presenting proposals and ERs 
responding to the proposals during the same meeting. 
While the issue of collective redundancies was not in the remit of the forum, ERs 
seemed keen to bring this issue up for discussion. For example, in a case that involved 
making redundant 30 posts, the forum was not involved at all in the process. Despite 
management resistance to enter into consultation some ERs seemed determined to 
promote such issues for discussion: 
`I do not think we are going to give up just because they are not in the remit ... I 
think that we should discuss issues of redundancies, maybe if there are major 
health and safety issues, major business continuity issues or changes in 
employees' working, transparency in pay scales, changes in terms and conditions. 
I think those are important because they do impact upon people. ' (ER) 
Overall, information provision rather than consultation took place. Management 
noted that it was 70% information provision and 30% consultation and explained that 
this was a result of the absence of items brought up by the employee side. The view 
that the forum was primarily a means for dissemination of management information 
to employees was shared by ERs who felt that they did not have the chance to feed in 
more about what was going on the ground to management. The lack of consultation 
was attributed by ERs to the need for it to take place at an earlier stage of decision 
making and for further development of trust between management and ERs that 
would then induce the expansion of the consultative scope. The limited number of 
forum meetings in conjunction with the significant amount of information provided 
seemed to inhibit further the development of greater dialogue between the ERs and 
management during the meetings. In terms of the balance of objectives an ER noted: 
`While the forum is an excellent progression for the employees and the company it 
is very company-based. It is more about what the employer wants than what the 
employees want. I know why it is like this. Well we are not a trade union, whereas 
a trade union is all about what the employee wants and not the employer, so it is 
restricted to that. ' 
Impact on management decision-making 
Both management and the ERs felt confident that on issues, such as the road shows, 
full consultation had taken place and suggestions regarding the substance of some of 
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the proposals and their implementation were taken into account by management. 
Regarding the impact of the forum on the process of management decision-making, 
the COO noted that although the forum was still evolving, there had been an 
intervention in the senior management decision-making process. This was evident in 
the Group-level board meetings where issues under discussion were considered by the 
COO and the BSI HR Director as matters where the forum could get involved. 
However, it was also noted that due to the time-sensitive nature of some management 
decisions and the lack of provision for ad hoc forum meetings, decisions were 
knowingly taken without the involvement of the forum. 
As suggested above, the general feeling of ERs was that the outcome was just a 
greater degree of communication to employees. In operational issues, ERs believed 
that the potential for influence on these issues was limited to specific elements of 
the management proposals so as to attain more efficient implementation and not on 
the substance of the proposals. In terms of issues related more directly to the 
workforce, the limited scope of the remit in conjunction with the fact that 
consultation on such issues predominantly took place at departmental level, where 
the forum did not have access at all, reduced the ability of the forum to influence the 
substance of such decisions. An ER commented: 
`I do think the majority of the forum is really about us receiving information, it is 
not really about consultation. I think it is receiving information about what is 
going to happen, what they have decided is going to happen, as opposed to us 
having major influence, any particular strong influence on them ... 
So I think we 
are fairly toothless as we can just report back to people about what is going on. 
And the main reason for this is the limited scope of the forum... So in a way, if 
that's what the directive is saying, that it should be a forum for influence, a forum 
for consultation, then I do not feel that is what it is. ' 
6.3.2 Internal ICE arrangements 
ERs were complemented by deputies who were equally involved in the first stages of 
the development of the forum. Despite the right of ERs to elect a coordinator as the 
primary interface between the management team and ERs on matters to do with the 
administration of the forum, they had not done so. The importance of the pre-forum 
meetings was stressed and ERs noted that these allowed them to discuss developments 
and to present more coherent arguments in the forum meetings. However, it was 
regarded as better if the pre-meetings could be arranged two weeks before the forum 
meetings. Whilst email and phone facilities were provided for the development of 
procedures for information exchange, for agreeing and coordinating interests, 
communication between the ERs was essentially confined to the pre-forum and 
forum 
meetings. 
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Further, there were no informal contacts based on mutual forum membership. 
Plausible reasons for the absence of internal structures were the ERs' confusion and 
uncertainty regarding the nature of their role and the nature and frequency of forum 
meetings. The main reason cited for the uncertainty was the constrained remit of the 
forum, which did not provide them with opportunities to deal with collective issues. 
In line with the absence of a recognized union and low union membership in the 
sector there were no union members elected as ERs. Relations between the ERs were 
generally described as open. There were no reported differences and divisions 
between ERs representing different groups of employees. Nonetheless, the level of 
cohesion of the ERs' team must be read within the context of the absence of informal 
contacts, which limited the degree of cohesion which had been achieved. 
6.3.3 ICE arrangements and employees 
On average, the number of employees that each ER represented was 60-80; however, 
problems were reported concerning the lack of coverage of outsourced employees. 
The opportunity for employees to raise their concerns before meetings and then being 
informed of the outcome of the forum discussions was seen by ERs as a key factor in 
achieving a level of legitimacy. When the forum was established ERs embarked on 
presentations to the workforce that covered matters such as the remit of the forum and 
the methods of communication. A forum section was included in the intranet, which 
gave information on the forum's structure, future agenda items and agreed minutes. 
Employee feedback was provided via phone and email. 
Whilst management at all levels were generally supportive of ERs communicating 
with their constituents there were concerns that employees were not aware of the 
forum. In most of the cases, it was only at the ERs' initiative that they actually 
received feedback from employees. Within this context, consultation exercises with 
employees such as the annual employee road shows were considered beneficial for the 
visibility of the forum. There was initially no provision of facilities for surgeries or 
meetings with employees. Weekly surgeries later took place in some sites and ERs 
also attended regional meetings. Both were considered useful for the dissemination of 
key forum messages. However, ERs felt that due to the limited remit of the forum and 
the operation of the confidentiality agreement they were not able to discuss with their 
constituents a number of issues. Instances of employee dissatisfaction with the forum 
when ERs declined to report such issues to the workforce were reported. The issue of 
misunderstanding by employees of the role of the forum was highlighted by some 
ERs; employees tended to perceive the forum's role as akin to that of a trade union. 
For instance, during forum briefings items were raised by employees on topics which 
were clearly not within the scope of the forum, such as terms and conditions and 
pensions. An ER even described the outcome of the operation of the forum as 
negative for employees and justified this view on the higher expectations of 
employees and the actually restricted remit of the forum. 
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6.3.4 Case study summary 
Although established the forum's scope to operate and participate was significantly 
constrained. While the level of information provision was considerable instances of 
consultation were limited and activities were confined to meetings with management. 
The limited facilities provided for were not used by ERs to build internal capacity and 
cohesion. Nor was the forum in a position to engage with the workforce and to take 
action above and beyond what was stipulated in the ICE agreement. 
6.4 BS2 
6.4.1 ICE arrangements and management 
Scope to operate 
Training was provided to all ERs during the establishment of the forum and an 
additional session was held when the ICER were introduced. Concerns were raised as 
to the independence of the external organization providing the training and the lack of 
training on management conflict and negotiation. ERs also emphasized the significant 
challenges in combining their duties at work with the role as ERs. The limited time- 
off was due to work requirements and not necessarily the lack of management support 
for the performance of their duties. However, in some cases managers did not wish to 
allocate more time to ERs. This was evident in the case of ERs representing lower 
occupational roles, and those in operational roles or who had clients as their direct 
managers. An ER resigned from her post and other ERs missed several forum 
meetings because of work commitments. 
At the initial stages, the agenda was mainly dictated by management with the ERs 
adopting a re-active approach. Over time, the ERs developed a more proactive stance 
and challenged the agenda topics. An ER described the drafting of the agenda as 
`collaborative on both sides but with equal input. ' However, there was still evidence 
of management apprehension. For instance, it was only at the ERs' insistence that 
management decided to include the feedback received from the consultation with the 
workforce on salary review. The agenda was usually finalized a week in advance and 
included a number of matters for which documentation was needed, but ERs 
complained that they did not receive the documents in advance and felt they had 
insufficient time to digest the information, let alone discuss as a group and agree on 
an approach. In response, ERs tended to put off the issues until the next meeting so as 
to read the relevant documents. 
There was an agreement to increase the number of regular meetings from four to six 
per year and, by the end of 2005, to eleven. ERs were responsible for drafting the 
minutes and distributing them to the forum members for approval. A communication 
was prepared by the ERs' team, which was then available to the employees on the 
intranet. Instances of management refusing to include specific topics for publication 
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on the intranet were reported. In the case of the salary review, for instance, 
management successfully objected to the publication of the strong negative employee 
feedback. ERs strongly criticized management's refusal and felt that this came close 
to censorship. 
Scope to participate 
Twice a year the CEO informed the forum on the current finance and business 
situation, future prospects and the strategic direction of BS2. While in the view of 
ERs the provision of information was generally satisfactory they did not receive the 
information beforehand and were unable to comment and pose any questions to 
management. Information was also regularly provided during the normal forum 
meetings. An expansion of information topics was reported by the ERs and it was 
seen as significant in terms of both indicating management's appreciation for the ERs' 
views and allowing them to prepare for the consultation stage. The signing of 
confidentiality and insider-dealing agreements facilitated the provision of more 
detailed information on business and financial issues and items that were considered 
by management as confidential were clearly defined in the forum meetings. 
During its early stages the forum was more involved in `tea and toilet' issues. For 
instance, a decision to reduce the hot meal service at BS2 sites introduced before the 
forum was launched, was overturned thanks to the forum's efforts. Concerning the 
general quality of consultation, an ER remarked it was a case of `consultation with a 
view to getting the forum 's agreement, which is not the same as with a view to 
agreeing'. ERs attempted to expand the scope of the forum and develop a fully- 
fledged consultative function, particularly on pay and reward issues. The initial 
exclusion of these issues from the scope of the forum was met with concern by ERs, 
who were determined to pursue the issue. Following the demonstration to 
management of the value of the forum in communications and in understanding 
employees' perceptions they were able to persuade management to include them in 
the discussions over the annual business cycle. Hence, the forum became involved in 
mid-2005 on aspects of pay and bonuses with particular emphasis on the maintenance 
of transparency, planning of pay and bonuses and communication of related decisions 
to the workforce and influence over the distribution of the reward pot was reported. 
Further, the ERs played a significant role in changes regarding the so-called `market- 
place salaries', a concept introduced as a result of the different terms and conditions 
and benefits in BS2. Precipitated by the lack of employee awareness on the criteria 
utilized, ERs suggested specific means for the measurement of the values included in 
the marketplace salaries and insisted that management should write to every employee 
informing them of their actual and nominal salaries. Whilst the concept was 
reportedly intrinsically bound up with BS2's history of TUPE transfers, management 
agreed to the need for transparency and 
decided to inform employees on how their 
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marketplace salary was made up, and how they were planning on completing the 
salary review process. During mid-2005 ERs collated a significant amount of 
workforce opinion on the salary review process and its outcomes for employees. The 
employee feedback was received in two `waves'. The first wave was stimulated by the 
communication of details regarding marketplace salaries. The second larger wave 
came when the actual impact of marketplace salaries and the salary review process on 
employees became clear. They key message from the employee feedback was that 
whereas the principles of marketplace salary and review process were generally well 
received, the management guidelines were seen by employees as setting the wrong 
expectations and were not always seen to have been fairly applied. ERs noted their 
significant dissatisfaction with the bad management communication and the lack of 
intention to increase actual salaries so as to reflect the market-place salary level and 
the increased performance. 
Another example of the greater involvement of the forum was its inclusion in 
discussion of the so-called `bench process', that involved employees who had recently 
finished working on assignments, waiting `on the bench' until a new assignment was 
available. An ER described the process as `a clock that starts ticking and is unspoken 
a time limit on how long you can spend being on the bench before potentially you 
could be made redundant. ' The forum encouraged management to be more 
transparent about the process. Feedback on the administration of the process, such as 
earlier communication to employees so that they could start searching for a new 
assignment, was also given by the forum and it was taken into account by 
management in the final decision. Finally, while initially it was stipulated that after a 
specific number of weeks being on the bench employees would be made redundant 
this was subsequently removed. While it could be suggested that this increased the 
insecurity of employees ERs claimed that there was no evidence that the process was 
used as a mechanism for making employees redundant. In the view of the ERs, 
management was making genuine efforts to try and retrain employees and relocate 
them so as to avoid redundancies. The forum was further involved in consultation on 
a number of issues that related to organizational issues, such as career/assignment 
management, performance and absence management; and to employment issues such 
as promotion frequency, standardization of terms and conditions on promotion, 
flexible working. The salience of ERs' activity to the development of the forum's role 
was recognized by the Managing Director (MD): 
`They (ERs) are trying to push the boundaries a little bit into what I would call 
information and consultation into negotiation, and we are trying to keep the 
boundaries very much around consultation and input. ' (MD) 
While the expansion of the consultative remit was considered by ERs as significant, 
the HR Director was concerned about the move from the original terms of reference 
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and expressed a preference for rethinking the forum's remit. For example, their 
request to have access to information regarding the annual reward review was 
described as `an uneasy development for management', since it was considered as 
outside of their scope. It was also suggested that ERs pursued in some cases personal 
agendas when raising issues. In conjunction with the low success rate of the surgeries 
that ERs ran from time to time, HR management claimed that the forum did not 
always truly represent workforce interests. However, in a significant number of cases, 
management and the ERs sought consultations with the workforce on employment 
issues. Examples included the consultations held on the `employee of the year' 
scheme, the introduction of a childcare voucher, the standardization of terms and 
conditions and pensions. Based on employee feedback, ERs were then able to make 
specific suggestions to management that were all taken into account and influenced 
the substance of decision-making. 
Whilst the involvement of the forum grew substantially on some issues, its role in 
restructuring and collective redundancies was often limited. In the early operation of 
the forum, there was no involvement whatsoever in the consultation exercises held 
between management and the group of elected ERs. Later it was decided that, where 
appropriate, an ER would be included in all major redundancy processes to `ensure 
consistency of approach and that lessons would be learnt and carried forward. ' For 
instance, in a case of collective redundancies in late 2004, an ER was invited to 
participate in the discussions held between a committee consisting of three 
representatives selected from the affected group and management. As the details of 
the redundancy packages had been decided upfront there was no impact on the 
substance of the management decision as a result of intervention by the forum. 
However, the issue of communication in such instances was seen as critical by the ER 
since it influenced the number of enforced redundancies. In two further redundancies 
that were the result of outsourcing contracts, ERs `shadowed' the consultation 
exercises. Whilst consultative meetings were held reasonably early between the ad- 
hoc committee with the participation of an ER and management employees that came 
in as a result of outsourcing could not `identify' with the forum. 
Evidence of late consultation was also provided even in the period when the forum 
had significantly expanded its scope and it was pointed out that consultation took 
place when the decision was already taken by management. ERs felt that a more 
proactive stance should be followed: `We lack teeth in being able to follow some of 
those things through. ' In addition, instances of absence of involvement in 
employment issues, such as changes to maternity benefits, normal retirement age, 
changes in contractual locations, and HR policies were reported. Some ERs perceived 
that the HR approach to the forum was not always positive: `They see the forum as 
irritation that we've got to do so we'll just get on with it. 'The lack of support at other 
management levels was also stressed. In the view of the ERs, the absence of 
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attendance of senior management and the apprehensive stance of middle and HR 
management had implications for the implementation of decisions taken within the 
forum. 
Impact on management decision-making 
While the scope of the forum expanded significantly, most ERs noted that its 
influence on the substance of management decision-making was still weak. The 
capacity of the forum to influence management decision-making was summarized by 
an ER: 
`We've got an influence in terms of getting management to stop and rethink about 
the appropriateness of certain decisions. We have had quite a significant impact 
on the way in which they communicate things but in terms of influencing key 
decisions, such as do we pay a bonus this year, how much is in the pay pot, do we 
change the pensions' scheme, I do not think we have much influence. So great 
influence around the way decisions are made and the way decision are 
communicated, but no on the actual decision. ' 
The absence of sanctions was considered as an important factor determining the 
effectiveness of the forum when disagreements with management existed. Instead, the 
dependence of the forum on the power of argument was stressed: 
`When you bring something to the table, the only thing you have that you can use 
is the power of persuasion and argument, whereas obviously a union 
representative would have the ultimate sanction, to strike. ' (ER) 
A perception that the forum concentrated mostly on dealing with issues of interest to 
more senior employees and not with issues that concerned employees at lower bands, 
such as job security, was expressed by some ERs representing lower bands. The 
inability of the forum to influence the way the bonus was distributed was referred to 
as an example of this situation. In-depth discussions took place within the forum and 
an agreement was reached that the bonus should be motivational for all employees. 
However, the level of the bonus provided to each band remained unchanged, limiting, 
in the view of the ERs, the extent to which employees on lower bands would be able 
to benefit. 
6.4.2 Internal ICE arrangements 
Despite the fact that ERs were elected to represent specific bands, they tended in 
practice to consider issues irrespective of the band they represented. The presence of 
internal communication networks was evident. ERs developed informal structures and 
procedures for information exchange, for agreeing and coordinating interests and for 
dealing with issues arising during the operation of the forum. `Away days' were 
202 
organized that allowed them to develop networking activities and a common 
approach to the representation of the employees' interests. A teleconference, which 
was chaired each time by a different ER, was also held every fortnight and allowed 
ERs to discuss what needed to be included in the agenda for the forum meetings and 
delegated issues that were brought forward by employees for resolution. ERs also 
attempted to divide their responsibilities and take on specialist subjects among 
themselves. For instance, they bracketed specific issues into categories such as `my 
life after BS2', `pensions', `pay and reward' and `career management'. Each ER 
`owned' a subject and with the help of a deputy was responsible for dealing with the 
issues coming up under the category. In order to become `sharper' in dividing the 
responsibilities it was agreed to introduce an annual calendar so as to prepare for the 
consultation exercises held regularly within the forum and get involved at an earlier 
stage. 
While ERs came from diverse business divisions, this did not impact on the internal 
network; ERs also reported the absence of different interest groups. While no 
representative had a `greater voice' than the others, differences in terms of motivation 
and willingness to get things done were noted between ERs that represented lower 
bands and ERs that represented senior bands. These were solely attributed to the 
greater flexibility in terms of time off and greater confidence that ERs representing 
senior bands enjoyed. While all ERs operated on the `same wavelength' their different 
backgrounds assisted in bringing different issues to the discussion table: you've got 
the diversity so you can think of all the facets of it. ' (ER). In a similar vein, all ERs 
emphasized that whilst some were union representatives the latter had successfully 
distinguished their different roles. 
6.4.3 ICE arrangements and employees 
The number of employees represented by each ER varied, with ERs representing on 
average very large constituencies consisting of 300-400 employees. In the case of 
outsourcing contracts the workforce that came in was represented before being 
banded by an ER elected from the specific business unit. Concerns were expressed 
that the number of ERs was not sufficient for effective representation. These concerns 
were also precipitated by the joint venture that was entered into between BS2 and a 
public service organization, where a staff representative group was already in 
operation. An agreement was later reached to increase the number of ERs from 10 to 
12 and to include a member from the staff representative group on the BS2 forum 
while an ER could attend some of the meetings of the staff representative group. 
In terms of infrastructure, ERs deliberately avoided the use of the corporate 
communications team in their contact with constituents. Due to the credibility gap 
with the unions and the apathy gap with the employees ERs believed that a joint 
communication with management would significantly undermine their independence. 
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The forum had a dedicated webpage in the organization's intranet, which included 
significant information on ERs and the nature of the forum, the election process, news 
related to the forum, and details on meetings. A section called `how we are making a 
difference' was also included, where ERs referred to the representation of employee 
interests on issues such as pensions, work life balance, performance management, 
career management and others. `Hot topics' that were under discussion in the forum 
were also outlined together with documents explaining the forum's suggestions and 
position with regard to specific issues. 
However, the constraints in the independence of the communication infrastructure 
were highlighted by some ERs, who felt that there was always a potential veto power 
by management. ERs reported instances of late distribution of communications issued 
to the workforce after the forum meetings due to disagreement over the content by 
management. For instance, management blocked the communication of the feedback 
on the salary review on the basis that it would have an unnecessarily detrimental 
effect on the workforce. The confidentiality constraints and management's 
apprehension to the ERs communicating the developments in consultation were 
emphasized by an ER: 
`Many of the subjects we talk about are at that time embargoed, what that means 
is we're not allowed to tell the workforce about it. So it's very difficult to explain 
at the time that something has been done as a result of forum consultation... We 
also try to get communications out, there are often delays in doing that because 
we have rows with the standing members about what should go out. When we get 
feedback from a consultation we would like to summarize that and reply to the 
workforce, management hate that, absolutely hate it. We are sensitive to that, we 
do now routinely show them what we are going to send out, we do listen to them, 
but we must, absolutely must, tell our workforce what they have said. ' 
The impact of limited time-off facilities on the ability of the forum to communicate 
adequately with the workforce was also stressed. Further, the lack of engagement with 
BS2 on the part of employees coming over as a result of TUPE transfers impacted on 
the quality of the representative function of the forum and its legitimacy. This was 
exemplified in the ERs' unsuccessful attempts to represent employee interests in 
consultation exercises held in redundancy situations. Moreover, whereas management 
had adopted a pro-active stance in terms of ERs holding face-to-face meetings with 
the workforce, it was only in sites where the employees were concerned with 
particular issues, such as job security, that the surgeries were more successful. 
On average, less than 50% of employees usually participated in the forum elections. 
Nonetheless, the perception of ERs was that a significant number of employees felt 
represented in the organization. In the annual surveys employees were asked to 
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evaluate the following statement: `I believe that the forum's ERs add value by 
representing employees' views on a wide range of company initiatives at the forum'. 
The latest employee responses were 3 out of 5. Evidence of employee awareness was 
provided in the number of employee `hits' to the forum's webpage and in the various 
consultation exercises held with employees. Employee responses to the consultation 
exercises varied according to the issues. On average, the proportion of employee 
responding was around 10%. The issue that had a bigger response rate, 600 of 3,500 
employees, concerned the pay review. The ER responsible for the administration of 
the mailbox reported that there was a considerable level of activity and email coming 
from employees and covering a variety of issues related mostly to employment 
conditions. A number of employees recognized the forum's work in their email 
communication with the ERs. The expansion of the involvement of the forum and its 
role in communicating and consulting directly with employees on more significant 
issues, such as the changes in the pension scheme, assisted also in raising the profile 
of the forum. 
6.4.4 ICE arrangements and trade unions 
According to management, when faced with issues that needed to be discussed with 
both the forum and the unions, the briefing by management to the two parties and any 
consultation held later took place simultaneously but under separate channels. There 
was no evidence of management supporting formal or informal integration between 
the forum and the unions. Instead, the negative stance adopted by management 
towards potential co-operation between the forum and the unions was emphasized by 
ERs, who were told that it would be inflammatory if they were to sit at the table with 
the unions; an ER described management approach as `divide and conquer. ' On the 
management side, the HR manager also claimed that ERs that were also union 
representatives had on occasions leaked information to the unions. 
Attempts by ERs to approach the unions and develop a level of co-ordination were 
made during the initial stages of the forum's operation. For instance, when initially 
faced with the lack of engagement of unionized employees with the consultation 
exercises, ERs organized a meeting with the unions and fed in information on the 
forum's operation. Whilst they expected that the unions would exchange information 
with the forum, no such development took place. This lack of mutual recognition was 
emphasized by both ERs and union officials. According to the union side, the limited 
rights enjoyed by the forum and the participation in the forum of ERs representing 
senior bands indicated an organizational intention to use the forum as the `mouthpiece 
of management'. The existence of a number of different collective agreements 
stipulating different terms and conditions and the resulting friction among the unions 
was also referred as a significant factor influencing the level of resource 
supplementation between the forum and the unions. Importantly, the involvement of 
the forum in pay and reward issues increased further union worries as they felt that 
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the communications issued by the forum on these subjects undermined their 
bargaining groups. The potential overlap in the issue had an impact on the forum side 
as well and some ERs perceived that the unions negotiated to the detriment of the 
company and sometimes also to the detriment of their members. In the view of both 
the union officials and senior management, the operation of the forum had not 
impacted on the nature of the relationship between management and the unions or the 
level of employee support enjoyed by the unions. 
However, an interesting development both in terms of management approach to 
dealing with the unions and the forum and in terms of the interaction between the 
forum and the unions took place at the end of 2005 and early 2006. Management 
expressed their support for tripartite discussions as helping overcome the difficulty in 
dealing separately with the unions and the forum on the complicated issue of pensions 
and securing a consistent approach. In the view of ERs, management was also 
possibly hoping that the forum would act as `a calming voice or a voice for reason for 
the unions. 'Discussions were first held towards the end of 2005. A delegation of the 
forum comprising three non-union ERs had regular brief meetings with the union 
officials before the formal meetings with management so as to discuss and agree, if 
possible, a common response. A good working relationship was developed as a result 
of the forum-union meetings and a degree of alignment of interests was secured to the 
extent that neither of the parties did attempt to undermine each other's position. Union 
officials stressed that the forum was necessarily aligned to the unions' priorities as 
they lacked access to pensions' experts, the right to take industrial action and to 
negotiate on behalf of the workforce. The alignment of the forum to the unions caused 
concern on the part of management, who were concerned that the forum would follow 
the unions. 
It was not until December 2005 that the forum had the first employee feedback on 
management's suggestions and feedback was tabled. The feedback from both parties 
illustrated employee dissatisfaction with management's proposals. Following 
discussions, management made a revised offer in January 2006, which improved 
some of their previous proposals such as increasing their contributions by about 4%. 
However, alignment between the forum and the unions seemed to weaken from that 
point on, as the feedback received by the employees indicated that almost half of the 
workforce supported management's proposal. The disassociation of the forum from 
the unions was welcomed and the MD stressed the constructive comments made by 
the forum. The involvement of the forum in the pensions' discussion was seen by 
ERs as important in terms of communication with the wider workforce and in 
feeding back the employees' views on management. But in terms of the capacity of 
the forum was to influence the outcome of the discussion, an ER involved in the 
process held: 
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`We were pretty ineffective, not though any fault of ourselves or the ERs, just 
simple because we do not have any sanctions at our disposal in the same way that 
a union does to use industrial action. That in itself is the quintessential between 
the unions and an employee consultative body. ' 
While ERs welcomed the inclusion of unions in the discussion over the pensions' 
changes, they registered their concern towards the extension of such an approach to 
other issues. The conflict of interests between the representation duties of both parties 
was brought to attention by ERs who stressed that tripartite discussions would render 
the fair representation of non-union employees difficult, such as in the case of pay. 
Efforts to bring again the forum and the unions to the same table took place in the 
case of collective redundancies in mid-2006. In this case, ERs reported that they 
`nearly did the consultation together'; but the unions' stance was generally cautious. 
In the view of the ERs, the potential for the forum and the union to be mutually 
compatible still existed. The basis for such compatibility was based on the different 
functions and areas of involvement of the two representative mechanisms. While the 
unions had access to stronger forms of sanctions, such as the right to strike, the forum 
had a wider remit in which they could exert some influence over management 
decision-making. 
6.4.5 Case study summary 
The forum aimed to open up scope for activity and participation beyond the scope of 
the ICE agreement and to move on towards formalized consultative procedures. It 
defined tasks for itself and sought to build a sustained capacity to engage successfully 
in consultation with management. It sought to consolidate and forge trust with the 
workforce as well as creating structures for regular interaction and communication 
with employees. With few exceptions, the informal support provided by the unions to 
the forum was very low. 
6.5 BS3 
6.5.1 ICE arrangements and management 
Scope to operate 
External training that covered issues related to the meaning of consultation, 
differences with negotiation and means of ERs' suggestions to management was 
provided to all ERs. In the view of the management, `the provision of training set the 
ground rules and we can certainly refer back to it if they [the ERs] start behaving in a 
way we don 't think is appropriate. ' Despite ERs' requests training had not been 
provided since the amendment of the forum. While access to experts was stipulated in 
both agreements it was only used in the case of the big restructuring process in 2001- 
2002 and the drafting of the amended ICE agreement. ERs had half a day before the 
forum meeting and half a day after to meet together. The post-forum meetings usually 
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involved the employee chair and a limited number of ERs responsible for issues 
arising during the discussions. The meetings, which took place on a quarterly basis 
and were chaired by a senior manager, lasted for two days. The first day ERs had their 
separate meeting in the morning and they later joined the management for the full 
forum meeting, which continued until noon the following day. 
The HR manager was predominantly responsible for organizing the meetings, 
suggesting topics for the agenda and ensuring that relevant speakers attended. The 
process usually involved sending the draft agenda to the ERs' chair and asking 
whether there were additional issues. Management then considered whether the issues 
suggested by the ERs could be discussed in the forum. There was evidence that the 
relationship became progressively adversarial and management retained in effect the 
final say over the issues included in the agenda. Questions submitted by ERs for 
answer and discussion at forum meetings were filtered very rigorously by 
management at the stage of agenda setting and several were `disallowed' on the 
grounds that they addressed local issues or issues where consultation was not required 
as management did not contemplate changes in those areas. ERs were also concerned 
that management concentrated deliberately on the provision of not `very useful' 
information so as to avoid discussing issues that were of more direct interest to 
employees. The employee chair noted that it was perhaps easier for management to 
manage the forum through having meetings that did not always concentrate on 
important issues rather than simply declaring that they were not prepared to enter into 
consultation. The management chair explained: 
`The ERs would like an awful lot more on the agenda than we put on but at the 
end of the day management actually decides the agenda but we do consult over 
it... The consultative forum is for us to consult with employees, it's not for us to 
explain ourselves to employees, you know, whatever they want us to explain to 
them. ' 
ERs requested that detailed information on the nature of the issues should be provided 
at least a week before the meetings so as to familiarize themselves with the issues and 
to reduce the time allocated for presentations saving thus time for consultation. 
Management rejected both requests on the basis, first, that the agenda was intended to 
list just the items and timing and not to provide a summary of each topic and, second, 
that the presentations were necessary for the discussions held afterwards. 
Regarding the drafting of the minutes the process usually involved the ERs writing 
them and sending them to the HR manager for approval and amendments, where 
necessary. ERs emphasized that the process was positive as they were able to frame 
the documents according to employees' interests. However, substantial disagreements 
were reported in a number of cases over the content of the forum reports to be 
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communicated to employees. For instance, in August 2005 management objected to 
the publication of both the minutes from the May meeting, associated sub-groups 
reports and a report on redeployment and regrading. Following iterations in which 
ERs attempted to edit the documents so as to secure management's agreement while 
`still maintaining a faithful report of what was discussed in the meeting', ERs 
concluded that the process did not seem to reach an outcome as there was no 
agreement over the wording of the communication. As a result, the ERs prefixed the 
documents to emphasize that these were reports from ERs alone, and not agreed with 
management, and published them on the forum website. The dispute escalated with 
management immediately closing down the website. Nearly a week later, the website 
finally re-appeared in the intranet but all the reports were removed and more 
importantly the authority for the website became the HR manager's responsibility and 
the ERs had no more publishing rights. The HR manager explained that the ERs' 
report did not give an accurate representation of the forum discussions. The dispute 
stalled progress on the forum for several months. Following a meeting, management 
decided to restore the ERs' ability to publish on the website but with an agreement 
that management reserved the right to insert statements in the minutes of 
disagreement. However, management reportedly continued to prevent the UK forum 
publishing documents without their approval during 2006 and both sides emphasized 
the negative impact of those disputes on the level of trust between the forum and 
management. 
Scope to participate 
A mixture of information and consultation took place within the forum, which, 
according to management, allowed the representatives to understand the business 
context in order to be able to hold consultation on other issues. Information on 
company performance was provided in every meeting by senior management invited 
for this purpose. The issue of long term strategic planning was also addressed where, 
while consultation did not take place, management was reportedly keen on receiving 
the ERs views regarding the possible directions forward and the way these could work 
in practice. Information was also provided in case of statutory consultation in cases of 
collective redundancies and transfers of undertakings. Requests were made by ERs to 
focus on matters where the company wanted to consult employees through the forum, 
and matters which ERs wanted to raise on behalf of employees and that management 
should identify prior to meetings specific decisions that were under consideration and 
any alternative options being considered so as to enhance the scope for consultation 
with the forum. 
The confidentiality provisions operated in most cases on a time-limited basis: ERs 
were required to keep certain issues confidential until a related announcement was 
made by the organization. While management noted that they were nervous over 
maintaining information confidential there was never an issue of 
breach of 
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confidentiality provisions by ERs. An exception to the provision of information was 
made in the case of the amount of money put aside for the pay review, where 
management refused to disclose the company pay budget to ERs unless the latter 
agreed to keep it confidential from employees. In the view of both the unions and ERs 
management's insistence on keeping information confidential was attributed to their 
concern that the unions could use information from the forum to support their 
campaign on pay and benefits issues. 
According to management, issues for consultation included: development and training 
activities, pay review process, potential changes to the appraisal system, and 
employment policies. Issues where both union and non-union ERs were active 
included: pay and benefits, offshoring, redeployment, recruitment and allocation of 
work within the UK, car parking, health and safety and collective redundancies. The 
forum operated intentionally within a formal structure as management believed that 
the forum should be confined to a strategic level and informal methods of engagement 
should remain management's responsibilities. Instead, any interaction between 
management and the forum was managed by the HR department, who were also 
responsible for arranging management participation in forum meetings. While 
local/regional forums also operated there was no formal link with the forum; only 
informal advice and guidance was possible in limited cases. Specific sub-groups were 
set up within the forum so as to deal with issues such as health and safety, pay and 
benefits, retirement age and communication. 249 According to management, this 
allowed work at a more focused level, which was then taken for further discussion to 
the UK forum. From ERs' perspective, the sub-groups assisted the forum in 
developing effective consultation instead of just being given a detailed presentation 
by management and ERs expressing their instant reaction within the meetings. 
However, evidence of lack of substantial management commitment over items 
discussed within the sub-groups was reported. For instance, following the amendment 
of the forum, the `Reward Framework Discussion Group' was recommenced. The 
group, which was made up of two union representatives, two ERs and a management 
representative, held discussions on pay and benefits matters. However, management 
reportedly subsequently stopped involving the forum on certain processes regarding 
pay and benefits issues. Moreover, the group met very occasionally and as there was 
no agreement over the minutes it was effectively prevented from having an input into 
management decision-making. A general change of management approach to 
employee relations that constrained, in turn, the forum's operation since mid-2003 
was stressed by ERs. An ER commented: 
249 The sub-group on communication looks more at coordinating the means of communication of the 
forum with employees and as such did not deal with substantial issues that come under 
discussion 
within the forum. 
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`Since the company made the shift to stifle the forum and censor it a few years 
ago, the level of management involvement has just gone down and down. There 
used to be more senior management involvement. Now, sometimes you can have a 
whole meeting that is just one HR person after another. But there is no real 
engagement from the company in terms of senior management at the moment, I 
think it's more damage limitation. ' 
Especially since the amendment of the agreement in 2005, management concentrated 
on organizational issues that revolved more around business strategy and less on 
employment issues. While employee-side organization was mentioned as a means to 
develop a momentum for the forum ERs noted that management secrecy and 
constraints effectively constrained the ERs' work and led to frustration of ERs unable 
to represent adequately employee interests. In conjunction with the limitation of 
consultation only within the forum meetings and the small number of meetings the 
scope provided for effective employee participation was significantly reduced. 
An example of the different management approaches was provided in the case of 
consultation held in restructuring instances. In the 2001-2002 redundancies the 
forum played a significant role in keeping employees informed, consulted and 
influencing management decision-making. Based on the forum's and unions' 
proposals significant improvements were made with regard to the redundancy 
packages, selection criteria and appeal processes. Out of around 1500 posts that 
originally were going to be made redundant, 700 posts actually were. Later, 
evidence of managerial intention to limit the extent of consultation was observed. 
While the management practice had been to engage in 90-day consultation with 
employees, irrespective of the number of employees affected, management 
subsequently refused to apply the same period in the case of employees not covered 
by the Security of Employment Agreement concluded with the unions, and excluded 
simultaneously the forum from the consultative meetings. This finally culminated in 
the formal exclusion of the forum from consultation in restructuring cases that 
affected specific parts of the organization. The employee chair held the view that 
consultation with ad hoc representatives enabled management to deal with less 
experienced representatives. In terms of consultation with a view to reaching an 
agreement, ERs noted that management were keen to emphasize their ultimate right 
to manage: 
`The HR people get obsessed with the management's right to manage. So they get 
absolutely wound up about the difference 
between co-determination or 
negotiation, consultation and information... 
Every time you tried to discuss 
anything, HR will say, this is not co-determination. 
What I am trying to illustrate 
here is the mindset, they are very protective of their right to manage. 
I think partly 
because of the British management tradition and partly 
because out industry is 
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dominated by very anti-union, American companies and that sets the tone for how 
employers behave across the whole industry. ' 
Impact on management decision-making 
Evidence on impact on the process of management decision-making was mentioned 
by the HR manager. According to management, the operation of the forum forced 
management to plan when and how employee involvement should be dealt with. 
While the ICER made a difference in terms of awareness of the need to inform and 
consult, the culture of the organization did not significantly change, according to one 
of the HR managers interviewed, who stressed that only at the instigation of HR 
management, was the forum consulted. 
In terms of impact on the substance of management decisions, the employee chair 
noted the presence of influence but not often on matters of importance. Impact on the 
substance of decision making was mentioned in the case of a small increase, i. e. from 
4% to 5%, in the bonus given to employees in 2005. Management representatives 
stressed that the ERs put a good case forward regarding the low pay reviews and the 
reasons for the increase and their input was finally taken into account by the CEO. 
Impact was also reported in the case of people development, where the training plans 
that were introduced so as to develop personal employee growth had taken note of the 
forum's comments about improved management training. In the case of annual leave, 
while an ERs' request in October 2005 to allow employees to carry over a number of 
annual leave days was initially rejected, management decided in 2007 to re-assess the 
situation and to relax the policy so as to give more flexibility. Overall, the existence 
of significant limitations on the forum's scope was highlighted by ERs. In the view of 
the employee chair, its constrained impact was attributed to the greater control 
attained by the HR department over its operation, the HR department's adversarial 
approach to ERs, and the exclusion of the forum - as stipulated in the 2005 agreement 
- from issues affecting specific parts of the organization. 
6.5.2 Internal ICE arrangements 
A select committee was established to allow ERs to introduce a `notion of democracy' 
as it allowed the separation of the employee-side from the joint 
management/employee structure of the forum. In practice, the operation of the 
committee assisted in the development of a common understanding among ERs on the 
issues dealt with by the forum and in taking up collective action in cases where 
management attempted to constrain the forum's operation. ERs suggested holding a 
select committee meeting one month before each forum meeting and invited the 
management chair to attend some of the time so as to identify the issues likely to arise 
and appropriate speakers to be available. The suggestion was rejected by the 
management chair on the basis of time constraints for the ERs and of seeing no 
additional benefit for the group meeting separately from the other ERs. The 
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organization of pre- and post-forum meetings allowed ERs to develop networks and 
build their capacity as an integrated group. Informal communicating between the ERs 
varied depending on the issues within the forum and peaked before and after 
meetings. ERs frequently used phone conferences and email correspondence; the time 
needed for such communication averaged one-two hours. Further, ERs had the 
opportunity to discuss their approach to certain issues during the sub-group meetings 
that were held between full forum meetings. 
A significant number of ERs were either union representatives/members. 
Management perceived a level of friction in the employee-side that was attributed to 
the active stance of certain union representatives. Such ERs highlighted that 
considerable differences existed between unionized and non-unionized ERs regarding 
their response to management restraints and pressures. However, most ERs insisted 
that despite the significant differences between union and non-union ERs there was 
never a division between them as to the handling of issues. In comparing the situation 
with regard to the operation of the EWC in BS3 where sectional interests could 
reportedly create problems among the ERs, an ER who participated in both forums, 
i. e. EWC and UK, noted that these kind of issues did not have a bearing in the UK 
forum as ERs had most of the times a common understanding of the issues in 
question. 
6.5.3 ICE arrangements and employees 
ERs were given time and resources to approach employees through face-to-face 
meetings. So-called `Meet the Representatives' meetings took place on a periodic 
basis but employee attendance was not significant. This was attributed to the absence 
of issues of direct relevance to employees from the remit of the forum, such as 
restructuring cases affecting specific parts of the organization, and the lack of 
consultation exercises with employees. Still, the meetings with employees were 
considered useful for raising the profile of the forum and giving the opportunity to 
employees to bring up issues. Whilst some of the issues were already on the 
employee-side agenda additional ones were raised, such as the issue of parking on 
worksites, health and safety, work-life balance, stress at work and mobile working. 
Based on an employee `pulse survey', which was carried out in 2007, the issues taken 
up by ERs in the discussions with management were in line with employee interests. 
However, ERs were concerned about the finding that their ability to communicate 
with their constituents was reported as inadequate. Furthermore, despite the fact that 
BS3 had been awarded the IIP accreditation evidence from the employee surveys 
illustrated that employees were aware of the forum's operation but the level of greater 
interest in the forum was limited. 
A `Communication and Publicity Subgroup' was set up within the forum to maximize 
two-way communication between the forum and the workforce. The sub-group, 
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which included company representatives, met fairly regularly but at the time of the 
research it had yet to meet formally with management. Among their activities, the 
members of the group introduced a standard format for the forum's communications 
so as to separate them from other centralized email communications and agreed to 
introduce distribution lists so that each ER could communicate with the respective 
constituents. However, ERs reported that management prohibited them from using the 
facilities and instead requested that all communications intended for the workforce 
should be sent to the HR team, who would then be responsible for distributing them 
to employees. The case was presented as matter of `responsible use of the 
communications means' but in the view of ERs the actual reason was the persistence 
of management to maintain certain issues confidential. In a similar vein, while an 
intranet page was provided where forum documents could be accessed by the 
employees, ERs' ability to communicate with employees was limited as a result of 
HR controlling the content of the website. 
While in some cases ERs had consulted their constituents on specific management 
proposals, such as the restructuring case in 2001-2002, their ability to communicate 
and provide feedback to the workforce on developments in the discussions since the 
amendment of the agreement was limited due to management constraints put in place. 
In comparing the situation with that of union recognition, where representatives are 
able to take issues back to the members who then decide on the course of action, an 
ER held that the lack of a mechanism to consult the workforce hindered its 
accountability to employees and the extent to which it could represent accurately the 
interests of employees and deliver. 
6.5.4 ICE arrangements and trade unions 
HR managers suggested that management support for tripartite discussions between 
management, the forum and the unions depended on the nature of the issues and the 
circumstances. If they believed that the participation of the unions in the discussions 
with the forum would lead to the overshadowing of ERs and overall employee 
interests separate consultations with the forum and the unions would be held. 
Management was also concerned that tripartite discussions would change the nature 
of the discussions, i. e. from consultation to negotiation, and blur the distinction in the 
role of ERs that were also union representatives were. However, certain benefits from 
having union representatives in the forum were recognized, including their ability to 
contribute more and bring subjects for discussion that other ERs would not perhaps 
bring. This was facilitated by the better training, greater time and better resources that 
union representatives had at their disposal. Moreover, greater efficiency and a better 
alignment of interests were possible: 
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`If we can reach an agreement with them [the unions], then because they are more 
vocal they tend to say a lot more than the other people in the forum and then they 
can bring everybody else with them. '(HR manager) 
The biggest union occupied a key position in the forum, providing training, advice 
and support for union ERs. The union officers expressed their wish to use the forum 
to `increase workplace democracy'. However, they were keen to emphasize that the 
role of unions, offering independent organization and campaigning, was crucial. 
Within this context, consultative forums were not seen as substitute for trade union 
organization; instead, `employee interests would be best protected if union and 
consultative forums worked together in close co-operation' (union representative). 
Acting as organizations outside the corporate sphere both unions sought to exert 
influence over representational issues via the forum. The fact that the unions did not 
have specified seats in the forum enabled them to use it as a way of attaining a greater 
understanding of developments across the organization and supporting union 
campaigns and raising their profile during forum elections. Union representatives who 
were also ERs were also able to use the resources provided by management to 
establish extensive informal contacts and co-ordination both within the same union 
and with the other unions. Despite the limitations imposed on the forum by the 
amended agreement in 2005 unions were reportedly still able to use it for networking 
purposes. 
On the forum side, there was evidence of a desire to work with the unions to ensure 
better representation of employee interests. In practice, this was exemplified in the 
consultation exercises regarding the 2001-2002 restructuring programme. Through 
regular meetings that were held between the forum and union representatives, 
representatives from both sides were able to mobilize an exchange of information, co- 
ordinate their actions to a significant extent and lend each other support. The pursuit 
of common policies played a major role in developing specific proposals for handling 
the restructuring exercises and opened up space for dialogue with management that 
mitigated to a degree the extent of the negative repercussions of the restructuring for 
the workforce. While the forum was not involved in endorsing pay claims submitted 
by a union, the employee chair emphasized that the forum did not cut across the 
union's activity and signaled that it would not be successful for management to play 
us off against each other. ' However, concerns that the forum itself was in 
considerable danger of being perceived by management as controlled or dominated by 
the unions were expressed. In the view of the employee chair: 
`The close relationship developed between the forum and the unions have made 
things difficult in a way because the company appears now suspicious that the 
union tries to use the forum for its purposes and has, in turn, become much less- 
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cooperative in some ways than it might have been with a body that it could see as 
an alternative to the unions. ' 
6.5.5 Case study summary 
Whilst the forum was active, there was limited participation above and beyond 
information; management policy became progressively minimalist and constrained the 
forum's scope to operate and participate. However, the forum saw itself as a forum for 
the mutual exchange of information and provision of support between ERs. It acted as 
an information hub with access to communication channels that allowed it to forward 
and exchange information between meetings. Despite management constraints it 
managed to maintain contact with the workforce, albeit on an infrequent basis. 
Finally, significant informal support was offered by the unions. 
6.6 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to analyze the dynamic interplay of the four different 
`fields of interaction' (Lecher et al., 1999,2001): interaction between the (employee 
side) ICE arrangements and management; interaction among the ERs; interaction 
between the ICE arrangements and employees; and interaction between the ICE 
arrangements and trade unions, as influenced by the implementation of the ICER at 
organizational level. Moving beyond an assessment of the formal text of the ICE 
agreements, the study sought to present the evolution of the ICE structures in each of 
the case study in terms of their role and relationship with the main actors, i. e. 
management, employees and trade unions. 
As evident from the analysis, significant variation existed concerning the four levels 
of interaction of the ICE arrangements. Concerning interaction with management, this 
ranged from forum activities being confined to meetings with management, i. e. Finl, 
BS1, to forums that worked towards extending the range of consultation and opening 
up channels of interaction with management, i. e. Fing and BS2. On the issue of 
employee-side organization, again the level of development of internal capacity and 
cohesion was different in each case study. Further, constrained by the ICE 
agreements, interaction with the workforce varied from regular and frequent 
interaction, BS2, to almost absent, Fin 1. Finally, the level of informal support 
provided by unions to the ICE arrangements varied from being generally limited, Finl 
and BS2, to active mutual recognition in BS3. Based on this in-depth presentation of 
the trajectory in each of the arrangements, the next chapter focuses on an assessment 
of the findings from the operation of the ICE arrangements and provides an evaluation 
of the extent to which the `nominal rights' stipulated under the ICE agreements 
developed into `effective rights' for the purpose of integrating employee interests in 
the organizations. 
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Chapter 7. Evaluation of the operation of the ICE arrangements 
The aim of this chapter is to assess the nature and extent of the capability for voice of 
the ICE arrangements and to account for the variation in the capability for voice 
observed between the ICE arrangements under study. Informed by the theoretical 
framework of the study, the analysis seeks ultimately to assess the capacity of the ICE 
arrangements to promote discursive procedures between the main parties involved in 
the processes with the aim of advancing capabilities for voice at organizational level. 
Before proceeding to such an assessment it is important to emphasize here two issues: 
firstly, the cases studies cannot be seen as representative of the ICE arrangements 
operating in UK-based organizations. Apart from the fact that the number of the case 
studies is small, based on their approach to the ICER the organizations under study 
constituted rather `early movers' (Beaumont and Hunter, 2003) to the introduction of 
the legislation, and as such their organizational approach to the implementation of the 
ICER may not match the approach in cases, where, for example, ICE arrangements 
have been introduced either through the application of the ICER provisions 
concerning `negotiated agreements' or standard provisions. Secondly, due to the 
recent introduction of the arrangements in most cases only an evaluation of the 
capability for voice of these arrangements during their early stages of their operation 
can be made. Nevertheless, this evaluation is still of substantial interest as the early 
operation of the arrangements can be significant in shaping the future path of their 
development. 
Based on the analysis of the main findings from the four fields of interaction as 
illustrated in chapter seven, the present chapter probes first whether different case 
studies appear to share some similarities and deserve to be considered as instances of 
the same `type' of general case. Such an observation assists in analyzing whether the 
arrayed case studies reflect subgroups or categories of general cases - raising the 
possibility of a typology of individual cases that can be insightful. The typology used 
here is based on those suggested by Marginson et al. (1998) and Lecher et al. (2001) 
for the evaluation of EWCs' practices and development of a `capacity to act' (Lecher 
et al., 2001). Findings on the extent of the capability for voice in each of the ICE 
arrangements are synthesized in the next section, which accounts for the variation in 
the extent of the capability for voice observed among the five cases in terms of the 
influence of the external context, i. e. the ICER, and agency factors. Based on this 
elaboration, it becomes then possible to evaluate the extent to which the `nominal 
rights' stipulated under the ICE agreements become `effective rights' for the 
development of the capability for voice. 
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7.1. Analysis of the ICE arrangements' practice and dynamics for development 
of capabilities for employee voice 
In light of the analytical framework, the objective of the analysis was to assess the 
extent to which ICE arrangements had the capacity to assist learning and evolution 
regarding social dialogue procedures and to advance the capability for voice. The 
capability for voice includes the following elements: capability of the representatives 
to form a view on management decisions, capability to express these views, and 
finally capability to have an impact on management decisions. As briefly outlined in 
chapter six, the study found considerable variation in the extent to which the ICE 
arrangements developed such capabilities. In more detail, variations between the 
organizations in terms of the four fields of interaction were reflected in the overall 
assessment of the character of each ICE forum. 
In order to evaluate the capability for voice of the arrangements under study, a 
typology of such arrangements is here suggested (table 7.1). In table 7.2 the study 
categorizes each ICE forum as `symbolic' or `active' (Marginson et al., 1998) and, for 
the active ICE forums, as `service', `project-oriented' or `participative' based on the 
more detailed classification suggested by Lecher et al. (2001) in the case of EWCs. 250 
In two cases, Finl and BS1, where management's policy towards the ICE was 
minimalist, employee-side cohesion was low, substantial interaction with the 
employees was nearly absent and there was no evidence of integration with the 
unions, where existent, the ICE forums were essentially `symbolic'. In the other three 
cases, Fin2, BS2 and BS3, the ICE forums were `active' and fell into the categories of 
`service' or `project-oriented' ICE forums by virtue of medium or strong employee- 
side cohesion, pro-active management policy, strong links with the workforce and the 
unions. The next section presents in detail the rationales for the different classification 
of the case studies and accounts for the variation in the capability for voice observed 
between the ICE arrangements under study. 
250 The categories by Lecher et al. (2001: 33) represent stages in the development `from a symbolic to a 
participative EWC'. However, as the authors also note, `this progression is not inevitable - in two 
respects. Firstly, a EWC in any category can remain in that category; and secondly, EWCs are not 
immune from the possibility of regression ... nor 
does every EWC has to pass through each stage; for 
example, an EWC can become participative without first being project-oriented. ' Nonetheless, it has to 
be emphasized that in practice the arrangements may often be hybrid which cannot be unambiguously 
allocated to any of the categories (Lecher et al., 2001: 54). The same considerations may apply in the 
case of ICE arrangements. 
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7.2 ICE arrangements and management: from acceptance to influence? 
The focus here was on the dynamic of social dialogue, as developed and formalized 
between management and the employee-side within the ICE procedures. This was 
manifested in the provision of resources, the drafting of the agenda and the minutes 
from the meetings, the distribution of documents before the meetings and the 
development of information and consultation within the forums. Issues related to 
structural conditions, mainly the institutional design of the ICER, constituted factors 
shaping the level of interaction between the two actors and were also points for 
analysis. 
In order for ERs to have the chance to get involved in a learning process of 
participation and of developing capabilities emphasis must be placed upon advocacy, 
adequate training, independence, resources and expertise (Terry, 2003). A first issue 
to consider here is the selection of ERs. In line with the ICE agreements, ERs were 
elected in practice through secret ballots, administered either by external 
organizations or internally. Under either route, few problems were reported regarding 
the transparency and fairness of the procedures and there were limited instances of 
management promoting specific individuals to stand for the elections and indeed of 
management appointing ERs directly. The issue of resources was another area of 
limited reported friction between the ERs and management; ERs were generally 
satisfied with the provision of managerial support to the performance of their duties, 
such as coverage of expenses. However, a level of dissatisfaction was reported 
concerning the absence of access to external experts, such as at BS2 and BS3, and the 
provision of training. Instances of greater concern were reported in the case of time- 
off facilities and greater challenges were encountered by ERs representing lower band 
constituencies. Despite the provision of facilities, resources and time-off for the ERs 
to perform their duties, concerns about the autonomy of the ICE arrangements were 
expressed as they were reliant on management's assistance and consent for their rights 
and power. 
While the issues of training and time-off facilities constituted issues of concern 
without culminating in instances of disagreement between management and the 
employee side, considerable friction was evident regarding the drafting of the agenda 
and the minutes from the meetings and the distribution of documents before the forum 
meetings, limiting the extent to which ERs were likely to collect, process and react to 
new information so as to prepare for the conduct of consultation. As Hall et al. (2003: 
88) have argued, one key test of the nature of interaction between management and 
the employee side, e. g. whether it is open and ongoing and whether it is constructive 
or adversarial, is the degree of `jointness' in terms of the control of the ICE meeting 
and activities. Whilst at Fin2 and BS2 the forums' agendas were very much jointly 
determined and there was frequent and ongoing contact between the key management 
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personnel and the core of the employee side, in Finl and BSI the agenda was shaped 
largely by management. At BS3 since the amendment of the agreement a series of 
consultation issues were put forward by ERs but the `national' dimension of the 
management decisions in question tended to be contested. Friction also arose 
regarding the drafting of the minutes from the meetings. Importantly, the absence of 
sanctions was particularly emphasized by almost all the employee-side interviewees. 
Hence, the inability to translate social and labour rights into enforceable rights in case 
of disagreement within the context of PEAs limited significantly the possibility of 
them being used as `instruments of change' (Hepple, 2002: 255). 
The frequency of the meetings constitutes a further factor differentiating the extent to 
which ERs were given the chance to express employee opinions and thoughts and 
make them count in the course of organizational decision-making in line with a 
capability-based approach. The more regular and frequent the meetings the greater 
were the opportunities for the development of social dialogue procedures between the 
two sides. The most infrequent meetings were in Finl where formal ICE meetings 
took place twice a year; the forums at BS 1 and BS3 met three times per year and the 
Fin2 forum met bi-monthly. The frequency of meetings in BS2 increased from six 
meetings per year to monthly ones, reflecting a process of learning. Information 
provision was considered in most cases satisfactory, with exceptions however being 
reported in the case of employment issues and most notably restructuring and 
reorganization plans. This finding from the case studies is in line with the CIA survey 
results concerning information topics (see section 4.2.2) Whilst there was limited 
evocation of confidentiality provisions and agreements by management in order to 
justify potential limitations in the provision of information, other justifications were 
brought up in order to restrict information on such issues. The business context where 
the organizations operated, both in the finance and the business services cases, acted 
in some instances as a constraint on the provision of information, especially regarding 
restructuring plans which were considered by management as impossible to divulge 
because of the inability to predict such instances in light of the turbulence in the 
markets, Fin 1, or impractical in cases where the forums did not meet frequently, BSI 
and BS3. Significantly, only the agreement in BS3 did stipulate the right of the ERs to 
apply to the CAC for the reasonableness of the imposition of confidentiality 
requirements. However, in none of the other organizations were there concerns 
regarding the lack of recourse to statutory mechanisms for the resolution of disputes 
regarding confidential information. 
Reflecting the ambiguity in the ICER and in the resulting ICE agreements, the 
meaning of consultation was a matter of different interpretations between 
management and the employee side (see table 7.3 for a synopsis of issues, processes 
and outcomes from consultation exercises). Management used the term 'consultation' 
to describe cases that ranged from serious efforts to address employee interests in 
222 
management decision-making to instances, such as Fin2 and BS2, where the ERs 
acted in essence as `focus groups' for the collection of feedback from employees, 
such as Finl and BS1. Evidence of absence of management response to ERs' 
suggestions and proposals was further apparent at BS3. In line with the definition of 
consultation, as stipulated in the ICER provisions on PEAs and those [CE agreements 
that excluded the notion of `with a view to reaching an agreement', management 
reiterated in all the cases the lack of obligation on their part to seek to reach an 
agreement with the ERs. In light of the ambiguous understanding of the notion of 
`consultation', ERs were in cases confused regarding their input and the extent to 
which they could get involved. The confusion was particularly evident among non- 
union ERs in newly established forums, such as Finl and BS1, constraining thus the 
potential of the arrangements to become an instrument for the development of social 
dialogue between management and employees concerning the organization and for the 
achievement of social rights. 
Within the context of consultation, Beaumont and Hunter (2003,2005) have 
suggested that the process of consultation is important both as an end in itself and as a 
shaper of outcomes. One of the justifications for `works council' type structures is the 
greater potential for cooperative deliberation between employer and ERs as a 
counterpoint to the distributive conflicts mediated by collective bargaining (Bogg, 
2006: 14). Whilst information provision was the predominant function of the forum in 
some cases evidence that the ICE arrangements acted as procedural structures that 
allowed the development of mediation between management orientations and 
employee interests was provided. Such findings were particularly present in Fin2 and 
BS2. In the first stages of the operation of the arrangements in Fin2 and BS2 the 
process of social dialogue was marked by attempts for recognition of the employee- 
side actors and the need to broaden the scope of the arrangements including, for 
instance, earlier involvement of the forum, in Fin2, and expansion of consultation 
topics to pay and reward issues, in BS2. As episodes of interaction multiplied the 
parties realized the potential for progressing towards a model of social dialogue that 
relied on the mutual recognition of the social actors at the organizational level. Hence, 
two ICE arrangements displayed essential elements of a more cooperative phase that 
in turn enhanced the capabilities for employee voice: recognition of collective actors, 
realization of the advantages of social dialogue, and the introduction of more detailed 
rules governing the consultation processes. From a learning point of view, these ICE 
arrangements evolved from a stage of uncertainly and even apprehension to a more 
co-operative stage with the support of senior management, that was the CEO in the 
case of Fin2 and the MD in the case of BS2, which enhanced the development of a 
learning process of participation and of integrating employee interests in corporate 
decision-making procedures. 
In contrast, the process of consultation in Finl, BS1 and BS3 remained limited and 
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tightly controlled by management. Management in each case was anxious to limit the 
role of the forum and to retain managerial control of the process. For instance, in Finl 
the substantial capture by management of the operation of the forum constrained the 
extent to which the ICE forum was recognized as a collective actor and party to social 
dialogue procedures in the organization. At BSI, management's approach to the ICE 
forum was minimalist, aimed at doing the least it regarded as necessary in terms of 
information provision to fulfill its obligations. This led to some complaints from the 
employee side regarding the lack of information and consultation about restructuring 
plans that were treated under the agreement as items outside the remit of the forum. 
While the ICE agreement in BS3 defined different stages of the consultation process 
management abstained regularly from responding to ERs' suggestions by providing 
commentary behind any subsequent decisions. Evidence of tokenism - going through 
the motions and recording responses, engaging in dialogue but at a stage when 
decisions were effectively taken and confining agenda to trivial items (Beaumont and 
Hunter, 2007) - was thus present, which hindered in turn the fostering of capabilities 
for voice. 
The extent to which the arrangements broadened the scope of consultation was also 
contingent on management considerations on the organizational situation. In Fin2 and 
BS2 the decisions by management to extend the issues of consultation took place 
when a trade union was actively campaigning in Fin2 and when the rather militant 
unions in BS2 were interested in extending their influence in the organization. In 
contrast, where attempts by ERs to widen the remit of the forum were in the main 
unsuccessful, in BS 1 and BS3, the situation was different. In BS3, while two unions 
were recognized for specific parts of the organization, management's refusal to grant 
further scope of action to the forum was arguably prompted by the significant level of 
control of the forum by one of the unions. 
However, a tendency for management to be less forthcoming with information and 
consultation and to revert to managerial unilateralism, leading to impotent frustration 
on the part of ERs and pointing thus to the phenomenon of `consultation for the good 
times'(Terry, 1999: 27) was evident in all the cases, albeit on particular issues. This 
was more evident on issues that involved pay and reward, in BS2 and more so BS3, 
and restructuring, in Finl; in other words on issues where the implications for the 
workforce could be unpalatable (Terry, 1999). Regarding pay and rewards out of the 
five agreements only two, i. e. Fin l and BSI, excluded such issues from the remit of 
the forums. In BS2, while management clarified in the early stages of the process that 
these were outside of the remit of the forum there was considerable evidence that ERs 
saw the role of the forum as including consultation with management on pay issues. 
The forums in Fin2 and BS3 were also involved in pay and reward issues however to 
a lesser extent and with different impact. Whilst the development of consultation on 
such issues was considered as positive by the ERs, there was evidence of management 
224 
being eager to limit the development of the forums' role. This finding generally 
accords with the CIA survey findings on the incidence of consultation on pay issues 
(see section 4.2.2). 
Concerning restructuring, the organizations studied here represent examples of the 
many financial and service sector organizations undergoing a rapid and near- 
continuous restructuring characterized by the re-engineering of processes and their 
relocation to low-cost destinations in the context of fierce competitive and shareholder 
pressures. There were several cases where the forums were formally excluded from 
consultation exercises in restructuring cases as a result of `damage limitation' 
provisions (Marginson et al., 1998)252 included in the agreements establishing or 
amending the ICE arrangements, such as in BS 1, BS2 and BS3. Management justified 
the formal exclusion on the basis that that ad-hoc committees would be more suitable 
for addressing the interests of the employees affected from restructuring. However, 
there were also cases where, whilst under the scope of the agreements ERs had the 
right to be informed and consulted, management chose to bypass them and consulted 
solely with ad hoc committees, such as in BSI, or avoided altogether the obligations 
to inform and consult through proceeding to dismissals of less than 20 employees, 
such as in BS2. ERs criticized the exclusion and felt that it was principally a 
consequence of managerial control of the process and content of the discussions 
leading to the agreements establishing or amending the ICE arrangements. 
Where the forums were involved in restructuring instances the decisions to proceed to 
restructuring were made by management and consultation with the forums and trade 
unions took place with regard to the process of handling job losses and not on the 
wider principles of restructuring (see also Hall and Edwards, 1999, Daniel 1985, 
Turnbull 1998, Wood and Dey 1983). The formal announcement of management 
proposals for restructuring was predominantly considered as the start also of the 
consultation process, excluding thus any possibility for consultation to take place at a 
point when proposals are still at a formative stage. 253 In most of the cases, there was 
no attempt by ERs to question the rationale for the business issues that led to or 
influenced the restructuring and it was not clear that this had been among their 
objectives. This became particularly apparent where representation through the forum 
was operating as an additional layer to the existing ad-hoc committees that were set 
up for the purpose of consultation, such as Finl and BS2. 
252 Marginson et al. (1998) defined `damage limitation' more narrowly and the notion concerned 
confidentiality and the right to withhold information that is regarded as `sensitive'. In the present study, 
`damage limitation' refers to the practice of deliberately excluding a wider range of issues from the 
remit of the ICE arrangements. 
253 At a minimum the employer is required to engage in `conscientious consideration' of the 
representatives' submissions at a formative stage in the process 
(see Middlesbrough Borough Council v 
TGWU [2002] IRLR 332). 
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But influence on the implementation of the decisions taken by management and the 
means to communicate these to employees was evident in some cases. ERs were able 
to persuade management to seek employees for voluntary redundancy and to influence 
the criteria used for the selection process of the employees being made redundant. 
There was also in some cases, i. e. Fin2 and BS3, a significant reduction of the number 
of employees made redundant. Confirming the conclusions in the Hall and Edwards 
(1999) study, ERs described the outcomes of consultation as `ranging from mutually 
acceptable arrangements through `acceptance of the inevitable' to a feeling among 
employees that managerial prerogative has been imposed on them. ' The opportunities 
thus for ERs to open up new areas of social dialogue with management that will 
include cases of re-organizations on an on-going basis, to develop an overall 
organizational approach to staffing arrangements for the purpose of avoiding 
collective redundancies (Turnbull and Wass: 1997) and to act as buffers against 
pressures that emanate in the context of companies operating in economic sectors with 
increased outsourcing activity were limited. From a theoretical point of view, this 
finding is particularly significant as it points to the insufficient institutional design of 
the UK legislation. Whilst, as suggested in chapter two, the introduction of permanent 
employee consultative arrangements through the ICED could support the development 
of social dialogue procedures in the context of restructuring the possibility, as offered 
under the PEA option, for management to exclude consultation on such issues, limited 
in practice the opportunities for employee representation on such issues. 
Moving on to examine the broader impact of the arrangements on management 
decision-making some further comments can be made. Reflecting broadly the 
different dynamics developed within the management and the employee-side 
interaction and the different management considerations and structures the extent to 
which the arrangements had an impact on management decision-making differed 
substantially. In the case of EWCs, Marginson et al., (2004) have suggested that the 
impact of EWCs on management decision-making ranges from impact on the process 
of management decision-making and impact on the outcome of decision-making. 254 In 
the cases under study, impact on the process of management decision-making was 
reported in some cases. For instance, at Fin2 the forum chair and the two full-time 
ERs saw liaising with business management and identifying potential issues as a key 
254 The impact on the process distinguishes two forms of impact: first, impact in the form of 
establishment of new structures or mechanisms of management co-ordination as a result of the EWC; 
secondly, impact in the form of signaling mechanisms, which ensure that the individual businesses alert 
central management to upcoming decisions that have a transnational dimension, and which potentially 
need to be tabled at the EWC (Marginson et al., 2004: 211). In terms of the impact of EWCs on the 
outcome of decisions, `the strongest form of impact is where the substance of a management decision 
is changed as a result of intervention by the EWC. A more limited impact is where implementation of a 
business decision is changed as a result of EWC intervention ... A third 
form of impact is also 
conceivable: where management changes the way 
in which decisions are framed from the outset, in the 
light of the requirement to engage with the EWC. 
In practice, this is likely to prove hard to detect' 
(Marginson et al., 2004: 211-212). 
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part of their role. Central management at Finl, BSI, BS2 and BS3 utilized existing 
management structures to sensitize business management to the information and 
consultation requirements stemming from the agreements. The greatest impact on the 
outcome-substance of management decision-making was evident in BS2, where in a 
number of instances the content of management decisions was altered as a result of 
ERs' suggestions. Fin2 was another example, where the forum's intervention led to 
greater influence in the substance of management decision-making. In both cases, 
senior management was regularly involved in the ICE arrangements with the latter 
being established at a level that matched the level of management decision-making. 
The situation in the other cases was substantially different. In Fin 1, with the exception 
of limited instances, only the implementation of business decisions was sometimes 
altered as a result of the forum's operation. As senior management had only `arm's 
length' involvement in the forum this meant that the scope for impact on management 
decision-making was significantly constrained. On their part, ERs saw themselves as a 
`service agency' for the communication of management decisions. In BS3, despite the 
continuous efforts by the ERs to influence both the implementation and substance of 
management decision-making, management barriers in the form of downscaling 
management's involvement in the forum and the adoption of a more apprehensive 
management approach constrained to a significant extent the ability of the forum to 
have an impact on management decisions. Lastly, while the forum at BS 1 was chaired 
by the COO, the limitations in the remit of the forum, as stipulated by the ICE 
agreement, and the management-led process of consultation limited the extent to 
which the forum could encourage the shift towards the view of employee rights as 
organizing the socio-economic relations at organizational level. Hence, through the 
provision, under the ICE agreements, of a consultative framework largely delineated 
by management the extent to which collective representation managed to act in these 
cases as a means to open up space for social dialogue and redress the vulnerability of 
individual employees in their dealings with the employer (Hyman, 1997: 321) 
depended considerably on management choices; these shaped the options and to an 
important extent constrained the outcomes from the operation of the arrangements. 
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7.3 Relationships within the ICE arrangements: the development of networks of 
cooperation 
While most of the forums were still in the early stages of their operation, the findings 
indicated possible trends regarding the development of networks of cooperation within 
the employee-side consultative arrangements. One of the most striking findings from the 
study concerned the salience of ERs in developing the role of the ICE arrangements. This 
in turn resulted in the development of space for social dialogue and participation in 
organizational decision-making. While, as suggested elsewhere in the present study, the 
general assumption has been that the ICE arrangements would be largely determined by 
management the case studies point out to the important role of the ERs' interaction within 
the ICE arrangements in challenging the adoption of a `damage limitation' approach by 
management during the establishment and most notably the operation of the 
arrangements. 
Regarding the capacity of the arrangements, basic infrastructural means of 
communication, such as telephone and email, were available and used extensively by ERs 
outside of the forum meetings for the maintenance of communication and the 
development of cohesion between the forum members in all the cases. Significantly, one 
common element shared by the `active' forums in Fin2, BS2 and BS3 was the availability 
of an operating structure: in the form of a team of full-time ERs in Fin2, rotation of 
employee chairs in BS2, and a select committee in BS3 employee side. In having in place 
such structures, ERs sought to consolidate the autonomy of the arrangements and build a 
sustained capacity to engage in the development of social dialogue procedures with the 
aim of advancing capabilities for voice. Over time the ERs-only meetings acquired a 
significance of their own, especially once a level of communication relationship was 
developed among the ERs and were hence successful in establishing internal 
communicate relationships and structures, which, in turn, promoted and stabilized these 
relationships. 
Significant presence of internal procedures between ERs was again mostly evident in the 
cases of Fin2, BS2 and BS3 where the ERs had developed informal structures and 
procedures for information exchange, for agreeing and coordinating interests, and for 
dealing with issues arising during the operation of the forum. In effect, ERs in Fin2, BS2, 
and BS3 developed substantial internal processes of constitution through which they were 
able to unlock the potential and build the strengths of the ICE arrangements beyond the 
confines of the ICE agreements. The strongest example of such activity was provided by 
BS2: while scope for the forum's participation in management decision-making over the 
longer term was originally denied, based on the systematic developments of its internal 
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capacities and structures and its coherence to deliver opinions as a body to management 
the forum managed to define various tasks for itself and open up opportunities for getting 
involved, such as extending the consultative remit of the forum to include pay and 
bonuses matters. In all three cases, a core of more proactive ERs were responsible for the 
management of the operation of the forum, without however having a dominant position 
in terms of establishing unilaterally a common forum position and strategy. Instead, this 
was a matter for discussion and agreement between all ERs. While there had been in 
some cases disagreements over the adoption of specific approaches to the operation of the 
forums these did not escalate to disputes between the ERs. 
That the `symbolic' Finl and BSI forums exhibited less developed communication 
structures and cohesion can be attributed to a number of factors, which were rather 
independent of the early operation of the forums. Firstly, in contrast to the forums in 
Fin2, BS2 and BS3, the employee side at Finl and BS2 did not have in place distinct 
structures and procedures, which could guarantee internal capacity. While the agreement 
at Finl stipulated the election of an employee chair, a management chair was instead 
appointed, who constituted the radial feature in the operating structure of the employee 
side. The forum was largely a `service committee', which met rarely independently of 
management. Evidence of differing interests within the employee side and lack of 
propensity on the employee side to engage in network activity that would encompass all 
UK sites was also provided in the Fin I forum. Similar findings were evident in BSI, 
where while the ERs met before and after the forum meetings, there was no development 
of informal interaction between the ERs during the periods between the meetings. This 
was exemplified by the fact that while they had a right to elect a coordinator amongst 
them, they had not chosen to proceed to such action. Due to the lack of internal capacity 
and cohesion, the arrangements at Fin l and BS 1 were unable to forge trust and an 
experience of cooperation amongst ERs that would serve as a platform for the 
development of social dialogue procedures in the organizations. 
7.4 ICE arrangements and employees: recognition in its infancy 
A key factor conditioning ICE arrangements' potential to foster capability for voice is the 
interface between the employee-side of the forum and the workforce. As anticipated, 
informed understanding of the significance of the ICE arrangements did not emerge 
spontaneously. Instead, this was dependent not only on the facilities available for 
interaction with the workforce, as stipulated by the ICE agreements, but also on the ERs 
generating interest in their work amongst employees and persuading them of the value of 
the ICE arrangements. As Kelly (1996) has suggested, employees require an effective 
voice based on workers' rights to exercise collective power through independent 
mechanisms that they regard as legitimate. Regarding legitimacy, as defined by Hege and 
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Dufour (1995: 85), efforts were clearly made in `active' forums of Fin2, BS2 and BS3, 
which included site-level meetings between ERs and employees. Significant activity was 
reported in Fin2, where ERs developed a rather professional approach when promoting 
the operation of the forum to employees and dealing with issues raised by their 
constituents. Moreover, as a result of external support and advice by the IPA, ERs felt 
more confident in their skills in representing employees and independent from 
management fiat. ERs in BS2 and BS3 were able through, formal in BS2 and informal in 
BS3, structures, procedures and means they had developed for communication and 
interaction with employees to maintain their links with them and to express the identity of 
the work group in their dealings with management. In contrast, attempts to maintain 
informal communication links with the workforce in the `symbolic' forums were largely 
absent, Finl, and minimal, BS1. Apart from limited efforts on the part of the ERs to 
develop informal communication channels with employees, the lack of communication 
means, such as email facilities in Finl, played a significant role in constraining their 
ability to engage substantially in with the employees' immediate needs at the workplace. 
In BS 1 whilst efforts by the ERs to develop such links were evident these were still at an 
evolving stage. 
Further, visible process of consultation with management can confer legitimacy on 
accredited ERs (Terry, 1999) and act as a driving force for the ICE arrangements' 
representation and activity with the view to enhancing social dialogue procedures and 
capabilities for voice. Two means of demonstrating the visibility of the process of 
consultation are through ERs' reporting back to the workforce the results of the ICE 
meetings and consultation with management in the form of minutes or other 
documentation and the conduct of consultation exercises directly with employees. 
Regarding the former, evidence of information disseminated to employees regarding the 
results of the ICE meetings was apparent in Fin2, BS2 and BS3. However, serious 
disputes between ERs and management regarding the content of communications were 
reported in the cases of BS2 and BS3 that constrained significantly the ability of the ERs 
to report to employees their own views on the results of consultation exercises. In 
contrast, the fact that minutes were not kept and that strict confidentiality provisions were 
in operation in Finl meant that the communication to the workforce of developments in 
consultation exercises held within the forum was not possible. 
Regarding the second means, consultation exercises held between management and the 
ERs included in some cases consultation with the workforce. The most extensive level of 
interaction between ERs and employees regarding this aspect took place in BS2: 
consultation exercises were held with employees in a number of cases in order to 
determine employee priorities in issues dealt in consultation with management at forum- 
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level. Evidence of consultation with the workforce was also provided in BS3, albeit on a 
more limited scale. In contrast, there was very limited consultation with the employees in 
Fin 1, Fin2 and BSI. In Fin!, management constraint regarding confidential information 
largely precluded the exercise of consultation exercises. In Fin2, while the ICE 
documents stipulated the right for ERs to canvass regularly the opinion of the workforce, 
there were reportedly only limited instances where ERs sought the views of employees. 
Finally, in BS 1 there were limited reported attempts to consult directly with employees. 
The absence of consultation exercises with employees meant the inability of the 
employee-side ICE arrangements to transfer of employee interests to forum-level which 
would strengthen the process of participation and of developing capabilities. 
7.5 ICE arrangements and trade unions: the search for common ground? 
Through the introduction of another actor, i. e. ICE arrangements, the ICER confronted 
the traditional industrial relations actors, i. e. management and trade unions, with 
challenges regarding the processes and practices of collective organization at 
organizational level. In line with the management policy of excluding trade unions from 
the process, parallel negotiating and ICE arrangements were in operation in all three 
unionized organizations. Whilst the general approach by management when dealing with 
issues that should be discussed with both the forum and the unions was to involve 
simultaneously both parties but usually under separate channels, exceptions to this 
practice were observed in BS2 and BS3 and tripartite discussions were sometimes held. 
Significantly, in all three cases management expressed in some instances positive views 
regarding the potential for the adoption of a more integrative approach, i. e. involving the 
unions and the forums under the same channel, when dealing with issues that should be 
dealt by both employee representative arrangements. This stands in sharp contrast to the 
management position during the establishment/amendment of the ICE arrangements in all 
cases and could open up opportunities for the integration of the available employee 
representation channels. 
Many of the issues identified in the relationship of the ICE arrangements with the unions 
reflected some of the union discussions but also theoretical debates about the statutory 
recognition of employee consultative arrangements alongside trade union recognition and 
activity (Hyman, 1997; Kelly, 1997). The key issue was the extent to which trade unions 
and the forums could go in opposite directions or develop a common approach when 
dealing with the representation of the workforce. Although the arrangements in Fin l and 
BS2 were established without active involvement of the unions in the drafting of the 
agreements, the unions in both cases had managed successfully to promote union 
representatives in the forum elections. In BS3, where the unions provided formal and 
informal support to the forum during the establishment of the forum, again a significant 
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number of trade union representatives/members were elected. Still, in line with the ICER, 
there were no formal procedures for exchanging information between the forums and 
trade unions, and trade union support for the forums in the form of seminars, training or 
experts, was not formally established, constraining thus the extent to which they could act 
together for the advancement of participation and of capabilities for voice. 
The extent to which the relationship between the forums and the unions developed in 
practice varied significantly. This indicates the need to evaluate the empirical findings on 
a case-by-case basis. However, whilst the relationships between management and some 
of the unions were reportedly adversarial the different approaches adopted by the unions 
can be attributed to the different level of union activity in the organization and of general 
alignment of interests between the unions and the arrangements. In Finl, the clear 
demarcation of the issues dealt under the negotiation channel with the union and 
consultation with the forum, the concern of ERs not to be seen by management as aligned 
to trade union interests but also the concern of the union to avoid disturbing the existing 
union agreements constrained arguably the development of informal interaction between 
the union and the forum. In contrast, the fact that the unions did not have specified seats 
in the BS3 forum enabled them to use the latter as a way of obtaining information and 
supporting union campaigns within the entire organization. Precipitated by the adoption 
of a minimalist approach by management to the operation of the forum over time the 
latter drew closer to the biggest union. The situation in BS2 was somewhat different. 
While no specialist and policy support and certainly no resource supplementation and 
concentration in the form of mutual recognition and agreement on interests (Lecher et al., 
2001: 32) was provided by the unions - except from the case of consultation over 
pensions - attempts to develop a closer relationship between the forum and the unions 
were reported at the instigation of the forum. With the exception of Finl, where pay and 
rewards were not discussed, the unions in BS2 and BS3 adopted divergent views 
concerning the expansion of the forums to such issues. Whilst unions at BS2 were 
concerned that the forum encroached on their territory in BS3 the unions sought actively 
to extend the remit of the forum so as to include such issues for consultation. Irrespective 
of the fact that pay and benefits were in some cases issues for consultation, there was no 
evidence of the ICE arrangements evolving into bargaining relationships. 
255 
In the context of the representation channels available, the institutional design of the 
ICER is organized around a complex system of representation that articulates universal 
255 It can be suggested that the ICER 2004 do not prevent employee representatives from engaging with 
bargaining as opposed to consultative functions. Whilst reg 21 does impose a 
duty upon the parties to 
`work in a spirit of cooperation', it is unclear whether this 
duty might be interpreted as excluding 
bargaining functions from the consultation process (see Bercusson (2002) for an alternative reading. ) 
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and trade union representation at the same organizational level. This led Scott (2002: 6) 
to suggest that `if the UK is heading for a dual system, something which is a distinctly 
feasible evolution, what an amazing and appalling innovation it would be to find in a few 
years that the new Directive had ushered in a mutually exclusive dual system, either a 
single line union system or a single line employer controlled works council system. It 
would be a distinctly UK mutant hybrid, the worst of both worlds' (emphasis in original). 
Whilst the present arrangements were only at an early stage of their development, there 
was no evidence suggesting that the implementation of the ICER resulted in a mutually 
exclusive dual system, either in the form of single line union system or a single line 
employer-controlled works council system. On the one hand, the existing structures of 
negotiation remained untouched. Concerning the impact of the ICE structures on trade 
union presence at organizational level, the temptation, which arose on the part of 
management in some cases to develop alternative, parallel systems of representation, one 
union-based and the other not, with the potential to weaken both employer and employee 
commitment to union-based forms, did not result in the actual weakening of the trade 
unions in terms of membership in the organization. In BS2 and BS3 the establishment 
and operation of ICE structures did not either act as a stimulus to further unionization 
into areas not yet covered by collective agreements or to the expansion of issues where 
trade unions could be involved in consultation and negotiation with management. In 
contrast, union representatives at Fin I held that the introduction of the forum had a 
positive association with a small increase in union membership in the organization. 
On the other hand, despite the absence of formal integration between the unions and the 
forums evidence of the forums operating and sometimes cooperating alongside trade 
union recognition that assisted in the integration of employee interests in organizational 
decision-making was provided, albeit to a varying extent. The participation of unions in 
the newly established ICE arrangements was manifested in two ways: directly, through 
consultation exercises held between management, the forums, and the unions at the same 
table - that was the case mostly in BS3, and indirectly, through the election of union 
representatives as ERs - that was evident in all the unionized organizations. While the 
extent to which these instances led to changes to the formal role of the unions in terms of 
representing non-union employees was limited, evidence of an expansion of their role 
within the consultative framework, as suggested in chapter two, was provided, e. g. BS3. 
The unions at BS3 used the ICE arrangements as the institutional framework and the 
considerable source of support for their activities, and succeeded in extending their 
involvement from once-a-year pay bargaining in specific parts of the workforce to 
ongoing, broadened consultation around a wider range of issues that affected the whole of 
the organization. Even in BS2, where the unions had adopted an apprehensive approach 
to the operation of the forums, the tripartite discussions on the issue of pensions provided 
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them the opportunity to utilize the ICE arrangements in order to remedy the lack of 
mobilization of employees. Whilst on a limited scale, such activities highlighted the 
potential of UK trade unions to develop - along their role as negotiators -a capacity to 
represent all employees, irrespective of trade union membership or recognition, in 
consultation exercises with management. 
7.6 Conclusion 
The recognition of a right to information and consultation at organizational level opens 
up opportunities for interaction between the social actors. The formation of all-employee 
representative structures, as stipulated by the ICER, meant that management was obliged 
to enter into social dialogue with the elected employee-representatives over business, 
organizational and employment issues. Hence, in contrast to previous UK legislation, 
opportunities for regular information and consultation over a broader range of issues that 
covered all employees, irrespective of trade union recognition or membership, were 
provided. Assisted by the institutional design of the ICER the operation of arrangements 
relied significantly on a discursive and learning logic promoting, in effect, the adoption 
and development of flexible standards that were adapted to the particular circumstances 
of the organizations and workforce under study. However, the extent to which the newly 
established/amended arrangements encouraged the reshaping of the context in which the 
actors operated and the development of a capability for voice was significantly 
conditioned by the interaction between the institutional design of the ICER and the 
approaches adopted by the social actors involved in the arrangements. Reflecting but 
simultaneously diverging from the formal text of the ICE agreements, the extent to which 
the nominal rights stipulated in the agreements developed into effective rights was thus 
shaped by a matrix of different sources of influence operating at organizational level. 
Based on the fact that the most effective arrangements in terms of developing a capability 
for voice were found in BS2, where evidence of unions' integration into the arrangements 
was limited, a conclusion could be reached that mutual recognition and agreement on 
interest between the forums and the unions are not necessary preconditions for the 
development of effective ICE rights. However, in light of the findings presented 
regarding the interaction between management and the employee-side we should be 
cautious of such as conclusion. As already seen, management policy constitutes a 
determining factor in shaping the extent to which the ICE arrangement can develop a 
capacity to act. Whilst the arrangements at BS3 enjoyed significant support by the 
unions, the adoption of a minimalist policy by management constrained to a significant 
extent the capacity of the forum. In contrast, the fact that the forum at BS2 developed a 
considerable capability to act was a result of the gradual adoption of a pro-active 
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management approach that was arguably developed in part so as to prevent the unions 
from expanding their influence in the organization. 256 
Employee representative structures in the UK that were established in a regulatory 
vacuum, either statutory or based on industrial agreements, have been traditionally 
characterized as `managerial emanations that lack autonomy and efficacy. ' (Butler, 2003: 
6). Despite the introduction of statutory requirements through the ICER, the extent to 
which the arrangements under study were management-led was considerable. In taking 
advantage of the PEA option, management-led arrangements in terms of structures, 
resources and subjects for information and consultation were significantly promoted. The 
exercise of the ICE rights was, in effect, conditioned by management organization and 
policies. However, there was evidence that the operation of the ICE arrangements 
conditioned management organization and policies as well. Within this context, 
management decision-making, either in the form of process, substance or 
implementation, was influenced by the process of information and consultation operating 
at organizational level allowing hence for the development of a capability for employee 
voice, albeit of a varying nature. To that end, the effectiveness of ICE rights, as stipulated 
by the ICER, was crucially dependant on the mobilization of a number of other 
`conversion factors', such as capacity and cohesion of internal ICE arrangements, 
maintenance of links between the employee-side ICE arrangements and the workforce, 
and trade union advice and support. This confirms the argument put forward by Dufour 
and Hege (2002: 171) that `effective representation normally depends on resources 
extending beyond formal rights'. 
256 This finding is arguably in line with Kotthoff s (1981) suggestion that the quality of the union-works 
council relationship in Germany is influenced not only by the strength of the union identity of the works 
councilors, as Streeck has argued (1979), but also by the dynamic social (power) relations between works 
councils and management: the more powerful the management, the closer the works council gets to the 
union. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion 
While the scope of joint regulation, as evidenced in successive WERS, has diminished 
dramatically since 1980 there is evidence of a growing and more complicated regulatory 
environment - often driven by EU law - that has led to a marked increase in the number 
of employee representation structures and has impacted upon the traditional reliance on 
the `single channel' of representation through recognized trade unions. In this context, the 
adoption of the ICED in 2002 was heralded by a significant number of academics, policy 
makers, and organizations as entailing significant implications for the UK system of 
industrial relations. Even as the question of the impact of the ICED in the nature and 
function of employee representative arrangements in the UK could appear very specific 
the empirical findings highlighted - through employing the notion of `double 
subsidiarity' - the dependency of the analysis on factors operating in different systems 
and at different levels. 
As Falkner et al. (2005: 352) note, there is limited congruence between market 
liberalization, on the one hand, and socially motivated EU action to secure `just' and 
socially sustainable outcomes, on the other. The debate at EU level is increasingly 
informed by the economic rather than social imperatives of market integration and the 
`learning process' encouraged by the European Employment Strategy is skewed towards 
neoliberal policy objectives (Deakin, 2003). In this context, the ICED - despite its 
limitations - marked a significant departure from the practice of subordinating social 
rights regarding employee representation to economic considerations that give priority to 
management considerations in organizational decision-making. As suggested in chapter 
one, the directive adopted a reflexive orientation. In providing a legal framework that 
allows for adaptation to particular circumstances and within which there is a degree of 
self-regulation the objective was to overcome the dichotomy between prescription and 
deregulation in the area of employee representation. Contrary to the `leveling-down' 
agenda of negative harmonization the ICED aimed to encourage both member states, 
through the transposition, and organizations themselves, through negotiations with 
labour, to preserve a space for local-level experimentation and adaptation regarding 
information and consultation rights (Barnard and Deakin, 2000: 342). The starting point 
for RL is the nature of the interaction between the legal and other systems, such as the 
political and the industrial relations systems. The clear boundaries between such 
functionally differentiated autopoietic worlds and the resultant impossibility of directly 
influencing internal worlds across those boundaries has profound implications for 
concepts of political, legal and other intervention as any attempt must now recognize the 
internal dynamics of autopoietic systems which direct any external force away from the 
paths and goals sought by the external influencers. As a solution, reflexive regulation 
attempts to stimulate and facilitate a process of self-regulation (Rogowski and Wilthagen, 
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1994: 7) by providing a `frame' or `steering mechanism' rather than commanding 
industrial relations actors. 
For the purpose of the thesis, the capability approach was used in the evaluative analysis 
for assessing the impact of the institutional design of the legislation on the transposition 
of the ICED and the establishment and operation of consultative arrangements at sub- 
national level. In adopting a more dynamic notion of equality, ' the use of a capability- 
based approach has increasingly being used in policy and academic debates at supra and 
national levels in the EU concerning social matters. In brief, the CA conceptualizes 
freedom as the fundamental basis not only of human development but also of social 
justice. What distinguishes the application of the CA in the field of social sciences from 
individualistic (human capital) or sociological (social context) approaches is the emphasis 
on the importance of institutions (De Munck and Zimmermann, 2008). The institutional 
dimension of the CA has two effects: firstly, it introduces - through a description of the 
interactions between the legal system and its realization in the social field - the concept 
of normative objectives in the evaluative description of public policies in the social 
sciences. Secondly, the capability set becomes the object of a moral evaluation in the 
framework of obligations on the part of public policy-makers (De Munck, 2008). In this 
context, the CA constitutes an evaluative theory concerned with the State and rights. 
However, a capability-based approach has to be contextualized in order to function as an 
evaluative framework for human development. In the socio-economic context, it has been 
suggested that in order to promote the realization of rights as capabilities forms of 
procedural social rights have to be promoted (Browne et al., 2004). Such social rights can 
influence the institutional environment so that individuals can convert their resources, 
e. g. competences, capital, to actual functionings. More particularly, rights to information 
and consultation permit engagement in all forms of co-operation and agreement within 
the security of law. The process of adjustment of the existing industrial relations 
framework to statutory information and consultation requirements can induce a process 
of `institutional learning' (Didry, 2000) assisting, in turn, the integration of employee 
interests in organizational decision-making. In that way, the recognition of social rights in 
the form of proceduralized forms of participation can act as `social conversion factors' 
for the development of a specific type of capability, `capability for voice'. Rather than 
requiring the workforce to be `adaptable' to changing market conditions, the introduction 
of such rights requires that employment practices be adapted to take into account the 
circumstances of the employees through the development of social dialogue procedures; 
hence, the substantive freedom to realize a range of desired end-states and activities 
becomes feasible. Bearing in mind the rejection of theoretically or dogmatically asserted 
efficiency, a reflexive orientation to law and regulation, which stresses the importance of 
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a space for standard-setting by collective actors, is potentially a principal means by which 
such an approach may be operationalized in legal institutional terms. 
On this basis, the thesis sought to assess the extent to which the use of reflexive 
regulation mechanisms could promote a capability-based approach to the development of 
consultative arrangements. Emphasis was placed, more particularly, on the extent to 
which the introduction of institutional structures in the form of ICE arrangements 
promoted a change in the institutional logic of the British system of industrial relations 
and allowed, through the development of a learning process of participation, the 
discussion and evaluation of the organizational rules affecting employees' interests. In 
this context, it is important to stress here that the focus was solely on the collective 
dimension of freedom, i. e. capability for voice, as articulated through the 
establishment/amendment and operation of employee representative arrangements and 
not on the impact of the new statutory provisions for information and consultation on 
employees as individuals. 
To that direction, the thesis was based on the premise that the capability for voice that the 
new/amended arrangements can develop at organizational level is a product of external 
influences, i. e. ICER, and internal developmental preconditions of the ICE arrangements 
that operate in the organizations. Hence, through the use of an evaluative framework, 
adapted from the work of Lecher et al. (2001), that focused on the dimensions and 
indicators potentially useful for the development of a capability for voice, the research 
attempted to highlight the links between the development of the specific type of 
capability - that of voice - and the institutional framework, as provided by the ICER. In 
that way, it was made possible to take into account the totality of the resources and 
factors of conversion, stipulated by the ICER and developed by the parties, highlight the 
changing interactions between the main protagonists, and examine the processes through 
which effective employee representation, as an indicator of the collective dimension of 
freedom, was realized in line with a capability-based approach. 
The research pointed out some of the difficulties in the design of the reflexive regulatory 
framework. It was firstly true that much depended on the nature of the transposition and 
how what the objectives of the reformulation of EU-level norms in the process of the 
transposition of directives at national level were. The change that EU legislation brought 
was arguably greater than just adding another `layer' of new policies to the domestic 
system of employee representation (Falkner et al., 2005: 347). As suggested in chapter 
one, the effect of the ICED was potentially very radical in its departure from a number of 
traditional features of the UK legal and industrial relations systems and had the potential 
to transform significantly the nature and function of employee representative structures in 
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the UK system of industrial relations. First of all, the ICED envisaged a permanent 
statutory system of employee representation at organizational level. Secondly, it 
expanded the range of information and consultation to cover aspects of managerial 
prerogative that were until hitherto not covered by existing legislation, nor industrial 
relations practice. Thirdly, its application was `universal' covering hence all employees at 
a given undertaking, irrespective of their status as union members. Finally, the 
procedures encouraged by the ICED were more deliberative and cooperative in tone than 
the traditional pluralist emphasis on conflict of interest in the employment relation (Bogg, 
2005). 
Against this context and in diverging from existing UK social norms and conventions the 
institutional design of the ICED induced the creation of space for collective organization 
and a new role for the two sides of industry, CBI and TUC, in the development of labour 
legislation at national level. This was also attractive for the political system as it provided 
an alternative means of policy formulation and decision-making. Through this process, a 
re-conceptualization of the EU-level norms concerning information and consultation of 
employees, as stipulated by the ICED, and a consensus - based albeit on different 
rationales, i. e. high organizational performance on the part of the DTI and maintenance of 
existing arrangements on the part of the CBI and the TUC - that a `one size fits all' 
approach was not suitable were reached. As a result what was proposed and finally 
inserted in the transposing legislation was a range of employee representation models, 
including both union and non-union representations as well as forms of direct 
representation associated with soft HRM techniques (Upchurch et al., 2006). 
In light of the promotion of diversity by maximizing the scope for agreed arrangements 
that may depart from the minimum requirements of the ICED, the examination of the 
impact and potential outcomes for employers and trade unions from the consultation 
processes and arrangements emerging from the legislative framework is crucial. In effect, 
the flexible legislative framework offered different strategies for employers and different 
implications for trade unions; as such the extent to which the introduction of information 
and consultation rights could act as a `social conversion factor' for the creation of a 
learning process of participation and capabilities for voice were crucially dependent on 
the response of the main actors to the legal prompt. Similar to the legislation on EWCs 
and trade union recognition the new legislation drove to some extent the spread of 
voluntary arrangements, reached either ahead of its entry into force and less as a 
consequence of its trigger mechanism being used. However, there was not much evidence 
that the `standard provisions' of the ICER promoted institutional experimentation or to a 
new framework for learning and participation in line with the two theoretical approaches 
of reflexive regulation and capabilities. 
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Hyman's assertion in 1996 that management's response to the introduction of works 
councils arrangements in the UK depended on the nature of the legal obligations, the 
efficacy of the mechanisms of enforcement and the degree to which extra-legal resources 
could be mobilized - notably by trade unions - to influence employer strategy was 
confirmed in the thesis. Concerning the nature of the legal obligations, there was 
evidence both from the analysis of the findings of the application of the ICED and its 
implementation at lower level, i. e. organizational, that the thresholds were set too high 
for the application of the ICER. Only in very limited instances was it reported that 
organizations considered likely the possibility that employees would trigger the process 
for the application of the `negotiated agreement' procedure. Concerning enforcement, the 
analysis of the empirical findings suggests that sanctions were set up at a very low level 
and that the complexity of the process may have discouraged trade unions and more 
significantly employees from making use of the procedures. What is more, apart from 
few exceptions there was no effort on the part of unions to use the legal rights stipulated 
in the ICER to extend those available through traditional collective bargaining 
approaches. In general, both employers and trade unions were content to maintain the 
status quo on consultative arrangements rather than challenging existing practices or 
negotiating new agreements, limiting thus the extent to which collective organization for 
the setting of information and consultation standards could be achieved. The fact that the 
ICER were significantly based on the outline scheme agreed by the CBI and the TUC 
may possibly explain why reaction to the final form of the ICER, has, to date, been 
relatively muted. The TUC has chosen instead to criticize only the low level of sanctions 
and the possibility for compliance through direct ICE methods. 
As CA advocates suggest, the so-called situated state (Storper and Salais, 1997) must be 
considered in combination with the situated firm (Bonvin and Farvaque 2003). The 
recognition of the employer's obligation to enter into processes of information and 
consultation with employee representatives has the effect of institutionalizing a role for 
employee representation when organizational decisions are taken. In the context of the 
ICER, an evolution away from the traditional British model towards a continental 
European model that stresses consultation and social dialogue and enhances the 
opportunities for the integration of employee interests in the organization was observed in 
some case studies. In some cases, management treated the ICE arrangements in a serious 
way and ERs proved eager and able to develop their roles and responsibilities towards the 
workforce. In the study of Rogers and Streeck (1995: 6), a defining mark of works 
councils is that they are `institutionalized bodies for representative communication' 
supported by strong legal underpinning. However, reflecting the flexible design of the 
ICER, the powers of the ICE arrangements in the UK context were more attenuated as the 
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agenda of representation moved towards the vital interests of the employer and dealt with 
business planning, performance and finance (Hyman, 1996: 71). Furthermore, the degree 
of routine and stability that could be attained through the operation of consultative 
arrangements at organizational level was constrained to some extent. This was 
exemplified in the ambiguous scope for consultation, as prescribed by the ICE 
agreements, which resulted in uncertainty not only on the part of the workforce, but also 
on the part of ERs. 
Further, as a result of the denial of a preferred role to trade unions by the ICER the 
possibilities for creating `thick interactions' (Davies and Kilpatrick, 2004: 128) between 
the union channel and the newly created universal channel of employee representation 
were significantly constrained at organizational level. However, in some cases the 
introduction/amendment of ICE arrangements in light of the legislation became more 
accepted by trade unions and not only enabled the unions to address a considerably 
broader agenda than was the case until hitherto in these workplaces but also to secure 
better information about the organizations' business plans. The study thus confirmed the 
need for different `social conversion factors' that are located at different levels, i. e. legal 
systems and organization-based, to operate in conjunction for the development of ICE 
arrangements into a meaningful and capable exercise for the development of a learning 
process and a capability for voice. 
The difficulties reported in the present study demonstrate that whilst a reflexive legal 
strategy may overcome certain limitations of command and control regulation it is `no 
panacea for all social ills' (Teubner, 1993: 66). As Teubner (1993: 97) further 
acknowledges, `if law becomes "reflexive"... it can increase its regulatory potential to a 
certain extent. However, despite all "reflexivity", law is still a closed autopoietic system 
operating in a world of closed autopoietic systems. It is impossible to break down the 
barriers which result from this double closure. ' Nonetheless, the empirical findings more 
significantly pointed to some problematic areas of the institutional design of the ICER. It 
is important to remember that reflexive regulation involves an attempt to use `legal 
norms, procedures and sanctions to `frame' or `steer' the process of self-regulation 
(Barnard and Deakin, 2002); hence, the institutional frame and steering mechanisms 
provided by the legislation are of fundamental importance. From a legal analysis point of 
view, the argument of the present study is that whilst the legal strategy for regulating 
employee representation arrangements should maintain its reflexive regulation approach 
it should also revisit the conditions attached to the selection of different compliance 
options. 
In more detail, as evident from the study, the operation of the high threshold criteria and 
the provisions on sanctions acted effectively as `deterrents' to the establishment or 
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amendment of consultative arrangements so as to comply with the ICER. Whilst such 
absence of action can be perfectly justifiable in the case of organizations where employee 
representation through other effective forms exists, it may have negative repercussions in 
terms of the establishment of social dialogue procedures in organizations with no pre- 
existing arrangements or without trade unions. Further, as seen from both the application 
and implementation of the ICED at organizational level employee approval and 
agreement between management and labour on the structural and operational aspects of 
the ICE arrangements need not imply genuine participation of independent from 
management representatives of the workforce. This could be seen, then, as a means of 
legitimizing management as the party responsible for the aspects of the ICE 
arrangements. 
Provided that empirical findings from further research corroborate the ones reported in 
the present study, some possible amendments to the institutional frame of the ICER can 
be suggested. Firstly, in order to overcome the inability of the ICER to act in a manner 
anticipated by the ICED UK law could lower the 10 per cent threshold for the application 
of the legislation. The problem of the high threshold may be more acute in organizations 
employing between 50 and 100 employees since employees are less likely to have any 
trade union representatives who can act on their behalf and organizations lack 
sophisticated human resource departments that would be aware of the statutory 
requirements. Lowering the threshold could not only ensure that the application of the 
legislation would be easier in such organizational contexts but could also give the 
opportunity to the workforce to overturn ICE arrangements that were imposed 
unilaterally by management or prescribed controversially direct methods of information 
and consultation. In conjunction with this, a union priority rule for the representation 
mechanisms of information and consultation could be introduced; this would act as a 
counterweight to the lowering of the thresholds and would not only ensure that existing 
union agreements are protected but it could also encourage unions to take a more 
proactive stance to the establishment and operation of ICE arrangements. In line with the 
suggestions by Davies and Kilpatrick (2004: 137), priority should first be given to a 
recognized union and then to a union with sufficient presence in the workforce; only 
where there is insufficient union presence, should the third possibility, i. e. elected 
representatives selected by workforce ballot, be used. Such changes could make more 
robust the regulatory framework of the ICER and could limit the possibilities that the 
legislation would be used for the unilateral imposition of ICE arrangements to the 
workforce and the containment of trade unions. 
The need for improvements in the substantive context of the rights provided by the ICER 
was also highlighted in the research. In all organizations studied for the purpose of the 
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thesis PEAs were either established or amended in light of the ICER. 257 In these cases the 
introduction of the legislation prompted hence a response from organizations and had an 
effect on organizational practice. However, the loose institutional design of the 
Regulations was not enough to channel the ICE processes into more substantive 
outcomes. The reflexive design of the ICER concerning the realization of information 
and consultation rights, mainly through the prescription of undemanding PEAs 
provisions, undercut to some extent the standard developed by the ICED. The insertion of 
provisions mentioning explicitly the employer's obligation to give reasoned replies to the 
employees' representatives' opinions or to consult with a view to reaching an agreement 
would provide a framework more in line with the objectives laid down in the directive. 
Further, whilst maintaining a reflexive approach to the regulation of employee 
representation is in line with the context-dependent evaluation of valuable functionings, 
as suggested by CA theorists, it would be beneficial to reinforce the procedural 
safeguards against breach of the legislation's requirements by applying the enforcement 
mechanisms to the PEAs and increasing the upper level of sanctions currently available. 
In this context, consideration could be again given to empowering the CAC to restrain 
employers from implementing decisions until proper consultation has taken place. Such 
amendments would not only be compatible with the ICED requirements for `effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive' sanctions258 but could also encourage in the long-term the 
development of information and consultation norms and could enhance social dialogue 
procedures at organizational level. Finally, as Hall (2005: 116) suggests, the inclusion in 
the `standard provisions' of a more elaborate constitution for an undertaking-wide ICE 
body could also assist in more effective ICE procedures as it would provide a certain 
level of routine and certainty that would be valuable not only for employees but also for 
management. 
The empirical evidence on the implementation of the ICED at organizational level 
provides finally the opportunity to comment on the analytical validity of the analytical 
framework analyzed in chapter two and to suggest areas for further research. Arguably, 
the analytical framework used in the present study goes some way towards providing an 
understanding of the dynamics of ICE arrangements across different organizational 
settings. In detail, the analytical framework allows a rich form of analysis to emerge 
surrounding the processes used by management to inform and consult with employees, 
which takes account of the impact of the flexible institutional design of the ICER. This 
stands in stark contrast to accounts portraying employee representation arrangements in a 
vacuum of their external regulatory environment. Ultimately, there are variations even 
257 However, in Fin2 the arrangements were not in writing. 
258 Art. 8. 
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within single types that need to be explained and analyzed, and the framework goes some 
way towards that objective. Given the multitude of contingent variables that shape the 
choices for employee representation, then the processes and outcomes associated with 
ICE arrangements are best seen as temporal: moving in and out of symbolic and active 
status is dependent on a range of contextual factors. 
Although the legislation has not, as originally predicted by many commentators, resulted 
in `seismic' developments in the area of employee representation, it is important to stress 
that ICE arrangements constitute dynamic processes that only develop consolidated 
structures or defined and demarcated sets of tasks over time. A fruitful area for further 
research would be to further test and refine the understanding of complex social 
processes, and this would be an area ripe for further investigation as the statutory 
framework becomes embedded into domestic legislation. In this context, it might prove 
useful to first identify what role ICE arrangements can and are developing within the 
overall organizational context, rather than to pre judge the arrangements by applying an 
unspecific standard of effectiveness. A definitive measure of the quantitative impact of 
the ICER in terms of the extensiveness of ICE arrangements will be provided by the 
WERS series due towards the end of this decade. In terms of its qualitative impact, on- 
going research by IRRU members at the University of Warwick, who have already 
proceeded to the publication of findings in larger organizations (Hall et at, 2007), will 
provide a very useful basis for comparison across different case studies. Further, the 
response of organizations employing fewer than 150 employees, which is also addressed 
by the Warwick team, would be significant for the purpose of assessing, in particular, the 
extent to which certain features of the institutional framework, such as the trigger 
mechanism and the compliance option through direct ICE forms, produce results that are 
different from their application at larger organizations. 
Furthermore, the distinction between the functions of information and consultation on the 
one hand, and collective bargaining on the other, has become increasingly blurred in 
practice over the years and will continue to be so, maybe even more since the application 
of the ICER. In response to this, other processes of representation may at times provide 
resources that strengthen the potential for effective negotiation. In light of this, it will be 
fruitful to explore the extent to which the embedding of the ICER will induce further 
such blurring. Finally, apart from the fact that ICE arrangements may be important in 
their own terms, it will be interesting to examine their capacity to fill an infrastructural 
gap by providing a bridge between local and European-level representation arrangements 
as well as providing a vehicle for meeting the current range of issue-specific employee 
representation requirements in UK law (Hall and Terry, 2004: 227). 
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In light of the dependency of the ICE arrangements on a complex set of factors, the 
realization of such research projects will be able to address the issue of the sustainability 
of such consultative arrangements across time as well. However, whilst the empirical 
findings of the present research constitute one of the first attempts to evaluate the initial 
impact of the directive in the UK system of industrial relations there are lessons already 
for those who are interested in employee representation forms that diverge from the 
employer-initiated mechanisms of `direct participation' and the structures of trade union 
organization forms of employee representation. Embracing such employee representation 
forms will have important consequences for management strategies, union responses but 
also employees to future ICE arrangements in establishing effective workplace 
representation. 
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Appendix A. CIA survey questionnaire 
m 
CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 
IiISOCIAT 1011 
Employee information and consultation: 
Questionnaire for CIA member-organizations 
" This survey aims to collect some basic information on employers' arrangements in the 
chemical sector for informing and consulting their employees and the potential impact of the 
Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations that began to come into effect in 
April 2005 (see the final page for a summary of the Information and Consultation of 
Employees Regulations). 
" Completing this short questionnaire will take only a few minutes. Please indicate your 
response to the questions below by ticking ('l) the appropriate boxes. 
" The information you provide will be kept confidential and participating organizations will not 
be identified in any analysis or publication. 
"A summary of the findings will be sent to all the organizations participating in the survey; 
the Chemical Industries Association will have access to a report including suggestions 
regarding advice and guidance to member organizations. 
" Please return your completed form in the envelope provided, or fax it to the Industrial 
Relations Research Unit, Warwick Business School (024 7652 4184) by (date). 
Thank you for your co-operation. 
RESPONDENT DETAILS 
Name of your organization: ........................................................................................................ 
Your name: ................................................................................................................................. 
Your job title: ............................................................................................................................... 
1. ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION 
1.1 How many employees (either full-time or part-time) does your organization have? (tick 
one only) 
under 50 Q 50-99 Q 100-149 Q 150-499 Q 500-plus Q 
1.2 Is your organization? (tick one only) 
single-site Q multi-site Q 
1.3 Which is the main activity of your organization? (tick one only) 
pharmaceutical Q chemical Li 
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plastic manufacturing Q other (please specify): ........................... Q 
1.4 Does the organization recognize trade unions for any group of employees? (tick one 
only) 
yes Q no Q 
2. EXISTING INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION OF EMPLOYEES ARRANGEMENTS 
2.1 What type(s) of information and consultation arrangements for employees exist in your 
organization? (tick all that apply) 
a multi-site information and consultation body Q 
one or more site-level information and consultation bodies Q 
information/consultation via recognized trade unions Q 
information and consultation directly with employees Q 
no current arrangements for information and consultation of employees Q=> go to 
section 3.1 
other (please specify): ................................................................................................. Q 
2.2 If there are current information and consultation arrangements for employees in your 
organization, do they cover? (tick one only) 
the whole workforce Q half of the workforce Q some of the workforce Q 
2.3 Which of the descriptions below apply to your organization's employee information 
and consultation arrangements? (tick all that apply) 
they are based on a written agreement with trade union representatives Q 
they are based on a written agreement with other employee representatives Q 
they have been approved by employees (e. g. in a ballot) Q 
they are formal arrangements introduced by management acting alone Q 
they are ad hoc/event-specific arrangements (e. g. collective redundancies) Q 
2.4 If you ticked more than one box in 2.3 please provide details on the scope/coverage of 
each of the information and consultation arrangements: 
2.5 On which of the following topics does your organization inform and/or consult 
employees? (tick all that apply) 
business development (e. g. strategic Q 
objectives) 
financial issues (e. g. performance, Q 
pay issues (e. g. wage/ salary reviews) Q 
health and safety of employees Q 
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outlook) 
production issues (level of production 
of sales, quality of product or service) 
employment issues (e. g. 
redundancies, redeployment, training, 
transfer of undertakings) 
Q work organization (e. g. changes to Q 
working methods, working time) 
Q other issues (please provide the most Q 
important ones over the past 12 
months): ........................................... 
.............................................................. 
2.6 If there is an employee information and consultation body in your organization, how 
frequently are meetings held between management and representatives of employees? 
(tick all that apply) 
at least monthly Q at least quarterly Q at least annually Q when issues arise Q 
3. IMPACT OF THE UK INFORMATION AND CONSULTATION OF EMPLOYEES 
REGULATIONS 
3.1 Has your organization made an assessment of the possible impact of the Regulations 
on the way the business manages employee information and consultation? 
yes Q no Q => go to section 3.3 
3.2. If yes, which of the following statements most accurately describes your 
organization's response to the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations? 
(tick one only) 
the organization is not covered by the Regulations Q 
the existing information and consultation arrangements for employees meet the Q 
Regulations' requirements 
the existing information and consultation arrangements for employees have already been Q 
modified in response to the Regulations 
the existing information and consultation arrangements do not comply with the Q 
Regulations and the organization plans to introduce changes 
the existing arrangements do not comply with the Regulations and the organization is not Q 
currently planning any action 
3.3 Do you intend to make an assessment of the information and consultation of 
employees arrangements within the next two years? 
yes Q no Q 
3.4 Do you expect your employees to request negotiations under the Regulations on the 
establishment of information and consultation arrangements? (tick one only) 
yes Q 
4. CIA GUIDANCE 
no Q 
4.1 In assessing the possible impact of the Regulations 
in your organization, have you 
drawn on the guidance provided by the CIA? 
(tick one only) 
yes Q no Q not aware of 
the guidance Q 
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4.2 The CIA encourages organizations to adopt sustainable development goals. Does 
employee information and consultation constitute one of your organization's goals? (tick 
one only) 
yes Q no Q 
5. FURTHER INFORMATION 
5.1 Would you be willing to talk further to one of our researchers about the arrangements 
for information and consultation of employees in your organization? (tick one only) 
yes Q no Q 
Thank you for completing this questionnaire. 
Please send your completed form to (recipient) by (date). 
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Appendix B. Organizational context of the case studies 
Financial services case study 1 (Finl) 
Established in the 19th century, Finl plc is an international financial services company 
with some 16 million customers and around 22,500 employees in Asia, the UK and 
Europe, and the US. In the UK, Finl is a leading life and pensions' provider with seven 
million customers. At the time of the research, Fin 1 employed around 6,800 people. Fin 1 
UK, which is headquartered in London, is a multi-site organization. Its business activities 
have been characterized by major changes in the past few years, including the takeover of 
an insurance company in 1997, which enhanced the company's presence in the 
Independent Finance Advisors (IFA) market, and the acquisition of another company in 
1999. In 1998, in response to, and in anticipation of, industry trends Fin l created an 
exclusively internet-based financial services operation. However, challenges to the Fin l's 
UK business activities were later evident, including a takeover attempt by a rival 
organizational and the sale of the internet financial organization. 
The organization is partially unionized. A union has been recognized for collective 
bargaining purposes for up to and including the middle manager level in all but one sites. 
Apart from the recognition agreement, Fin l has entered into enabling, facilities and 
security agreements with the union. According to union information, in 2006 membership 
density stood at around 70% at Belfast, 55% at Reading, 30% at London and 80% at 
Bristol. Management believed that in average less than half of the workforce is union 
members. The only non-union site at the time of research was in Scotland where around 
2,300 people are employed. A non-union forum, which was in operation in various forms 
for over 20 years and was inherited from the acquisition of an organization in 1997, 
constituted the principal mechanism for collective but also individual representation for 
all grades in the site. Both the emergence of the call centre and the digitilization of the 
back office enabled Finl, in common with much of the financial services sector, to 
launch significant offshoring of services and processes to India. In 2002, the 
announcement by the organization of the closure of a call centre with the loss of around 
850 jobs and the subsequent creation of an offshore call-centre and back-office 
processing unit in Mumbai led to an acrimonious dispute between management. Whilst 
the decision to proceed to offshoring was implemented, the union achieved the 
conclusion of a 14-point agreement including a commitment to `no compulsory 
redundancies' as part of a job security package that would be effective until 2005. Both 
the ER manager and the union representative noted that the relationship between the 
parties picked back again and was at the time of research `reasonably comfortable and 
good. ' The general relation between management and the union was described as `a good 
working relationship based on cooperation', without however reaching the extent of a 
partnership approach. 
Still at representative level, a `European Employee Forum' was set up in 1999 following 
the adoption of the EWCD. The forum is chaired by the Chief Executive of Fin 1 UK & 
Europe and is made up of elected representatives from a number of Fin 1's European 
businesses. A minimum of two meetings per year are held, with different senior 
executives invited to attend. Employee involvement, through `business-driven' 
direct 
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forms of employee involvement (Hall, 2005), such as the use of intranet, email systems, 
team briefing systems, focus groups and annual employee surveys, has also been in 
operation. The management style towards employees was generally described by the 
Employee Relations ('ER') manager as one of `employee involvement and commitment. ' 
Financial services case study 2 (Fing) 
Fin2 was launched by a major insurance company in the late 1990s following 
deregulation of financial services in the UK. The insurance company was the majority 
owner, owing 78% of the Fin2's shares. The organization is an innovative financial 
services company providing a range of banking, investment and insurance products 
through its internet site. The first internet savings accounts were marketed in 1999. The 
organization's goal at launch of the Fin2 brand in October 1998 was to attract £5 billion 
of deposits within five years. It achieved that goal in the first seven months of operation, 
principally through the opening of accounts over the telephone and later through the 
Internet and has over 3 million customers today. Fin2 was floated on the LSE in 2000 and 
expanded its business into Europe through the acquisition of one of France's leading 
online banks in mid-2002. 
While during the early years of its operation Fin2's core banking products were attractive 
to customers in the UK challenges appeared in the following years as UK online banking 
became an increasingly competitive marketplace, particularly among the 'new online 
banks', the recently formed UK standalone Internet banks, set up by mortgage banks and 
retail deposit institutions. Due to operational losses in 2004 Fin2 decided to withdraw 
from the French market and focus on the development of their core UK business. 
However, particular uncertainty was created by the potential sale of the business over 
these years. Following unsuccessful attempts by the majority owner to sell the holding at 
Fin2 in July 2005, the owner announced in October 2005 that it was to hang on to its 
majority stake in Fin2. In December 2005, the majority owner agreed to buy the 21.7% 
stake in Fin2 it did not already own. However, having reviewed its UK operations, 
including Fin2, the majority owner organization agreed finally to sell Fin2 to a US 
banking organization in January 2007. 
At the time of research the organization was operating entirely within the UK and 
employed some 2,700 staff split between Derby, Dudley and London. Head office, in 
Derby, is home to most of the business functions to the main call centre site and 
accommodates the majority of the workforce, almost 1,800 employees, who are 
predominantly young graduates and women. A further 400 people are located in Dudley 
and 150 in London. The employee chair noted that at launch Fing was `a small company 
with a dynamic culture'. Management at Fin2 endorsed fully the human management 
resource model that emphasizes the importance of cooperation in all organizational 
relations and employ a range of direct methods of employee involvement. Within this 
context, employees are encouraged to regard the relationship with management as non- 
hierarchical and open. 
Fin2 does not recognize a trade union. Pay and benefits are determined at company 
level 
by management and are based on both individual and company performance. 
However, 
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Fin2 and a union were locked in a battle over the union's recognition since 2003. While 
the union is recognized for the purpose of collective bargaining in the majority owner of 
Fin2 management at Fin2 decided from the start of Fin2's operation that a trade union 
was not needed for the purpose of representing the workforce. The reason for the refusal 
to allow the union to operate in Fin2 was management's perception that the existing 
policies ensured the fair treatment of the workforce. In 2005 the union stepped up its 
campaign to represent Fin2's employees, claiming that the internet bank's workers 
needed protection from the threat of outsourcing. The union wanted to be allowed to 
recruit members at Fin2 and to participate in workplace negotiations at the bank. Protests 
were held against Fin2 in two sites. Management but also the Fin2's forum rebuffed 
attempts by the union to recruit members at Fin2's call centres in Derby and Dudley. 
Business services case study 1 (BS1) 
BS 1 was borne out of an outsourcing agreement over property outsourcing with a 
government department in mid-1998 and has developed to be one of the UK's leading 
property partnership specialists. In 2001 the organization was acquired by BS 1 Group. At 
the time of research the BS 1 Group's principal activities were developing property and 
managing portfolio of offices, shops, retail warehouses, food superstores and leisure 
together with property outsourcing throughout the UK. Apart from BSI, the Group is 
made up of a various others business units, e. g. portfolio management, development. The 
Group agrees the overall strategy of the business and determines the HR policies for the 
business. At the time of research the total number of employees in BS 1 stood at around 
1,400. The organization operates in six regions. Pay and bonuses are performance-related 
and there is no trade union recognized in BS 1. Only in the BS 1 Other Services unit, 
which forms part of BS 1, two trade unions were recognized for a small number of 
employees that had come as a result of a joint venture launched with another organization 
and an outsourcing contract. However, in September 2005 BS 1 decided to dispose of its 
50% in the joint venture and in 2006 the outsourcing contract for the provision of 
management properties services was also terminated. While management was not aware 
of the specific number of union members in the organization they perceived that the level 
of union membership was generally very low. 
In terms of employee relations, the management style was generally characterized by 
both management and ERs as based on a `co-operative spirit that supports commitment 
and involvement of employees in the organization. 'A culture of non-hierarchy, visibility 
and communication has been promoted by management at all levels. BSI's programme 
of internal communication include the company's intranet, regular presentations to 
employees on business activities and business planning, notice boards, management and 
staff away days, weekly email news updates, six-weekly publication of the BS1 
Group's 
e-magazine and a monthly environmental letter. The organization carries out also annual 
employee opinion surveys, the results of which are communicated to all employees. 
Two 
further management initiatives include the so-called `Ideas into Action' and 
`Values into 
Action' schemes. Management reported that in contrast to the significant range of 
internal communication and employee engagement schemes at 
BS 1, at Group level there 
was traditionally more information and less employee engagement. 
When the latter 
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bought BSI, the Group adopted from BSI a significant number of practices around 
employee involvement. 
Business services case study 2 (BS2) 
Founded in the 1960s, the organization employed female computer programmers working 
from home. Its core activity was designing and building applications software. Between 
1976 and 1987 the company grew organically. It floated on the London Stock Exchange 
in 1996 and renamed itself as BS2 in May 2001. A couple of IT consulting acquisitions in 
2000 and 2001 allowed the organization to branch out from its applications developments 
roots. Today, its principal activities are the provision of computer software, consulting 
and related support services. The main sectors of the BS2 clients' activity are: banking 
and insurance, retail, telecoms, utilities and the public sector. BS2's registered office is in 
the UK and it operates in the UK and Asia Pacific, with three process and technology 
centres across India. At the time of the research the company employed 6,850 people, 
4,018 in the UK and 2,815 in India. In total there are approximately 101 sites with a large 
number of employees working at customers' premises. In July 2007, the organization was 
acquired by a French IT services organization. 
Historically, BS2 attempted to build employee participation and retention through share 
plans, including the so-called `all employee share ownership plan' and the `save as you 
earn scheme'. In the view of the Managing Director (MD), the wealth-creation basis of 
the relationship between management and employees created a feeling of employee 
commitment and ownership. The expansion of the organization to outsourcing activities 
and the development of a partnership strategy with clients helped in bringing lengthy 
contracts with customers but also a large number of employees, representing around two 
thirds of the whole workforce, that were transferred as a result of the application of 
TUPE. Owing to these developments, the culture of the organization also evolved. In 
effect, a different engagement model that resembled no longer the kind of family 
relationship' as promoted at the early days of the organization, but, in the view of the 
ERs, towards a shareholder culture, where employees were not considered anymore the 
`heart of BS2 ' was developed in the recent years. 
The application of TUPE meant also the bringing over in the organization of trade 
unions. At the time of the research, five trade unions operated at BS2. No exact figures 
were provided with regard to the level of union membership but ERs reported that trade 
unions represented around 40% of the total UK workforce. Before law acted as a catalyst 
to the introduction of the unions in the organization, BS2 was intentionally a non-union 
organization. There was no management expertise on dealing with trade unions. 
Management has since concentrated on redefining the relationship with the unions 
towards co-operation. Twice a year business review updates are held between the unions 
and management. The organization also invested in an Employee Relations Manager and 
has a structured forum for discussion with the unions. The unions have formed a Joint 
Unions Committee but management has refused to recognize it as legitimate for the 
purposes of negotiation. Where a trade union is recognized pay and rewards are set by 
collective bargaining while in non-union sites these issues are determined at company 
level by management based on both individual and company performance. 
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Despite working towards a more positive relationship with the unions, senior 
management questioned the value of trade unions in organizational contexts, such as 
BS2, where the majority of the workforce consists of highly educated and experienced 
individuals. Within this milieu, the need for the unions to adapt to the new organizational 
context was emphasized and the business environment was mentioned by the MD and the 
union officers as a significant factor determining the relationship of the organization with 
employees and unions as well. Another issue that seemed to hinder the development of a 
positive climate between management, trade unions and employees was the increased use 
of outsourcing and offshoring services to lower-wage countries, specifically India, and 
the resulting destabilization of the sense of security and sense of belonging of employees. 
The situation was further complicated because of the nature of the organizations where 
the new employees came from, mostly large public but also private organizations, which 
functioned in a different to that of BS2 way, and the difficult IT market context during 
the late 1990s and early 2000. The general management approach was described by some 
ERs as one of `command and control', where the distinction between the roles of 
management and employees are clearly defined and constantly re-affirmed. 
However, a range of direct forms of employee involvement have been in operation for a 
number of years. Monthly communication processes and the development of an Internal 
Communication Shared Service Centre are provided as additional means to exchange 
information and support between management and employees. Bi-annual, confidential 
employee opinion surveys take also place, the results of which are fed back to employees 
and action plans are put in place to address concerns raised. Career management 
communications address specific issues that managers need to be aware of on a monthly 
basis and a `Top talent forum' has established which meets every six months and 
concentrates on some of the key organizational issues. 
Business services case study 3 (BS3) 
BS3 is a fully-owned European subsidiary of the BS3 Group that is head-quartered in 
Japan. It is a leading IT services company that operates through a wide range of 
relationships with customers, from full outsourcing through managed services, 
professional services and projects. BS3 employs around 18,000 people in over 20 
countries, including about 12,000 in the UK. Headquartered in London, it has various 
additional sites located around the UK. While the organization is wholly owned by the 
Japanese group, the Group HR Director explained that the HR strategy is not determined 
by the headquarters in Japan: 
`The culture of our organization is typically British and our managers are not used to 
having to consult with employees. ' 
Owing to increased outsourcing activity and acquisitions, large groups of employees with 
existing collective agreements were brought in BS3. As a result, while the organization 
does not have any national agreements with unions, at the time of the research there were 
around 15 different recognition agreements covering a small number of employees. Two 
unions enjoy the largest number of members; these are recognized for collective 
bargaining in certain work-sites. The biggest union is unique in that it is the only 
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recognition agreement for certain categories of employees in the Manchester site and 
goes back for almost 30 years, when BS3 was part of another manufacturing 
organization. Management suggested that around 1,000 employees across the UK are 
covered by collective agreements. 
The relationship with the biggest union has been particularly adversarial, especially 
during the last four years. In effect, the union is viewed by management as having 
evolved within a manufacturing, engineering type organizational culture that no longer 
corresponds to the nature of the organization, i. e. a modern IT services organization, 
which employs professional people. On the union side, representatives have claimed that 
the organization tries to derecognize the union in the Manchester site and has responded 
with the organization of strikes. Management and the union have also been involved on a 
dispute over pay transparency in the recent years. In contrast, the relationship with the 
next largest union present in the organization was described by management as `less 
confrontational. ' The latter was attributed by union representatives to the business 
environment where BS3 operates and the union is present, e. g. public sector, and, 
secondly, to the fact that union membership is dispersed in small pockets in the 
organization and as such management perceives this union less of a threat. The 
importance of the business context in framing the relationship with the unions was also 
emphasized by management. In their view, the employee relations strategy concerning 
unions in the organization is built on the perceived need for clarity that the organization 
is happy to work with different unions instead of having an exclusive relationship with 
one union as this would not help BS3 to win outsourcing contracts. 
The situation with employees in the IT sector was described by ERs as lacking awareness 
of the collective representation of their interests through a union. Employees, according 
to ERs, do not see an alternative in the individualization of the employee relations culture 
and as a result, only a minority of employees, around 2%, are union members. The 
employee chair of the forum noted that although management policy was sometimes 
supportive of employees, it was not always implemented by managers at lower levels. A 
number of `business driven' employee engagement initiatives have been in operation. 
These include: regular local team meetings that are held at least every six weeks, intranet 
for employees, employee opinion surveys, regular road shows conducted by senior 
managers to meet employees, quarterly business update meetings for managers, magazine 
for employees and twice-yearly video messages. In addition to those, local or regional 
consultation forums are in operation. The local forums are comprised of business 
managers and employees in these areas. Their purpose it to provide space for discussion 
regarding changes taking place in particular business areas within the UK or areas of 
interest developing. Apart from those `business driven' employee engagement initiatives, 
a EWC was established in 1995. The organizational rationale behind this initiative was 
the need to consult with representatives of each country at company-level and feed then 
the results of the exercises at national level through the local works councils or forums 
operating in each of the countries. The EWC, which meets on a quarterly basis and 
comprises 22 ERs, concentrates on issues spanning several countries, such as the 
organizational direction, major re-organizations, and financial issues. 
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Appendix C. Checklist for ICE agreements 
1. The Comaanv 
1.1. Company name 
1.2. Home country 
1.3 Principal sector of activity 
1.3.1 Secondary sector of activity 
1.4 Is any information provided on workforce size? Yes 
No 
1.4.1. If yes, what is the number of employees and how is 
it divided into different, if any, sites? 
2. The agreement 
2.1. Year and month of agreement 
2.2 Employee-side signatories (or ratification) Check field (more than 
one may be checked) 
Trade union organization (s) 11 
Works council-type body Q 
"Employee representatives 0 
Other (specify) El 
2.3 Method of approval Check field (only one 
may be checked) 
Majority of employees voting in a ballot Q 
Majority of the workforce expressed through signatures Q 
Agreement of employee representatives, representing a 
majority o the workforce 
Q 
2.4 Number of agreements Check field (only one 
may be checked) 
Single Q 
More than one (specify) Q 
2.4.1 If there are more than one agreements, do the 
separate agreements cover 
Check field (only one 
may be checked) 
Geographically separated businesses Q 
Different occupational groups 0 
Other (specify) El 
2.5 Legal status of the agreement 
2.6. Does the agreement provide for a core principle of 
cooperation between management and employees? 
Yes 
No 
2.7 Does the agreement provide for a corporate alignment 
rind le? 
Yes 
No 
3_ Nature and Name 
3.1. Nature of body Check field (only one 
may be checked) 
Joint mana ement/em lo ee structure 0 
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Employee-side only structure Q 
3.2 Is the ICE agreement set up as a 
A pre-existing agreement not intended to pre-empt the ICE 
Regulations 
Q 
A pre-existing agreement set-up in order to pre-empt the 
ICE Regulations 
Q 
A negotiated agreement 11 
An agreement based on the standard provisions 11 
Other (specify) Q 
3.3 What is the name of the ICE body 
Consultative committee Q 
Consultative Forum Q 
Employee Council Q 
Other (specify 
3.4. Business structure covered Check field (only one 
maybe checked 
Group-wide only Q 
Divisional only Q 
Groups plus divisional Q 
3.5 Are all employees covered? Yes 
No 
3.5.1 Are there any employees excluded from the 
coverage of the agreement? 
3.5.2 If yes, which are the employees not covered by 
the agreement? 
Part-time employees Q 
Fixed-term employees Q 
Those employed on contracts of employment of indefinite 
duration 
Q 
Agency workers Q 
Contract workers Q 
Others (specify) Q 
A D, - 1o Z. 1\VAV 
4.1 Stated role of body Check field (more than 
one may be checked) 
Information and consultation LI 
Formal consultation on some issues 
Giving opinions/comments 
Making recommendations 0 
Negotiating oint texts Li 
Setting up sub-committees LI 
Other s eci LI 
4.2 Is there a definition of information in the agreement? 
Yes 
No 
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4.2.1 I es, how is it defined? 
4.3 Is there a definition of consultation in the agreement? Yes 
No 
4.2.2 I es, how is it defined? 
4.4 Issues dealt by the ICE body Check field (more than 
one may be checked) 
Structure Q 
Business, production, sales Q 
Economic and financial situation Q 
Employment/social issues Q 
Investment Q 
Organization 11 
New working methods/production rocesses/technolo Q 
Transfers of production, mergers, cutbacks, closures and 
collective redundancies 
Q 
Training 
Health and sae Q 
Environment Q 
Equal opportunities 
Working hours/conditions Q 
Trade union rights Q 
R&D Q 
Competition 11 
Industrial Q 
Legallpolitical developments 11 
Involvement in joint ventures/projects Q 
Other (specify) Q 
4.5 Is the ICE forum specifically excluded from 
considering any issues? 
Yes 
No 
4.5.1 If yes, what are these issues? Check field (more than 
one ma be checked) 
Issues already dealt with by national/local 
consultation/bargain in 
Q 
Collective redundancies Q 
Business transfers Q 
Occupational pensions 11 
Health and sae issues Q 
Pay/remuneration Q 
Industrial disputes 11 
Personal matters Q 
Political matters Q 
Others (specify) Q 
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5. Composition 
5.1 Is it possible to calculate the number of employee 
representatives? 
Yes 
No 
5.1.1 How many representatives are in total? 
5.2 Is the basis for the distribution of seats specified? Yes 
No 
5.2.1 If Yes, how are the seats distributed? 
Flat-rate 
Check field (only one 
maybe checked) 
Q 
Workforce-size related Yes 
No 
Other (specify) Q 
5.2.2 If Yes (to 5.2), is there a divisional/sectoral 
dimension to distribution? 
Yes 
No 
5.2.3 If Yes (to 5.2), is there an occupational dimension to 
distribution? 
Yes 
No 
5.2.4 If Yes (to 5.2) is a distinction drawn between 
different types of operation (e. g. production sites and 
others)? 
Yes 
No 
5.3 Is there a workforce-size threshold for ICE 
representation? 
Yes 
No 
5.3.1 If Yes, does this apply Check field (only one 
may be checked) 
To all subsidiaries/national operations 
To some subsidiaries/national operations 
5.3.2 If Yes, what is the threshold? 
5.4 How are representatives selected? Check field (only one 
ma be checked 
Nomination by trade unions Q 
Appointment by management 11 
Direct elections Q 
Other (specify) Q 
5.4.1. If trade union nomination is checked, is this 
method used 
Check field (only one 
may be checked) 
As the primary or only method or the selection Q 
As the subsidiary method or selection Q 
Other (specify) El 
5.4.2 If appointment by management is checked, is this 
method used 
Check field (only one 
ma be checked) 
As the primary or only method or the selection Q 
As the subsidiary method or selection Q 
Other (specify) Q 
5.4.3 If direct elections is checked, is this method used Check field (only one 
may be checked 
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As the primary or only method or the selection Q 
As the subsidiary method or selection Q 
Other (specify) Q 
5.4.4 If direct elections is checked, who organizes the 
elections 
Check field (only one 
may be checked) 
The company itsel f 
An independent body 
Some combination of the previous two El 
Other (specify) El 
5.4.5 Is there a period of office of representatives defined 
in the agreement? 
Yes 
No 
5.4.5.1 If yes, what is the period of office of 
representatives? 
5.4.5.2 Is it defined in the agreement when a 
representative will cease to hold office? 
Yes 
No 
5.4.5.3 If yes, which are the reasons Check field (more than 
one may be checked) 
Ceases to be an employee Q 
Resigns as an employee representative El 
Is absent from work for more than a specified period 
owing to sickness of injury 
Q 
Fails to attend.... consecutive meetings of the body Q 
Breaches the confidentiality provisions 11 
Other (specify) El 
5.4.6 Are there any criteria specified for eligibility as a 
candidate? 
Yes 
No 
5.4.6.1 If Yes, which are these criteria? Check field (more than 
one ma be checked) 
Length o service Q 
Disciplinary record Q 
Other (specify) El 
5.5 Are there any employee-side members of the forum, 
other than lay representatives? 
Yes 
No 
5.5.1 If Yes, are they Check field (more than 
one may be checked) 
National trade union officials 
Unspecified trade union officials 
(Any trade union officials) El 
Others (specify) Q 
5.6 Can any non-members attend the forum's meetings, by 
right? 
Yes 
No 
5.6.1 If Yes, are they Check field (more than 
one may be checked) 
National trade union officials 
Unspeci aed trade union officials Q 
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(Any trade union officials) Q 
Observers Q 
Experts Q 
Guests Q 
Others (specify) Q 
5.7 Can any non-members attend the forum's meetings, by 
invitation? 
Yes 
No 
5.7.1 If Yes, are they Check field (more than 
one may be checked 
National trade union officials 
Unspecified trade union o icials Q 
(Any trade union officials) 
Observers 
Experts 
Q 
Q 
Q 
Guests Q 
Others (specify) Q 
6. Organization 
6.1 Who chairs the forum's meetings Check field (only one 
may be checked) 
Management representative 11 
Employee Representative 0 
Joint/rotating chairs Q 
Not specified Q 
6.1.1 If management chairs, can the employee side elect 
an employee official? 
Yes 
No 
6.2 Is it specified how the agenda for EWC meetings is 
set? 
Yes 
No 
6.2.1 If Yes, is the agenda set Check field (only one 
ma be checked 
Solely by management 11 
Solely by the employee side Q 
By some joint process 0 
6.3 Is it specified how the minutes or report of the forum's 
meetings are drawn up? 
Yes 
No 
6.3.1 If Yes, are the minutes or report drawn up Check field (only one 
ma be checked) 
Solely by management 
Solely by the employee side Q 
By some joint process 
6.4 Are there any provisions for the feedback of 
information arising from the forum's meetings within the 
group, beyond the members of the forum? 
Yes 
No 
6.4.1. If Yes, what form does it take Check field (more than 
one may be checked 
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Distribution of the minutes to managers LI 
Distribution of the minutes to employee/union 
representatives 
LI 
Distribution of the minutes to workforce as a whole 
directly or indirectly-e. g. to all sites) 
Q 
Distribution of a joint communiquilreport to managers 11 
Distribution of a joint communique/report to 
em lo ee/union representatives 
Q 
Distribution of a joint communique/report to workforce as 
a whole (directly or indirectly-e. g. to all sites) 
Q 
Employee representatives to report back to employees Q 
Joint report back to employees Q 
Joint report back to employee representative bodies Q 
Information dissemination to workforce 0 
Other (specify) Q 
7. Meetings 
7.1 How many ordinary forum meetings are held a year? 
7.2 Is there a facility for extraordinary meetings? Yes 
No 
7.2.1 If Yes, are meetings called by: Check 
one ma 
field (more than 
be checked) 
Management 0 
Employee side Q 
A joint rocess Q 
7.2.2 If Yes, does the meeting involve: Check 
one ma 
field (more than 
be checked) 
The ull orum Q 
Some other restricted group Q 
Other (specify) Q 
7.3 Is there a facility for employee representatives to hold 
preparatory meetings without management? 
Yes 
No 
Is there a facility for employee representatives to hold 
follow-up meetings without management? 
Yes 
No 
c Fnnili+iae 
8.1 Does the employee-side have access to external 
experts, or similar 
Yes 
No 
8.1.1 If Yes, is the access to Check field (only one 
maybe checked) 
One expert F] 
Two or more experts F] 
Unclear/uns eci ied El 
8.1.2 If Yes, may these experts attend: Check field (more than 
one may be checked 
Full forum's meetin s 
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Preparatory meetings 0 
8.1.3 If yes, is management agreement required for 
attendance at 
Full forum's meetings 11 
Preparatory meetings 0 
8.2 Are the operating expenses of the forum borne by 
management 
Yes 
No 
8.3 Does the agreement provide for management to 
provide/fund the following 
Check field (more than 
one may be checked) 
Paid time off for employee representatives to attend 
meetings 
Q 
Paid time off for some or all employee representatives to 
carry out their duties (other than attending meetings) 
Q 
Accommodation and travel or orum 's members Q 
Cost o re arator meetings 11 
Costs of one expert Q 
Costs of more than one expert Q 
Trainingfor employee representatives 11 
A separate budget or the forum 0 
Secretarial/technical assistance or the forum Q 
Access to workplaces Q 
Other (specify) Q 
8.3.1 If training checked, does this relate to: Check field (more than 
one may be checked) 
Financial/economic matters Q 
Company-specific matters Q 
Social matters/legislation Q 
Other (specify) Q 
9_ ('nnfirlentiality 
9.1 Does the agreement contain a clause relating to 
confidentiality? 
Yes 
No 
9.1.1 If yes, which provisions does the clause contain Check field (more than 
one may be checked) 
Obligation on members to treat as confidential 
information identified as such 
Q 
General obligation of discretion or members Q 
Joint process for establishin con identiali Q 
Confidentiality obligations continue to apply after expiry 
of mandate 
Q 
Sanctions for breach of confidentiality identfflied 11 
Management may withhold potentially detrimental 
information 
Q 
Experts specifically covered Q 
Confdentiali a lies to minutes/re orts etc Q 
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Other (specify) Q 
10. Protection 
10.1 Does the agreement make any provision on 
protection for employee representatives? 
Yes 
No 
10.1.1 If Yes, what provision? 
Same protection as in law/practice 
No advantage/disadvantage through membership 
Other (specify) Q 
11. Resolvint disputes 
11.1 Is there any procedure for resolving disputes defined 
in the agreement? 
Yes 
No 
11.2 If yes, what kind of recourse is stipulated? Check field (only one 
may be checked) 
Internal procedure only 11 
Internal procedure followed by an external one on a 
second level 
Q 
External-independent third ar only Q 
Other (please specify) Q 
12. Amenaing the agreement ana termination of ine agreement 
12.1 Is there any provision stipulated regarding the Yes 
amendment and termination of the agreement? No 
1I_ T. paal -tams of the aureement 
13.1 Is the legal status of the agreement clarified? Yes 
No 
13.1.1 If yes, is the agreement legally enforceable? Yes 
No 
13.1.2 If yes, is the whole text of the agreement legally Yes 
enforceable? No 
13.1.2.1. If no, which clauses are enforceable? Check field (more than 
one may be checked) 
Confidentiality clause LI 
Other (specify) LI 
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